35 bomber/OBL calls: Gaudin testimony, JI, Report, 129–, Wright, 276–.
36 “I did”/Odeh/“my leader”: Bergen, Holy War Inc., 53, 113, Reeve, 201. The four men convicted for their roles in the Kenya and Tanzania bombings were Mohamed al-’Owhali, Mohamed Odeh—the two terrorists referred to in the text—Khalfan Mohamed, and bin Laden’s former secretary Wadih al-Hage. They were convicted in May 2001. A fifth man, Ahmed Ghailani, who had been charged on a total of 285 counts, was in 2010 acquitted of multiple murder and attempted murder charges. Though found guilty only of conspiracy to damage U.S. property, he was handed a life sentence (4 men: AP, 11/24/08; Ghailani: BBC, 1/25/2011).
37 “excited and happy”: bin Ladens & Sasson, 237;
38 “juice”: int. of Abdulrahman Khadr, Frontline: “Son of al Qaeda,” www.pbs.org, “Al Qaeda Family: The Black Sheep,” 3/3/04, www.cbc.ca;
39 “Only God”/“real men”/“Our job”: int. of OBL for ABC News, 12/23/98 available at http://pws.prserv.net, Time, 1/11/99;
40 “the greatest”: int. of OBL for Al Jazeera, 12/98, http://wasarch.ucr.edu;
41 “respond”: MFR 04021459, 1/29/04;
42 opportunity/attack: Tenet, 115–, Miller & Stone, 210–, Clinton, 803–, Burke, 52;
43 Security tight: MFR 04021469, 12/19/03, Richard Clarke, 187;
44 told Pakistan/Ralston: Clinton, 799, Richard Clarke, 186–;
45 “Our target”: text of President Clinton’s address, CBS News, 8/20/98.
46 circumlocution: CR, 113–, 126–, 484n101, Executive Order 12333, United States Intelligence Activities, 12/4/81. National Security Adviser Sandy Berger, who had succeeded Lake, would tell the 9/11 Commission that the intention of the missile strikes had been “to be bouncing bin Laden into the rubble.” Under Secretary for Political Affairs Thomas Pickering told commission staff the primary objective had been “to kill bin Laden and other senior leaders he was meeting with” (Berger: testimony of Sandy Berger, 3/34/04, CO; Pickering: MFR 04013744, 12/22/03, CF).
47 “intently focused”: Clinton, 798.
48 some fatalities: CR, 117, bin Ladens & Sasson, 240–, Bergen, Holy War Inc., 121–, int. of OBL for ABC News, 12/23/98. National Security Adviser Berger told the 9/11 Commission that “20–30 people in the camps” were killed. Interviewed in late 1998, bin Laden acknowledged that seven “brothers” were killed and “20-something Afghans.” In addition, according to Bruce Lawrence, editor of bin Laden’s public statements, seven Pakistanis also died (CR, 117, 482n46, int. of OBL by Rahimullah Yusufzai, 12/23/98, ABC News online, www.cryptome.org, ed. Lawrence, 83fn);
49 factory destroyed/intelligence shaky: Reeve, 202, Tenet, 117, CR, 118, Stephen Hayes, “The Connection,” 6/7/04, www.weeklystandard.com;
50 $750,000: Bamford, Pretext, 209;
51 $10,000: CR, 498n127;
52 propaganda victory/T-shirts: Hamel, 216, WP, 10/3/01;
53 “a highly”: bin Ladens & Sasson, 238.
54 “He had been”: MFR 03013620, 12/12/03, CR, 117. Bin Laden himself appeared to confirm as much a month later when he told Al Jazeera: “I was hundreds of kilometers away from there. As for the information that was supposed to have reached us, we found a sympathetic and generous people in Pakistan who exceeded all our expectations, and we received information from our beloved ones and helpers of jihad for the sake of God against the Americans.” Omar bin Laden’s recent account seems more worthy of credence than the story told by one of his father’s former bodyguards, Abu Jandal. According to Jandal, only a whimsical change of mind led bin Laden to change his plans and head for Kabul instead of the targeted camp (“I was hundreds”: ed. Lawrence, 7; whimsical: Nasser al-Bahri with Georges Malbrunot, Dans l’ombre de Ben Laden, Neuilly-sur-Seine, France: Michel Lafon, 2010, 149–, transcript, CNN Presents: In the Footsteps of bin Laden, 8/23/06).
55 “In 1996”: JI, Report, 217;
56 “conspiracy”: ibid., 129, Statement of Mary Jo White, 10/2/02, JI, Report;
57 200-page/$5 million: Indictment, U.S. v. Usama bin Laden et al., U.S. District Court for the Southern District of NY, 98 CR, 11/4/1998, WP, 11/5/98;
58 $25 million/double: Kenneth Katzman, “Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002,” Congressional Research Service, Washington, D.C., 2/13/02, BBC News, 7/13/07 “Tier 0”: JI, Report, 40;
59 “We are”: CR, 357, JI, Report, 124.
60 “lethal force”: CR, 131–, 485n123, Shenon, 357. Clinton, Berger, and others told the 9/11 Commission that the president’s intent was clear—he wanted bin Laden dead. According to Tenet, however: “Almost all the ‘authorities’ [presidential authorizations] provided to us with regard to bin Laden were predicated on the planning of a capture operation.” Other senior officials agreed with this interpretation. Attorney General Janet Reno, Tenet wrote later, “made it clear … that she would view an attempt simply to kill bin Laden as illegal” (intent: CR, 133; Tenet: Tenet, 111–, “Director’s Statement on the Release of the 9/11 IG Report Executive Summary,” 8/21/07, www.cia.gov; Reno: CR, 132–).
61 operations against: Executive Summary, “Report on CIA Accountability with Respect to the 9/11 Attacks,” 6/05, CR, 132–, 142;
62 “Policy makers”: Tenet, 123.
63 “two chances”: Scheuer, Marching Toward Hell, 61. The Scheuer reference relates to the period between May 1998 and May 1999. A 9/11 Commission staff report noted only three occasions in that time frame on which strikes were considered. In December 1998, when there was intelligence indicating that bin Laden was at a location near Kandahar, an operation was called off—according to Tenet—because of doubt as to whether the information was good and the risk of killing people in a nearby mosque. In February 1999, bin Laden was firmly believed to be at a location in the desert in Helmand province. U.S. officials vacillated, however, because members of the government of the United Arab Emirates were hunting nearby. The opportunity passed. Another strike was considered in May 1999, but scrubbed because some doubted the reliability of the source. In July that year, President Clinton authorized the CIA to work with Pakistani and Uzbek operatives to capture bin Laden. It is not clear what stage that project reached (Staff Statement 6, CO, CR, 130–, 485n116–488n194, & see Scheuer, Marching Toward Hell, 284n8, 285n15).
64 “Tenet consistently”: WP, 4/29/07.
65 “cared little”/“moral cowardice”: Scheuer, Marching Toward Hell, 48, 75, 82, 84, 85, 290. Scheuer was closely informed on everything to do with the pursuit of bin Laden until some point in 1999. Sometime after the aborted strike in February 1999 (see previous note), however, he was removed as head of Alec Station—after a clash with an FBI manager assigned to the unit. Much of Scheuer’s 2008 book comes over as a furious venting of his feelings (Wright, 291–, Shenon, 188, Scheuer, Marching Toward Hell, refs.).
66 “pathetically”: Clarke, 204;
67 “authorized”: int. of Bill Clinton by Fox News, 9/24/06;
68 “kill authority”: Shenon, 357–;
69 “attacks”: CR, 120;
70 “My father”: bin Ladens & Sasson, 239;
71 went to ground: ibid.;
72 stopped using phone: Mail on Sunday (U.K.), 12/23/01, Kessler, 84–, Corbin, 88, JI, Report, 69;
73 “wished to send”: Atwan, 55–.
74 “But things”: Gaudin testimony. The bomber arrested after running away was Mohamed al-’Owhali (see above). The accomplice he named was Abdullah Ahmed Abdullah (aka Saleh), who is still at large. FBI agent Stephen Gaudin, who questioned him in Nairobi, cited the passage quoted in federal court (Testimony of Stephen Gaudin, U.S. v. Usama Bin Laden et al., U.S. District Court for the Southern District of NY, S[7] 98-CR-1023, 1/8/01).
75 summoned/“could work”: KSM SUBST. KSM provided “inconsistent information” as to whether bin Laden approved the operation in late 1998 or in early 1999, according to CIA accounts of his various interrogation sessions (CR, 492n38);
76 Kenya/alias: JI, Report, 313.
&nbs
p; 77 decoy: Financial Times, 2/14/03. Another report, however, has it that—as of that same month—KSM was working as an “escort” for his longtime mentor Sheikh Abdul Sayyaf, leader of Ittehad-e-Islami, the Islamic Union Party (NY to Bangkok et al., FBI265A-NY-253802, 7/8/09, INTELWIRE, CR, 146–);
78 persuaded: CR, 149, 490n16.
79 “full support”/Atef: KSM SUBST, CR, 154. Al Qaeda suspects questioned in Jordan were to allege that Atef seized on the concept following the 1999 EgyptAir crash off the coast of Massachusetts, which was never satisfactorily explained. The NTSB found that the crash probably occurred “as a result of the relief first officer’s flight control inputs. The reason for the relief first officer’s actions was not determined.” The first officer’s exclamation was initially interpreted as “I place my fate in the hands of God,” and later revised to “I rely on God.” EgyptAir and Egypt’s Civil Aviation Authority advised that the statement was “very often used by the Egyptian layman in day to day activities to ask God’s assistance for the task at hand.” The officer uttered the exclamation nine times while alone, twice more after the captain returned to the cockpit. Two hundred and seventeen people died in the crash (Aircraft Accident Brief, EgyptAir 990, NTSB, 3/13/02, www.ntsb.gov).
80 influenced: WP, 9/11/02.
81 targeting/operatives: KSM SUBST, CR, 154. The plan was adjusted according to the number of suitable operatives available. It would turn out early on that only two of four men originally selected to be pilot hijackers were able to obtain U.S. visas. The two who had no visas, it was then hoped, would explode planes in midair over Asia at the same time their accomplices were hitting targets in the United States. Thinking it too difficult to synchronize the operation, bin Laden would later cancel the Asia part of the operation (KSM SUBST);
82 “military committee”: Fouda & Fielding, 158;
83 two years: KSM SUBST;
84 “planes operation”: CR, 154;
85 Omar disillusioned: bin Ladens & Sasson, 201, 212–, 218–, 248–;
86 “I have heard”: ibid., 254;
87 “gigantic”: ibid., 277.
88 Noonan/“History”: Forbes, 11/30/98.
CHAPTER 24
1 “The mighty”/curbed: bin Ladens & Sasson, 244, Bergen, OBL I Know, 321, 455n20;
2 candidates/two parts/too complicated: KSM SUBST;
3 Yemenis’ visas/in vain: Staff Report, “9/11 and Terrorist Travel,” CO, 13–. The Yemenis were Walid bin Attash—also known as Khallad—who had lost a leg on the Afghan battlefield, and Abu Bara al-Tai’zi, on whom there appears to be scant information. Bin Laden had known Attash in Saudi Arabia. He was to play a role at later points in the story (KSM SUBST, CR 155–) two Saudis/aged 24/23: National Drug Intelligence Center for the FBI, “265D-NY-280350, TWINBOM-PENTTBOM, Biographical Report,” 11/26/01, authors’ collection, Blair Oakley to Janice Kephart, 3/23/04, “Hijacker Primary Documents—AA77,” B50, T5, CF;
4 friends: Testimony of George Tenet, 6/18/02, JI, Bamford, Shadow Factory, 9;
5 well-to-do/married Yemeni/veterans: ibid., 9, Staff Statement 16, CO, Report, JI, 131, Wright, 309–. Mihdhar’s relations by marriage were the Hada family in Yemen’s capital, Sana’a—their connection to terrorism will be reported later. The future 9/11 conspirator to whom Mihdhar was linked by marriage was Ramzi Binalshibh, one of the Germany-based accomplices (marriage: Bamford, Shadow Factory, 7–, McDermott, 183 & see AP, 12/23/07; Binalshibh: WP, 9/11/02);
6 “Jihad Ali”/Inspired: KSM SUBST, Testimony of Stephen Gaudin, U.S. v. Usama Bin Laden et al.; Saudi visas easy: Staff Report, “9/11 and Terrorist Travel,” CO, 14–, 116–;
7 had sworn: JI, Report, 131–, Testimony of George Tenet, JI, 6/18/02;
8 “I swear”/“hijrah”: KSM SUBST. In its literal sense, the word hijrah or hegira refers to the Prophet’s move from Mecca to what is now Medina in A.D. 622—the first year of the Muslim era. It has thus come to be synonymous with migration. In the context used here it appears to denote a spiritual “migration” or transformation of the self (corr. Hans Kippenberg, 2010);
9 “the joys”/“My father”: bin Ladens & Sasson, 262–;
10 candidates in Gulf: KSM SUBST;
11 Italy: McDermott, 209, 299n65. The source cited on the reported KSM visit to Italy is a senior Italian investigator;
12 Germany: Leading U.S. news sources have cited “intelligence reports” indicating that KSM visited Hamburg in 1999. “We have indications from various sources,” Walter Wellinghausen, a senior official of the Hamburg Interior Ministry, told The New York Times, “that [KSM] was in Hamburg for a period, but we have not been able to definitively verify this” (Newsweek, 9/9/02, NYT, 11/4/02, WP, 9/11/02).
13 Atta: Texas Service Center, 911 Terrorist Review, “Hijacker Primary Documents—AA11,” B51, T5, CF, McDermott, 10;
14 friends: int. Mounir Motassadeq;
15 1992/architecture/Cairo: McDermott, 18–;
16 father divorced: Timeline Pertaining to Hijackers in Florida, “Timelines 9/11, 2 of 2,” B20, T7, CF;
17 “never stopped”: NYT, 10/10/01;
18 mother’s lap: Sunday Times (London), 1/6/02;
19 “child feelings”: Frontline: “Inside the Terror Network,” 1/17/02, www.pbs.org;
20 insect/“brainless”: Time, 9/30/01;
21 cardiologist/professor: McDermott, 14;
22 did all right/arranged meeting: ibid., 19.
23 flew to Germany: Atta had done a course in German at Cairo’s Goethe Institute. In Germany, he was at some stage sponsored by the Carl Duisberg Gesellschaft, which assists young professionals from many foreign countries (Goethe: Uwe Michaels statement to Bundeskriminalamt, Hamburg, 10/2/01, authors’ collection; Duisberg: Tagespiel [Germany], 10/16/01).
24 “exceedingly”: Uwe Michaels Statement to Bundeskriminalamt, Hamburg, 10/2/01, authors’ collection;
25 own meals/pots/video/risqué: Chicago Tribune, 3/7/03;
26 blouse: Sunday Times (London), 1/26/02, LAT, 1/27/02;
27 “that person”: int. of Michaels Jr. by Hannah Cleaver;
28 “words”: Chicago Tribune, 1/27/02;
29 clashes: McDermott, 25–;
30 “a dear human”: Newsweek, 10/1/01 applied self/trips: transcript, int. Dittmar Machule, 10/18/01, Four Corners: A Mission to Die For, 10/18/01, www.abc.net.au;
31 Omar arrive/phony/returned: MFR 04016498, 1/13/04, LAT, 9/1/02, CR, 161;
32 aspired: CR, 161, Fouda & Fielding, 74;
33 “in love”: McDermott, 48;
34 “very funny”: int. Mounir Motassadeq;
35 “disgusting”/read Qur’an: eds. Der Spiegel, 197;
36 newcomer/father muezzin: McDermott, 55;
37 prayer tape: Corbin, 134;
38 “regular guy”: CR, 162;
39 “happy”: int. Mounir Motassadeq;
40 jokes: Miller & Stone, 263;
41 “dreamy”: McDermott, 54;
42 military: CR, 162;
43 marine engineering: McDermott, 53–;
44 $4,000: Corbin, 136;
45 “explode”: Sun Sentinel (Fort Lauderdale), 9/23/01;
46 never spoke: McDermott, 54;
47 recite/imagined: ibid., 54, 87;
48 “What is”: ibid., 48;
49 Jarrah flew in/grew up: Corbin, 137, LAT, 10/23/01, CR, 163, “The Fifth Estate: The Story of Ziad Jarrah,” www.cbc.ca, 10/10/01;
50 civil servant/teacher: Fisk, The Great War, 1052, Aysel Sengün statement to Bundeskriminalamt, 9/15/01, authors’ collection;
51 great-uncle: Der Spiegel, 9/17/08, conv. Gunther Latsch, Fouda & Fielding, 85;
52 cousin: NYT, 2/19/09;
53 Sunni/Christian schools/skipped prayers: Aysel Sengün statement to Bundeskriminalamt, 9/15/01, authors’ collection, Fisk, The Great War, 1051–;
54 alcohol/“Once”: Corbin, 137, eds. Der Spiegel, 190;
55 nightclubs: The Independent (U.K.), 9/16/01, LAT, 10/23/01;
&
nbsp; 56 girls: eds. Der Spiegel, 246;
57 Sengün: Aysel Sengün statement to Bundeskriminalamt, 9/15/01, authors’ collection, Corbin, 137, McDermott, 51, 80;
58 got religion: McDermott, 51; CR, 163, Newsday, 8/15/07;
59 imam/“terrorist”: Tenet identified the imam as Abdulrahman al-Makhadi (Testimony of George Tenet, JI, 6/18/02, & see National Drug Intelligence Center for the FBI, “265D-NY-280350, TWINBOM-PENTTBOM, Biographical Report,” 11/26/01, authors’ collection);
60 “criticized”: Aysel Sengün statement to Bundeskriminalamt, 9/15/01, authors’ collection;
61 dentistry/switched: CR, 163;
62 “Someone explained”/pregnant: LAT, 1/27/03;
63 Shehhi moved/emulating: CR, 162–;
64 Atta/“leader”: transcript, int. Dittmar Machule;
65 talked angrily: MSNBC Investigates: The Making of the Death Pilots, MSNBC, 4/7/02 & see Chicago Tribune, 9/11/04.
66 “always”/“the war”: Four Corners: A Mission to Die For, 10/18/01, www.abc.net.au. The student was Ralph Bodenstein. One account of Bodenstein’s recollections states that Atta was angered by Israel’s treatment of Palestinians but that—as an Egyptian—he was “most vehement about matters in his own country.” He often raised the Palestine issue at religious classes he gave to younger Muslims. In his youth, Atta may have been influenced on the Palestine issue by his father. Australian reporter Liz Jackson has recalled that after 9/11, when she approached Atta Sr. for an interview, he “said he’d only talk if we paid US $25,000 to the Palestinian intifada. Without that, if we continued filming, he’d break the camera” (one account: Miller & Stone, 251; raised: Chicago Tribune, 9/11/04, McDermott, 36; Atta Sr.: Four Corners: A Mission to Die For, 10/18/01, www.abc.net.au).
67 Brotherhood abjures violence: see “History of the Muslim Brotherhood,” www.ikhanweb.com;
68 exceptions: Benjamin & Simon, 86;
69 recruiting grounds/engineering club: WP, 9/22/01;
70 men from Allepo: transcript, int. Dittmar Machule, McDermott, 29.
The Eleventh Day Page 64
