During 109 days of fighting, the U.S. rose to the challenge of a European rival. Some 200,000 Americans donned a uniform, but no more than 35,000 left the U.S. While 379 soldiers and sailors were killed in action, another 2,565 perished from disease. Yellow fever, typhoid, dysentery, and malaria devastated the American divisions, which prompted Shafter to lament that he commanded “an army of convalescents” in Cuba. Navy transports swiftly carried V Corps from Santiago to Long Island's Montauk Point, where the Medical Department established Camp Wikoff to quarantine the evacuated troops. As the summer ended, thousands of Americans mustered out of service. The next year, the American Veterans of Foreign Service formed a fraternal order that later became known as the Veterans of Foreign Wars.
Philippine Rebellion
If U.S. forces left the Philippine islands prematurely, McKinley feared that Germany, France, Russia, or Great Britain would attempt to snatch them. Calling them a “gift from the gods,” he urged senators to ratify the Treaty of Paris and to annex the entire archipelago. Many opponents of new acquisitions, however, expressed contempt for “an alien race and foreign tongue.” Despite a contentious debate in Washington D.C., the Senate ratified the treaty on February 6, 1899.
Figure 9.3 Colonialism in Asia, 1914
The terms of the treaty kindled animosity between U.S. forces and Filipino insurrectos, whom Aguinaldo named the Army of Liberation. Once the Spanish soldiers exited the fortifications across Luzon, the former allies faced each other on the outskirts of Manila. Their relations grew tense while trading gunfire and insults along the lines. McKinley replaced Merritt with General Elwell Otis, who regarded the Filipinos as “ignorant and very superstitious.” Shortly before the treaty vote, he authorized a series of military actions to secure the Manila perimeter.
As directed, two American divisions stormed the Filipino dispositions around Manila while taking few casualties. Unable to resist the surprise offensive, thousands of Filipinos died in defense of blockhouses and redoubts. In fact, Filipino weaponry such as the bolo proved no match for U.S. arms and ammunition. U.S. gunboats pushed up the Pasig River, which brought naval firepower further inland. Rifles crackled and cannons roared from the front lines to the rice paddies. General Arthur MacArthur marched a division into the villages of Caloocan, Malolos, and Calumpit before the onset of the monsoon season. With Aguinaldo's Army of Liberation in retreat, U.S. forces rolled onward from February to June.
That February, McClure's magazine in the U.S. published a poem titled “The White Man's Burden” by Rudyard Kipling, a British scribe. With the subtitle, “The United States and the Philippines,” he interpolated the prevailing assumptions of race with grim exhortations about power. The verses beckoned Americans to embrace an overseas mission, that is, to fight “the savage wars of peace.” Resonating with a resurgent nationalism at the end of the century, Roosevelt called it “poor poetry but good sense.”
A sense of nationalism permeated the rank and file of the American military, who seemed eager for another war abroad. Following the annexation of the Philippines, Congress approved legislation to maintain 65,000 regulars in the Army while adding another 35,000 volunteers for service. Once reinforcements arrived from the U.S., various National Guard and volunteer units with expiring enlistments departed for home. The logistical problems presented by 6,000 miles of ocean notwithstanding, the high command likened operations in Luzon to “Indian fighting” in the American West. Nevertheless, some officials in the War Department worried that African American regiments would not fight against “their colored Filipino cousins.” Troop levels exceeded 20,000 in 1899, when Otis began forming native auxiliaries as well.
After a brief hiatus in the military campaign, Otis expected U.S. forces to crush the Philippine rebellion that fall. Called the “General of the Night” by Aguinaldo, Lawton led a column up the Rio Grande River and over to the Lingayen Gulf. While General Loyd Wheaton failed to cut off the Filipino leader's escape route from Tarlac, MacArthur pressed forward along the railroad line from Angeles to Dagupan. The triple-pronged pincer succeeded in defeating the Army of Liberation, but it did not end the resistance. An enemy sharpshooter killed Lawton during a small skirmish on December 19, which made him the highest-ranking U.S. officer to die in the Philippines. Aguinaldo fled into the mountains of northern Luzon, where he directed the remnants of the Filipino forces to shift from conventional to guerrilla tactics.
Despite co-opting a number of Filipinos, the American military struggled to counter an insurgency in the countryside. Otis issued General Order 40 to organize municipal governments, which allowed him to declare victory and to go home. William Howard Taft, a prominent judge from Ohio, arrived in Manila to head a civilian commission as a temporary governor. Ultimately, more than 15,000 natives joined the Philippine Constabulary, the Philippine Scouts, and various other police and paramilitary organizations under U.S. supervision. While administering conquered areas, Army personnel oversaw the building of schools, hospitals, bridges, and roads. In addition, they strung around 16,000 miles of telegraph wire. However, they also condoned the sacking of villages, the execution of prisoners, and the raping of women. They grew frustrated with amigo warfare by some Filipinos, which entailed friendly cooperation in public but deadly sniping and sabotage in secret. To implement what McKinley called “benevolent assimilation,” U.S. forces confronted their foes with extreme prejudice.
However ugly, U.S. forces generally operated within the framework of the existing “laws of war.” Americans resorted to variations of the “water cure” to enhance interrogations, which involved forcing liquid down a subject's throat until information was forthcoming. If the torturous application failed to produce results, then soldiers stood on the swollen stomach to induce vomiting. Moments later, the “water detail” repeated the steps. An Army marching cadence at the time shouted with glee: “We've got him down and bound, so let's fill him full of liberty!” With little guidance from Washington D.C., cruelty all too often became the hallmark of the operations in the Philippines.
As hostilities took a toll on the operations, American corpses sometimes appeared mutilated beyond recognition. Chaplain Charles C. Pierce established an Army morgue in the Philippines, where the bodies of the slain were tagged for repatriation. Going forward, he proposed that the War Department include an “identity disc” in each soldier's field kit. Years later, his recommendation resulted in an item that U.S. forces called “dog tags.”
Taking command of U.S. forces in 1900, MacArthur extended the operations by establishing hundreds of garrisons throughout the archipelago. He boasted of killing 15 Filipinos for every one wounded, which insinuated a motto of “no quarter” within his command. His strength in the Philippines surged to 70,000 men while offering incentives for armed guerrillas to lay down their weapons. With great success in penetrating the mountains and jungles, he expanded the activities of the native constabulary and scout units.
MacArthur authorized Colonel Frederick N. Funston to personally lead a clandestine party that included Filipino auxiliaries. A successful interrogation of Cecilio Segismundo – a courier for Aguinaldo – revealed the location of his secret hideout. Funston posed as a prisoner to gain entry to Aguinaldo's headquarters at the village of Palanan. With the aid of Macabebe villagers from central Luzon, he captured the Filipino leader on March 23, 1901. Consequently, Aguinaldo wrote a general proclamation to insurgents asking them to surrender.
The surrender of Aguinaldo represented a closing act in the Philippine rebellion, although horrific violence continued in a few provinces. American troops on Batangas forced at least 300,000 civilians into concentration zones. On Mindanao, a group of Muslims known as the Moro resisted pacification for another decade. Following the massacre of 45 soldiers at Balangiga, one brigade commander, General Jacob Hurd Smith, told subordinates to turn the interior of Samar into a “howling wilderness” in retaliation. On July 4, 1902, the U.S. officially proclaimed an end to the rebellion.
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p; From 1899 to 1902, the U.S. deployed over 126,000 regular and volunteer soldiers to the archipelago. The federal government spent approximately $400 million to counter an insurgency that most officials in Washington D.C. ignored. The Americans lost 4,234 dead in addition to suffering 2,818 wounded. At least 16,000 Filipinos perished in three years of clashes. More than 100,000 civilians died from a cholera epidemic, which erupted as a result of contaminated food and water in the war-ravaged areas. Though tainted by the sensational stories of military atrocities, the American colors flew over the Philippines until 1942.
The Boxers
Given the weakness of China in the late nineteenth century, a number of European powers began carving out “spheres of influence” across the mainland. Moreover, Japan and the U.S. emerged as important rivals in the Pacific Rim. Under the protective guns of steel navies, American missionaries and merchants entered Asia with great expectations. In the words of Secretary Hay, they expected “a fair field and no favor.”
Beginning in 1899, Hay circulated a series of “Open Door notes” to London, Berlin, St. Petersburg, Rome, Paris, and Tokyo. His policy resembled the Monroe Doctrine in a sense, albeit in terms that transcended the western hemisphere. While acknowledging the interests of foreign nations in existing “spheres” within China, he urged them to allow wide access to the China market. “We do not want to rob China ourselves,” he wrote privately to McKinley, but “public opinion will not allow us to interfere with an army to prevent others from robbing her.” Though mostly a bluff, the U.S. pledged to protect China's territorial integrity. The Open Door Policy provided legitimacy to the burgeoning American interests in Asia while laying the groundwork for future military actions if warranted.
By 1900, a group of Chinese nationalists began calling themselves “Fists of Righteous Harmony,” or the Boxers. Adept at martial arts, they claimed to possess supernatural powers that made them invulnerable to bullets. Empress Dowager Cixi recruited nearly 30,000 into her army while declaring war on all “devils.” In a period of severe drought, one placard announced: “Heaven is now sending down eight million spirit soldiers to extirpate these foreign religions, and when this has been done, there will be a timely rain.” Denouncing the encroachments upon their traditional culture, the red-sashed warriors marched across the Chihli Province toward Peking. After destroying railroads, dismantling telegraphs, and burning churches, they besieged the Legation Quarter in the capital. Extending less than 1 square mile, the embassies of 11 foreign nations stood between the walls of the Tartar City and the Imperial City.
Sweeping through Peking, the Boxers began to “serenade” the Legation Quarters with rifle and cannon fire along the Tartar Wall. Refugees flocked to the compounds, while the rampage continued for weeks. On May 31, 1900, more than 50 marines arrived by rail to protect the U.S. embassy. “Thank God you've come,” exclaimed the U.S. minister Edwin H. Conger, who feared for his safety. Standing guard alone, Private Dan Daly held a barricade overnight with only a Lee straight-pull 6-mm rifle and a bandoleer of ammunition. Joining with a British relief expedition, Captain Bowman McCalla, skipper of the U.S.S. Newark, led 112 marines and sailors in a vain attempt to rescue the legations. Though causing little damage, a Chinese shell hit the U.S.S. Monocacy while anchored in port. Without consulting Congress, McKinley decided to deploy around 5,000 troops to quell the Boxer rebellion that summer.
Drawing personnel from ongoing operations in the Philippines and in Cuba, U.S. forces arrived in China along with British, French, Austrian, Italian, German, Russian, and Japanese troops. After landing at the Taku forts in June, a marine battalion under the command of Major Littleton W. T. Waller marched 30 miles to Tientsin. Members of the 9th Infantry Regiment and the 1st Marine Regiment arrived later than their counterparts, but they participated in the Battle of Tientsin on July 13. The Americans lost 23 dead and 73 wounded in a sharp engagement with the Boxers. The city fell to the coalition of forces the next day.
The coalition lacked an overall commander, even though the various commands worked together to form the China Relief Expedition. Disembarking from a U.S. warship that July, General Adna R. Chaffee led 2,500 soldiers and marines into the fray. A 48-year-old cavalryman, he experienced combat from Gettysburg to the Red River before reaching the rank of general in the Spanish–American War. His command in China included the 9th and 14th Infantry Regiments, a marine battalion, a cavalry troop, and a light battery of artillery. In concert with 20,000 troops from other nations, the expedition set out for Peking in early August.
The Americans reached Peking on August 14, when they gazed upon the Tartar Wall that rose nearly 30 feet high. No one had brought along scaling ladders, but Corporal Calvin P. Titus, a bugler from Company E of the 14th Infantry, climbed the wall to look around. “The coast is clear,” he shouted with confidence to his comrades below. After more soldiers reached the top and passed over the wall, they opened the Tung Pien gate for the rest to enter the city. They rescued Russian troops pinned down in the courtyard, while Captain Henry J. Reilly cleared the way with his horse-drawn cannons. However, British soldiers reached the Legation Quarter shortly before the Americans completed their dash of glory. Chaffee next ordered U.S. forces to enter the Imperial City, where Reilly fell from a bullet to his head. A few days later, leaders of the coalition entered the Forbidden City together to demand concessions from the empress.
Following the seizure of Peking, the coalition attempted to erase the last vestiges of the Boxer rebellion. Chaffee's command lost around 250 casualties overall, while the losses of others in the China Relief Expedition numbered in the thousands. Whereas the outcome vindicated the principles of the Open Door Policy, a temporary military government allotted different zones of occupation to participating nations. Observers described an “orgy of looting” by many soldiers, even though the U.S. sector featured improvements in sanitation, hospitals, policing, and schools. The next year, the Chinese dynasty signed the Boxer Peace Protocol. Accordingly, they agreed to pay an indemnity to the foreign governments. On September 7, 1901, American troops began their withdrawal from China.
A Progressive Defense
Americans entered the twentieth century with renewed passion for national defense, even as many debated the role of the armed forces around the world. With domestic disturbances on the rise, troops were summoned occasionally to quell unrest at home. Given the range of tasks assigned to military personnel, policymakers complained about the misuse of limited resources in general and the mismanagement of the War Department in particular. As a result, the federal government appeared receptive to calls for the reform of military affairs.
In the aftermath of the Spanish–American War, the McKinley administration formed a commission chaired by retired General Grenville M. Dodge to investigate military affairs. Commissioners questioned bureau chiefs as well as staff officers in the War Department, even visiting Army camps associated with misery and malfeasance. As the Commanding General of the Army, Miles testified that the unfortunate soldiers consumed “embalmed beef” with poisonous chemicals. Poor food, he posited, was “one of the serious causes of so much sickness and distress on the part of the troops.” A muckraking press highlighted the venality of the outgoing Secretary of War, thus making “Algerism” a synonym for the Army's ineptitude in contrast to the Navy's competence. Exposés of corruption and negligence tarnished the image of the War Department, but the commission concluded that most Army officers served “with earnestness and energy.”
No official played a more significant role in restoring the reputation of the War Department than Elihu Root, who became the Secretary of War during 1899. A New York attorney before his appointment to the cabinet, he assumed the post with a fresh outlook on the relationship between the armed forces and civil society. After immersing himself in the writings of the deceased General Emory Upton, he resolved to make the Army comparable to European models. In 1901, he urged Congress to increase the Army's manpower to 100,000. That year, they establish
ed the Army Nurse Corps to attract female professionals into military service. The “Root Reforms” included the first Field Service Regulations in the Army along with procedures that rewarded merit rather than seniority. Throughout his tenure at the War Department, he reiterated the axiom: “The real object of having an Army is to provide for war.”
Root posited that the officer corps needed an extended postgraduate program of professional military education. On November 27, 1901, he announced General Order 155 to establish the Army War College. A few years later, the first class of six captains and three majors convened to study plans for war and peace. Located originally at Washington Barracks, the educational institution launched by Root ensured that high-ranking officers received “intelligent and adequate preparation to repel aggression” against the U.S.
Root wanted to make voluntary service more professional, especially in regard to the nation's reserve component. Charles W. Dick, an officer in the Ohio National Guard and a Republican member of Congress, collaborated with the War Department to overhaul the militia system. The Militia Act, which was also known as the Dick Act, attempted to raise the state forces to federal standards. Passed in 1903, it established the National Guard as the “organized militia” under the War Department. Although the states retained military personnel for local emergencies, Congress provided for their dual service as a “reserve militia” to replenish the regular Army. In other words, the National Guard constituted both a traditional militia under the command of a governor and a federal reserve under the authority of the commander-in-chief. With a formula for payment of federal subsidies to states, policymakers promulgated guidelines for training, equipping, and mobilizing citizen soldiers. Thereafter, Guardsmen trained at least twice a month and once a year in a summer camp. They also participated in at least five days of maneuvers annually with Army regulars. Irrespective of the limitations imposed on the duration and the scope of militia service, the National Guard constituted the main recruiting base for volunteers.
The American Military - A Narrative History Page 35
