While Howe and Hocquart exchanged pleasantries, Boscawen grew fearful that the quarry might escape, and so in accordance with his orders he signaled Dunkirk to "engage the enemy" and it let loose a devastating broadside. Torbay joined the fray. Surprised and outgunned, Hocquart fired a leeward gun to signal surrender. As Howe secured Alcide, other ships in his squadron gave chase to the remaining two Frenchmen. Within two hours Lys, with eight companies of soldiers, was captured. But the third ship, Boyal Dauphin, escaped.
In public Howe and Boscawen rejoiced at their small victory. In private, however, they admitted that these three ships were simply stragglers. Altogether, sixteen of the eighteen ships that had left Brest arrived at either Louisbourg or Quebec. Only eight of the seventy-eight companies bound for Canada fell into enemy hands. Boscawen confessed to his wife, "What I have done will add fewel to the fire only." When the news arrived in London, Lord Hardwicke, the lord chancellor, put it to Newcastle, "We have done too much or too little."19
Boscawen's actions at sea were reminiscent of Washington's attack at Jumonville Glen. Both men initiated an attack against forces with whom their nation was ostensibly at peace. Both claimed to be acting under orders. Boscawen clearly was, but Washington's case is less certain. In both instances, however, British forces had committed acts of war in a time of peace.
Among those safely delivered to Quebec was Canada's new governor, Pierre de Rigaud de Vaudreuil de Cavagnial, the marquis de Vaudreuil. Duquesne had requested and been granted leave to return to France. Vaudreuil, who was born in Quebec in 1698, was returning home. His father was a petty nobleman from Languedoc who had come to New France earlier as an officer in the colonial troops. In 1703 Louis XIV appointed him governor of New France. The marquis secured a commission for his son, and for nearly twenty years the younger Vaudreuil served as an officer in the colony. The family was well respected in Canada and enjoyed excellent connections in Paris. After the elder Vaudreuil died in 1725, his wife stayed in close contact with her friends at Versailles. With his mother's help, Vaudreuil moved up several notches in the colonial administration, eventually securing appointment as governor of Louisiana in 1742;. From New Orleans Vaudreuil watched uneasily as British influence grew over the tribes in the Illinois, Ohio, and Carolina country. In his dispatches home he urged the government to take strong measures, and he did all that he could to reinforce the small French posts along the Mississippi and in the Illinois country. He paid close attention to the Indians, gaining valuable experience in the complex negotiations required to keep the tribes faithful.
Louisiana was a backwater, a mere way station on Vaudreuil's route of ambition. His goal was to follow in his father's footsteps to become governor of New France. He lobbied incessantly for the post. Jonquiere's death in 17525, he thought, gave him the opening, but Duquesne beat him to it. Vaudreuil toyed with the notion of retiring to a chateau on the ancestral lands in Languedoc, but fortunately for him, Duquesne did not view life in New France with the same fondness that Vaudreuil did, and after less than two years as governor, he was pleased to return to France to resume his career as a naval officer. Finally, Vaudreuil had his chance. The king appointed him to be the first Canadian-born governor, and on April 1, 1755, he received his secret instructions: "His Majesty is firmly resolved to maintain his rights and his possessions against pretensions so excessive and so unjust; and whatever his love for peace, will not make for its preservation any sacrifice but those which will accord with the dignity of his Crown and the protection he owes his subjects."20
Pierre de Rigaud de Vaudreuil de Cavagnial, the marquis de Vaudreuil
Vaudreuil crossed to Canada in the company of General Jean-Armand Dieskau. A protege of the renowned Marshal Maurice Saxe, Dieskau had been the military governor of Brest when he was tapped to command the army being sent to Canada. Although he was the senior military officer in Canada, Dieskau was subordinate to Vaudreuil. Neither the governor nor the general wasted any time. Within a few days of their arrival Vaudreuil was rallying the people of Canada, and Dieskau was on his way to Fort Niagara to organize an expedition against the "pretensions" of the English at Oswego.
According to the grand strategy laid out at Alexandria, Governor William Shirley was to march to Oswego with the Fiftieth and Fifty-first regiments, and from there launch an attack across the lake against Niagara. Almost as soon as he left Alexandria, however, the plan faltered. Shirley was too inexperienced a commander to handle the enormous logistical problem confronting him. Between Albany and Oswego lay nearly two hundred miles of rough terrain through which he had to move men and materiel. Within a few weeks the challenge had bogged him down to such a degree that he lost any hope of reaching Niagara for at least a year. In contrast, at the other end of New York the indefatigable William Johnson had already succeeded in gathering a large force of militia and Iroquois, mostly Mohawk, to march against Crown Point. Johnson's threat to Crown Point was far more advanced and organized than Shirley's stumbling march toward Niagara. For the moment at least, Niagara was safe, and so Vaudreuil, concerned about Johnson's advance, recalled Dieskau from the west and dispatched him to meet the threat aimed at Crown Point.
Johnson had returned from Alexandria with a new title, colonel of the Six Nations and "Sole Agent and Superintendent of the said Indians." In his new role Johnson reported to Braddock and drew funds directly from the royal treasury. Johnson's star rose even higher when he obtained a commission as major general in the provincial militia, making him one of the most powerful men in America.21
The Iroquois, particularly Johnson's close friends the Mohawk, were key to the colonel's plan, but their support was far from certain. Nearly a year had gone by since the debacle at the Albany conference, but little had changed. The British had offered no new proposals to guarantee the safety of their villages. How, the chiefs asked, would the English protect them from the wrath of the French? Adding to the Mohawk's uneasiness was a long-standing division within their own nation. For generations a significant number of Catholic Mohawk had lived in Kahnawake near Montreal. Faithful to church and the French king, these Mohawk were important allies for the French. Yet because they kept in contact with their New York brethren, they were also suspect. Dieskau doubted their "fidelity."22 Vaudreuil, on the other hand, dismissed the general's concerns and assured him that the domiciled Mohawk were reliable. The British too were ambivalent and uncertain about "their" Mohawk. The Albany leaders accused the local Mohawk of being in league with their Kahnawake cousins. Like Vaudreuil, William Johnson dismissed these concerns, and in June, to confirm their loyalty, he invited the Iroquois to Mount Johnson.
The gathering at Mount Johnson was the largest assemblage of Indians ever seen in New York. By some accounts, more than one thousand men, women, and children camped in the orchards and fields surrounding Johnson's home. ("They have spoiled my meadow and destroy every green thing about my estate," he later complained.)23 For nearly two weeks, from June 21 to July 4, the Iroquois leaders sat with Johnson. Like the convening of Parliament, or muster day in a New England town, the meeting was marked by endless rounds of drinking, eating, dancing, smoking, and debating. Both the English and Indians caucused among themselves and then returned to the public council meeting to lay before the audience opinions and proposals. A moment of high theater occurred when Johnson stood and told the chiefs, "My war kettle is on the fire, my canoe is ready to put into the water, my gun is loaded, my sword by my side, and my axe sharpened! I desire and expect you will now take up the hatchet and join with us! "24 Johnson's impassioned rhetoric notwithstanding, the nations meeting at Mount Johnson were not yet ready to charge into war. Their natural reluctance to commit themselves ripened to deep skepticism when "the incoherent, unexpected, unintelligible, not to be credited damned bad news" of Braddock's disaster came up the river.25 In spite of the ill tidings, the elderly Mohawk chief Hendrick (They anoguin) remained Johnson's faithful friend.
Probably in his midseventies by then, Hend
rick traveled about the Mohawk Valley trying to recruit warriors for Johnson's march against Crown Point. Unfortunately, his influence did not reach into Canada, and there was little he could do to persuade the Kahnawake Mohawk to remain neutral. Hendrick's and Johnson's overtures to them were rebuffed with the following reply: "[By] Religion and Treaties [we are] so united to the French, they [we] must obey their orders."26
Johnson's problems recruiting Indians were compounded by the ungenerous behavior of his archrival, Governor Shirley, who detested him. Johnson heartily reciprocated the sentiment, calling him "my inveterate enemy."27 Their relationship only worsened when Shirley, as a result of Braddock's death, became commander in chief in North America.
Late in July 1755 the colonel left Mount Johnson and established his headquarters at Albany. Captain William Eyre, an experienced engineer who had come to America with Braddock, joined him. It was Eyre's good fortune that Braddock had sent him north to assist Johnson before the general left on his ill-fated march to the Monongahela. Through July and early August, as the New England militia assembled, Johnson laid plans for his march on Crown Point. He planned to move his army in three stages. The first objective was to move up the Hudson forty miles and establish a strong base at the Great Carrying Place (Fort Edward, also known as Fort Lyman). This was the northernmost point of navigation on the Hudson, and the southern terminus of a fourteen-mile portage running northwest to the southern tip of Lac Sacrament (Lake George), where Johnson intended to plant his second base, later to be called Fort William Henry. Once he controlled the lake, Johnson intended to sail to the northern end, build a third base (Ticonderoga), and from there launch his final assault on Crown Point. Like Braddock, he faced the daunting challenge of moving men through a hostile wilderness, albeit over shorter distances, much of them over water.28
Fort Edward was the key link in Johnson's logistical chain. To protect the depot and its precious stores, Eyre laid out a large stockade surrounding an array of barracks and warehouses. The main gate faced west toward the river landing, where every day bateaux arrived from Albany delivering men and materiel for the campaign. Not even Eyre's substantial stockade and numerous buildings could accommodate the flood of supplies floated up from Albany. Soldiers and sutlers spilled out beyond the walls and made camp among stacked barrels of provisions, gunpowder, and other stores. The post was fast becoming one of the largest towns in North America.
Meanwhile Johnson's axmen were working their way north, widening the portage path to Lac Sacrament.
On August 14 Johnson joined his men at Fort Edward. He brought fifty Mohawk, including his "brother" Hendrick. Some of the New England militia were stunned by the wild appearance of Johnsons Indian friends, noting that "they had juels in Their noses. Their faces painted with all Colouers."29 Johnson broke camp at Fort Edward on the morning of August 26 and marched for Lac Sacrament with fifteen hundred militia, mostly New Engenders, and forty Indians. Three days later he pitched his headquarters tent on the shores of the lake, which, in order "to honor His Majesty [and] to ascertain his undoubted dominion here," he promptly renamed Lake George.30 While his men gathered timber and brush to form a temporary barrier around the camp, Johnson sent Eyre to scout a site for a permanent fortification. The next day two hundred more Indians arrived, and Johnson, fearing that the season was getting late, sent word back to Fort Edward to hurry more supplies ahead, including bateaux to be launched on the lake.
There was an eerie silence along the shores of Lake George. Johnson reported, "We have no Interuption'from the Enemy," and then he added boastfully, "I do not dread a Surprise." But where were the French? For the moment, however, Johnson's chief worry was more with his own fractious militia, whose ill discipline and contempt for military routine created a scene of "disorderly management."31 Ill health and improper hygiene were the immediate enemies. The "bloody flux" (dysentery) was ever present and ravaged Fort Edward. When he arrived at the post, Colonel Ralph Burton, one of the lucky survivors from Braddock's march, reported that "between five and six hundred [are] sick. Bury daily from five to eight men, and officers in proportion."32 British army standing orders required the men to keep standards of personal hygiene, wash their clothes, and dig latrines at distant spots. Militia, ignorant of the hazards of camp life, dismissed the orders as just more harassment by the regulars. Fort William Henry, according to Burton, was even worse.
* * *
The French were waiting at Crown Point. Ten days before Johnson set out from Fort Edward, Dieskau had left Montreal with seven hundred soldiers from the recently arrived regiments, sixteen hundred Troupes de la Marine and militia, and seven hundred Indians—all three thousand, according to their commander, "panting for the attack." Dieskau, however, was not sure what to attack. For two weeks he remained at Crown Point waiting for the Indians to bring him intelligence about the English. He was sorely disappointed. According to Dieskau, the Kahnawake Mohawk were "spoiled." "Never," he complained on September 7, "was I able to obtain from them a faithful scout."33 A few days later a Canadian scout reported that three thousand enemy were at Fort Edward. Unaware that Johnson had already moved his force north, Dieskau marched toward Fort Edward to attack. After a few days on the march Dieskau learned that Johnson had arrived at Lake George, leaving barely five hundred men to guard Fort Edward. Dieskau saw a chance to sweep around the English at the lake and strike their base camp. With a picked force, he set out on a rapid four-day march.
Successfully avoiding detection, Dieskau led his force south along the lake's west shore. By the evening of September 7 he was within striking distance of Fort Edward, and he planned a night attack. For this, however, he needed the Kahnawake Mohawk to guide his soldiers along the unfamiliar terrain. Unaccountably, the scouts got lost, and Dieskau spent the night in the forest. Having spoiled any hope of a surprise assault on Fort Edward, the next morning Dieskau's Indian allies announced they had no intention of storming the well-defended stockade. They preferred to move north to attack Johnson's unfortified lake camp, where they believed (wrongly, as it turned out) that the defenses were weak and that there was no artillery. Furious, but restrained, Dieskau had little choice but to agree. He dared not risk moving through the forest without Indian allies. He broke camp and sent scouts ahead to guide him toward the lake.
As the French were stirring from camp, Johnson was at Lake George. His scouts reported the stale information that the French were marching toward Fort Edward. Johnson quickly ordered one thousand militia under the command of Colonel Ephraim Williams to march to the fort's relief.
Rutted and narrow, the road between the lake and Fort Edward twisted and climbed gradually over hills and around ponds and streams. Along the road's edge thick forest crowded close, providing ample cover for any lurking enemy, while the hills and curves limited visibility ahead and to the rear.
About eight in the morning Williams's militia, along with two hundred Mohawk led by Hendrick, headed south toward Fort Edward. Despite his age, Hendrick rode at the very front of Williams's column. Behind him were his warriors, moving quickly in single file.
Dieskau's Mohawk alerted their general that the English were approaching. Hastily, Dieskau prepared an ambush. He ordered the Mohawk to conceal themselves in the woods until the English column passed so they could attack them from the rear. On the flanks of the road he placed his Canadians, whose task would be to pour fire into the enemy ranks as they passed between them. Ahead, across the road hidden by a rise, he marshaled his regulars in line formation to block the advance. It was a neat cul de sac. By the time Hendricks and Williams saw the French regulars, they would be covered on both sides and in the rear.
As the English Mohawk drew near, a French Mohawk, against orders, called out suddenly to Hendrick, "Who goes?" No Mohawk in either camp needed to be told who Hendrick was. The call was a warning to a cousin. Hendrick reined in his horse and turned toward the woods. He called to his Kahnawake brothers that they ought to join him and the English to repel th
e French invaders. The French officers were dumbstruck. This conversation in the middle of the road upended their entire plan. Dieskau described it as "the moment of treachery."34 A shot rang out, and Hendrick fell from his saddle. The battle was on.
At first the French held the advantage. Unnerved by their leader's fall, Hendrick's Mohawk fell back as Williams's militia advanced up the road. From the flanks the Canadians poured fire into the English. Several militia fell, including Colonel Ephraim Williams. The French Mohawk, however, failed to close the rear gate, allowing the English to fall back. As soon as Johnson heard shots—"the marks of a warm engagement . . . about three or four miles" away—he sent off three hundred men to reinforce Williams. By this time, however, Williams's men, without their colonel, were retreating back toward the lake.35
As the sound of fire drew nearer, Johnson ordered his men to throw up a barricade of brush, limbs, barrels, bateaux, wagons, and anything else that could stop a musket ball. Captain Eyre's men hauled cannon into place to cover the hasty defense. Down the road came the militia, running at double time to stay ahead of the French and Indians clamoring at their heels. The provincials barely made it behind the barricade. At half past eleven, nearly two hours after the first shot had been fired on the road, the French regulars came into Johnson's view. In perfect order the soldiers of La Reine and Languedoc drew up on line 150 yards in front of the English position.
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