by Philip Short
The small, crowded room where the meeting was held overlooked an inner courtyard. In the centre, a brazier full of glowing charcoal threw its puny heat at the damp, raw cold of the Zunyi winter. Wang Jiaxiang and another wounded general lay stretched out on bamboo chaise-longues. Braun and his interpreter sat away from the main group, near the door.
Bo Gu, as acting Party leader, presented the main report. He argued that the loss of the central Red base area and the military disasters that had followed were due not to faulty policy, but to the enemy's overwhelming strength and the support the nationalists had received from the imperialist Powers.
Zhou Enlai spoke next. He acknowledged having made errors. But he, too, refused to concede that the policy had been wrong. Zhou still had hopes of saving something from the ruins.
Zhang Wentian then presented the case for a change in strategy, which had been alluded to though not discussed openly at Liping and Houchang, and Mao followed up with a full-scale attack on the troika and its methods.19 Braun remembered, forty years later, that he spoke not extempore, as he usually did, but from a manuscript, ‘painstakingly prepared’.20 The fundamental problem, Mao said, was not the strength of the enemy: it was that the Party had deviated from the ‘basic strategic and tactical principles with which the Red Army [had in the past] won victories’, in other words, the ‘flexible guerrilla strategy’ which he and Zhu De had developed. But for that, he claimed, the nationalist encirclement would probably have been defeated. Instead, the Red Army had been ordered to fight a defensive, positional war, building blockhouses to counter the enemy's blockhouses, dispersing its forces in a vain attempt to preserve ‘every inch of soviet territory’ and abandoning mobile warfare. Temporarily surrendering territory could be justified, Mao said. Jeopardising the Red Army's strength could not, because it was through the army – and the army alone – that territory could be regained.21
Mao laid the blame for these errors squarely on Otto Braun. The Comintern adviser had imposed wrong tactics on the army, he said, and his ‘rude method of leadership’ had led to ‘extremely abnormal phenomena’ within the Military Council, a reference to Braun's hectoring, dictatorial style, which was widely resented. Bo Gu, Mao declared, had failed to exert adequate political leadership, allowing errors in military line to go unchecked.
When Mao sat down, Wang Jiaxiang launched his own tirade against Braun's methods. Another Moscow-trained leader, He Kaifeng, then sprang to Bo's defence. Some of those present, like Chen Yun, a former print-worker who had been close to Zhou in Shanghai, found Mao's attack one-sided.22 Although Chen had no military role, he was a Standing Committee member and his opinions carried weight. Others may have had in the back of their minds a message received from Wang Ming in Moscow shortly before they left the base area, indicating that the Comintern took a favourable view of Mao's experience as a military leader.23 The ground commanders, whose armies had had to pay the price of the troika's mistakes, also weighed in. Peng Dehuai, a gruff, outspoken general who cared for only two things in life, the victory of the communist cause and the welfare of his men, likened Braun to ‘a prodigal son, who had squandered his father's goods’ – a reference to the loss of the base area for which Peng, with Mao and Zhu, had expended so much time and blood.
Braun himself sat immobile in his corner near the door, smoking furiously, as his interpreter, growing increasingly agitated and confused, tried to translate what was said. When he finally spoke, it was to reject the accusations en bloc. He was merely an adviser, he said; the Chinese leadership, not he, was responsible for the policies it followed.
This was disingenuous. Under Stalin in the 1930s a Comintern representative, even an adviser, had extraordinary powers. Yet there was some truth in what he said. Braun had not had the last word on military affairs. That had rested with Zhou Enlai.
Mao had no illusions that Zhou was his real adversary. He had known it since Zhou had arrived in the Red base area at the end of 1931 and unceremoniously elbowed him aside. Neither the amiable Zhang Wentian nor, still less, Bo Gu, was a serious contender for ultimate power. Zhou Enlai was. But to have attacked Zhou head-on at Zunyi would have been to tear the leadership apart in a battle which Mao could not win. So, in a move characteristic of his political and military style, he concentrated his attack on the weakest points of Zhou's armoury, Braun and Bo Gu, while leaving his chief opponent a face-saving way out.
Zhou took it. On the second day of the conference he spoke again. This time he acknowledged that the military line had been ‘fundamentally incorrect’, and made a lengthy self-criticism. It was the kind of manoeuvre at which Zhou excelled. From being Mao's opponent, he transformed himself into an ally. Mao, of course, knew better. So did Zhou. But for the moment there was a truce.
The resolution drawn up afterwards excoriated Zhou's two colleagues in the troika for their ‘extremely bad leadership’. Braun was accused of ‘treating war as a game’, ‘monopolising the work of the Military Council’ and using punishment rather than reason to suppress ‘by all available means’ views which differed from his own. Bo Gu was held to have committed ‘serious political mistakes’. But Zhou escaped unscathed, even managing, on paper at least, to achieve a short-lived promotion: when the troika was officially dissolved, he took over its powers with the cumbersome title of ‘final decision-maker on behalf of the Central Committee in dealing with military affairs’. His role in the débâcle that had preceded the Zunyi conference was passed over in silence. The resolution condemned the ‘elephantine’ supply columns which had slowed the advance, but omitted to say that it was Zhou who had organised them. It referred to ‘the leaders of the policy of pure defence’, and on one occasion, to ‘Otto Braun and the others’, but did not say who those ‘others’ were. Zhou was mentioned explicitly only once, as having given the ‘supplementary report’ following Bo Gu's. Even then, in all copies of the resolution except those distributed to the highest-ranking cadres, the three characters of his name were left blank.
Mao was named to the Politburo Standing Committee, and became Zhou's chief military adviser. Small recompense, it might seem, for two years in the wilderness. But, as so often in China, the spirit of these decisions counted far more than the letter. Even Braun acknowledged that ‘most of those at the meeting’24 ended up in agreement with Mao. In spirit, Mao's cause had triumphed. Zhou, notwithstanding his new title, was identified with the discredited leadership whose policies had been condemned.
Over the next few months the spirit was given flesh.25 Early in February, Bo Gu was replaced as acting Party leader by Mao's ally, Zhang Wentian. A month later a Front Headquarters was established, with Zhu De as Commander and Mao as Political Commissar, which effectively removed a large measure of Zhou's operational control. Soon afterwards, his power was further eroded when a new troika was established, consisting of Zhou, Mao, and Wang Jiaxiang. By early summer, when the Red Army succeeded in crossing the River of Golden Sand into Sichuan, Mao had established himself as its uncontested leader.
Other battles lay ahead. It would be eight more years before Mao was formally installed as Chairman, the title he would keep until his death. But Zhou's challenge was over. He would pay dearly for it. In 1943, his position was so precarious that the former head of the Comintern, Georgii Dimitrov, pleaded with Mao not to have him expelled from the Party.26 Mao kept him. Not because of Dimitrov but because Zhou was too useful to waste. The future Premier was instead humiliated. In the new Party Central Committee, formed two years later, he ranked twenty-third.
Twenty-five years after Zunyi, in the spring of 1961, Mao was aboard his private train, travelling through his home province of Hunan in southern China.27
The years seemed to have been good to him. Adulated and glorified as China's Great Helmsman, the ageing, corpulent figure whose moon face gazed out serenely from the Gate of Heavenly Peace appeared to the rest of the world as undisputed ruler of the most populous nation on earth and standard-bearer of a puritanical global revolution
which the fleshpots of Khrushchevite revisionism had abandoned.
Yet Mao was not as the rest of the world imagined.
He was accompanied on this journey, as on all such trips, by a number of attractive young women with whom he shared, severally or together, the pleasures of an oversized bed, which was specially installed wherever he went, not so much for carnal reasons as to accommodate the piles of books he insisted on keeping at his side.28 Like Stalin, who, after his wife's suicide, was provided with attractive ‘housekeepers’ by his security chief, Lavrentii Beria, Mao in late middle age had given up on family life. He found in his relations with girls a third his own age a normality which was denied him elsewhere.
By the 1960s Mao was totally cut off from the country that he ruled, so isolated by his eminence that bodyguards and advance parties choreographed his every move. Sex was his one freedom, the one moment in his day when he could treat other human beings as equals and be treated as such in return. A century earlier the boy Emperor, Tongzhi, used to slip out of the palace incognito, accompanied by one of his courtiers, to visit the brothels of Beijing. For Mao that was impossible. Women came to him. They revelled in his power. He revelled in their bodies. ‘I wash my prick in their cunts,’ he told his personal physician, a strait-laced man whom he took a perverse delight in shocking. ‘I was nauseated,’ the good doctor wrote afterwards.29
Mao's peccadilloes, like the private lives of all the leaders, were hidden behind an impenetrable curtain of revolutionary purity. But on the train one afternoon that February, the veil was suddenly pierced.
He had spent the night with a young woman teacher and, as was his custom, had risen late and then left to attend a meeting. Afterwards she was talking with other members of Mao's suite when a technician joined them. Mao's doctor takes up the story:
‘I heard you talking today,’ the young technician suddenly said to the teacher, interrupting our idle chatter.
‘What do you mean you heard me talking?’ she responded. ‘Talking about what?’
‘When the Chairman was getting ready to meet [Hunan First Secretary] Zhang Pinghua, you told him to hurry up and put on his clothes.’
The young woman blanched. ‘What else did you hear?’ she asked quietly.
‘I heard everything,’ he answered, teasing.30
Thus did Mao discover that, on the orders of his senior colleagues, for the previous eighteen months all his conversations, not to mention his lovemaking, had been bugged and secretly tape-recorded.31 At the time, the only heads to roll, and those not literally, were of three low-level officials, among them the hapless technician. But four years later, when the first political tremors announcing the Cultural Revolution began to roil the surface calm of Party unity, Mao's fellow leaders would have done well to have reflected more deeply on what had led them to approve those secret tape-recordings.
In one sense their motives had been innocent enough. The six men who, with Mao, made up the Politburo Standing Committee, at the summit of a Party which now counted 20 million members, were all Zunyi veterans, part of the minuscule elite which had accompanied him throughout the long odyssey to win power. By the early 1960s, they found the Chairman increasingly difficult to read. They wanted advance warning of what he was thinking, so as not to be caught off-guard by a sudden change in political line or an off-the-cuff remark to a foreign visitor. Yang Shangkun, another Zunyi survivor, who headed the Central Committee's General Office, decided that modern technology, in the shape of recording machines, was the obvious answer. From that standpoint it was almost a compliment. Mao had achieved such Olympian status that his every word must be preserved. But it also reflected an uneasy awareness within the Politburo of the mental gulf that had developed between the Chairman and his subordinates – which was all that the other leaders now were.
From this mental chasm sprang an ideological and political divide which, before the decade was out, would convulse all China in an iconoclastic spasm of terror, destroying both the Zunyi fellowship and the ideas that it had espoused.
The struggle in the 1960s was more subtle, more complex, and ultimately far bloodier and more ruthless than that of thirty years before. Small wonder: all that had been at stake at Zunyi was the leadership of a ragtag army of 30,000 men playing an apparently dwindling role on the periphery of Chinese politics. In Beijing the battle was for control of a nation which would soon number more than a billion people. But the ground rules were the same. On that earlier occasion, Mao himself had spelt them out:
Under unfavourable conditions, we should refuse … battle, withdraw our main forces back to a suitable distance, transfer them to the rear or flanks of the enemy and concentrate them in secret, induce the enemy to commit mistakes and expose weaknesses by tiring and wearing him out and confusing him, and thus enable ourselves to gain victory in a decisive battle.32
‘War is politics,’ he wrote later. ‘Politics is war by other means.’33
I The Communist International (Comintern) was established by Lenin, in March 1919, as an instrument whereby Moscow could control the activities of foreign communist parties. These were treated as Comintern branches under the orders of a Russian-dominated Executive Committee.
CHAPTER ONE
A Confucian Childhood
In winter, in Hunan, the wind howls bone-cold across bare fields of dry yellow earth, kicking up the dust so that it stings the eyes of the horses and makes men squint as they lean into the frozen air, their faces like leather masks. This is the dead season of the year. The peasants, in unheated mud-brick huts, bundle themselves up in layers of dirty, quilted cotton, drawing their hands up into their sleeves so that only their heads protrude warily from the folds of blue cloth, tortoise-like, waiting for better days.
Mao was born into a Hunanese peasant household in the village of Shaoshan, a few days after the winter solstice, the great mid-winter festival when the Emperor Guangxu in far-off Beijing was borne in solemn procession to the Temple of Heaven to perform the sacrificial rites and give thanks for another year safely passed.1 It was the nineteenth day of the eleventh month of the Year of the Snake by the old calendar, December 26 1893 by the new.2
By tradition, which was strictly adhered to in the case of a firstborn son, the baby was not bathed until three days after the birth.3 A fortune-teller was then called in and a horoscope drawn up, which showed that the family was lacking in the water element. Mao's father therefore named him Zedong, because the character ze, ‘to anoint’, which has the secondary meaning, ‘beneficent’,4 is held in Hunanese geomantic lore to remedy such a deficiency.I That marked the start of a year of the Buddhist and Daoist folk-rituals with which Chinese peasants through the ages have tempered the harshness of their existence, adding a touch of colour and excitement to the severe Confucian teachings around which their lives were fashioned and society revolved. After four weeks, the baby's head was shaved, apart from a small tuft left on the crown by which ‘to hold him to life’. A few copper cash, or sometimes a small silver padlock, attached to a red cord, were placed around his neck for the same purpose. In some families, the hair that had been cut was mixed with the hairs of a dog and sewn into the child's clothing so that evil spirits would see him as an animal and leave him alone. Others made a boy-child wear an earring so that the spirits would think he was a girl and not worth bothering with.
By the standards of the time, Mao's family was comfortably off.5 His father, Shunsheng,6 had enlisted at the age of sixteen in the army of the Viceroy of Hunan and Hubei, and within five or six years had accumulated a small capital, with which he bought land. By the time Mao was born, the family owned two-and-a-half-acres of rice paddy, a substantial holding in a county renowned as being among the wealthiest and most fertile in one of the richest rice-growing provinces in China.7 His father, a thrifty man who counted every copper cash, later bought another acre and took on two farm labourers. He gave them a daily ration of rice and, as a special concession once a month, a dish of rice cooked with eggs – b
ut never meat.
His penny-pinching coloured Mao's image of his father from an early age. ‘To me,’ he later recalled pointedly, ‘he gave neither eggs nor meat.’ Although there was always enough to go round, the family ate frugally. To Mao as a small boy, this stinginess was compounded by a lack of paternal affection, a deficiency made all the more glaring by the warmth and gentleness of his mother. It blinded him to his father's good points, the single-mindedness, drive and determination which Mao would later demonstrate in such abundance in his own life. While still a child he came to view the family as split into two camps: his mother and himself on one side, his father on the other.
A combination of parsimony and unrelenting grind soon made Mao's father one of the most prosperous men in Shaoshan, which then had a population of about 300 families, most of them also surnamed Mao, theirs being the dominant clan.
In those days, a peasant family in Hunan was thought to be doing well if it had an acre-and-a-half of land and a three-roomed house.8 Mao's parents had more than twice that much, and built a large, rambling farmhouse, with a grey-tiled roof and upturned eaves, beside a cascade of terraced rice-fields tumbling down a narrow valley. Pine woods stood behind and there was a lotus pond in front. Mao had a bedroom to himself, an almost unheard-of luxury, and when he was older would sit up late at night reading, hiding his oil-lamp behind a blue cloth so that his father would not see. Later, after his brothers were born, they too had rooms of their own.9 His father's capital amounted to two or three thousand Chinese silver dollars, ‘a great fortune in that small village’, as Mao himself acknowledged.10 Rather than extend his own land-holdings, he bought mortgages on other peasants' land, thus indirectly becoming a landlord.11 He also purchased grain from poor farmers in the village and sent it for resale in the county seat, Xiangtan, thirty miles away.12 A sprawling agglomeration of several hundred thousand people, Xiangtan was then the hub of the provincial tea trade and an important entrepot and financial centre because of its position on the Xiang River, Hunan's largest navigable waterway and the main artery of trade in the province. From Shaoshan, it was two days' journey by oxcart along a rutted earthen track, although porters could do it in one, carrying 80 kilograms of merchandise on their backs.
