But Tshekedi noticed that local officials were perturbed to see the two men coming together. They ought to have been delighted, if the animosity between the two men had been the genuine reason for Seretse’s exile, as the Government had claimed. But as it had been merely a pretext, they regarded their reconciliation as a threat to the viability of the Government’s cover story. Tshekedi and Seretse understood this weakness in the Government’s case and started to talk together about the possibilities of a joint strategy to deal with the Government.10
Meanwhile, in the Bangwato Reserve, the boycott was growing from strength to strength: no one would serve on the Finance Committee, School Committee or Livestock Improvement Centre Committee. There were no ‘native’ taxes coming in, except from Bangwato miners in South Africa, whose tax was taken at source.11 Forbes MacKenzie called a meeting in the Kgotla in Serowe, but only one person turned up. This made his job impossible, he seethed, especially as there had been an outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease and he needed to regulate the movement of cattle. As a last resort, he drove through the village in his Land Rover, broadcasting instructions through a loud-hailer; but his instructions were politely ignored. When he sent word to Mahalapye that he was going to hold a meeting there, Manyaphiri sent a message that he was too ill even to read the District Commissioner’s telegram.12
MacKenzie decided it was time to force the Bangwato into cooperation. He sent an official to withdraw sales permit books from all the villages refusing to present their cattle for inspection. If he found the culprits, he said, he would deal with them – and if there wasn’t enough evidence for a prosecution, they would be made to report daily to his office.13 But when he started to make arrests, Seretse cabled a report on them to the Fighting Committee in London, who immediately passed this information on to the press. This led to questions in the House of Commons and MacKenzie was instructed to back down.14
While MacKenzie was failing so publicly to hold meetings with the Bangwato, Seretse’s lawyer Fraenkel was being invited by villages throughout the Reserve to come and talk to the headmen. This infuriated MacKenzie. He insisted that Fraenkel be accompanied by a Government representative and that full transcripts were made of everything that was said. Fraenkel went to five different assemblies. At each one, he reported on the opposition in the House of Commons to the exile of Seretse, quoting Winston Churchill’s judgement that it was ‘a very dishonourable transaction’. He explained that many of the press in the UK were on the side of the Bangwato and also told them about the Seretse Khama Fighting Committee.15
Wherever Fraenkel went, the headmen asked him to act as their legal adviser. ‘May God help you in our sorrow,’ said a man in Mahalapye – ‘We send you as our ears and spokesman.’ ‘Please plead with the Government as we have no power,’ asked Manyaphiri, in distress.16 At a meeting in Shoshong, Goareng Mosinyi recalled the sacrifices made by the soldiers from Bechuanaland who had joined up to help the Allies in the Second World War. ‘Next war,’ said Mr Mosinyi, ‘we shall not listen when the government asks us to fight, and then forgets us in times of peace. Our hearts are sore.’ ‘You can rest assured,’ promised Fraenkel, ‘that I and the barristers are trying hard to comply with your wishes.’17
Once Seretse had returned to Bechuanaland, the issue of his banishment had been put on hold in London. ‘We decided, in effect,’ wrote Gordon Walker in his diary, to let Seretse stay ‘on good behaviour’. There was a general feeling, he recorded, that Seretse had been treated badly: ‘The PM and [Herbert] Morrison stood firm: also McNeil. Lord Addison weakened on the question of return: but not on recognition. Bevan was hostile throughout and probably egged on the dissidents in the Party.’18 But the High Commissioner was determined to get Seretse out of Bechuanaland. So long as he was there, observed Clark to Baring, the Administration was ‘on a very sticky wicket’.19
In the second week of June, Gordon Walker brought the High Commissioner from Africa to London, for further discussions. Baring welcomed the visit, as an opportunity to build up pressure on the Government.20 As soon as he arrived, he attended a special meeting in the Commonwealth Secretary’s room at the House of Commons, which was also attended by Liesching and other senior officials. Baring drew the meeting’s attention to the problem of non-cooperation in the Bangwato Reserve and proposed the banishment of Serogola and Peto Sekgoma – an idea which was not taken up. Then Baring argued that people would start to turn to Tshekedi once Seretse had gone – and Seretse had to go. There was some talk of producing another White Paper; in that case, said Baring, examples should be included of the ‘threats’ to good government that had been made by Ruth.21
As far as the Bechuanaland Administration was concerned, Ruth had become an intolerable irritant. ‘If Seretse leaves and Ruth returns to the Bamangwato Reserve,’ Sillery believed, ‘she will be set up by Seretse’s supporters as titular head on [the] same basis as Mrs Moremi, widow of the Kgosi of the Batawana, and will be [the] focus of continued trouble.’ The Administration’s dislike of Ruth was bordering on hatred and Sillery argued that she was ‘by far the greater danger at present than is Seretse’.22 The High Commissioner’s Office warned that
Ruth has not learned Sechuana. S[eretse] has an obvious taste for Eur. habits. They are bound to seek the company of Eurs. or of Coloured persons. There will therefore undoubtedly be unfortunate incidents and these will receive a great deal of publicity. Moreover, every complaint made by every discontented African in the Bam. Res. will continue to find its way into the newspapers as long as pressmen wander about the Prot. waiting for [a] new development.23
There were two further risks, believed Baring, if Ruth were to stay in Bechuanaland. The first was that ‘if she became ill – and we know already that she is quite capable of feigning illness – it would be very difficult for humanitarian reasons to oppose visits by Seretse to her’. The other risk, which continued to bother him, was that ‘she would invite her sister to join her, whose intention it is to become engaged to another African’.24
At the end of June, Gordon Walker circulated the Cabinet with a memorandum, arguing that the time had come to remove Seretse from Bechuanaland and bring him and Ruth to the UK. The reason for this, he said, was the need to placate South Africa. He did not specify any particular reasons, but the memorandum would have been read by Cabinet members against the background of the surprise attack on South Korea by the North, starting just a few days before, on 25 June, and horrifying the West. The drive to obtain uranium from South Africa had now become more urgent, as had the neeed to protect defence agreements with the Dominions. ‘Commonwealth forces were prepared, if occasion offered,’ recorded Attlee in his memoir, ‘to resort to war. It became necessary, therefore, to strengthen the armed forces of the democracies.’25 It was not a good time to alienate South Africa.
Nevertheless, the memorandum was read with uneasiness. Norman Brook, the Cabinet Secretary, wrote to the Prime Minister about his concerns. For one thing, he objected, Ministers had already made it clear – on 8 March and then again on 16 March – that they were unhappy about the idea of Seretse’s exclusion. Secondly, the tenor of the memorandum suggested that there was no real prospect of Seretse ever being recognized as Chief – even though it had been clearly understood that the Government would keep an open mind and that the position would be reviewed at the end of five years. Furthermore, argued Brook, the Cabinet should consider ‘whether they are going to allow the possible reactions of South African opinion to influence their decision at all’.26 Hartley Shawcross, the Attorney General, was asked for his views. ‘I do not,’ he answered with distaste, ‘like the idea that an Order deporting a British subject from his home territory could be made on the ground that the Governor or High Commissioner does not like his moral character.’27
But when the British Cabinet met on 29 June 1950, it agreed to remove both Seretse and Ruth from the Protectorate in August.28
15
Into exile
Seretse and Ruth had be
en in Lobatse for just six weeks, when they were told by Gerald Nettelton that it was time for them to leave Bechuanaland. They were extremely upset: they had become hopeful about the possibility of being able to stay in Africa and had even bought a new car – a 1950 model fawn-coloured Ford Custom. If the High Commissioner wanted him to leave, argued Seretse, then he would have to order him to go. But Nettelton ignored their distress and got on with his job. He asked them to think about preparations for leaving and the young mother was appalled to learn that her tiny baby, just eleven weeks old, would have to be inoculated against yellow fever. This was a requirement for travelling through Egypt, which was on the route of the flying-boat to the UK. ‘Wife asked’, reported Nettelton, ‘whether Government could not issue what she termed a ‘phoney’ certificate, namely a false certificate since she asserted this had been done before.’ This was ‘obviously a try on’, he commented callously, ‘to see what Government would do’.1
The issue of certificates for Jacqueline had in fact been causing the Administration considerable worry earlier that week. When Seretse signed the notice of birth for his daughter, he described his occupation as ‘None (Exiled Chief)’ and listed Ruth’s occupation as ‘Exiled Chief’s Wife’.2 This had been annoying, which was bad enough. But then Protectorate officials noticed that Seretse had registered baby Jacqueline on a form under Proclamation Number 59 of 1939, which provided for the registration of births and deaths of persons other than natives. ‘Natives’, explained the form, were defined as ‘any aboriginal native belonging to any tribe of Africa and also any persons of mixed race living as members of any native community, tribe, kraal or location in the Territory’. But was the tiny baby a ‘native’ – or not? In Mafikeng, Ellenberger consulted an expert. He was told:
I think we must look to Section 1 of Proclamation 59/1939 for the definition of ‘Native’ in this matter.
The question is whether the child, admittedly of mixed race, is living with her mother as members of a native community, tribe or location. If the answer is ‘Yes’ then the child is a ‘native’ and cannot be registered under the Proclamation 59/1939. If ‘No’ then she can.
The problem was further complicated by the fact that Seretse had described himself on the form as a ‘Mongwato’ – a member of the Bangwato. ‘It seems quite clear,’ observed Ellenberger in dismay, ‘that registration cannot legally be effected.’3
Baring was horrified to hear of this dilemma, which was just the kind of detail that the press would blow up into a major news story. He instructed his office to sort out Jacqueline’s registration straightaway. The High Commission staff and their lawyers put their heads together and finally came up with a formula to solve the problem: ‘Child is of mixed race and is living with its European mother presumably after style of a European. It is not repeat not living as a member of a native community, etc.’4 Baring heaved a sigh of relief.
When Nettelton had brought his bad news to the Khamas, his last words to Seretse were that they should work on the basis of departure by flying-boat on 18 August.5 As it turned out, these were quite literally his last words to Seretse. For he was a very sick man, with high blood pressure and kidney trouble, and he died just days later.6 Baring now had to find another Resident Commissioner and in the meantime, Clark took over the implementation of the Government’s policy on Seretse. On 3 August, he flew to Lobatse and drove to the Khamas’ home, to deliver their exclusion orders. They had been expecting his visit and had been waiting with Fraenkel, but nonetheless they were shocked when the orders were produced. They withdrew to discuss matters and when they came back, said Clark, Ruth looked ‘a little upset’ and the atmosphere was polite but strained. He explained that they would be flown from Gaberones to Livingstone on 16 August, to catch the flying-boat two days later. Seretse said they would like to take with them his sister Naledi, who was nursing in Durban.7
‘Circumstances of interviews were trying,’ reported Clark. But, he added with a respect that he had not expected to feel, ‘their attitude most of the time was reasonable and correct’.8 This was the first time Clark had met Ruth and he was compelled, he wrote to Liesching, ‘to some admiration of Ruth… She has obviously been through a lot including loneliness, but she was neat in appearance and composed in manner. She displays a quick but limited intelligence and a ready wit. She undoubtedly has courage.’ Of Seretse, he wrote that he ‘undoubtedly feels very sore; his often lethargic manner cloaks deep feelings’.9
Discussions continued about Jacqueline’s inoculation, to which Ruth finally consented when Dr Moikangoa assured her of its safety. But she was anxious about the practical details of taking her little baby on the long journey by flying-boat. ‘Ruth made a pathetic last-minute request to my wife, who had been one of her two white women intimates,’ recalled Noel Monks later. ‘Baby Jacqueline was very young to fly – two months – and Ruth wasn’t allowed to go into Mafikeng, the nearest town, to shop. Did we have such a thing as a carry-cot?’ Mrs Monks was glad to help and handed over the carry-cot they had used for their own baby.10
Ruth’s ‘attitude’ was a source of searing irritation to MacKenzie, who had replaced Nettelton as the Acting Resident Commissioner of Bechuanaland. He ordered an intensification of the watch on Seretse’s house in Lobatse, as well as twenty-four-hour wireless communication between Lobatse, Serowe and Mafikeng. This would ensure an immediate warning of any attempt by Ruth to get back to Serowe – ‘where there could be a fine old scene with hordes of native women grappling with police if she refused to go. Such a scene would be better staged in Lobatse or Gaberones where it would perforce be on a smaller scale!’11 Three white women from the British South Africa Police were secretly brought from Southern Rhodesia into Gaberones, in case Ruth had to be forced against her will to leave the Protectorate. Baring felt he could cope with Seretse. But, he wrote to Sir Godfrey Huggins, ‘I would be most chary of having to carry out an arrest of Ruth with male police. You can imagine the row which this would create in the press!’ He arranged with Huggins to send
some of your very excellent police-women to stand by in case of need for a few days about mid August. If so, I would suggest that they might travel in plain clothes and take a few days holiday at the Protectorate’s expense in the hotel at Gaberones. Our Commissioner of Police could then mobilise them immediately in case of need. This arrangement will be kept strictly secret.12
Baring had heard about the reconciliation between Seretse and Tshekedi and was anxious to know more. In the second week of August, he arranged for MacKenzie to bring Tshekedi down to Pretoria, where he managed to obtain from him a general sense of his discussions with his nephew: that they had talked about renouncing any claim to the chieftainship and hoped to return to the Reserve as citizens. Baring was horrified. He warned Tshekedi that if Seretse were to return, South Africa would lose no time in pushing her claim for the High Commission Territories. He persuaded Tshekedi to put any plans on hold – to wait until Seretse and Ruth had left the Protectorate. They could resume talks, he pointed out, at a later date in London.13
Then Tshekedi left Pretoria and went to Lobatse, to the Khamas’ bungalow. As soon as he had greeted Ruth and the baby, he and Seretse left the house for discussions outdoors, in the hills outside the town. They wrote down some guidelines and principles upon which they might work together – that they would carry out the orders of the Government, but under protest. They would also consider the possibility of giving up any claim for themselves and their children to the kingship of the Bangwato – though, of course, this would have to be discussed fully at the Kgotla, since it was not in their power to make such a decision. As well, they would press the British Government to allow them to live in the Bangwato Reserve and serve their people in some capacity, and they advocated the formation of a Tribal Council. They agreed not to publish any of these views without further consultation with each other, and to meet in England as soon as possible, for a fuller discussion.14 They both signed this document, but it was not
in any way binding – it was simply, as they wrote at the top, an ‘Aide-Memoire’. For now, they would keep it secret.15
Then Tshekedi and Seretse asked the Administration for more time. They had every hope, they said, of reaching an agreement on a joint statement urging cooperation between the Bangwato and the Government. They also asked for transport facilities to bring representatives of the Bangwato to Gaberones, so that the joint statement could be delivered.16 Clark was greatly heartened to hear of this idea – for by now the campaign of non-cooperation had more or less paralysed the Reserve.17 He telephoned Baring, who agreed to grant twenty-four more hours to Seretse and Ruth; it would make scheduling tight, but there would still be enough time for the Khamas to make the flying-boat as planned.18 He also agreed to provide transport, and a fleet of trucks, cars and jeeps drove off to collect about 200 SubChiefs and headmen from places as far away as Francistown.19
But Seretse was keenly disappointed. ‘I expected postponement for life, not twenty-four hours,’ he remarked bitterly.20 Until the late hours of the evening, he and Ruth had been hoping for a last-minute reprieve. Now that Seretse and Tshekedi had settled most of their differences, the reasons for exile that had been given in the White Paper were redundant. ‘I have never really believed that we would have to go back to England,’ Ruth told a reporter that evening. ‘Notwithstanding what has been published in the British press, I do not want to leave Bechuanaland… my home is out here now, and I really belong to this territory.’21 But they had to go. Sullivan called on Ruth at nine in the evening, to give her a final set of travel details.22
Seretse and Tshekedi were working on their joint statement a few miles away from Lobatse, with Kgosi Bathoen. When it was ready and Clark had approved it, the three men said they wished to hold a meeting with some of the elders of the Bangwato in secret, to avoid the intrusions of the press. Clark readily agreed, especially as they offered to keep Government officers informed of their whereabouts and said they were welcome to attend. Clark was appreciative. ‘There was really no obligation on them to do this,’ he reported afterwards. ‘Had they wished, they could have gone ahead by themselves jointly or independently with results which might have been embarrassing or disastrous to us.’ They borrowed lamps, typewriter, paper and carbons, and disappeared. They were hard at work until nearly midnight, when Seretse and Tshekedi delivered signed copies of their joint statement to the Administration, for Monsarrat to issue to the press next morning.23
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