Later that day when Eisenhower arrived with his chief of staff, Walter Bedell Smith, Montgomery insisted they meet alone in his command trailer. Eisenhower acquiesced to this insulting arrangement even though de Guingand stayed with Monty. Montgomery then patronizingly lectured Ike on his plan in which the Twenty-First Army would mount a single thrust to the Ruhr with the American First Army in support.
MONTGOMERY's viewpoint was that the Americans already had their day in the Normandy campaign and now it was Britain's turn. They had held down most of the Wehrmacht forces, while patton's spectacular advance met little resistance. But this would not be an all-British show as Lieutenant General Courtney Hodges of the American First Army would also take part.
Eisenhower told him, “The American public would never stand for stopping Patton in full cry, and public opinion wins wars.”52
“Nonsense,” Monty rebuked him. “Victories win war. Give people victory and they won’t care who won it.”
Leaving Allied politics aside, throwing everything to the north ignored current battlefield conditions as in the south the Germans were clearly more vulnerable. Eisenhower refused to take such a high-risk gamble: “I knew that any pencil-like thrust into the heart of Germany would meet nothing but certain destruction…. I would not consider it.”53
Unable to move Eisenhower on either the command issue or an exclusive offensive, Montgomery shifted his ground on what support he could realize for an advance toward Germany. For the time being he wanted to have Patton halted in place. He sought to take Pas-de-Calais, Antwerp, and Brussels and go beyond toward the Ruhr. (See Map 25.) To achieve this, Montgomery wanted the airborne army for paratroop operations and the First Army assigned to him, and all available supplies.
Eisenhower eventually agreed to give Montgomery operational control of the airborne divisions and the First Army. Monty would receive “top priority” in supplies, but Ike insisted on continuing to build up the strength of the Third Army for an advance toward Metz.
Most importantly Eisenhower told Montgomery he must first capture Antwerp and get it functioning as a supply port before thrusting northeast toward the Ruhr. He also gave priority to knocking out the V-weapons launching sites causing havoc in London.
Even though in principle Eisenhower and Montgomery reached agreement on these orders, Montgomery and Dempsey had already rejected the possibility of opening Antwerp and the other channel ports thereby pocketing the German Fifteenth Army that had been deployed around Calais. Even after Monty's agreement to terms at the August 23 meeting, their attention remained fastened on a rapid thrust over the Rhine. Incredibly Montgomery's own logistical planners naively told him that once the Seine and Channel ports began operating they would be able to logistically sustain the Twenty-First Army Group's eastward advance into Germany. This caused Monty to proclaim, “I don’t need Antwerp.” This directly contradicted what Admiral Ramsay and SHAEF logistical planners had determined was required to sustain the offensive.54
THE THIRD PLAN: EISENHOWER's BROAD FRONT
During the end of August Eisenhower began discussions on another strategy—a broad front for the next phase of the Allied operation in Europe. In the spring of 1944, SHAEF planners presented alternative plans after the Normandy breakthrough to end the war. Among them was capturing the Ruhr Valley in the industrial German heartland that kept the Nazi war machine operating. This goal became center stage in August 1944.
There were four invasion routes to the Ruhr from northern France: through Flanders; along the northern edge of the Ardennes Forest; through the Ardennes; and south of the Ardennes through Metz, the Saar, and Frankfurt.
Eisenhower envisioned a double envelopment of the Ruhr: Montgomery's Twenty-First Army Group as the northern pincer, and Bradley's Twelfth Army Group, the southern component to complete a double envelopment. With its industrial base eliminated, the combined Allied forces could advance at will on Berlin and occupy all of Germany.
An essential component of the “broad-front” plan included opening up the major ports of Antwerp and Marseilles. They would provide the necessary logistical support for the Allied drive into Germany. Eisenhower envisioned Montgomery and Bradley's drives as two pincers that would meet behind the Ruhr in a great encirclement. Above all, Eisenhower was absolutely clear that without both ports operating at full capacity, the Allies could not sustain their advance to the Rhine and Berlin.55 (See Map 26.)
From Eisenhower's standpoint the broad-front strategy also was an avenue for keeping the Grand Alliance intact at this critical stage in the war. Triumph would be shared by both Montgomery and Bradley's armies. Eisenhower as supreme commander was determined that neither the British nor American forces alone would win the final victory in Europe.56
The problem Eisenhower faced in August was that he could not deploy both pincers of his broad front. He could only deliver enough fuel for one army to advance without first taking Antwerp and getting its port facilities up and running. Antwerp was clearly in MONTGOMERY's zone of operations.
The other issue was the state of the German army. Could it successfully resist a further Allied thrust into Germany? Perhaps the most accurate picture of German defensive capabilities at that time came from Speidel, chief of staff of Army Group B, and Blumentritt, chief of staff in the West. By the last week of August, Speidel described the Allied advance as “a foaming torrent” that had swallowed up the remnants of both the Seventh Army and the Fiftieth Panzer Army. Inside Germany there were no reserve ground forces of any significance to reinforce the western front. The current battles on the eastern front with the Russian army in East Prussia and Hungary were at their climax. They had consumed all available German reserves.57
DRIVEN COMMANDERS FIGHT OVER PLANS AND SUPPLIES
Many forms of opposition and counterproposals arose to these three plans. They were triggered by differing command perspectives and national rivalries. Supplies remained a key issue.
The American Commanders Fight for Gasoline
After Eisenhower's August 23 meeting with Montgomery, Bradley was incensed over what had transpired. He spent two days with Ike arguing over giving the American First Army to Montgomery. Tedder also agreed with Bradley. They were joined in opposing Montgomery's plan by General Kenneth Strong, Eisenhower's intelligence officer (G-2), and General Harold Bull, his operation's officer (G-3).
Ike yielded to their combined pressure and changed his directives. Instead of giving Montgomery operational control of the First Army, on August 28 Eisenhower directed that Montgomery was only “authorized to effect,” through Bradley, “any necessary coordination between his own forces” and the First Army.58
Giving Montgomery top priority in supplies resulted in stopping the Third Army's thrust into Germany dead in its armored tracks. Trucks that were bringing gasoline and other supplies to Patton's forces were diverted to Hodges's First Army. In addition when Ike transferred the Airborne Army to Montgomery, he also took away the air transport fuel supply that supplemented the deliveries of the Red Ball Express. Cargo aircraft were held in readiness for paratrooper operations.
Eisenhower had approved Montgomery's plan to use the airborne to clear a path for his northern thrust. An airborne drop was planned at Tournai on September 3 to help trap the German Fifteenth Army. (See Map 23.) Bradley pleaded with Eisenhower and Montgomery to cancel this drop so that Patton would have enough gas to get inside Germany, but Eisenhower refused to listen. Then at the last moment Monty canceled the operation.59
On August 30 Bradley ordered Patton to stop at the Meuse because no gasoline was available for him. Patton immediately protested to Bradley. At a September 2 meeting at Chartres with Eisenhower, Bradley, Hodges, and Hoyt Vandenberg (the new commander of the Ninth Air Force), Patton made his plea directly to Eisenhower: “We had patrols on the Moselle near Nancy…. If you let me retain my regular allotment of tonnage, Ike, we could push on to the German frontier and rupture that Goddamn Siegfried Line. I’m willing to stake my reputation
on that.”60
“Careful, George,” Eisenhower replied, “that reputation of yours hasn’t been worth very much.”
“That reputation is pretty good now,” Patton responded.
Patton did not give up. With Bradley's persuasive support they both argued for at least an equal share with Monty's Twenty-First Army. “We have an excellent plan, Ike,” Patton pleaded, “for a drive through the Nancy-Epinal gap. The Siegfried Line isn’t manned yet, and the Huns have little if anything in the area to stop us. If you let me go and give me what we need, we can be in Germany at the Rhine in 10 days.”61
Eisenhower would not budge. All Ike offered to Bradley and Patton was that he would allow the V Corps of the First Army and the Third Army to go back on the offensive once the Calais area ports had been taken by Montgomery.
The British Seek to Stay in Control
The British objected both to Eisenhower's assumption of the ground command and a broad-front strategy. On August 28 Alan Brooke wrote in his diary,
Difficult C.O.S. [Combined Operating Staffs] meeting where we considered Eisenhower's new plan to take command himself in Northern France on September 1st. This plan is likely to add another three to six months on to the war. He straight away wants to split his force, sending an American contingent towards Nancy whilst the British Army Group moves along the coast. If the Germans were not as beat as they are this would be a fatal move…. In any case I am off to France tomorrow to see Monty and to discuss the situation with him.62
Fig. 11.4. General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Omar Bradley, and George S. Patton. (Everett Collection, Inc./Alamy Stock Photo)
Encouraged by Brooke's low opinion of Eisenhower's military qualities, Montgomery confided to his diary that the supreme commander “did not know Christmas from Easter.”63
At the September 2 Chartres meeting the implementation of a broad-front strategy was also discussed. On September 4 Eisenhower authorized his headquarters to issue an order calling for the forces north of the Ardennes “to secure Antwerp, breach the sector of the Siegfried Line covering the Ruhr and then seize the Ruhr.”64 The southern forces were to proceed to the Rhine and through the Saar and to seize Frankfort.
Montgomery immediately sent a furious response to Eisenhower stating that there were not sufficient supplies for two fronts and that such a strategy would prolong the war. Montgomery asserted that his northern thrust had “reached a stage where one really powerful and full-blooded thrust toward Berlin is likely to get there and end the German war.”65
CHANGED PLANS EXACT A HEAVY PRICE
On September 5 Patton accumulated enough fuel to resume his offensive, helped by the capture of 100,000 gallons in a German fuel depot. But by then the German forces had time to reorganize, and they now appeared in strength to block his offensive. By the next day, he abandoned his immediate effort to cross the Moselle. Patton was dismayed. He wrote to his wife, “All this comes from the fatal decision of the Supreme Commander…to halt the Third Army until the Pas-de-Calais area is cleaned up.”66
Worse was yet to come for Patton. He lost the race to the Siegfried Line. On September 11, units of the American First US Army successfully broke through the West Wall. Patton was embarrassed, since his most forward units were still twenty-five miles from the Siegfried Line.
Once again a great opportunity to end the war in Europe had slipped through Patton's hands. His September 11 diary entry says it all: “I wish people would stop making plans and changing their minds.”67
The delays caused by Eisenhower's attempts at compromise and his changes in strategic plans exacted a heavy price. Of the 750,000 casualties the Allies incurred in liberating Western Europe, 500,000 were after September's lost victory.68
“PURSUIT WITHOUT PAUSE”
Liddell Hart agreed with Patton that the final days in August 1944 were the “unforgiving minute.” The Germans were still in shock, defenses unprepared, and all the Rhine bridges were still intact. A powerful punch by Patton, a pursuit without pause, offered a good strategy to trigger the total collapse of the German army in the West. “The best chance of a quick finish,” Hart concludes, “was probably lost when the ‘gas’ was turned off from Patton's tanks.”69
Fig. 11.5. The Thirty-Ninth Infantry Brigade of the US Army crossing the Siegfried Line in Germany. September 1944. (US Army)
Eisenhower's compromise strategy threw away the best opportunity to quickly end the war. Yet August 1944 was a remarkable month in the history of warfare. The tide of battle in Normandy ended in the rout of the German army. “The war could have easily ended in September 1944,” Hart assures us.70 Nigel Hamilton also agrees: “Had Eisenhower accepted Patton's Plan…a week before the fall of Paris, World War II might have well been won that year.”71
What would have occurred if Patton's plan had been used instead of Montgomery's? Without doubt the Third Army and elements of the First Army would have reached German soil. Patton would have penetrated the West Wall. In fact the area chosen for his attack was one of the more run-down and vulnerable parts of the Siegfried Line. If properly supplied, the Americans could have succeeded as the southern pincer against the Ruhr.
After the war, German general Siegfried Westphal, who was chief of staff of OB West at this time, affirmed the disastrous condition of the West Wall in August 1944 and stated what his conclusions in that period were:
Had the Allies assigned all available ground and air tonnage for the transport of fuel, and had they used airborne units to establish bridgeheads east of the Rhine, it would have been possible for them to penetrate deeply into the Reich, push the West Front up against the East Front, and win the war before the end of the year 1944.72
As the British major general and military historian Hubert Essame concluded, “Providence had given Eisenhower the greatest cavalry leader [Patton] and as good an army as his country had ever produced: at the decisive moment he failed to use them.”73
“Monty's big mistake, as the war moved to its final phase, was to allow his unassailable self-belief to blind him to certain new realities. Politics would not allow him to carry on giving the orders to great armies of Americans simply because, in his view, he was better than their generals.”
—Mark Urban, author of Generals: The British Commanders Who Shaped the World1
STARS ON THEIR SHOULDERS
On September 1, Eisenhower assumed direct operational command of the ground forces in northern Europe. Ike had little choice. Marshall insisted on this as the preponderance of armed forces in this region was now American. US public opinion demanded action over the command question. Also the muddled Falaise operation acutely demonstrated the need for more unified command decisions.
Montgomery and Brooke resisted this change until the eleventh hour. Now Monty reverted to a position of command equality with Bradley as the British/Canadian army group commander. As Churchill anticipated intense censure from the British press and people, he arranged for Monty's promotion to field marshal. Now he outranked Eisenhower, his new boss, five stars to Ike's four. Monty and the British would continue to fight a prolonged rearguard action over who was really in command to the end of the war.2
Not every British commander was pleased with his promotion, Admiral Ramsay noted in his diary: “Monty made a Field Marshal. Astounding thing to do and I regret it more than I can say…. An insult to Ike & to America.”3
Churchill's gesture seems most quixotic in view of the fact that the prime minister was almost surely aware that the US Congress was reactivating the rank of five-star general of the army. Eisenhower would be one of the first generals so appointed.4
Brooke, Monty's mentor, gave him some sage counsel in a congratulatory letter: “I should like at this moment of your triumph to offer you one more word of advice. Don’t let success go to your head and remember the value of humility.”5 This sound exhortation did not guide Monty's past, present, or future behavior.
ANTWERP: A KEY OBJECTIVE
On August 29, Montgomery launch
ed his most spectacular drive of the European campaign. Once the Allied armies had crossed the Seine, they advanced rapidly through the north of France, and by the beginning of September, the British Second Army had crossed into Belgium. This drive was spearheaded by General Brian Horrocks's XXX Corps that surged ahead at an awe-inspiring speed, crossing the Seine east of Rouen to trap remnants of the German Seventh Army. The British advanced 250 miles in six days. (See Map 27.) Horrocks reached Amiens on August 31. Lille and Brussels also were soon liberated. Meanwhile Hodges's three American corps, now attached to the British Second Army, closed on Mons, Belgium, capturing twenty-five thousand German troops, the remains of about twenty shattered divisions left from the Normandy campaign.6
Meanwhile Lieutenant General Henry Crerar's First Canadian Army cleared the channel ports, taking Dieppe and encircling the German Fifteenth Army at Le Havre, Calais, and Dunkirk. The Canadians also took Ostend that fell without delay. Boulogne withstood a siege by the Canadians until September 22, Calais fell on October 1, but Dunkirk was not liberated until the war's end in May 1945. All these ports were wrecked by the Germans, preventing a quick fix to the Allies’ serious supply crisis.
Fig. 12.1. Lieutenant General Henry Crerar. (Library and Archives Canada)
THE IMPORTANCE OF ANTWERP: DIFFERING PERSPECTIVES
The real solution to the Allies’ logistics nightmare was Antwerp, which was a major port in Europe with thirty miles of docks and over six hundred cranes that could handle sixty thousand tons of cargo daily. It was only sixty-five miles from the Allied forward supply depots, thus offering greatly reduced rail or truck haulage for the Allied invasion of the German Reich.
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