Unbeknown to the British, the Germans had also looked ahead and took a more pro-active approach to their needs. During the autumn months of 1939, so called ‘tourists’ visited Norway to take photos of all that they could see including important features such as towns, fjords, harbours and military establishments. But it was only after the German invasion of Poland in September 1939 that Britain slowly awoke from its slumber to events in Scandinavia.
Neutral Norway, with its long, rugged, western coastline incised with deep fjords and ports, offered natural protection to the German iron-ore ships that plied their trade. During peacetime the Germans were importing around 10 million tons annually from Sweden, with another 10 million tons being imported from France; with the advent of war the Swedish iron-ore became vital to Germany’s war industry. A small amount of ore came out from central Sweden, but the main bulk was exported from the Swedish port of Lulea. However, the Baltic port was prone to becoming ice-bound during the winter months and so the ore was transported by train overland to the Norwegian port of Narvik then shipped out by freighter via the territorial waters of the Leads, south to Stavanger, across the Skagerrak and then on to German ports. Churchill, ever alert to the material needs of the Germans, badgered the Cabinet for action, but his plans were thwarted by political heavyweights such as Lord Halifax, the Foreign Secretary who bitterly opposed any infringement of Norwegian neutrality. Churchill noted, somewhat inaccurately, in his memorandum to the First Sea Lord on 19th September 1939:12
I brought to the notice of the cabinet this morning the importance of stopping the Norwegian transportation of Swedish iron ore from Narvik, which will begin as soon as the ice forms in the Gulf of Bothnia. I pointed out that we had laid a minefield across the 3-mile limit in Norwegian territorial waters in 1918, with the approval and co-operation of the United States. I suggested that we repeat this process very shortly.
Halifax had in fact been dampening many of Churchill’s desires and ideas to take the war forward and consequently Churchill was reined in.13 Halifax was seen as the senior figure in Chamberlain’s government and, despite Churchill’s remarkable oratory skills, he was not in any way over-awed by him. Churchill, for his part, had every respect for a man that stood up to him. Despite Churchill writing an informative paper on the iron-ore traffic, and twice bringing the matter to the attention of the cabinet, Churchill was continually thwarted in his efforts to bring direct action against the traffic.14 He later wrote:
When all was agreed and settled at the Admiralty I brought the matter a second time before the cabinet. Again there was general agreement upon the need; but I was unable to obtain assent to action. The Foreign Office arguments about neutrality were weighty, and I could not prevail. I continued, as will be seen, to press my point by every means and on all occasions. It was not however until April 1940 that the decision that I asked for in September 1939 was taken. By that time it was too late.
Churchill’s vision of defeating Germany took on a new lease of life when the Soviet Union attacked Finland causing worldwide protests. The Allies, supposedly keen to assist Finland, now had their eyes firmly fixed on the iron-ore coming out of Sweden and once again Narvik became the centre of attention. Churchill, astute as ever to an opportunity, foresaw it becoming an ideal Allied base for supplying the brave Finns. The British Foreign Secretary, Lord Halifax, had now become vociferous in his disgust at the Soviet attack on Finland and Churchill sensed that the mood had shifted to his way of thinking. Yet it was Halifax who again frustrated Churchill’s ideas about supporting the Finns with British troops. Halifax realised that infringing the sovereignty of Norway and Sweden could force the Russians, and perhaps the Germans, to invade those countries as a direct result of British violation. Understandably, Norway and Sweden were also very fearful of Churchill’s plans and point blank refused access through their territories, although aircraft, guns and supplies were eventually sent as aid. Thankfully though, the Finnish-Russo war came to an end on March 12th 1940 and this surely must have been a relief to all, particularly the Norwegians and Swedes as well as the British who had not particularly wanted to start a fight with the Soviet Union.
For Churchill’s plans for naval operations at Narvik to be accepted he would need the full backing of General Sir Edmund Ironside, Chief of the Imperial Staff from September 1939 to May 1940, but this was far from straightforward as arguments persisted between the two men. Churchill’s idea of naval action to bring an abrupt halt to the German transport was not to Ironside’s liking. He wanted to put into operation an overland expedition, which would culminate in the occupation of the iron-ore mines. The arguments raged wearily on serving only to alienate Prime Minister Chamberlain and Foreign Secretary Halifax from the idea of taking any form of action. Still Churchill would not give in to inaction and the many, frequently tedious debates wore on, often late into the long winter nights of 1939.
Meanwhile, on December 10th 1939 in Germany, Vidkun Quisling, a name later to be synonymous world-wide with the word traitor, was visiting Berlin as leader of the Norwegian Nationalist Socialist Party in an attempt to become more politically informed of events in Germany and to garner support for his movement. Through his intermediary, Albert Hagelin, Quisling participated in a meeting with Grossadmiral Erich Raeder, the C-in-C of the German Navy, who had previously expressed his favour of the Third Reich expanding their affairs in Scandinavia. Quisling, for his part, spoke readily about his fears of a British invasion of Norway and naturally Raeder was keen to hear what he had to say. The next day, December 12th, Raeder recounted Quisling’s views positively to Hitler, the result of which led directly to the Führer inviting Quisling for talks the following day at the Reichskanzlei (Reich Chancel). Quisling did not hold back. He informed Hitler [wrongly] that the Norwegian Government had surreptitiously agreed to Allied forces occupying southern Norway and that the British would not respect Norwegian neutrality. Hitler could see that if the Allies were invited to Norway then his northern flank would be exposed. Quisling went further by offering to get his party followers, many of whom he claimed were in significant positions of civil responsibility, to seize Norway via a coup. He would then, as the leader, invite German forces to occupy Norway. Quisling’s standpoint, which was without foundation, had influenced Hitler’s thinking. The talk concluded and after Quisling had departed Generalmajor Alfred Jodl, chief of the operations office at OKW, was instructed to initiate a low-key investigation into how Norway could be occupied should the need arise. Jodl busied himself and by January the outline framework for ‘Studie Nord’ was in place. Even at that stage it was still a contingency plan against any British threat against Norway. Hitler knew that it was in his country’s best interests for Norway to remain neutral, but if the Allies made moves towards Norway then they would be ready.
Whilst Churchill kept the debates on Norway simmering even he, as a visionary, could not forsee that events in Norway would erupt so quickly in the aftermath of an event considered by some to have finally persuaded Hitler on Britain’s intentions as regards to Norwegian neutrality…the Altmark affair.
The Altmark – described in the official 1939 list as ‘Deutschen Kriegsmarine trossschiff’ (German Navy supply ship) for the so called ‘pocket battleship’ Graf Spee, had been used to hold captured British merchant sailors from the ships that the Graf Spee had sunk.15
The Royal Navy, having thankfully seen the demise of the Graf Spee after she had been scuttled off the coast of Montevideo, now widened their search for the Altmark. The British authorities were convinced that the Altmark had merchant navy prisoners aboard taken from the Graf Spee after she had earlier sunk her mercantile quarry… and the British wanted them back. The hunt was on and the First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill, demanded results.
The Altmark fortuitously evaded detection by sailing northwards crossing over the equator line and into the North Atlantic. Her skipper, Captain Dau made good use of lookouts and at the slightest hint of smoke or superstructure
on the horizon he would alter course and steer away from the sighting. After many days at sea the Altmark, skirting south east of Iceland, but north of the Faeroes, eventually reached Norwegian waters on Wednesday February 14th 1940; Dau was seeking the relative safety of the neutral fjords with their high snow covered mountains that have stood sentinel for an eternity over the dark, enigmatic waters that lay below. The Altmark had arrived just north of Trondheimsfjord and Dau’s plan was to travel down the rugged western coastline keeping his ship well hidden from prying British eyes and then steal into the Skagerrak Sea during darkness. This tactic would afford him and his crew a furtive cloak of anonymity as the prison ship headed for a German port. Hamburg was the favoured choice, but the port of Kiel was also an option.
The Altmark’s voyage around the Norwegian coastline was not without problems. The ship was stopped several times and boarded by Norwegian naval officers, although a full search was never conducted and the hopes of the prisoners stowed below were cruelly dashed.
At last the RAF finally spotted the Altmark and a message was immediately sent to all Royal Navy ships in the area using plain signal rather than code, such was the urgency of the situation. The Altmark sighting caused much excitement within the Admiralty and the senior naval men knew that the net was closing in as lookouts of the Royal Navy ships intensified their sweeping of the sea. Eventually the Altmark was spotted by HMS Arethusa and chased into Jossingfjord.16 As collaboration with the Norwegian authorities was not possible, Captain Vian of HMS Cossack was ordered to take his destroyer alongside Altmark and board her. To the cries and shouts of ‘the Navy’s here!’ 299 British prisoners were released. The date was February 16th 1940.
Cossack came home to a hero’s welcome, but to Germany it seemed that the Norwegians were either unable or unwilling to defend their neutrality. Equally, the Germans felt humiliated and Hitler, apoplectic with rage, ordered that plans for ‘Operation Weserübung’ be intensified. In Hitler’s view the loss of Norway to the Allies could not be tolerated. The countdown to invasion had begun in earnest.
On February 21st General der Infanterie Nicolaus von Falkenhorst, C-in-C of the German XXI Army Corps was summoned to Berlin and appointed in charge of the invasion of Norway. The appointment had come of something as a shock to Falkenhorst who was then ordered by Hitler to go away for a few hours and consider how to occupy Norway. Falkenhorst duly returned armed with the only piece of information he could find on Norway – a Bädeker tourist guide and map. Following that inauspicious start, Falkenhorst’s preparations became rather more focused. Norway was to be taken by land, sea and air with Oslo, Bergen, Stavanger, Narvik, Kristiansand, Arendal, Egersund and Trondheim falling to German forces with little if any bloodshed…if the Norwegian forces proved not to be hostile.
Subsequently, on March 1st 1940, Hitler issued the directive for implementing Operation Weserübung. The Allies, not realising or predicting Germany’s intentions were about to play ‘catch up’.
The consequences of Britain’s actions in Norwegian waters in the ‘Altmark Affair’ had now brought about a chain of events that were to result in far more serious repercussions for all, particularly Norway. For the Admiralty, the Altmark affair was fully justified by the release of a large number of British and foreign national prisoners but for Norway there was understandable anger and dismay that their neutrality had been breached so blatantly. Foreign Minister Koht dispatched a strongly worded diplomatic note of protest to Britain, whilst according to Kersaudy, King Haakon voiced his concern by confiding to the French minister, Count de Dampierre, that Norway was being used as a football field by the two antagonists. Meanwhile in Germany, Admiral Raeder was told by an enraged Hitler that Norway could no longer maintain her neutrality and that as a result there was only one option to take: invade. The German press and radio also added their collective voice of scorn. Planning for Operation Weserűbung now took on a renewed urgency and by early April 1940, German naval units and their merchant support were slipping quietly out of port: the simultaneous invasion of Denmark and Norway had begun.
It was to be Britain who first seriously violated the neutral waters surrounding Norway by implementing Operation Wilfred, the laying of mines at the entrance of Vestfjord on April 8th. British and French ministers sent diplomatic notes to the Norwegian Foreign Secretary stating that their reasons for sowing the mines were to interrupt the passage through Norwegian territorial waters of all ships ‘carrying war contraband’.17 Later that day the Norwegian Government gloomily debated the issue and as a result a solemn note of protest was sent to the British and French governments. All that had been achieved was for attentions to be drawn away from the German fleet that had already sailed in number towards Denmark and Norway and although there had been plenty of warnings to the Allied and Norwegian governments, their reactions to the news of a possible German invasion was one of total disbelief. With the exception of a few alert and farsighted types the reactions of Britain, France and Norway in view of the information received could be considered nothing short of shameful and shambolic.
During the night of the 8th and early hours of the 9th April 1940, Germany invaded Norway and Denmark with a proclamation from Joseph Goebbels that both countries had been ‘taken under the protection of the Reich to forestall Allied occupation’.18
Despite some resistance from the Norwegians the invasion was largely successful, although the loss of the Hipper class cruiser, Blücher, was to be a significant blow to the German plan of taking Oslo quickly.
For their part Britain and the Allies had been caught napping and the response to the invasion is considered by many to have bordered on the farcical at times, although the resourcefulness and professionalism of sailors, soldiers and airmen cannot be brought into question. Important clues as to the intentions of the Germans were on offer; reports to the Foreign Office and Britain’s Secret Service indicated that an attack on Norway was forthcoming, but these reports were largely ignored. Harry Hinsley, a Cambridge undergraduate who was on the staff of the Naval Section of Bletchley Park, had been monitoring German naval W/T traffic and had noted a dramatic increase on the Baltic frequency. He also noted that a completely new frequency had been born and was in use. He duly reported his findings to his seniors, but it appears that no deductions were made or further action taken. Clearly, the different departments being handed these clues were not coordinating their resources and any indication about the intentions of the Germans were ignored.19
Meanwhile, Captain Henry Denham, the British naval attaché in Denmark had noted significant German warship movements heading for Norway from his vantage point at Rödby. One of the ships he identified was the Blücher, but his report to the Admiralty warning them that Norway was the probable destination, and ironically received by his friend, Captain Ralph Edwards (Duty Captain at the Admiralty) on the evening of April 7th, was ignored by Winston Churchill, who had retorted, ‘I don’t think so’ after Edwards had advised him of Denham’s telegram.20 It wasn’t just the UK that was ignoring the many warning signals. Similar shortcomings were occurring in Norway, France and Denmark. Interestingly, Sweden was aware of what was going on, but decided to keep her counsel, although there was an instance on April 5th when the Head of Swedish Intelligence, Oberst Carlos Adlercreutz called his counterpart in Oslo, Oberstløytnant Wrede-Holm to warn him that Sweden had reliable information that the Germans were going to attack Denmark and then Norway. Similar information was also received from the Danes; again no action was taken.21 It would appear then that the collective eyes and minds of the Allies and their neutral neighbours were rendering themselves blind and oblivious to the approaching danger.
By late evening of April 7th, it was obvious that a major German naval undertaking was in progress and, attempting to prevent what the Allies considered would be a German break-out into the Atlantic, Admiral Sir Charles Forbes dispatched the Home Fleet north-east out of the British naval base of Scapa Flow late that day. Meanwhile, the 2nd Cruiser Squa
dron under the command of Vice-Admiral Collins departed Rosyth and headed towards Stavanger. The plan was to arrive at a point off the Norwegian coast the next day and then sweep northwards, but a combination of poor weather, misreading of signals and miscalculating the German intentions meant that the Royal Navy failed to locate their quarry, with the exception of the destroyer HMS Glowworm (pennant H92), which happened by chance to locate and engage German destroyers, although Glowworm later lost contact with the ships due to the atrocious weather. Events then turned fully against Glowworm when the German cruiser Admiral Hipper appeared out of the gloom. It was a one-sided affair, but Glowworm’s skipper, Lieutenant Commander Roope and his crew fought bravely as they took on the mighty cruiser. German shells smashed into the destroyer killing and wounding a great many sailors. The bridge was taken out and steering was completely lost. It was at this point that the Glowworm, still making smoke, turned towards the Admiral Hipper and rammed her. The collision caused the bow of the Glowworm to shear off and as she drifted clear of the Admiral Hipper the destroyer was subjected to further shelling until Kapitän zur See Heye ordered a ceasefire. Glowworm was lost and sinking fast. Lt Commander Roope gave the command to abandon ship and the survivors took to the water.
Kapitän Heye, considering that there was the possibility of British ships close by, bravely chose to heave to positioning his ship so that the currents would bring the stricken survivors towards the Admiral Hipper and so began the humanitarian rescue of British sailors. Forty-four men were eventually saved and brought aboard via the ship’s nets, although some unfortunately succumbed later to their wounds and the effects of a very cold sea. Lt Commander Roope made it to the scramble nets, but mortally wounded, and with any lingering strength being sapped away by the intense numbing cold, slipped the safety of the nets. He was lost to the sea.22
Gold Run: The Rescue of Norway’s Gold Bullion from the Nazis, 1940 Page 2
