“The crux of the problem,” wrote Morgan, “is…likely to be our ability to drive off the German reserves rather than the initial breaking of the coastal crust.”19 In formulating this plan, Morgan had to factor in many constraints. The size and scope of the initial and follow-up landings were limited by the available number of landing craft and supply ships available. His instructions were to plan an opening assault with only three divisions.
In order to fulfill the Combined Chiefs of Staff's prime directive, France and the Low Countries (i.e., Holland, Belgium, and Luxemburg) had to be cleared of German forces before the final drive into the heart of the Third Reich. Logistics were at the heart of the OVERLORD operation. The capture of major ports such as Antwerp, Brest, Le Havre, and Marseille were vital for mounting a successful invasion and sustaining the subsequent deployment of large numbers of troops. During the actual OVERLORD campaign, forty-eight million tons of supplies had to be delivered in order to sustain US forces in Normandy. To do this, these ports had to be quickly seized, cleared of obstructions, and opened to shipping.
Morgan envisioned a large buildup of forces in order to begin the liberation of all of France. The coastal area of Normandy could not physically accommodate all of the necessary forces. By ninety days after the invasion, a larger lodgment area bounded by the Seine River on the north, and the Loire on the south, would be needed. This included the ports of Cherbourg and Brest. The other component in the liberation of France was Operation ANVIL that the Allied invasion mounted in southern France, which included the objectives of seizing the ports of Toulon and Marseille. ANVIL's drive northward up the Rhone River valley would link up with OVERLORD forces advancing eastward with the aim of destroying German forces or forcing their rapid retreat into Germany. (See Map 1A.)
COSSAC proposed three landing beaches between Le Havre on the Seine and the base of the Cotentin Peninsula. British forces would land on the left to be supplied by Le Havre, Dunkirk, and Antwerp. The Americans would land on the right with their supplies coming through Cherbourg, Brest, and, with the success of Operation ANVIL, Marseille.
Morgan recognized that the Cotentin Peninsula itself gave the German defenders ample opportunity to stop the Allied invasion cold. Beyond the beaches of Normandy were thick woods, hedgerows (the “bocage”), and undulating hills. This whole area, Morgan stated, was “on the whole unsuitable for the use of large armored forces” because of “the marshy river valleys…steep hills and narrow valleys.”20
That is why the COSSAC plan gave top priority to the rapid capture of Caen, Bayeux, and the road to St. Lo, on D-Day itself or shortly thereafter. Next the Americans would capture the port of Cherbourg, and the British would open the road to Falaise. This area north, northwest, and southeast of Caen was flat and open—ideal tank country. Here the Allies could deploy their numerous armored divisions to begin the liberation of France.21 (See Map 1B.)
Morgan realized that the three-division size of the initial invasion force in the COSSAC plan was far too small, but his directives forced him to base the plan on the available number of landing craft. However, when not faced with such constraints, his projections regarding the total number of Allied divisions needed to win France and go on to conquer Germany were far from cautious, as he called for fifteen British and eighty-five US divisions (one and a half million men). During the entire Second World War the US Army deployed a total of eighty-nine divisions. Back in early 1942 at the Arcadia Conference, Churchill estimated that this campaign would require twenty British and twenty American divisions. Marshall's original Operation ROUNDUP called for forty-eight divisions (thirty US and eighteen British).22
The British Chiefs of Staff were not very enthusiastic when they reviewed the COSSAC plan in early August. They even refused Morgan's request to forward the plan to the American chiefs of staff.23 The Combined Chiefs of Staff was soon meeting at Quebec (Quadrant Conference) to examine Morgan's plan.
Morgan outflanked his own chiefs by sending Major General Ray W. Barker, his American second-in-command, to brief Marshall and Roosevelt before the Quebec meeting. Subsequently at Quadrant (August 17–24, 1943), Morgan's basic OVERLORD plan was accepted by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.24
COSSAC was only a rough draft for OVERLORD. However it did settle an important issue. Morgan's staff had formalized Normandy as the target landing area. What appears self-evident today was far from certain in 1943.
Morgan's planning accomplishments also highlighted the bumpy road of the Allied partnership. It showed there were significant cultural and institutional differences in British and American approaches to planning grand strategy.
In the US military planning, the senior officers would outline the objectives and provide a tentative timetable. Their staff subordinates were then charged with developing the detailed planning needed to attain the objectives.
The British strongly objected to this approach. They preferred to secure complete agreement throughout the chain of command for every detail of an operation. This obviously was more time-consuming, but it produced a more carefully written, analytical plan.
The Americans thought that this was a waste of time and effort. US plans often produced astounding numbers and almost impossible deadlines in the British view. They usually greatly underestimated America's production capabilities.25
Though the American enthusiasm as beginners was often counterbalanced by the five years of British war experience, this fundamental planning and operational conflict was never resolved. As we will see, this would repeatedly jeopardize vital battlefield decisions throughout the Normandy campaign thus ultimately extending the war in Europe.
The target date for OVERLORD of May 1, 1944, was also approved at the Quebec Conference. However, Morgan's planning dilemmas were far from over. The basic COSSAC plan was little more than an outline of a planned operation. Time was running out. A detailed plan was a necessity. A supreme commander needed to be appointed for OVERLORD. Throughout the autumn of 1944 Morgan remained frustrated in his role as COSSAC's interim commander without decision-making authority.
After World War II ended, Morgan wrote to British historian Liddell Hart about these and many other issues he faced during COSSAC's lifespan. One of his most unsettling comments might help us better understand some of the Normandy campaign's command dilemmas. Morgan observed that as the size of the US commitment to OVERLORD grew in manpower, aircraft, ships, etc., so did the signs that the British were developing an inferiority complex. He thought that this situation was “frightening.”26
After OVERLORD's supreme commander was chosen, the COSSAC planners were absorbed into the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF). By January 1944 SHAEF had established itself at Norfolk House. It was headed by 489 officers, almost equally divided between the Americans and British, and included 614 staff members of lower rank, two-thirds of whom were British. Morgan was appointed as SHAEF deputy chief of staff for the war's duration. But who would be named as SHAEF's supreme commander?27
“His extraordinary generosity of spirit to his difficult subordinates proved his greatness as Supreme Commander.”
—Max Hastings commenting on Dwight D. Eisenhower1
At the Tehran Conference, less than a year before the actual Normandy invasion, Stalin asked Roosevelt and Churchill the critical invasion question: who will command Overlord? Incredibly, both responded no one would.
They tried to sidestep the issue. But Churchill reported that the Soviet leader became insistent: “Stalin declared it essential that a man should be appointed at once to be responsible, not only for the planning, but also for the execution.”2
Actually a supreme commander shell game had been underway for quite some time. The two top candidates were the Anglo-American chiefs of staff—Alan Brooke and George C. Marshall.
ALAN FRANCIS BROOKE
The seventh and youngest child of Sir Victor Brooke, a baronet from Ulster, Northern Ireland, Alan Brooke was born in 1883. Since his mother preferred wa
rmer climes, he was raised in Pau, in the south of France, until he was sixteen. He was privately educated and spoke fluent French and German before learning English. Brooke also was a proficient hunter, fisherman, and horseman.
Fig. 3.1. Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke. (© Imperial War Museums [TR 151])
Brooke entered the Royal Military Academy in Woolwich at the age of eighteen. Upon his graduation in 1902, he was commissioned as a second lieutenant in the Royal Regiment of Artillery with which he served in France during World War I. Most of his service was as a staff officer. At the Battle of the Somme he introduced the French “creeping barrage,” a system designed to reduce casualties by covering an infantry advance with machine-gun fire. Brooke earned a reputation as an outstanding operational planner and by the end of the war was promoted to lieutenant colonel and was awarded the Distinguished Service Order.
After the war most of his service was as a staff officer. He attended the Staff College at Camberley and in 1929 was appointed commandant of the School of Artillery. That same year, he remarried. (His first wife had been killed in an automobile accident in 1925.) This second marriage has been credited with being a calming influence on his ego-driven personality.
Brooke was an instructor at the Imperial Defence College from 1931 to 1933 where Bertram Ramsay was his naval colleague. A close friendship developed between them. After commanding a mobile division that prefigured later armored divisions, Brooke was promoted to lieutenant general and in 1939 became commander in chief of Britain's antiaircraft command. As a result, he worked closely with Air Marshal Hugh Dowding, then commanding Fighter Command, in preparing for potential German Luftwaffe attacks.
In August 1939 Brooke became commander in chief of the Southern Command. At the outbreak of World War II, he was placed in command of II Corps in the British Expeditionary Force. In a decisive battle (May 28, 1940) on the road to Dunkirk, his troops held the German forces back long enough to allow over 300,000 British and French troops to be evacuated to England. After Dunkirk he again was sent to France, where upon his recommendation three additional combat divisions and other army units (140,000 men) were evacuated to Britain.
In July 1940, Brooke became commander in chief of the Home Forces, overseeing plans to defeat any potential German invasion of England after the fall of France. Due to his record as a superb field commander, Churchill appointed him chief of the imperial general staff in December 1941. Noted for his clarity of mind and unflinching realism, he became the master strategist of Britain's military effort. However, he could be highly critical and short-tempered if anyone disagreed with his decisions.
In March 1942, Churchill gave Brooke the additional post of chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, thus making him his chief military advisor. As chief of staff he played a critical role throughout the war in effectively quelling Churchill's frequent—often last-minute—meddling in military decisions. In one episode after Brooke voiced his strong oppositions to one of the prime minister's pet projects, an outraged Churchill told his personal chief of staff, General Sir Hastings Ismay, that Brooke hated him and had to go. Ismay, who intervened to soothe Churchill's stressed ego, reported this to Brooke. Brooke replied, “I don't hate him, I love him, but when the day comes that I tell him he is right when I believe him to be wrong, it will be time for him to get rid of me.”3
Under his chairmanship the chiefs of staff became a most efficient military machine shaping global strategy. Many military experts believe Alan Brooke was the most capable British general of World War II. General Douglas MacArthur wrote that Alan Brooke “is undoubtedly the greatest soldier that England has produced since Wellington.”4
Through most of 1943, it had been assumed that OVERLORD's supreme commander would be British. It would provide a balance to Eisenhower's appointment in 1942 as TORCH's commander in the Mediterranean theater. Also Britain would be the launching point for OVERLORD. At least in its beginning phase, British and Commonwealth forces were to dominate on the ground. Churchill repeatedly assured Brooke that he had the cross-channel invasion command, and on June 15, he offered Brooke this appointment.
Then sometime during 1943, Churchill began to alter his perspectives on this issue. He appears to have realized that as OVERLORD advanced, the preponderance of troops would be American. Shortly before the Quebec Conference in August 1943, Churchill visited Roosevelt at this home in Hyde Park, New York. Historian Carlo D'Este suggests that Churchill proposed agreeing to an American as supreme commander for OVERLORD if he could appoint Lord Louis Mountbatten, his longtime protégé, as the new supreme commander in Southeast Asia.5
As a result of this meeting, after the end of the Quebec Conference Churchill broke the news to Brooke (August 15) that he would not be named the Allied supreme commander, claiming that Roosevelt and his chief adviser, Harry Hopkins, had strong-armed him into accepting an American to command OVERLORD. Brooke was acquiescent but crushed. Churchill presented it “as if it were one of minor importance!” Brooke later wrote, “It took me several months to recover from [it].”6
At that time both Churchill and Roosevelt had agreed on George C. Marshall's appointment to the supreme command of OVERLORD. Brooke clearly resented their choice, since he believed that Marshall lacked his in-depth command experience in the field and was an amateur in strategic planning.7
GEORGE C. MARSHALL
Initially, President Roosevelt desired to reward George C. Marshall with OVERLORD's supreme command. At the time of Pearl Harbor Marshall was in a strong leadership position. Though he had never commanded a division during America's participation in World War I (1917–1918), he had been chief of operations for the First Infantry Division. As such he worked under his mentor, General John J. Pershing, commander of the American Expeditionary Forces. Marshall had been a key planner of American operations, including the Meuse-Argonne Offensive. After the war he was Pershing's aide-de-camp for five years before his appointment as assistant commandant of the US Army Infantry School at Fort Benning, Georgia. He was appointed as the army chief of staff on the same day (September 1, 1939) that Adolf Hitler began World War II by invading Poland.
Fig. 3.2. General George C. Marshall. (Wikimedia Creative Commons, source: Dutch National Archives; licensed under CC BY-SA 3.0 NL)
The US Army and US Air Force in the summer of 1939 had a combined strength of less than 200,000 men. That grew to over eight million by 1945. As the new chief of staff, Marshall was pivotal in ensuring that this gigantic force was well armed, equipped, and trained. He carefully selected able commanders whom he had often mentored at Fort Benning during the preceding decades. As Time stated, he “had armed the Republic.”8
Marshall was often criticized for being aloof and overly rigid. But he exercised his leadership with discipline and tact. Churchill, who often crossed swords with him during the OVERLORD operation, called him “the noblest Roman of them all.” At the war's end in 1945, Churchill also astutely titled him the “Architect of Victory.”9
At the time of the Quebec Conference everyone in the British-American command circles assumed that Roosevelt would name Marshall as OVERLORD's commander in chief. Roosevelt thought that the general had earned his spurs as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and a member of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. In Roosevelt's estimation he merited this great opportunity to be remembered as “the Pershing of the Second World War.” The US secretary of war Henry Stimson supported this general consensus when he wrote to Roosevelt, “General Marshall already has a towering eminence of reputation as a tried soldier and as a broad-minded and skillful administrator.”10 Even though no one had officially offered Marshall the appointment, he began to close his stateside home anticipating a move to England.
Back in Africa, Eisenhower (or “Ike”) also heard after the Quebec Conference that he would trade commands with Marshall. He would chair the Joint Chiefs of Staff while Marshall would command OVERLORD. Ike had always thought that Marshall would lead the cross-channel attack, but he loathed the id
ea of again being stuck behind a desk in the Pentagon.11
Sometime between Quebec and the conferences held in Cairo and Tehran (November 22– December 1, 1943), the president began to hesitate. How good a substitute was Eisenhower for Marshall? Could anyone really replace him? Who could continue running the entire Pacific-European war while Marshall ran OVERLORD? How could Eisenhower as chief of staff become Marshall's theoretical superior? Could Eisenhower handle the personalities and issues already mastered by Marshall, including General MacArthur, Admiral King, Congress, the Pacific War, and all of the ramifications surrounding appropriations, war production, and the draft?
Members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff also objected, saying Marshall was essential in Washington. Some even suggested that the OVERLORD command was a demotion from chief of staff. Others were perhaps jealous of the supreme command appointment. However most of his contemporaries considered Marshall as the essential commanding personality whose direct and honest approach could successfully manage a politically influenced president. His role in this respect was similar to that of General Alan Brooke, who was adept at reining in his mercurial, often overly interfering prime minister.12
While Roosevelt vacillated over the supreme command appointment, on October 1, 1943, Eisenhower was told personally by Frank Knox, secretary of the navy, that Marshall had officially been named to command OVERLORD. Roosevelt's personal advisor, Harry Hopkins, also gave Ike the same news and said that he was to become the chief of staff. With these assurances, Eisenhower sent Major General Walter Bedell Smith, who was his own chief of staff in North Africa, to brief Marshall in Washington.13
Divided on D-Day Page 4
