At the start of GOODWOOD's July 18 attack, Montgomery wrote to Brooke, “Operation this morning a complete success.”73 Later that evening he sent Eisenhower a message that virtually claimed he had broken through the German line: “Am very well satisfied with today's fighting on eastern flank…three armored divisions now operating in the open country to the south and S.E. of CAEN.”74 This was not true.
On the next day, July 19, Montgomery issued an incredibly optimistic bulletin to the press corps stating that the British and Canadians had broken through the German positions. That day the London Times headline blared, “Second Army Breaks Through,” and the next day's headline was “Wide Corridor through German Front.”75
Actually none of this was true. By July 20 the British tanks were stuck in the mud from a rainstorm, and the German line was once again intact. The panzers even launched several counterattacks. Later Monty tried to do damage control when the actual battlefield results became public.76
Montgomery might have been forgiven if he had clearly stated all along that his intentions were only to hold the German panzers to Caen. But if his true objective had been a major breakout, as his PR campaign before the battle repeatedly claimed, then GOODWOOD was a failure and Monty was only trying to save face. In the end the press thought so, as did the RAF, Eisenhower, Churchill, Bradley, Marshall, Tedder, and the SHAEF staff.
Eisenhower was incensed over GOODWOOD's results. Captain Harry C. Butcher, Eisenhower's aide, wrote in his diary, “Ike said yesterday that with 7,000 tons of bombs dropped in the most elaborate bombing of enemy front line positions ever accomplished, only seven miles were gained—can we afford a thousand tons of bombs per mile?”77
The SHAEF staff had felt misled even before the operation began and by Montgomery's press briefing on its progress. Bill Williams, Monty's senior intelligence officer, called his press statements “bloody stupid.”78
Confidence in Montgomery and the British Second Army now reached an all-time low. The deputy supreme commander, Air Chief Marshal Tedder, led a campaign to ax Monty. He complained that Montgomery was either failing as a leader or deliberately deceiving his superiors about his intentions and expectations. Tedder wrote Montgomery on July 20, “It is clear that there was no intention of making this operation the decisive one which you so clearly indicated [it would be].”79 An enraged Tedder seriously thought of sacking Montgomery himself if Eisenhower demurred.80 He virtually begged Ike to take over the ground war, telling him, “All the evidence available to me indicated a serious lack of fighting leadership in the higher direction of the British Armies in Normandy.”81
Tedder had stirred the controversy up to such a level that the British War Cabinet was alarmed enough to dispatch its own liaison officer to Montgomery's headquarters to obtain a report on GOODWOOD. Montgomery refused to see this emissary whom he viewed as an intruder. He had earlier requested Eisenhower to keep all visitors away since GOODWOOD “will require all our attention.”82
Aware of Tedder's efforts, Brooke flew to Monty's headquarters on July 19 and ordered him to cancel his no-visitor policy and to write a letter to Churchill inviting him to visit at any time. Both Churchill and Eisenhower were insisting on a personal meeting with him to vent their ire over GOODWOOD. Brooke believed Montgomery would awe them both with his mastery of the battlefield.83
Ultimately Brooke was proven correct. When Eisenhower and Montgomery met on July 20, Montgomery somehow managed to dampen Ike's outrage and sidestep the issues he raised. The next day Monty received a follow-up letter from Ike:
Since returning from your Headquarters yesterday, I have been going over the major considerations that, in my mind, must guide our future actions…. There are also serious political questions involved…. You stated [on July 10]…“We are now so strong…that we can attack the Germans hard and continuously…” [Eisenhower could have asked, so why are you not doing this?] Time is vital…. I was extremely hopeful and optimistic [over the beginning of GOODWOOD]. I thought that at least we had him [the enemy] and were going to roll him up. That did not come about…. I feel that you should insist that Dempsey keep up the strength of his attack.84
This was Ike's harshest rebuke of Montgomery during the Overlord campaign.
After reading this letter, Tedder thought it was “not strong enough. Monty can evade it. It contains no order.”85 Yet Ike's letter did seem to shake Montgomery up, as he wrote on July 22, “There is not and never has been any intention of stopping offensive operations on the eastern flank. For that reason I have regrouped. [Why not renew the attack?] Does above assure you that we see eye to eye on the main military problem. If NOT do please let me know.”86
It was not until July 30 that Montgomery would renew his offensive with Operation BLUECOAT. As we will see, this attack was also a disaster.87
During this leadership crisis Montgomery prevailed upon Brooke to tell everyone in England that OVERLORD was succeeding according to his plan. Brooke remained his firm supporter. He still believed Monty was the only commander capable of leading the Twenty-First Army Group.88 As Brooke confided in his diary, “With that Supreme Command set up it is no wonder that Monty's real high ability is not always realized.”89
Churchill traveled to Montgomery's headquarters on July 21. Churchill had been seething over Monty's lack of aggressiveness since shortly after D-Day. We do not know what they discussed. One of Montgomery's Tac staff officers said it was common knowledge that Churchill had come with the relief order in his pocket.90 It was not used.
In many ways Montgomery and Churchill's fate were inexorably intertwined. The British leadership had built up Montgomery as the great commander—the “Hero of El Alamein.” After many battlefield setbacks, this was the first major British victory of World War II and served as an important morale booster for the British people. Churchill's credibility as Britain's great wartime leader now largely rested on the success of both OVERLORD and Montgomery. Removing Montgomery might have caused a crisis that would bring down Churchill's government as well. As historian William Weidner indicated, “It was apparent that Churchill needed Montgomery nearly as much as Montgomery needed him.”91
While Montgomery retained his position as commander of the ground forces, the patchwork conditions of OVERLORD's leadership remained unchanged. In his diary a frustrated Brooke posed this critical question: “Will we ever learn to ‘love our allies as ourselves’??!! I doubt it!” He then explained why: “There is no doubt that Ike is all out to do all he can to maintain the best of relations between British and Americans, but it is equally clear that Ike knows nothing about strategy and is quite unsuited to the post of Supreme Commander as far as running the strategy of the war is concerned!”92
Brooke recognized Eisenhower's greatest strength. But he failed to give any credit to the skills Eisenhower and other American commanders were developing as they gained battlefield experience. In fact it was on the American sector that plans for a successful Normandy breakout were being worked out.
CONFRONTING THE BOCAGE HELL
Bradley was very depressed as he sat in his command post after the fall of St. Lo. His seventeen-day offensive had suffered the highest proportional American losses of the entire European war. And he had not broken out. But how could he do it? Seeking to discover a solution, he erected a huge map of Normandy in his headquarters. The bocage seemed an endless maze.93
There were just too many hedgerows that had to be cleaned up one at a time. The infantry became dulled by fatigue as this endless combat process seemed to have no end in sight.
Sherman tanks littered the countryside. They tried to enter these fields by the few obvious bocage openings or exposed their vulnerable undersides by going over the hedgerow's top. Engineers developed a device nicknamed the “salad fork.” A pair of stout timber prongs were affixed to a tank and were then rammed into a hedgerow. Two small tunnels were created into which high explosives were packed. When detonated, a gap was blasted that allowed the passage of a tank. However these procedures
took too much time, were too hazardous, and consumed huge amounts of explosives.94
Yankee innovation came into play. Captain Jimmy de Pero of the Second Armored, 102nd Cavalry Reconnaissance had a bull session with his men to chew on the hedgerow problem. One of his men, a Tennessee hillbilly named Robert, asked him, “Why don’t we get some saw-teeth and put them on the front of the tank and cut through these hedges?”95
In the crowd was Sergeant Curtis G. Culin, known as a shrewd soldier and chess player.
He thought it was a good idea. Strewn across the Normandy beaches were an array of steel teeth-like obstacles the Germans had deployed to rip apart landing-craft hulls. Some had been taken from the German West Wall (Siegfried Line); others were pieces of the “Czech hedgehog” defenses. Culin welded a steel scrap of several tusklike prongs, teeth that held down the tank belly while the tank burst though the hedgerow by force.96
Fig. 8.2. Rhino tank. (© Imperial War Museums [B 9336])
Culin's company commander got General Gerow to contact Bradley's staff. On July 14 Bradley personally attended a demonstration. With Culin's cutter you just aimed the tank and the hedgerow exploded as the Sherman burst through covered with dirt and shrubbery. Desperate for a solution, Bradley ordered the cutters installed using the scavenged beach obstacles. By July 25 three out of every five tanks were equipped with what was dubbed the “Rhino.” In order to maintain tactical surprise, Bradley banned the deployment of the Rhinos until the launch of COBRA.97
By themselves the Rhinos did not completely overcome the bocage terrain. However in the coming Normandy breakout, they became an important tool combined with other innovative tactics. They gave Bradley's tanks the ability to maneuver across the Normandy terrain. The German panzers had to remain on the roads, but the American Shermans now could cut cross-country and outflank the enemy.98
PATTON'S “DOGHOUSE” STATUS
On July 6, exactly one month after D-Day, Patton, his aides, and his bull terrier Willy boarded a C-47 transport at 10:25 a.m. at an airfield near Salisbury, England. With two other C-47s and four P-47 escorts they flew for one hour to an airstrip just behind Omaha Beach. For the previous two days the Third Army's men and equipment had begun embarking on LSTs for France.
Though Patton was in Normandy he was not allowed to make any contributions in ending the stalemate on the ground. The entire seven weeks, between D-Day and the activation of his Third Army (August 1), were for Patton the most frustrating days of World War II.
Partially this occurred to preserve the Operation Fortitude deceit that Patton was still in England commanding the First US Army Group's final preparations for launching the main Allied invasion against the Pas-de-Calais. This deception tied down the large forces of the German Fifteenth Army that were kept stationed across the Straits of Dover, thereby depriving Rommel of significant reinforcements for Normandy.
The major reason for Patton's exile from command had occurred much earlier. The two outrageous slapping incidents of shell-shocked soldiers in a field hospital had cost Patton the command of the Seventh Army during its invasion and occupation of Sicily. These incidents nearly cost him any role in OVERLORD.99
Fig. 8.3. Generals Patton, Bradley, and Montgomery. (Photo by Morris [Sgt.], No. 5 Army Film & Photographic Unit)
Then at the end of April 1944, Patton's impromptu speech to a ladies’ club in Knutsford, England, was a second bombshell that nearly got Patton sent back to the United States for the rest of the war. Patton made the off-the-cuff comment, “It is the evident destiny of the British and Americans, and of course the Russians, to rule the world.”100 A hidden newsman reported on his overweening statement. Afterward the public relations blowup in the United States was so bad that Marshall wanted to send Patton home. He left the final decision up to Eisenhower.
Patton reported to Eisenhower on May 2. Life-long friends, and Ike's best fighting general, he gave Patton another chance. According to his deputy Beetle Smith, Ike told Patton, “I expect from now on that you will please keep your goddamned mouth shut. When it is time for you to speak, I WILL TELL YOU!”101
After this Patton was deathly afraid of doing or saying anything that would put him back in the doghouse. As Eisenhower explained to Bradley, “All he wants is the chance to get back into the war. For a time he thought he was through.”102 Eisenhower was right in believing he would now set aside his ego and loyally serve under Bradley, as Patton was acutely aware that any further negative incidents would deprive him of participating in Overlord.
By July, however, Patton was very concerned about the failure of the Allies to achieve a breakout. He confided in his diary that Eisenhower was “bound hand and foot by the British.”103 Patton wrote, as a result, “We actually have no Supreme Commander—no one who can take hold and say that this shall be done and that shall not be done. It is a very unfortunate situation to which I see no solution.”104
COBRA—WHOSE IDEA?
Since D-Day George S. Patton, always innately restive, was chafing at the bit, fearing the war might end without him. Though on June 8 he wrote in his diary, “Apparently things are not going too well and one gets the impression that people are satisfied to be holding on, rather than advancing.”105 On July 2, he observed that Bradley should have attacked on a narrow front to achieve a breakthrough.106
The terrain where Bradley's First Army was to achieve a breakout was intimately known to Patton. In 1913, in what his wife called their second honeymoon, Patton had personally reconnoitered almost every square foot of Normandy's bocage country. Then in 1917 he had trained his World War I tank corps in the region. Patton believed he had a plan to get through the tortuous bocage:
I could break through [the enemy defenses] in three days if I commanded. They try to push all along the front and have no power anywhere. All that is necessary now is to take charge by leading with armored divisions and covering their advance with air bursts [ground-air tactical bombing]. Such an attack would have to be made on a narrow sector, whereas at present we are trying to attack all along the line.107
Before he had left England, Patton spent the whole night of June 30 to July 1 drafting an offensive plan for a Normandy breakout that his biographer Farago calls his “Opus No. 1.”108 He proposed that one or two armored divisions followed by two infantry divisions converge in a rapid dash aimed at Avranches. (See Map 16.) Patton's thrust straight down the coastal highway might be costly in tanks, but on this narrow front, it would achieve a breakthrough to Avranches in forty-eight hours.
Farago relates that Patton had told Bradley about his plan as early as June 26 and sent him a written version on July 2. Bradley, however, did not seem very interested in any suggestions coming from Patton. He had not been his first choice as an army commander but was imposed upon him by Eisenhower. Bradley still feared Patton's “impetuous habits.”109
Bradley wrote of his struggles in early July to come up with a plan using “a giant eight-foot map of the beachhead.”110 After coming up with an outline of a plan, Bradley asked for a critique from a number of his aides. By July 11 COBRA was officially born.
Farago states, after Patton studied the COBRA plan, “He had no doubt that somehow he had inspired it and Bradley—deliberately or unwittingly—had copied his ideas.”111 Patton was positive that COBRA was actually a modified version of his own Opus No. 1. Still being “in the doghouse” Patton never raised any claims to the plan's origins. “I don’t care,” Patton told his secretary, “if I don’t get any credit for the idea as long as they allow me to carry it out.”112
However, Patton's giant ego is much in evidence in his diary comments of July 12: “Brad says he will put me in as soon as he can. He could do it now with much benefit to himself, if he had any backbone. Of course Monty does not want me as he fears I will steal the show, which I will.”113
In spite of these hidden rivalries and resentments among the Allied commanders, COBRA proved the plan that finally propelled the Allies out of the Normandy beachhead. With B
radley as its father, COBRA would be one of the most decisive battles of the OVERLORD campaign.
Operation COBRA, the other half of Monty's two-pronged German envelopment plan, became the battlefield “safety valve” that helped save Monty's role as general ground commander. If COBRA had also failed, the public pressure to remove Montgomery, and perhaps other commanders, might have been too great to ignore.
“Rush them off their feet.”
—General George S. Patton1
As of July 23 the Allied gains were still quite unimpressive. After seven weeks, OVERLORD was still well behind schedule. Its farthest advance was between only twenty-five to thirty miles inland along an eighty-mile front. Casualties had been heavy: British-Canadian—forty-nine thousand; American—seventy-three thousand. These losses, however, were completely replaced by July 25 as sixteen new British-Canadian divisions (591,000 troops) and seventeen US divisions (770,000 troops) had landed inside the Normandy bridgehead. But the Allies now badly needed a new tactical boost for a breakout.2
COBRA'S VENOM
Bradley's COBRA breakout attack plan differed greatly from Montgomery's GOODWOOD assault. As previous broad-front attacks had failed, Bradley's assault concentrated on a narrow six-thousand-yard front, five miles west of St. Lo. It too would use intensive bombing, but unlike GOODWOOD, the US Ninth and Thirtieth Infantry Divisions would lead the assault to hold its shoulders, backed up by the US First Division and the Second Armored Division. A corps of three armored divisions and mechanized infantry would then push (see Map 16) up the coast of the Cotentin Peninsula to the crossroads at Coutances. Then the motorized infantry and armor would drive on to Avranches at the base of the Brittany peninsula.
From that key road junction Bradley would launch Patton's new Third Army for the advance into Brittany and the seizure of its strategic ports. Bradley's goal for COBRA was to conquer the Brittany ports and advance beyond the entangling bocage country. The lightning advance of Patton's Third Army, however, turned COBRA from a breakthrough advance into a major breakout.3
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