by Philip Short
169. Jin Chunming, pp. 243–4.
170. Teiwes and Sun, Tragedy of Lin Biao, p. 128, n. 47.
171. Barnouin and Yu, p. 160; Peking Review, Sept. 13 1968.
172. Zhou was especially vehement. In a statement appended to the report of the Central Case Examination Group, which recommended Liu's expulsion, he wrote: ‘The criminal Liu is a big traitor, big scab, big spy, big foreign agent and collaborator who sold out the country. He is full of the five poisons and a counter-revolutionary guilty on more than ten accounts’ (Gao Wenqian, Zhou Enlai, p. 181).
173. Yan and Gao, pp. 356–62. Kuo, Classified Chinese Documents, p. 40.
174. CHOC, 15, p. 195.
175. Wang Nianyi, Da dongluande niandai, pp. 311–15; Yan and Gao, pp. 159–60; Barnouin and Yu, pp. 171–5; MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, Ch 16; History of the CCP, Chronology, pp. 344–5. In July 1967, Mao had told Wang Li: ‘If Lin Biao's health doesn't hold out, then it will be Deng Xiaoping who comes forward’ (Teiwes, Frederick C. and Sun, Warren, The End of the Maoist Era, M. E. Sharpe, Armonk, 2007, p. 25). Mao's remark about Deng having a great future was made to Khrushchev in Beijing in October 1959 (not to Kosygin, as Ross Terrill insisted when reviewing the first edition of this book [CQ 163, 2000, p. 872]).
176. Barnouin and Yu, pp. 175–8; MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, Ch 17.
177. MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, pp. 280–81.
178. There is now broad agreement that the total death toll from political violence in the period 1966–76 was between two and three million. In 1980 Hu Yaobang had suggested a figure of one million. Earlier estimates (for example, CHOC 15, pp. 213–14) were even lower. But in 1982, Ye Jianying told a discussion meeting during the 12th Party Congress that the true figure was of the order of 2.1 million dead with an estimated 557,000 unaccounted for.
179. The following account is drawn principally from Zhang Yunsheng, Maojiawan jishi.
180. CHOC, 15, p. 198.
181. Milton et al., p. 264.
182. Kuo, Classified Chinese Documents, p. 54; Schram, Unrehearsed, p. 283.
183. Teiwes and Sun, Tragedy of Lin Biao, p. 18.
184. Clubb, O. Edmund, China and Russia: The Great Game, Columbia University Press, New York, 1971, p. 488.
185. CHOC, 15, pp. 257–61; Garver, John W., China's Decision for Rapprochement with the United States, 1968–1971, Westview Press, Boulder, CO, 1982, pp. 54–6; Kissinger, Henry, The White House Years, Little, Brown & Co., New York, 1979, pp. 171–2.
186. See CHOC, 15, pp. 261–75, and Clubb, ch. 36. The centrality of the US dimension is now widely acknowledged. Lyle Goldstein, in ‘Return to Zhenbao Island: Who started shooting and why it matters’ (CQ 168, 2001, pp. 985–97) has argued that Mao manufactured the conflict to divert attention from the problems of winding down the Cultural Revolution. But the chronology does not support that. While it is certainly true that the border clashes provided a useful backdrop to the Ninth Congress, by March 1969 the active phase of the Cultural Revolution was over.
187. History of the CCP, Chronology, p. 348; Yan and Gao, p. 162.
188. Goodman, Deng Xiaoping, pp. 78–9.
189. Yan and Gao, pp. 162–4; MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, pp. 277–8; Perry, Anyuan, pp. 232–3; Dittmer, Lowell, ‘Death and Transfiguration: Liu Shaoqi's Rehabilitation and Contemporary Chinese Politics’, Journal of Asian Studies, Vol 41, No 3, May 1981, pp. 459–60.
CHAPTER 16 THINGS FALL APART
1. Li Zhisui, Private Life, p. 517.
2. Ji Dengkui, quoted in Teiwes and Sun, Tragedy of Lin Biao, p. 21.
3. Ibid., pp. 13 and 109.
4. In the 1980s, Deng Yingchao asked Hu Yaobang, then General Secretary of the CCP, to authorise the destruction of the offending minute, which had been preserved in Zhou's personal files in the secret section of the Central Archives. Hu agreed, and the original was destroyed. But, unknown to him, a copy was kept. Deng Xiaoping himself was aware of Zhou's conduct, but in 1979 exonerated him on the grounds that he would otherwise have been overthrown, which would have made the situation still worse. That has remained the official view ever since. In private, however, Zhou's colleagues were more ambivalent. After the February Adverse Current, Tan Zhenlin wrote: ‘How long does [the Premier] plan to wait before he's willing to speak out? Until all the cadres have been struck down?’ Even Deng, while acknowledging Zhou's role in mitigating the Cultural Revolution's excesses, was reported to have added that ‘without [him], it wouldn't have dragged on for such a long time’ (Oral sources; Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, 1975–1982, Foreign Languages Press, Beijing, 1990, pp. 329–30; and Gao Wenqian, Zhou Enlai, p. 162).
5. Oral sources.
6. Li Zhisui, p. 510.
7. Yan and Gao, Turbulent Decade, ch. 23.
8. Wang Li, ‘Insider's Account of the Cultural Revolution’, p. 44.
9. Wang Nianyi, Da dongluande niandai, pp. 384–8; Zhang Yunsheng, Maojiawan jishi, pp. 163–5 and 222–4.
10. Jin Qiu, The Culture of Power, pp. 116–18.
11. MacFarquhar, Roderick (ed.), The Politics of China: The Eras of Mao and Deng (2nd edn), Cambridge University Press, 1997, pp. 256–7; Barnouin and Yu, Ten Years of Turbulence, pp. 215–16; Lin Qingshan, Lin Biao zhuan, Beijing, 1988, pp. 686–8. Gao Wenqian (Zhou Enlai, pp. 196–7) quoting ‘inside accounts’, claims that ‘soon after the Ninth Congress’ – presumably in the winter of 1969 – Mao met Lin in Suzhou and suggested to him that, given Lin's poor health, he might wish to think of Zhang Chunqiao as his eventual successor. Lin's response is not known: presumably he expressed interest in the Chairman's suggestion. But, the key point, according to Gao, is that Lin then followed up with a suggestion of his own – namely that Mao should consider becoming Head of State. Gao then quotes Wu Faxian as saying that Mao's initial refusal in March 1970 to re-establish the post was less clear-cut than subsequent accounts made it appear – which may well be true. Such a sequence of events is plausible and might help to explain why Lin was so persistent in pushing the Head of State issue. However, corroborative evidence is lacking.
12. This is one of the least understood episodes in the whole of Mao's long career. There are two main scholarly interpretations: that summarised by MacFarquhar in The Politics of China (pp. 256–62), which holds that Lin was a victim of his own ambition; and the ‘revisionist’ view, advanced by Teiwes and Sun in The Tragedy of Lin Biao (pp. 134–51), and by Wu Faxian's daughter, Jin Qiu, that Lin was a victim of Mao's paranoia. Neither version is completely satisfactory although the second appears closer to the truth. The episode becomes comprehensible if Mao became involved much earlier than these writers suggest. This would have been in character: we now know that Mao manoeuvred Gao Gang, Peng Dehuai and Peng Zhen into the actions which caused their respective downfalls. He had already tested Lin once at the Ninth Congress (just as he had tested Liu Shaoqi at the CC work conference in December 1964), by proposing that the Defence Minister, rather than himself, should chair the Congress Presidium – a bait which Lin had wisely refused. Mao's handling of the state chairmanship issue eventually turned it into a similar test, but this time Lin's instincts let him down.
13. Teiwes and Sun, Tragedy, pp. 1 and 11.
14. Li Zhisui, p. 518.
15. That may be putting it too mildly. MacFarquhar and Schoenhals (pp. 318–20) say: ‘Mao hit the roof?. Lin evidently thought he was acting in accordance with Mao's instructions, but either he went further than Mao had intended or, inadvertently, he trespassed on what Mao, as the PLA's Commander-in-chief, regarded as his own domain.
16. Ye Yonglie, Chen Boda zhuan, p. 493. See also Li Zhisui, p. 511 for a description of Zhou Enlai's anxiety during this period lest Mao suspect him of forming an alliance with Wang Dongxing.
17. Normally when Mao spoke, that was the end of the matter. His disavowal of the campaign to root our ‘capitalist-roaders’ in the PLA in August 1967 is a typical example; the moment he hinted at a change of heart, his subordinates scattered in panic.
This time he expressed his disagreement on four separate occasions without his words being heeded. (According to Gao Wenqian, a Standing Committee meeting held in Mao's absence immediately before the plenum also called on Mao to assume the State chairmanship. See Zhou Enlai, p. 204). The only logical explanation is that the Chairman hedged the issue. That ties in with the fact that the CC's General Office, which took its orders from Mao, circulated two versions of the draft constitution – one with, and one without, a state chairman (Teiwes and Sun, Tragedy, p. 139). Roderick MacFarquhar and Michael Schoenhals speculate that from the outset Mao was setting a trap for Lin (Mao's Last Revolution, pp. 326 & 336). But to what purpose? Having just got rid of one successor, he had no reason to wish to overthrow another. Doing so would discredit both himself and the Cultural Revolution in which he put such store. If his goal was to weaken the role of the military, it was a very strange way of going about it. The familiar mixture of paranoia and suspicion of his successor's motives is much more credible.
18. Teiwes and Sun, Tragedy, p. 140; Wang Nianyi, pp. 392–6.
19. Teiwes and Sun, p. 141.
20. Ibid., p. 142; Hao and Duan, Zhongguo gongchandang liushi nian, p. 614. Mao afterwards denied having approved Lin's remarks in advance, but that appears to be untrue.
21. Teiwes and Sun, Tragedy, p. 144.
22. Ibid., p. 151.
23. Cited in Jin Qiu, p. 125.
24. The evidence here is fragmentary. Mao had been grumbling about the number of soldiers holding positions of power in the provinces. He had been alarmed by the ease with which Lin had placed the PLA on ‘red alert’ the previous autumn. He was aware that Chen's draft for the report to the Ninth Congress, emphasising economic development rather than the pursuit of the Cultural Revolution, reflected Lin's ideas. Shortly after Lushan, he took the first of a series of measures to place the army more firmly under Party control. None of that proves that the power which the military had acquired was a factor in Mao's attitude, but it is plausible.
25. Jin Qiu, pp. 126–7; Teiwes and Sun, Tragedy, Ibid., p. 148; Classified Chinese Documents, pp. 162–3.
26. Kuo, Classified Chinese Documents, pp. 162–3.
27. Wang Nianyi, pp. 406–9.
28. Schram, Unrehearsed, p. 294.
29. Teiwes and Sun, Tragedy, p. 153; Lin Qingshan, p. 716; Barnouin and Yu, p. 222: Yan and Gao, p. 313.
30. Hao and Duan, p. 618; Schram, Unrehearsed, p. 295.
31. Jin Qiu, pp. 132–5; Barnouin and Yu, p. 223; Hao and Duan, p. 618; Wang Nianyi, p. 415; Schram, Unrehearsed, p. 295.
32. Li Zhisui, p. 530.
33. Teiwes and Sun, Tragedy, p. 155.
34. MacFarquhar, Politics of China, p. 266.
35. Kuo, Classified Chinese Documents, p. 180.
36. Ibid., pp. 181–5.
37. Wang Nianyi, pp. 411 and 415.
38. Perry, Anyuan, p. 234. It is not clear exactly when they were removed, but they were no longer there in May.
39. Barnouin and Yu, p. 225.
40. Teiwes and Sun, Tragedy, p. 157.
41. Wang Nianyi, p. 415.
42. Barnouin and Yu, p. 226.
43. Schram, Unrehearsed, pp. 290–9; Jin Qiu, pp, 135–6, 194–5 and 198; MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, pp. 318–20. See also Barnouin and Yu, pp. 216–17. Whether Mao intended at this stage to treat Lin in the same way as Peng Dehuai and Liu Shaoqi, to whom he compared the Defence Minister in at least one speech to army commanders during his southern tour, is unclear. He may not have known himself. Zhou Enlai said later that Mao had been ready to allow Lin to remain in the Politburo if he confessed his mistakes. Certainly it would have been politically to the Chairman's advantage not to strike down his successor publicly. On the other hand, such campaigns inevitably developed a momentum of their own. The charge that Lin wished to become Head of State became a key theme in the subsequent campaign against him. The only known evidence for it is a confession by Wu Faxian, obtained under duress, parts of which have been shown to be false and which, even if it were true, was based on hearsay from Ye Qun. Given Lin's dislike of ceremonial, it appears highly improbable. The likeliest explanation is that Mao felt the charge of trying to usurp power would resonate more strongly than a claim that Lin had been trying to nudge him into honorific idleness, which would hardly justify such a dramatic fall from grace.
44. Yan and Gao, pp. 321–2; Barnouin and Yu, p. 235.
45. The most detailed account of this period is to be found in Jin Qiu, pp. 163–199 and 205. As Wu Faxian's daughter, she was able to interview most of the surviving participants, including Lin Liheng [Lin Doudou] and Lin Liguo's fiancée, Zhang Ning. See also Yan and Gao, pp. 322–33; Barnouin and Yu, pp. 228–9 and 235–42; MacFarquhar, pp. 271–5; Li Zhisui, pp. 534–41; Teiwes and Sun, Tragedy, p. 160; and oral sources. Additional details may be found in Wang Nianyi, Da dongluande niandai; and in Zhang Yunsheng, Maojiawan jishi.
46. Several witnesses, including Lin Liheng's fiancé, an army doctor, who treated him for his wounds, maintained that the bodyguard had shot himself, perhaps in an attempt to prove that he not been colluding with Lin.
47. Whether Mao actually used those words at the time, or whether this is a later embellishment, is open to question. However, it is a fact that no attempt was made to intercept Lin's plane, let alone to shoot it down.
48. Li Zhisui, p. 536.
49. Ibid., pp. 542–51.
50. Oral sources; see also Schram, Unrehearsed, p. 294.
51. History of the CCP, Chronology, p. 354; Kuo, Classified Chinese Documents, pp. 165–85; Wang Nianyi, p. 437.
52. Li Zhisui, pp. 551–2.
53. The following account is drawn from Kissinger, White House Years, pp. 163–94, 220–2, 684–787 and 1029–87; Li Zhisui, pp. 514–6; Garver, China's Decision, passim; Holdridge, John H., Crossing the Divide, Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham, MD, 1997; Foot, Rosemary, The Practice of Power: US Relations with China since 1949, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1995. US officials give the credit to Nixon, rather than Mao, for initiating the U-turn in policy. In fact, both men had decided independently that a change was desirable, but it was Mao, by triggering the border clashes, who made the process possible.
54. Oral sources; and Kissinger, White House Years, pp. 702–3. Nixon, in his memoirs, claims that he was aware of Snow's interview ‘within a few days’, but it appears that on this occasion his memory played him false (The Memoirs of Richard Nixon, Grosset & Dunlap, New York, 1978, p. 547).
55. Barnouin and Yu, p. 226.
56. This was the formula used in the Shanghai communiqué, signed on February 28 1972.
57. Li Zhisui, pp. 557–63; Salisbury, New Emperors, pp. 306–10; Zhang Yufeng, ‘Mao Zedong yu Zhou Enlaide yixie wannian qushi’, in Guangming Ribao, December 26 1988 to January 6 1989.
58. Kissinger, White House Years, p. 164.
59. Teiwes and Sun, End of the Maoist Era, p. 87.
60. Kissinger, pp. 1062–3; Nixon, p. 563.
61. Schram, Unrehearsed, p. 299.
62. History of the CCP, Chronology, p. 354; Yan and Gao, p. 407.
63. Gao Wenxian, p. 235.
64. Mao ordered the medical team not to carry out surgery but to emphasize instead ‘care and better nutrition’. In part this may have reflected Mao's scepticism about the merits of modern medicine – he frequently refused treatment for himself – but the decision quickly became a weapon in the hands of Zhou's leftist opponents, who hoped his illness would remove him from the scene. In March 1973, Mao authorized a surgical examination, during which cancerous growths were removed from the Premier's bladder, but a year later the cancer flared up again and soon metastasised into other parts of his body (Li Zhisui, p. 572; Yan and Gao, p. 412; Barnouin and Yu, pp. 235–6 and 259–62).
65. Renmin ribao, April 24 1972.
66. History of the CCP, Chronology, p. 356.
67. Yan and Gao, pp. 410–11.
68. Ibid., p. 410; Barnouin and Yu, p. 253.
69. In priv
ate, Mao told the Sri Lankan Prime Minister on June 28 1972 that Lin Biao was the ‘chief backstage backer’ of ‘that “Left” faction’ which had tried to unseat Zhou Enlai and Chen Yi, but his remarks were not publicised (Teiwes and Sun, End of the Maoist Era, p. 25).
70. Renmin ribao, Oct. 14 1972; Yan and Gao, pp. 412–16; Barnouin and Yu, pp. 253–5; MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, p. 355.
71. Renmin ribao, Jan. 1 1973.
72. Ye Yonglie, Wang Hongwen xingshuailu, Changchun, 1989, passim.
73. Barnouin and Yu, p. 249.
74. Gardner, John, Chinese Politics and the Succession to Mao, Macmillan, 1982, p. 62; Short, Dragon and Bear, p. 196; Evans, Deng Xiaoping, pp. 189–90; History of the CCP, Chronology, p. 359.
75. MacFarquhar, p. 279, n. 114; Jia Sinan (ed.), Mao Zedong renji jiaowang shilu, Jiangsu, 1989, p. 319; Yan and Gao, p. 454.
76. Barnouin and Yu, pp. 249–51.
77. For an account of the Central Committee meeting, including the travails of ‘Mr Wetpants’, see Teiwes and Sun, End of the Maoist Era, p. 106.
78. Evans, p. 197.
79. Peng Cheng, Zhongguo zhengjiu beiwnglu, p. 47; Evans, p. 198; History of the CCP, Chronology, pp. 361–2; Hao and Duan, p. 632; Yan and Gao, p. 455. MacFarquhar and Schoenhals (pp. 363 &379) suggest that the reshuffle of the Military Region commanders was initially proposed by Ye Jianying.
80. History of the CCP, Chronology, p. 363; Evans, pp. 199–200.
81. Cited in Yang Jisheng, Tombstone, pp. 483–4. The poem, written on August 5 1973, has not been published in China, but it was transmitted orally at study meetings during the anti-Confucius campaign.
82. Mao's judgement that the Cultural Revolution was 70 per cent correct, laid down in December 1975, marked a retreat from his assessment during the February Adverse Current in 1967, when he held that the movement was 90 per cent achievements and only 10 per cent mistakes.
83. The following section draws on Teiwes and Sun, End of the Maoist Era, pp. 118–35; and Barnouin and Yu, pp. 263–4. As evidence of the foreign policy conflict, MacFarquhar and Schoenhals (pp. 365–6) highlight the differences between Zhou's speech to the 10th Congress and that of Wang Hongwen (which they assume reflected Mao's views) in attitudes to the United States.
