by John Boyko
The conference moved quickly to determine details of the structure of the proposed government and the division of powers between the central parliament and provincial governments. Progress slowed when talk turned to the Senate. It was finally decided that the best way to ensure that ultimate political authority lay with the House of Commons would be to establish an appointed Senate. As appointees, senators would be expected to provide only what Macdonald called “sober second thought” in their consideration of bills, while the elected members of the House exercised genuine power.
On October 20, the day after the long debate on the Senate had ended, news arrived of the raid on St. Albans, Vermont. For the next stressful week, Canadian leaders balanced communications with Monck relating to the capture of the raiders, and threats from General Dix and Seward, with efforts to keep the Quebec conference on track. Distracting as these events were, they clearly demonstrated that danger from the United States was more than just another debating point.
New Brunswick’s Leonard Tilley and Nova Scotia’s Charles Tupper led their delegations with aplomb. They and the two island delegations were secure in the knowledge that, while it had been agreed that Canada would get two votes on all conference matters since the proposed deal would divide them into Ontario and Quebec, the four Maritime delegations could still outvote them if they wished. The arithmetic ensured that Maritime matters would not be taken for granted. Support for the intercolonial railway was guaranteed, and less-industrialized New Brunswick negotiated a financial subsidy to be paid by the new federal government.
As discussions moved forward, however, Prince Edward Island and Newfoundland delegates found themselves first frustrated and then angered. Neither bordered the United States, and so neither shared the visceral fear of the Americans felt by the others. Both resented the small number of members of parliament that would be afforded by their tiny populations and saw no benefit in the intercolonial railway that so excited the delegates from Nova Scotia and New Brunswick. Nor were they moved by Brown’s talk of expanding to the west. They were drifting away, and even Macdonald’s charm could not hold them.
The conference ended on October 27. All thirty-three delegates, even those from Prince Edward Island and Newfoundland, voted to support the seventy-two resolutions and agreed to take them to their respective legislatures for ratification. But first there would be a tour for the Maritimers who had not seen the Canadian province with which they had just voted to partner. They began the next day in Montreal. Then, in Ottawa, they marvelled at the Parliament Buildings that would house the new government. The Gothic buildings, although still under construction, inspired awe with their size and grandeur, and with the magnificence of their commanding presence on a cliff overlooking the mile-wide Ottawa River.
Macdonald then withdrew to his home in Kingston, surrendering to exhaustion and the bottle. Brown stepped up and hosted the group in Toronto. At a grand luncheon at the city’s Music Hall, he delivered the keynote address, explaining to the large audience what the Confederation delegates had done and why they had done it. It was November 3, the day that Magistrate Charles-Joseph Coursol had the St. Alban’s raiders before him in court. Brown knew those gathered to hear him were nervous. The papers had been filled for weeks with stories of the raid and its consequences. Brown began by explaining constitutional principles that would render the government more efficient, and emphasized the economic advantages and the opportunity for western expansion that Confederation would offer. He concluded with what his anxious audience may well have believed to be his strongest argument: “The delegates have unanimously resolved that the United Provinces of British North American shall be placed at the earliest moment in a thorough state of defence.… I cannot doubt they [Americans] have plenty of work already on their hands—and I confess that notwithstanding the fierce ebullitions of the American press, I have faith in the good feelings of our neighbours … but any fight would show, in the hour of trial, that the spirit which was manifested in 1812 has not died in 1864.”43
DEFENDING AN INDEFENSIBLE LINE
Brown’s bold words were meant to soothe and inspire, but they rang hollow when measured against reality. Earlier in the year, the Colonial Office had asked British army engineer Lieutenant Colonel W.F.D. Jervois to tour Canada and the Maritimes and assess what would be needed to mount a viable defence should the Americans invade. Months later, the various irritants that had been stirring Canadian-American distrust and increasing the possibility of American aggression had led the Colonial Office to dispatch Jervois again to complete a new assessment. His second Report on the Defence of Canada was released just days after Brown’s luncheon speech, on November 9. Jervois’s new conclusions were jarring. Constructing and augmenting border fortifications, building a credible Great Lakes fleet, and training and properly arming a sufficient number of men would cost a staggering £1.75 million. Even if all that were accomplished quickly and properly, Jervois argued, an American invasion would lead to a surrender of the southwestern part of Canada West, with effective defensive positions possible only in St. Catharines and Toronto. Even those cities would likely have to be surrendered. With all the preparations done, and all that territory given up by retreating British soldiers and Canadian militia, Jervois still believed that victory against the United States would be possible, but only if the British navy attacked American coastal cities from bases in Halifax and Bermuda, and then negotiated to have Canada returned. 44
The Canadian cabinet soberly digested the report and responded with a proposal to appropriate $50,000 as the first installment of the $2 million needed to fortify Montreal, and an additional million dollars to train and arm more militia.45 The proposal was predicated on the condition that Britain would contribute even more money and troops, while backing a loan so that Canada could pay its share. Brown was dispatched to London to determine whether the British would support the new defence plans and appropriations as well as the Quebec Conference’s seventy-two resolutions.
Before setting sail, Brown learned that Abraham Lincoln had been re-elected to a second term as president. The outcome had by no means been certain. In fact, Lincoln had been so sure that he would lose that in August he had written a note insisting that each of his cabinet secretaries promise to commit themselves to saving the Union in the months between the November election and March inauguration of a new president. He folded the copies so that none could read them before signing.
In the Chicago convention that Jacob Thompson had tried but failed to sabotage, the Democrats had nominated disgraced Union general George McClellan. He was as weak a presidential candidate as he had been a general, and stood on the shaky Copperhead platform of peace through negotiation and the creation of two separate American states. The party’s platform had been primarily written by Clement Vallandigham—in his Canadian hotel room.
McClellan’s candidacy had been doomed when, on September 3, 1864, Union general William Tecumseh Sherman took Atlanta. Lincoln’s steely determination to preserve the Union through victory was vindicated. Voting day was on November 8 and by midnight the decision of the people was unmistakable. Lincoln defeated McClellan by more than a million votes; and 116,887 soldiers had voted for the president, while only 37,748 had voted for their former general. Lincoln was instantly stronger than he had been, with a Union victory more certain and the North more united. For Canadians, all of this meant more foreboding than ever before.
On November 16, Brown left New York harbour aboard the Persia. Coincidentally, among his travelling companions was Lt. Colonel Jervois. Immediately upon his arrival in London on December 3, Brown was taken to meet the new colonial secretary, Edward Cardwell.
Cardwell was the Oxford-educated son of a Liverpool businessman and had been a member of parliament since 1841. In cabinet posts in both the Aberdeen and Palmerston administrations, his intelligence won him great respect; his ambition and drive led him to seek positive change in every matter he tackled. Cardwell’s correspondence with Go
vernor General Monck revealed a man with a keen understanding of, and interest in, British North America. While Palmerston, Gladstone and cabinet colleagues had slightly shifted in their opinions of Canadian Confederation, Cardwell brought a sense of firm purpose and direction. He was unwilling to simply to wait for the Canadian colonies to come to a consensus on reorganizing themselves and their relationship with Britain. The war and the growing certainty of Northern victory had robbed Britain of the luxury of patience. Cardwell wanted Monck and the Maritime lieutenant-governors to actively push for change, and had penned a number of letters to that effect.46
In January 1864, there had been about 11,000 British troops in Canada and another 3,500 in the Maritimes. In July, Cardwell argued in cabinet that there were too few troops to mount a credible defence but enough to provoke an attack. Cardwell had read a report from British captain James Goodenough, who had been sent by the Duke of Newcastle to spy on American military preparations of the Great Lakes. Goodenough’s May 1864 report stated that the number of American ships and fortifications under construction, and the improvements being made to harbours and connecting roads, allowed no other conclusion: the Union was preparing for war in Canada.47 It was Cardwell who had sent Lt. Colonel Jervois to write a second report.
Monck had been keeping Cardwell up to date on the Confederation conferences and had sent a copy of the seventy-two resolutions that had been hammered out in Quebec.48 The day before Brown arrived in London, Cardwell had sent a message to Monck praising the resolutions and offering his full support for their implementation.49
It was in this light that the colonial secretary welcomed Brown with open arms. They discussed the resolutions and the issues related to them for several hours. Cardwell told Brown what he had assured Monck. He agreed fully that the economic and military dangers facing the British North American colonies were real and that reorganization according to the model of the Quebec resolutions was not only intelligent but essential. 50
Over the next few days, Brown met with Britain’s political elite, and all echoed Cardwell’s points. Chancellor of the Exchequer William Gladstone, Colonial Office Undersecretary Sir Frederick Rogers and Foreign Secretary Earl John Russell all offered support and sought Brown’s views on the defence question in light of the St. Albans raid and other mischief that Thompson had instigated.
Brown sent a report to Macdonald that summed up the effusive British reaction to the Confederation proposals and what he believed were the main reasons for it: “There is a manifest desire in almost every quarter that ere long, the British colonies should shift for themselves, and in some quarters evident regret that we did not declare at once for independence. I am very sorry to observe this, but it arises I hope, from the fear of invasion of Canada by the United States, and will soon pass away with the cause that excites it.”51
Brown was able to enjoy Christmas with Anne’s family. While he had followed news of the St. Albans raid and its international ramifications in the pages of the London Times, upon his arrival back in Toronto on January 13, he was surprised by the level of tension that greeted him.
FRUSTRATION, ELATION AND DESPAIR—JANUARY TO APRIL 1865
George Brown returned to Quebec City to chair cabinet preparations for the parliamentary session that was to begin on January 19, a month ahead of schedule. It had been hoped that the only important order of business would be the debate and vote to ratify the seventy-two Confederation resolutions agreed to in the fall. However, the American reaction to Jacob Thompson’s irritating Confederate incursions, made worse by Coursol’s release of the St. Albans raiders, had been swift and the consequences portentous. Confederation would have to wait.
Lincoln had approved new regulations regarding American troops pursuing criminals over the border as well as a new passport law to control access to the United States. Seward had announced the end of the Rush-Bagot Agreement, clearing the way for a remilitarization of the Great Lakes, and Congress had voted for the abrogation of the 1854 Reciprocity Treaty. The American media supported all these measures as fervently as it had expressed outrage in the previous three years at what was generally perceived as Canada’s pro-South proclivities and activities. A New York Times editorial praising the Reciprocity decision stated: “The first object of reciprocity was the cultivation of a strong and intimate friendship with Canada but the war had proved the futility of this.”52 Many papers pressed for stronger retributions toward Canada. The Chicago Tribune, for instance, urged General Dix to sweep over the border and “take Canada as a St. Bernard would throttle a poodle pup.”53
Attorney General Macdonald and Governor General Monck had discussed Coursol’s decision to release the St. Albans raiders and agreed that it had been an abomination. They had correctly predicted the swift and negative American reaction.54 Macdonald, as always, remained calm in the face of crisis: “We must perform our duty, however, irrespective of the smiles or frowns of any foreign body and will never be hurried into extra exertions by proclamations like those of General Dix, or prevented by any feeling of indignation from carrying our laws into full force.55
On December 20, days after Coursol had made his fateful decision, Macdonald had approved a two-hundred-dollar reward for information leading to the recapture of Young and his men. Young was arrested later that day. Others were picked up in Maine where they had, surprisingly, tried to disappear by enlisting in the Union army. More were arrested in Newfoundland, having found work on a whaling ship. They were all brought back to Montreal to await a second hearing.
Meanwhile, Macdonald ordered an investigation of Coursol and Montreal police chief, Guillaume Lamothe, who had helped return the stolen St. Alban’s money to the thieves. Coursol was found to have made a decision far above his pay scale. Lamothe, meanwhile, had been motivated by politics: he was a Reform Party supporter determined to embarrass the Conservative government. The Canadian government announced that it would pay fifty thousand dollars to the St. Albans banks to cover the better part of the money that Lamothe had returned to the raiders.
With these short-term responses complete, Monck and Macdonald moved to implement changes that would address longer-term issues. The Western Frontier Constabulary Force was created to mirror work already being done in Canada East under the leadership of William Ermatinger, former police officer and field inspector of the volunteer Active Militia. Led by Gilbert McMicken, the new force would coordinate border patrols and improve surveillance on Union and Confederate activities. Macdonald spoke admiringly of McMicken: “He is a shrewd, cool and determined man who won’t easily lose his head, and who will fearlessly perform his duty.”56 McMicken was a Conservative member of the legislature for Welland and mayor of the small border town of Clifton. McMicken had also worked with Confederate agent James Holcombe to gather Confederate soldiers in Canada and return them to the South, though there is no evidence that Macdonald knew about this.57
Macdonald drafted a new law granting the Canadian government the power it needed to better defend the border against American incursions and to arrest and deport Confederates attacking the North from Canada. Monck had communicated with Seward, Lyons and Cardwell about how the law should be structured.58 The Alien Act allowed for any foreign national even suspected of engaging in acts interpreted as hostile to a nation friendly to Canada to be fined up to three thousand dollars, have his property seized and be deported. It was overwhelmingly passed on February 6, 1865.
Canadian leaders were not the only ones worried about the ratcheting up of border tensions. In a report from London, American minister Adams reminded Seward that the British Parliament still contained many friends of the Confederacy and enemies of the North. He reported that Southern agents in Britain and Europe were taking full advantage of the propaganda gift the American actions of the past few weeks had handed them. He wrote to Seward on February 9: “The insurgent emissaries and their friends are busy fanning the notion that this is a prelude to war the moment our domestic difficulties are over.”59 He a
sked Seward to do all he could to defuse the situation.
Foreign Secretary Russell composed a remarkable letter addressed to European Confederate agents, including Mason and Slidell, with copies to Monck and Lincoln. The letter stated, in part, that the “so-called” Confederate States had been undertaking a number of violent acts, including raids onto American soil from Canada, with the intention of inciting an Anglo-American war. He cited recent actions taken by Canada to stop them and continued, “I trust you will feel yourself authorised to promise that such practices will cease, and shall be entirely abandoned for the future.”60 Lincoln was so pleased with the letter that he had General Grant send a copy under a white flag of truce to General Lee. Lee refused to accept the letter, however, and sent it back to Grant with his compliments.
Unknown to all those trying again to avoid a broader war was that two months earlier, on December 3, Jacob Thompson had sat down in his Toronto hotel room and composed a long and detailed report to Confederate Secretary of State Benjamin. He acknowledged his failures but tried to sound hopeful: “I have relaxed no effort to carry out the objects the Government had in sending me here. I had hoped at different times to have accomplished more, but I still do not think my mission has been altogether fruitless.”61 He admitted, “A large sum of money has been expended in fostering and furthering these operations and it now seems to have been too little profit. But in reviewing the past I do not see how it could have been avoided, nor has it been spent altogether in vain. The apprehensions of the enemy have caused him to bring back and keep from the field in front at least 60,000 to watch and browbeat the people at home.”62
