At 10:17 p.m. Patton gave the order for Haislip to continue his advance in the direction of Falaise until he made contact with the Canadians. A containing force was left behind to cover the three weakened panzer divisions at Argentan, and the Fifth Armored began a slow drive toward Falaise. During the early-morning hours of August 13, a reconnaissance unit already had advanced eight miles. Only six miles separated them from Falaise and closing the pocket.
After authorizing the continued advance, Patton called Bradley that same evening to appraise him that he was about to close the pocket. Bradley was furious. In a sharp telephone exchange he told Patton, “Nothing doing. You’re not to go beyond Argentan. Just stop where you are and build up on that shoulder.”24
After learning on the morning of August 13 that Haislip's reconnaissance had still pushed on to within a few miles of Falaise, Major General Leven Cooper Allen, Bradley's chief of staff, called Gaffey, Patton's chief of staff, and ordered all of the XV Corps forces back to the Argentan line.
Patton could not believe that Bradley would halt the successful operation so close to victory. He called back to the Twelfth Army Group headquarters and asked for Bradley. Allen answered his call and told him that Bradley was with Eisenhower at the SHAEF advance headquarters. Failing to reach Bradley at SHAEF, Patton called Allen back to again plead his case. Allen then contacted Bradley and conveyed Patton's request to allow the Third Army to renew its push to close the Falaise Pocket.
Bradley was with Eisenhower, so they both discussed Patton's urgent request. As previously mentioned, on August 9 Eisenhower had written to Marshall declaring that Patton's Third Army would march from Le Mans toward Alencon and Falaise to close the gap and destroy the German forces in the pocket. But now Eisenhower hesitated when Bradley cast doubt on the viability of Patton's drive.
At 12:15 p.m. Patton called Allen again. Patton wrote in his diary, “I told him…it was perfectly feasible to continue the operation. Allen repeated the order [from Bradley] to halt on the line and consolidate.”25
After he hung up, Patton told Gaffey, “The question why XV Corps halted on the east-west line through Argentan is certain to become of historical importance. I want a stenographic record of this conversation with General Allen included in the history of the Third Army.”26
That day Patton wrote in his diary, “I am sure that this halt is a great mistake, as I am certain that the British will not close on Falaise.”27 Patton was proven correct on both counts.
STOP ORDER CONTROVERSY
Four major controversies surround Bradley's stop order:
What command decisions were made on boundary line issues.
Whether the Third Army had sufficient forces to stop the onrush of retreating Germans.
Would US and Canadian forces collide resulting in friendly-fire casualties?
Whether a short hook or long hook would capture more Germans.
1. Command Decisions and Boundary Lines
The XV Corps had already crossed the army boundary lines that separated the operations of the Twenty-First and Twelfth Army Groups. Partly due to coalition courtesy and also under the mistaken impression that the Canadians could more easily close the pocket from the north, Bradley waited for Montgomery to continue the advance. Bradley wrote, “If Montgomery wants help in closing the gap…then let him ask us for it.”28 He never did.
According to historian Niall Barr, the critical decision on army boundaries had earlier taken place. As mentioned before, on August 8 Bradley telephoned Montgomery in Eisenhower's presence to receive permission for Patton to cross the then British boundary in his attack northward from Le Mans toward Argentan. Barr reports that “Montgomery acceded and also agreed that the existing boundaries could be ignored.”29 No meeting place was ever selected for the closing of the pocket by the American and Canadian forces.30 The increased fluidity of the battlefield situation made formal army boundaries a meaningless issue. As D’Este concludes, “The boundary line controversy is a tempest in a teapot.”31
During the evening of August 12, Montgomery learned of Haislip's advance beyond Argentan. He told his chief of staff, Major General Francis de Guingand, to “[t]ell Bradley they ought to get back.” De Guingand and the other member of Monty's staff were appalled. Later when they were notified of Bradley's stop order, they pressed Montgomery to give Bradley permission to proceed with the advance. He refused. In his memoirs, Operation Victory, written after the war, de Guingand states his belief that the Americans’ advance beyond Argentan would have closed the pocket. De Guingand blamed both Montgomery and Bradley for blocking the American advance as Monty wanted the victory to be a British/Canadian one.32
Bradley has always denied he contacted Montgomery for permission to continue the attack northward. Yet evidence exists that on Sunday morning, August 13, Bradley ordered his operations officer, General Kibler, to call Montgomery's headquarters. Kibler spoke with de Guingand and was denied permission.33
Later that day Bradley flew to Montgomery's headquarters and met with Dempsey and Monty. Dempsey later stated in his diary, “So long as the Northward move of Third Army meets little opposition, the…leading Corps [of Patton's army] will disregard inter-army boundaries.” Montgomery also seemed to have no objections to the XV Corps advance to Falaise.34 If Dempsey's version is correct, then it appears that it was Bradley's choice, not Montgomery's prohibition, that stopped Patton's advance.
Fig. 10.1. Major General Francis de Guingand, chief of staff, Twenty-First Army Group. (© Imperial War Museums [H 39144])
The viewpoint of Bradley's aide was quite different. On the evening of August 14, as Patton's forces began moving eastward toward the Seine, Major Chester B. Hansen wrote about the “Falaise follies” in his diary, “It is clear now that our chance to close the German army between Falaise and Argentan has vanished for reasons both clear and difficult to conceive. It is possible that Montgomery has succumbed to his vice of exaggerated precautions. However, it would be folly to criticize Montgomery due to his prestige position among the British…. He occupies an almost papal immunity.”35
A 1946 Chester Wilmot interview of Montgomery adds additional confusion over the phantom commander who had the responsibility for stopping Patton from closing the gap. Monty told Wilmot that the Third Army was never ordered to stop at Argentan: “It was ordered to strike north on the axis Alencon-Argentan and to close the gap. If Patton stopped, he must have been stopped by opposition.”36 As historian John Keegan comments, controversy over who made the fatal command decision “was the outcome of a curious passage of inter-Allied discord.”37
2. The Third Army vs. the Germans
Bradley told Patton, “You’re not to go beyond Argentan. Just stop where you are and build up on that shoulder. Siebert tells me the Germans are beginning to pull out. You’d better button up and get ready for him.”38 This command was based on what Bradley later acknowledged was faulty Allied intelligence.
The assumption was that Haislip's XV Corps of four divisions might be sufficient to hold the southern jaw of the pocket but was too weak to also plug its mouth. Bradley feared that the nineteen German divisions trapped inside would stampede and overrun Patton.39
However on August 12 the Germans were not bolting eastward in desperate retreat. They were waiting immobilized inside their führer's self-made trap. Hitler took four more days before he gave Kluge the order to disengage (August 16).
To what degree was Patton's claim that his XV Corps was strong enough to reach Falaise and close the escape route? On the evening of August 12 Patton's reconnaissance forces told him that the only German units between the Third Army and Falaise were a regiment of antiaircraft guns that was short of ammunition, and the surviving remnants of the Ninth and 116th Panzer Divisions. There also was the First SS and Second Panzer Divisions of General Hans Eberbach's panzer group that were scattered northwest of Alencon. At best Eberbach had between seventy and eighty-two tanks. Patton's XV Corps was advancing with over three hundred Sher
man tanks, twenty-two battalions of artillery, two infantry divisions, and complete command of the air.40
In addition to Haislip's XV Corps, Collins's VII Corps was on or near Carrouges. Walkers's XX Corps was near Le Mans. The Fourth Armored Division would arrive on August 13 from Brittany to form the XII Corps. Between August 10 and August 14 there were five US armored divisions and eight US infantry divisions in the American First and Third armies numbering over 200,000 soldiers sitting on the German southern flank. Most were capable of moving rapidly into place and permanently shutting the Falaise Pocket.41
Major General Richard Rohmer at that time was a reconnaissance pilot flying a Mustang in 430 Squadron of the Royal Canadian Air Force. Based on his observations and his fellow reconnaissance pilots, he reached this conclusion:
The opportunity to complete the encirclement was at hand…. But there was no way the Canadians, Poles and the British Army could break through north of Falaise to “rush” south past Falaise to Argentan; they were pinned down where they were. No, if the ring was to be closed with the two German Armies inside the pocket, it would have to be done by Patton and it would have to be done at forthwith.42
3. Avoiding Friendly Fire
Another Bradley argument for stopping the XV Corps’ advance was the possibility they would collide with the Canadians at Falaise in a “disastrous error in recognition.”43 Friendly fire was a weak argument. Even Bradley later suggested that landmarks or geographical features could have been used to identify a potential meeting point. Both British and American army units had generous supplies of signal rockets. There would have been little difficulty in each army using coded-light signal identification. On radio, the accents of Scots, British, and American personnel would be very apparent as they neared each other. Both armies also deployed scout aircraft. The Allied white star was conspicuously displayed on each side's tanks, jeeps, and trucks.
The American forces and British-Canadian army would have eventually met. Where they plugged the pocket was irrelevant. The goal was to do it quickly and destroy the bulk of the German army in France.44
4. Short Hook vs. Long Hook
On August 14 Bradley moved to redeploy Patton from a short hook at Falaise to a long hook at the Seine River. He believed that the majority of the Germans had already escaped and now wanted Patton to close the pocket at the Seine. Neither Ultra nor air reconnaissance confirmed this assessment.
Bradley split Haislip's command and kept two divisions at Argentan and sent the two others eastward. Montgomery immediately agreed to this change, saying he had never supported the short hook. Both commanders sought to enlarge the pocket and bring the Allied armies together at Chambois. (See Map 21.)
Whether this could be done in a timely manner to entrap the Germans remained to be seen. Shifting Patton's army away from a certain closure at Falaise to a potential closure farther eastward remains one of the worst decisions made by the Allied commanders during the OVERLORD operation.45
EISENHOWER BACKS DOWN
On August 13 Eisenhower and Bradley were together when Bradley's operations officer received the news from Montgomery's chief of staff that the army boundaries were still to be enforced. Both men backed down before Monty's refusal to cooperate, though both later denied ever initiating that call. Ike later wrote that he supported “Bradley's decision to avoid friendly fire between the armies.”46
At the critical hour for the Falaise Pocket, Eisenhower refused to potentially cause friction to the alliance and as supreme commander countermand Montgomery's refusal to cooperate. This was a pattern that Ike repeated many times with Montgomery during the campaign in France. As a result, Monty treated Ike as only a political figurehead who should not interfere with his control of the OVERLORD ground campaign.47 Montgomery would now try half-heartedly to close the pocket from the north.
TRACTABLE OFFTRACK
On August 14 Montgomery launched Operation TRACTABLe, a set-piece assault on Falaise. At noon two tank columns were making good progress when more than eight hundred Canadian and British heavy bombers dropped about 3,700 tons of bombs along the route of advance. Once again, bombing short inflicted more than five hundred casualties on Canadian and Polish troops. The resulting confusion meant by day's end TRACTABLE was offtrack, having advanced less than four miles. Moreover, the Germans found a copy of the attack plan in the pocket of a dead Canadian reconnaissance driver. They redeployed based on this intelligence of where to meet the Allied advance. On August 15 a breakdown in communications further confused inexperienced Canadian and Polish troops. They ended the day still short of Falaise.48 Yet at this time Monty wrote to Brooke, “Things really do seem to be going very well.”49
As part of TRACTABLE Montgomery abandoned the head-on thrust to close the pocket at Argentan, and on August 16 he ordered the Canadians and Poles to make a flanking move toward Trun, while the Americans attacked from the west and south toward Chambois as part of a long hook to close the Falaise Pocket. (See Map 22.) The Canadians and Poles were too weak by themselves to do the job. Unfortunately, Montgomery failed to reinforce them using his Seventh Armored Division. Also, a large part of Patton's army (Haislip's corps) had already left the area in an advance toward the Seine.
On August 16, the Canadians finally reached Falaise, the birthplace of William the Conqueror, although it took two more days to clean out resistance forces. It had been reduced to brick dust.
On the evening of August 18, the Canadian Fourth Armored and a Polish battle group occupied Trun. They had been slowed by both a commander's incompetence and by Montgomery's indecision on whether its armored brigade should continue the advance or break off for a wider envelopment at the Seine. Also the Poles lost their way heading for Chambois and ended up six miles north of the city. The encirclement remained incomplete.
Finally on August 19, the Poles and elements of the Fourth Armored reached Chambois. They met with the US Ninetieth and shook hands over their link up. Reinforced by the French Second Armored Division, the Allied forces were finally astride the escape route of the German Seventh Army inside the pocket. Though the enemy may have been in the bag, the bag was still full of holes. Allied strength between Trun and Chambois was still very spotty. Elements of the Second Panzer enlarged the holes by driving the Canadians back at Chambois to keep an escape route open until nightfall. Many German soldiers escaped. The Canadians called for reinforcements. But Montgomery's indecision on whether to seal the gap on the Dives river or to go for a longer envelopment on the Seine again delayed proper reinforcements to help seal the breach.
That same day, two Polish battle groups moved to the Mount Ormel ridge and dug in at Hill 262 during the night. (See Map 22.) The Poles were able to direct their artillery fire from Hill 262 directly at the retreating Germans. On August 20, Field Marshal Walter Model ordered units both inside and outside the pocket to attack the Polish positions. At midday units of several panzer divisions overran part of the Polish lines, allowing around ten thousand soldiers to escape. Additionally, heavy rain limited Allied air attacks, thereby helping thousands of Germans to flee out of the pocket.50
The next morning, August 21, though German attacks resumed, the Poles retained a blocking position on the ridge. Only small, isolated German groups were able to escape in the early-morning hours. With the noon arrival of Canadian reinforcements at Hill 262 and near Chambois, the Falaise Pocket was finally sealed.51
A STALINGRAD IN NORMANDY?
As the Allies dithered over closing the Falaise gap, what was the German response inside the pocket? Hitler's repeated orders to attack at Mortain had yielded no gains except to drive more units deeper into the encirclement.
By August 14, the Germans were failing to supply their troops with day-to-day necessities. That evening Field Marshal Kluge began a frontline inspection of a rapidly shrinking battlefield. Operational prospects were grim, “roads clogged with traffic and dispirited troops.”52 The Germans had only received thirty thousand replacements with ten thousand m
ore in transit.53
When Kluge arrived at Sepp Dietrich's Fifth Panzer Army Headquarters, he learned that the Canadian army's march toward Falaise had barely been stopped. If General Hans Eberbach's panzers did not successfully counterattack at Argentan, collapse was imminent. The Germans risked the loss of all the forces in the pocket.54 (See Map 22.)
Early on August 15 Kluge set out from Bernay to travel forty miles to meet with Eberbach and General Paul Hausser, commander of the Seventh Army. Their meeting was set for 10:00 a.m. at the village of Necy. It proved to be the ride of Kluge's lifetime. The field marshal's convoy of a staff car, radio truck, and motorcycle escort was an outstanding target for Allied fighter-bombers. Kluge spent his day repeatedly driving into ditches, having his radio truck destroyed, and signal men killed. Given this unpleasant taste of a heavy artillery bombardment, a frazzled Kluge arrived at Eberbach's headquarters west of Argentan after midnight. Only then could he contact the Supreme Headquarters West to inform them of his location.
Eberbach's panzer divisions were under a remorseless attack by both the American First and Third armies. Total Allied air superiority and intense artillery fire meant that logistical supplies to his divisions had practically ceased. Hausser's Seventh Army located to the west of Argentan was retreating slowly to prevent the total collapse of the front. His Tenth SS Panzer Division was trapped, and their fuel tanks were empty. Both men urged Kluge to order an immediate retreat from the pocket.55
Hitler declared August 15 to be “the worst day of my life.”56 After the attempted July assassination, the führer suspected most of his senior commanders of treason. Kluge's sudden disappearance for almost twenty-four hours convinced Hitler that the field marshal was engaging in secret negotiations with the Allies.
Earlier that day Hitler received news of the Allied landings in southern France (Operation ANVIL, later renamed DRAGOON). For once the führer did not hesitate. He had earlier reached the decision that this invasion demanded that he order all German forces to immediately retreat from the south of France.
Divided on D-Day Page 27
