The American Military - A Narrative History

by Brad D. Lookingbill

  Just as Ho Chi Minh predicted, the protracted struggle weakened the U.S. With America's power declining around the world, North Korea captured the U.S.S. Pueblo and imprisoned the crew for nearly a year. Johnson halted the air strikes in Vietnam north of the 19th parallel and reluctantly abandoned Khe Sanh. For the remainder of the year, MACV attempted to restore security around Saigon and the coastal areas. The NVA, NLF, and Viet Cong avoided direct combat but instead maneuvered to improve their strategic positions. After a lengthy debate regarding the shape of the table, the Paris peace talks officially began that fall.

  After Tet, Johnson appointed Westmoreland as the Army Chief of Staff and turned command of MACV over to General Abrams, his deputy. Consequently, MACV began scaling down “big unit” operations. CIA officers created the Phoenix Program, which focused on eliminating a shadow government through an accelerated pacification campaign. Without officially changing the grand strategy, the American military tried to become “more flexible tactically” across South Vietnam.

  A Better War

  Former Vice President Nixon won the presidential election with campaign assurances of a “secret plan” to end the war. Upon taking office in 1969, the commander-in-chief intended to facilitate a withdrawal from Vietnam. American troop levels peaked at 543,000 that April, but the number declined thereafter. The National Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger, needed the armed forces to provide “some bargaining leverage” for the peace talks in Paris. Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird expected “Vietnamization” to create a strong, self-reliant South Vietnamese military – an objective espoused by the U.S. for over a decade.

  The Nixon administration placed the various and sundry operations in South Vietnam under the supervision of Abrams, the new MACV commander. “He deserves a better war,” wrote one journalist at the time. A tank commander during World War II, he possessed a “tough guy” aura that inspired the rank and file. In private, he retreated to the solitude of fine wine, history books, and classical music. “The kind of war that we have here can be compared to an orchestra,” he once said, because “it is sometimes appropriate to emphasize the drums or the trumpets or the bassoon – or even the flute.”

  Virtually everything changed in MACV when Abrams took command. He recognized that upgrading Saigon's military capabilities and dismantling Hanoi's covert infrastructure required more than arms. He orchestrated “one war,” which blended military actions with civil defense according to strategic plans. With “Vietnamizing” the war in mind, he never forgot the rigors of hard fighting and enemy attrition. However, he focused on the communist system of forward movement by attacking their “nose” – weapon caches and food supplies pushed out in advance of their offensives. He discouraged the overuse of firepower in combat, which sometimes resulted in collateral deaths among civilians. In and around Saigon, he insisted on assessments other than “body counts” as measures of merit. Instead of “search and destroy” missions, the American and ARVN units swept the countryside on behalf of interdiction. The military objective shifted to increasing population security in South Vietnam while gradually disengaging U.S. forces from the war effort.

  Until their counterparts in ARVN became more proficient, the only alternative to American boots on the ground was air power. Nixon decided to lift the conventional restraints on aerial bombings, which underscored what he called a “madman strategy.” He aimed to convince Hanoi of the risks involved in opposing a leader with his hand on the nuclear button. Beginning with Operation Menu, B-52s bombed cross-border bases in Cambodia. Later, secret raids hit targets in northern Laos. Nixon mused that it might be necessary to bomb communist strongholds into the Stone Age.

  Figure 14.3 A Boeing B-52D in Vietnam. Photo 061127-F-1234S-017, National Museum of the U.S. Air Force

  Communist forces infiltrated South Vietnam through the A Shau Valley, where they stored ammunition, rice, and equipment for an impending offensive in 1969. For years, “search and destroy” missions failed to eliminate the staging area at the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Beginning on May 10, the 9th Marine Regiment and elements of the 101st Airborne conducted Operation Apache Snow. In a familiar pattern, B-52s and howitzers bombarded the bunkers at Ap Bia Mountain. After torrential rainfall turned the denuded terrain into muck, American troops assailed Hill 937. The tenacious “grunts” reached the summit after 12 attempts and gave it the nickname “Hamburger Hill.” They found 630 dead NVA in the bunkers, but lost 241 comrades in the battle. In a controversial move, Abrams ordered U.S. forces to abandon the ground only a week after gaining it.

  Meanwhile, Nixon formally began shifting the burdens of fighting the Cold War to allies. That June, he met with Thieu at Midway Island and announced the immediate withdrawal of an Army division from Vietnam. Moreover, he provided an arms package that reached $925 million that year. Consequently, ARVN received 700,000 M-16 rifles, 12,000 M-60 machine guns, 6,000 M-70 grenade launchers, and 1,000 artillery pieces. A month later at Guam, Nixon spoke with journalists about the evolving plan. While committed to providing Southeast Asia with assistance, Americans expected allies to employ their own troops to oppose communist aggression. With a thawing in the Cold War, the Nixon Doctrine reduced the U.S. responsibility for armed intervention in the Third World.

  Even though Ho Chi Minh died on September 2, 1969, Hanoi pledged to continue the war for national unification. In Paris, the delegation at the negotiating table appeared resolute. First, they insisted on the withdrawal of all American troops. Next, they wanted the removal of Thieu from office. Finally, they insisted that the NLF participate in forming a new coalition government. While General Giap remained in command of the military, North Vietnamese leaders quarreled internally over the best way to deliver a deathblow to the regime in South Vietnam.

  By the next year, South Vietnam appeared to achieve measurable progress. With ARVN assuming greater responsibility for military operations, the proportion of the enemy killed in action by the South Vietnamese reached one-third of the total number. Moreover, nearly all of the hamlets were deemed “relatively secure.” As the security data improved, the introduction of “miracle rice” produced record harvests. In fact, rice production across South Vietnam increased by 700,000 metric tons in one year. In Saigon, Thieu championed the “Land to the Tiller” program that turned peasants into landowners. Thanks to the subtle dimensions of military power, Americans facilitated innovative efforts that enabled the rural population to see improvements.

  Nixon authorized a bold incursion in Cambodia to destroy the enemy's Central Office for South Vietnam, or COSVN. While supply bases stretched for miles along the border, COSVN served as a mobile headquarters for the insurgency. Beginning on May 1, 1970, a joint U.S. and South Vietnamese force crossed the border and pushed into the Parrot's Beak and Fishhook areas. In the weeks that followed, they cut a swath through guerrilla hideouts, storage sites, training camps, and field hospitals. One logistical hub became known as “The City,” because it contained mess halls, animal farms, supply stations, and weapon caches. Americans operated with their South Vietnamese counterparts in Cambodia until the end of June, but they never found the elusive COSVN.

  The Cambodian incursion sparked public outrage in the U.S, where college and university campuses erupted with protests. Given the frequency of civil disturbances nationwide, National Guard units were dispatched by governors again and again. At Kent State University in Ohio, Guardsmen attempted to quell rioting after a group of students burned down the ROTC building. On May 4, they opened fire on a demonstration, killing four and wounding nine. In Washington D.C., domestic terrorists detonated a black powder explosive at the headquarters of the National Guard Association of the U.S. A month later, Congress passed the Cooper–Church Amendment that prohibited the use of American troops outside of South Vietnam. Evidently, the Nixon administration underestimated the domestic fallout of widening the war in Indochina.

  Nixon crossed another line, authorizing MACV to organize an invasion of Laos. Operation
Lam Son 719 began on February 8, 1971, when 21,000 ARVN troops advanced to Tchepone. As they passed the Ho Chi Minh Trail, U.S. forces supported them indirectly with B-52s, fighter-bombers, helicopters, and artillery. They battled 36,000 NVA troops, while heavy rains and poor coordination slowed the advance. In early March, Thieu ordered a withdrawal from Laos. The Ho Chi Minh Trail remained functional, because the North Vietnamese simply shifted traffic farther westward. Nevertheless, MACV claimed that ARVN suffered 9,000 casualties compared with 14,000 NVA casualties. While expanding the field of battle with fewer resources, Lam Son 719 preempted a communist offensive that spring.

  A year later, the North Vietnamese launched the Easter Offensive to pursue a decisive victory in the war. On March 30, 1972, approximately 200,000 men poured across the borders on three fronts. Surprised by the ferocity of the invasion, the South Vietnamese retreated everywhere. The most devastating assaults occurred at Quang Tri Province, which fell to the North Vietnamese a month later. While refugees fled to Hue, NVA troops severed the highway connected to Saigon. They captured Loc Ninh and Dak To and began a risky drive to cut South Vietnam in half.

  Nixon responded vigorously to the Easter Offensive with aerial bombardments. From April to October, Operation Linebacker involved strategic nonnuclear strikes across North Vietnam. With more than 41,000 bombing sorties, the Air Force and the Navy delivered the first sustained campaign against the enemy since 1969. In addition, the Navy mined the ports of Haiphong, Cam Pha, Hon Gai, and Thanh Hoa while blockading the entire coast. To signal U.S. resolve, Kissinger halted the negotiations in Paris. As the last American combat units departed on August 23, 1972, the communist momentum in South Vietnam actually stalled. North Vietnam sacrificed more than 100,000 soldiers in the offensive without achieving their military objective. Shaken by the unexpected outcome, Hanoi replaced Giap with General Van Tien Dung.

  Despite the tug of gravity away from the theater of operations, the approach of the Nixon administration permitted the “Vietnamization” of the war. MACV arranged a reduction in American troop levels along with a strengthening of ARVN. At the same time, the aid to North Vietnam from the Soviet Union and China declined significantly. Bolstered by air power and naval gunfire, Saigon appeared to slow the military advances of Hanoi.

  Ending the Draft

  With social unrest in the U.S. mounting, the war in Vietnam became the defining event for the baby-boom generation. The draft-age population grew disillusioned, as millions of young men faced the prospect of fighting for a cause that seemed misguided. At the end of the 1960s, cultural shifts on the home front encouraged public opposition to an increasingly unpopular war.

  In contrast to earlier periods of the twentieth century, the Selective Service system struggled to generate quality recruits. Although a lottery made the calls more equitable after 1969, many draftees conspired with doctors to contrive physical and mental ailments. The average age of the soldier in Vietnam fell to 19, because most were fresh out of high school. Working-class Americans seldom escaped the conscription pool and often resented the indifference of “the thinking man” to military service.

  The privileges of money and status enabled many to escape military service. Between 1964 and 1973, around 65 percent of the draft-age males found routes to avoid donning uniforms. Deferments enabled undergraduate students to postpone entering the draft until they received a degree or reached the age of 24. Some went on to graduate school to make sure they never reported for duty. At least 200,000 individuals simply refused to obey draft notices, though only 4,000 of them ever served prison sentences for violating the law. Several thousand fled to Canada or Sweden, while record numbers sought conscientious-objector status. Of the 1,200 men in the Harvard senior class of 1970, only two went to Vietnam. Whatever their motives, the beneficiaries of American higher education eschewed military service.

  Meanwhile, the New Left and the counterculture emboldened the “anti-draft” movement. Around the country, organizations popularized draft-card burnings and denounced “the system.” They chanted: “Make Love, Not War” and “Ho, Ho, Ho Chi Minh – The NLF is Gonna Win.” At faculty and student “teach-ins,” the Army surplus jacket became an ironic statement of fashion. Protestors assailed military recruiting offices, poured blood on draft board records, and marched on the Pentagon. With disapproval of the war on the rise, U.S. newspapers published classified documents known collectively as the Pentagon Papers. In Congress, the “Winter Soldier” hearings publicized the alleged atrocities by American troops. John Kerry, a member of the Vietnam Veterans against the War, famously questioned a Senate panel: “How do you ask a man to be the last man to die for a mistake?”

  As service members endured a prolonged conflict, their morale began to dissipate. The one-year tour of duty contributed to the “short-timer” syndrome, which made some reluctant to risk their own lives for their “buddies” in combat. Green lieutenants often lacked the field experience and practical skills necessary to lead their platoons on patrols. Knowing that all U.S. forces would soon leave Vietnam, no one wanted to be the last casualty. Unfortunately, the absence of a clear military objective contributed to the deterioration of unit cohesion.

  The American military seemed to degenerate into a disgruntled, undisciplined mass. In 1971, an article in the Armed Forces Journal warned about an impending “collapse.” In the Army, desertion rates skyrocketed to 73.5 per thousand that year. Likewise, other branches recorded surges in desertions and AWOLs. The most alarming trend was “fragging,” that is, the killing or wounding of a superior by a subordinate using a fragmentation grenade. Between 1969 and 1971, the Army reported 730 incidents. While outright revolts remained rare, the Army compelled commanders to institute measures to prevent the dereliction of duty.

  To compound the problems on duty, the proliferation of drugs redefined the meaning of recreation. Many recruits abused drugs before entering military service, but the narcotics trafficking in Southeast Asia fed addictions throughout the ranks. Heroin, opium, and marijuana flowed from Laos, Burma, and Thailand into Vietnam. The Pentagon responded with programs for testing, detoxification, and treatment, yet most came too late. Tragically, drug use plagued the American military for years to come.

  The American military in Vietnam grappled with the same racial tensions that afflicted the U.S. during the period. African Americans, Hispanic Americans, and Asian Americans in uniform confronted prejudice at almost every turn. From barracks to firebases, skin color affected training, assignments, and promotions. Military personnel traded ethnic and racial slurs. Antagonism sometimes led to fistfights in chow lines or near latrines but seldom impeded the war effort. Despite the persistence of racism in the armed forces, most officers downplayed the racial unrest until the turmoil became disruptive enough to lead to major disturbances.

  Racial unrest produced occasional outbursts on Navy warships. On October 11, 1972, around 200 black sailors armed with clubs and wrenches roamed sections of the U.S.S. Kitty Hawk. They beat dozens of their fellow sailors before the Marine detachment and senior officers dissuaded them from further violence. A few weeks later, 50 black sailors staged a “sit-in” on board the U.S.S. Constellation. After removal from the carrier, many received discharges from active duty. Commanders worked to gain the trust of African Americans in uniform, but discrimination remained a chronic problem in the nation overall.

  Larger social and political trends in the nation contributed to the demise of the military profession. Public opinion polls rated soldiering among the least attractive jobs, ranking slightly above garbage collection. In civil society, heightened individualism, widespread permissiveness, and deepening cynicism undermined the allure of national service.

  After becoming the commander-in-chief, Nixon pledged to end “permanent conscription in a free society.” Army officials conducted a classified study called Project Volunteer in Defense of the Nation, or PROVIDE, which highlighted concerns about recruitment and retention. Although the DOD preferre
d reforming and retaining the Selective Service system, the Nixon administration pushed ahead with plans to replace the draft.

  To study the feasibility of replacing the draft, Nixon appointed an advisory commission chaired by Thomas S. Gates, a former Secretary of Defense. Meeting for the first time on May 15, 1969, the Gates Commission featured renowned intellectuals such as Milton Friedman, W. Allen Wallis, and Alan Greenspan – all free-market economists. They concluded that conscription imposed a “hidden tax” on civil society and should be ended as soon as possible. Through voluntary enlistments, competitive pay, and enhanced benefits, a smaller but more highly trained armed force represented a preferable alternative to the one created by “involuntary servitude.” They released the report to the public a year later. Nixon sent a message to Congress endorsing their call for an All-Volunteer Force, or AVF.

  Even if the drive behind the AVF came from civilian authorities, it led to profound institutional and cultural changes in the American military. At the Pentagon, Secretary Laird promulgated the “total force” concept as a means to achieve manpower goals without the expense of maintaining a large military. Specifically, the National Guard and Reserves contained the replacements to complete the force structure as a whole. Going forward, they would bear a greater burden for national defense. James R. Schlesinger, who became the Secretary of Defense in 1973, championed the policy, because it meant that the “total force” operated within the budgetary constraints imposed by Congress. Removing support capabilities from the active units and placing them in the reserve component permitted the augmentation of forces at a fraction of the cost.