Ramsay's career thus far had been propelled by a strong work ethic and high personal standards. He faulted himself in trying to apply these perfectionistic traits to the other officers around him. Ramsay wrote in his diary, “My faults are that I can't sit still and see things done in an antiquated and un-progressive way.”96
Ramsay by temperament expected the highest standards from his officers and crew. Though sometimes one officer recalled that “he carried the aura of vinegar.” But overall he was considered fair and polite. In a crisis Ramsay exuded confidence and calm. He always knew the name of his staff and more than amply recognized their hard work. Both senior and junior officers grew to respect and trust him. A junior officer commented, “He was a good man and a very good boss…. What was superb was the lead he gave to his staff, and his tolerance and kindness. I never met anyone like him.”97
Ramsay exemplified a younger generation of highly professional British naval officers. Naval historian Correlli Barnett believed that he “combined austere personal integrity, high professionalism, and a personal warmth which won the enthusiastic loyalty of his subordinates.”98
In 1935 then rear admiral Ramsay was made chief of staff under Home Fleet admiral Sir Roger Backhouse. Backhouse was one of the old school, do-it-all-yourself admirals who disdained the modern staff system and insisted on exercising a tight personal command down to the minutia of dealing with all incoming fleet signals and business. As he was not being allowed to do his job, Ramsay rebelled against this giant step backward and asked to be relieved of his position after only four months on the job. Their parting was amicable with Backhouse feeling no ill will toward him. However, this cast a shadow on Ramsay's career moving him to the retired list for the next four years.99
When Backhouse unexpectedly became first sea lord during the 1938 Munich crisis, he appointed Ramsay vice admiral in charge at Dover, even though he was still on the retired list. Some have speculated that Backhouse was motivated by remorse over his previous role in short-circuiting Ramsay's highly professional career record.100
The Dover Command was the most ancient in all the Royal Navy. Ramsay's headquarters were located in galleries and chambers deep down in the chalk behind the famous white cliffs of Dover. The principal gallery had a window in the cliff face with a vista of the harbor and English Channel. A large chamber called the Dynamo Room served as the headquarters’ nerve center.
World War II Commands
Germany's successful attack in May 1940 on France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxemburg trapped the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) and their French allies at the port Dunkirk. On May 26, Ramsay was ordered by the Admiralty to implement an emergency evacuation of these troops (Operation DYNAMO). Ramsay mobilized 933 small craft and naval vessels into a massive amphibious operation that afterward would be called the “miracle of Dunkirk.”
Ramsay had initially estimated that only forty-five thousand of the BEF could be evacuated. However, when the destroyer Shikari, the last ship evacuating soldiers, sailed from Dunkirk shortly before 4:00 a.m. on June 4, an astounding 338,226 troops had been rescued. Ramsay and his staff's organizational feat of turning this motley fleet into a coherent operation on such short notice was truly an outstanding achievement. Dunkirk was a masterpiece of damage control and interservice cooperation. Ramsay had proven himself to be the right man in the right place at the right time. His services were recognized when he was knighted on June 7.101
In April 1942 Ramsay was appointed naval commander in chief for the invasion of northwestern Europe (Operation ROUNDUP). As we have seen that operation was postponed in favor of Operation TORCH, the invasion of North Africa, for which Ramsay was the chief amphibious naval planner. Ramsay afterward led the British Task Force (July 1943) for the invasion of Sicily (Operation HUSKY).
As the expert who had masterminded all of these amphibious operations, Ramsay was the obvious choice in October 1943 for appointment as the commander of the Allied Naval Expeditionary Force for Operation OVERLORD. As Allen Packwood has commented, “He eschewed normal career advancement to specialize in logistics but these are exactly the skills needed when we get to the Second World War…. So by the time we get to June 1944, he is the go-to man for complex naval operations; although nothing he had done was anything as complex as D-Day itself.”102
THE MELTING POT OF COMMAND
Both political necessity and the personal assessments and biases of Roosevelt, Churchill, Marshall, and Brooke largely determined the makeup of the OVERLORD command structure. This chapter has explored the backgrounds and the personality traits of the major OVERLORD commanders and the relationships and rivalries that preceded their appointments to this campaign. Previously we have also shown that the British and Americans had very different perspectives on when the invasion of northwestern Europe should be launched and who should be the supreme commander. Subsequent chapters will show that all this lack of a shared vision only grew throughout the Normandy campaign and served to seriously lengthen the war in Europe.
“The greatest amphibious operation of all time.”
—Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay
MUDDLED COMMAND
When Eisenhower arrived in London in mid-January 1944 his position as “supreme commander” remained nebulous at best. Though the British had agreed to an American having the top command position, they could take comfort in knowing that they had operational control of all Allied air, land, and sea forces. (See chart 1.)
This had been the modus operandi that evolved in the Mediterranean theater when British forces predominated. During both Operation TORCH and Operation HUSKY Eisenhower was essentially a figurehead political commander.
But Operation OVERLORD was a world apart. Though his boss Marshall told Eisenhower he must get along with his allies, he was determined this time to retain control. He was the man who had to make OVERLORD work. If the cross-channel invasion failed, it would rest squarely on his shoulders.
This real possibility of a German victory created an atmosphere of intense Allied cooperation. It did not however prevent individuals grasping for power.
In the proposed OVERLORD command, General Montgomery was to serve in two positions: commander of all Allied land forces and commander of the British Twenty-First Army Group. The British provided the majority of naval shipping and enjoyed approximate parity in ground forces until early July.
In July 1944 additional US divisions would begin tipping the balance of forces. At that time Eisenhower was to assume the position of Allied general forces commander, with General Bradley taking command of the new Twelfth US Army Group made up of the First and Third armies. Montgomery was to retain the command of the British Twenty-First Army Group. However, that command arrangement did not suit Montgomery.
On January 20, the day before the first full-blown OVERLORD conference, Montgomery made a demand for his own separate headquarters as ground commander in chief, distinct from his Twenty-First Army Group staff. Walter Bedell Smith as SHAEF chief of staff torpedoed Monty's request. He adamantly took the stand that no additional command structure could exist between Eisenhower and his commanders. Instead he forcefully made the case for Eisenhower to assume direct control of the two army groups when they began forming for Normandy.
As we will see, that handoff was delayed from July to September 1944 largely for political reasons. Even then, Eisenhower did not insist on implementing his own Allied ground force operational plans until March 1945.1
This confusion over final authority continued to dominate critical decisions during the OVERLORD operation. In hindsight Smith bitterly concluded, “We would have saved a lot of trouble if we had started off with Montgomery and Bradley as equals.”2
CHANGING THE PLAN
Eisenhower read the preliminary OVERLORD plan in Algiers (October 1943). He questioned the strength of the initial assault as “too weak in number and frontage.”3 He wanted to increase the assault force from three to five divisions with two more in reserve. This would br
oaden the invasion front and enlarge the size of the initial bridgehead.
At a meeting in Algiers on December 27, 1943, Eisenhower, Montgomery, and Smith met to review the OVERLORD plans. They all agreed with Eisenhower's initial analysis on the need to strengthen the invasion forces. On December 31, Montgomery visited Churchill at Marrakech. Monty wrote in his diary, “He then said he was very anxious to have my first impressions of OVERLORD, which I had never seen.” This is where Montgomery had his first real glimpse of the existing plans. Later in his memoirs Montgomery incredibly omits his earlier meeting with Eisenhower and claims all the credit for himself on the overhaul of the OVERLORD operational plans.4
At the Algiers meeting, Eisenhower asked Montgomery to act as the temporary Allied ground forces commander during the first stage of the invasion. This seemed to confirm Montgomery's perception that Eisenhower lacked confidence as a field commander. As planning rolled forward during the next seventeen weeks, Montgomery made substantial contributions to OVERLORD. This led him to leap to the assumption that he alone commanded OVERLORD.5
During this planning phase Montgomery and all the other commanders had a great advantage stemming from the three very large-scale amphibious invasions launched between July 1943 and January 1944 (Operations HUSKY-Sicily, AVALANCHE-Salerno, and SHINGLE-Anzio). They better prepared the Allies for the biggest assault of all time—Normandy. None of those landings had been perfect, but they provided the Allies with an excellent rehearsal for OVERLORD.6
COSSAC bequeathed to SHAEF two important legacies: a clearly outlined plan and a functioning planning staff. In many ways the OVERLORD operation was a complex logistical plan. Logistical experts teamed with the operational planners because logistical constraints, both in manpower and supplies, dominated operational planning calculations. Even with this emphasis, logistics became the Achilles’ heel of the OVERLORD campaign.7
NEPTUNE
The first phase of OVERLORD that included the amphibious assault and the establishment of a secure bridgehead was code-named Operation NEPTUNE. Although still on the retired list, in October 1943 Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay, the hero of the Dunkirk evacuation, entered Norfolk House, headquarters of COSSAC, to take up the post of Allied Naval Commander (Normandy) Expeditionary Force (ANCXF).
Ramsay had served as second-in-command to Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham in TORCH, and then was British supreme naval commander for HUSKY. Thus, he had established an unrivalled track record for organizing large-scale joint and combined amphibious landings. No one got on better with the Yanks in general and Eisenhower in particular than Ramsay. Within the OVERLORD command he faced the greatest challenge of his career that would test to the utmost his resourcefulness and organizational abilities.
Fig. 4.1. General Dwight D. Eisenhower and Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay at Southwick House. (© Imperial War Museums [H 39152])
Ramsay had to transport the world's largest invasion fleet across the English Channel and successfully land it on D-Day. He then had to keep it well supplied by sea, as it advanced inland. NEPTUNE had no precedent in terms of scale, risk, and strategic importance. This operation was the Allies’ first and possibly only chance of reestablishing a western front, defeating the German army, and advancing into the Third Reich. The outcome of the war in Europe was largely staked on NEPTUNE.8
The success of the Normandy gamble depended on Ramsay's ability to evaluate and synthesize the information gathered by the General Staff Intelligence section of British General Headquarters. In 1943 it was renamed the Theatre Intelligence Section with the responsibility of providing Ramsay with the information he needed for planning a cross-channel invasion.9
On March 2 Ramsay issued the naval plan for NEPTUNE.
The object of Operation NEPTUNE is to carry out an operation from the United Kingdom to secure a lodgement on the Continent from which further operations can be developed. This lodgement area must contain sufficient port facilities to maintain a force of 26 to 30 divisions and enable this force to be augmented by follow-up formations at the rate of three to five divisions in a month.10
Ramsay emphatically warned that adequate logistical planning was the vital lynchpin for ensuring the Normandy campaign's ultimate success.
It is important that the military plan for the subsequent land campaign should be worked out first…. There is a danger that…an assault plan…will not give effect to the military requirements for the land battle…. In general it is the responsibility of the Navy to land the Army as they require, but as the plan develops Naval considerations will arise which must be discussed and agreed upon.11
Ramsay at this time was joined by other SHAEF logistical planning experts in issuing the same warning to all the Allied commanders. They emphasized that once the Allies had broken out of the Normandy bridgehead, no major advance into Germany was logistically possible with the opening of the Port of Antwerp to Allied shipping. Unfortunately as the OVERLORD operation progressed, Ramsay's repeated warnings regarding this key port fell on deaf ears. Ramsay's logistical task was to build what he metaphorically termed a two-way bridge to France. This “bridge” must carry inbound and outbound traffic at a steady speed, each “vehicle” (ship) carrying a similar load made a delivery every fourth day. The aim was to make traffic control as simple as possible.12
Between March and June 1944, Ramsay and his staff prepared detailed operational orders to carry out the final OVERLORD plan. This formidable package offered encyclopedic coverage for all of the ships in the D-Day and subsequent operations.
The naval element of NEPTUNE was divided into four phases:
In the “prestowed phase” from D-Day to D+8, mechanized transport ships, small coastal vessels, barges, and landing craft were to move preloaded cargo and troops to the beaches as quickly as possible.
During the “buildup phase” from D+9 to D+21 the same mix of vessels would pick up additional loads.
The “maintenance movement period” from D+22 to D+41 would employ commodity-loaded deep draft vessels to augment the buildup.
A final “change-over period” from D+42 onward would use primarily deep draft vessels directly from the United States whenever possible.13
Some officers thought this NEPTUNE preplanning was too detailed. Ramsay understood that in the US Navy the command orders were largely limited to the definition of tasks and issuance of directives. He believed, however, that a complex operation of this magnitude, using combined US and British ships attacking on a narrow front, required much more detailed ship choreography.
On June 6, 1944, Ramsay's detailed operational orders were executed as planned. “They stand to this day,” says naval historian Correlli Barnett, “as a never surpassed masterpiece of planning and staff work.”14
On April 26, 1944, Ramsay moved with his staff to a new headquarters at Southwick House. Placed on a ridge seven miles from Portsmouth, Eisenhower's formal command post and Montgomery's tactical headquarters already had been erected amid a maze of truck caravans and huts scattered throughout Southwick Park. Henceforth Southwick became OVERLORD's nerve center. On that same day Ramsay was restored to the Active List of the Royal Navy.15
One of Ramsay's first actions was the addition of Vice Admiral Sir Philip Vian as his deputy commander. However, the expansion of the cross-channel operation from three divisions to five, which meant the need for five landing beaches, necessitated the creation of two naval task forces to cover them. Vian was appointed commander of the Eastern (British) Task Force rather than second-in-command of the whole invasion fleet.
Vian had a reputation as a “fighting admiral.” This new command seemed ideal. But the new diversity of shipping made him uneasy, as he was faced with administering a task force of cruisers, destroyers, minesweepers, and a strange conglomeration of hundreds of specialty landing craft and landing ships (i.e., larger ships that could land troops, supplies, and equipment right on the beach) including the following:16
LCVPs—Landing Craft Vehicle and Personnel (Higgin
s boats)
LCMs—Landing Craft Mediums
LSTs—Landing Ship Tanks
LSIs—Landing Ship Infantry
LCUs—Landing Craft Utility
LCTs—Landing Craft Tanks
LCI (L)—Landing Craft Infantry Large
Ramsay had to help Vian overcome a sense of “being a little helpless,”17 in organizing this disjoined assemblage of shipping.
Ramsay appointed Rear Admiral Alan G. Kirk to command the Western (American) Task Force. He had known Kirk as the American naval attaché to Britain. Unfortunately Kirk disliked the British and particularly Ramsay. Kirk, a product of US Navy culture, bristled at the command and control structure of the Royal Navy. Kirk constantly overstepped his bounds by challenging all the minute planning that came down from Norfolk House. But his superior, Admiral Harold R. Stark, commander of US Naval Forces Europe, gave Ramsay the full support he needed. Stark played a key role in the naval buildup for NEPTUNE. He was exactly the team player the Normandy invasion needed.18
Despite these varying tensions with his two task force commanders, Ramsay maintained a fully integrated naval command following his overall NEPTUNE plan. Each of his admirals was in charge of all the ships within their task force areas.
The case for an extensive naval bombardment in Normandy had been strengthened by previous Allied amphibious invasion experiences in the Mediterranean and the Pacific. Admiral Cunningham, now the British first sea lord, recognized that three phases of bombardment were necessary: First, German coastal defenses and mobile batteries had to be silenced. Second, immediately before the actual landings, saturation bombing was required until it became too dangerous for Allied troops. Third, the armies needed fire support to help expand the beachhead using air spotting or land-based fire control units in communication with the battleships and cruisers.19
To accomplish these bombardment assignments, Ramsay wanted to augment his naval forces by one battleship, seven cruisers, and fourteen destroyers. This would enlarge the final NEPTUNE fleet to six battleships, twenty-five cruisers, and fifty-six destroyers. Ramsay saw this as “a huge force but not great in respect for the issues at stake.”20
Divided on D-Day Page 8
