Gruppe II force enroute to attack neutral Norway. Men on the Blücher would have experienced a similar scene.
Close up of main armament on the Admiral Hipper. Blücher was unable to bring her main armament to bear on Oscarsborg Fort when she came under attack from the Norwegians.
The 13 remaining crewmen of Pol III were summarily hauled aboard the Albatros, and taken prisoner earning the dubious distinction of becoming the first Norwegian prisoners of war. Sadly, Captain Welding-Olsen’s body was never recovered and was deemed lost forever to Oslofjord.
Albatros commander Kapitänleutnant Siegfried Strelow then ordered the destruction of Pol III and the gunners soon turned the whaler into a burning wreck.
(NB some unconfirmed sources state that a German officer from Albatros boarded Pol III on the pretence of negotiating, but just after he left, and at a given signal, Albatros shelled Pol III. Other unconfirmed sources have said that Pol III accidentally bumped Albatros, which then opened fire on the Norwegians). It is reasonable to conclude that the captain and crew of Poll III were extremely brave to take on and engage the might of the Kriegsmarine and execute their duty as best they could that fateful night, especially under the neutrality circumstances that were currently in force.
The element of surprise was now utterly lost, and Kummetz fully realised this, but knew there was no other option than to carry on in obedience to Hitler’s orders…to be in Oslo Harbour at 05:00 without deviation:
I expect them to enter the ports of disembarkation with the utmost resolution, not allowing themselves to be deterred by the holding and defence measures of the local commanders, nor by guard ships and coastal fortifications…
Kummetz left Albatros to deal with the aftermath of Pol III and the invading force headed northwards, having now been joined by 8 R-boats of the 1st R-Boat Flotilla.27 Mist and fog now both shrouded and protected the invaders from the searching eyes of the Norwegian defenders, but sharp-eyed lookouts on Rauøy and Bolærne Forts managed to spot the large, shadowy grey shapes as they made their way up the fjord and despite the gloom, the forts trained their searchlights on the warships. Blücher replied focusing her own searchlights on the forts. The guns of the invaders were trained on the forts, but no shots were fired either from the ships or the forts. A signal lamp from a Norwegian minesweeper also challenged Blücher, but the signal was ignored and Blücher continued up the fjord and into the relative safety of thick fog. A little further on the force stopped momentarily to disembark troops, who then went on to quickly capture the Norwegian forts to the rear, including the Norwegian naval base of Horten.
Having disgorged troops and assigned various R-boats to support them gruppe V continued their journey at a slow pace. The fog was now lifting. The force approached the Drøbak Narrows determined that nothing would stop the invasion. Kummetz’s group was ahead of schedule. His orders were to pass the Narrows at 04:15 – a simultaneous point in time as the other groups were nearing or reaching their intended targets. But Kummetz pushed on towards the Narrows early – 03:30 – his thinking possibly being that the Norwegians were aware of the force and that the element of surprise had evaporated. Only the old fort at Oscarsborg Fort stood in Kummetz’s way. This was regarded as obsolete by the Germans, along with many other elements of the Norwegian forces, and therefore not considered a threat. Kummetz was confident that the firepower of the invasion force would deal adequately and ruthlessly with any defence measures that the Norwegians cared to put up. Whether arrogance played a part is unclear, but the decision to place Blücher as the lead ship, without a protective screen, can only be seen as naval folly of the highest order.
(NB Vidkun Quisling, on his visit to Berlin, had advised that there were no minefields in Oslofjord and that the coastal forts would not open fire unless specific orders were issued from the Government.)
At 02:30 Kondor was dispatched, along with two R-boats, to Horten. Meanwhile, as they closed in on their intended target the battle order for the three cruisers was Blücher followed by Lűtzow and Emden at 600m intervals. Möwe and R-boats 18 and 19 made up the rear. The speed of the convoy was now 7 knots. A short while later two Norwegian auxiliaries, Alpha and Furu spotted the slow moving warships and opened up with their searchlights. No shots were fired from either side, but the tension on the ships must have risen dramatically. The invading convoy continued on their way up Oslofjord closing in on the Drøbak Narrows and Oscarsborg Fort. The order for increased speed did not come. Blücher was now just moments away from disaster as Admiral Kummetz, having dismissed the fort as obsolete manoeuvred Blücher into the narrows, and unknown to him, towards a watery grave.
Oscarsborg Fort commanded the Drøbak Narrows – effectively the sea gateway to Oslo. The fort, built during the Crimean War and reputed then to be the strongest defence of its time in Northern Europe, was ideally situated on South Kaholmen, a small island in the middle of the fjord where the channel narrows to around 1000 metres. The fort has stood sentinel over all who have entered the capital by the sea routes, carefully observing the traders, tourists and armed warships of visiting nations. It was armed, ironically, with three German built Krupp 28cm (11inch) cannons named Josva, Aron and Moses. The cannons required their own manually operated crane to lift the 600lb shells to the breach. The rate of fire was approximately one round every five minutes, but only a few drafted men manned the guns, so any chance of firing off a succession of rounds was somewhat improbable.
Guarding the approaches; a view looking over the top of one of the guns at Oscarsborg Fort. Photo credit: Tore G Eggen.
Flanked on the mainland eastern side of the fjord, and just north of Drøbak were three smaller guns – 15cm (6inch) – based at Husvik along with two 57mm (6pdr) guns sited on the foreshore. But it was Oscarsborg Fort that was to deliver the first telling blows.
Oberst (Colonel) Birger Eriksen, a private, laconic man, but totally professional in manner had been warned that a significant naval invasion force was on its way. At this point he was probably unaware of the intentions of the force or the nationality, but he began preparations in readiness for any actions the fort would have to take to protect the neutrality of Norway. With only two sergeants and 23 drafted men Eriksen was able to muster crews for two of the guns only. Another crucial factor for Eriksen to consider was the darkness and fog…how would they see their targets? The answer was to station two small patrol boats south of the fort so that Eriksen could be given advanced warning of the invader’s approach. At around 04:00 Eriksen ordered the torpedo battery to be readied and to open fire if necessary.
To enable him to identify the number of ships, type of target, and distance from his guns, Eriksen climbed onto the grassy hill that formed part of the earthwork defence of the fort and placed himself between two of the cannons. Suddenly a searchlight illuminated the profile of Blücher and Eriksen could now clearly see his target. He estimated and ordered range for sights to be set at 1400 metres. The small Norwegian force replied that they were ready. With his guns standing by and batteries at Kopås and Husvik reporting prepared and ready Oberst Birger Eriksen gave the order to fire! It was 04:21.
Norwegian army recruit, Private Fevang, then stationed at Oscarsborg Fort recalled the moments when the fort opened fire on the Blücher:28
No one around where we were thought that it [the war] would spread to Norway. We believed that Norway would remain neutral and avoid it, but on the 8th of April we heard about ships that had violated and so on. But we trusted the British; they ruled the sea. Norwegians have always had a good relationship with the British; we thought we would get aid from the British.
I arrived as a 22 year old recruit, and received the supplies that I needed. We were quartered by the torpedo battery, in a room by the officer school, with bunks for 36 men. It was quite crowded. That’s where we stayed on the night of 9th of April. On the evening of 8/9th we were sitting in the mess, when we heard about ships in Sørlandet, and it started to sound a bit strange. But we were young a
nd didn’t think too much about it, so we went to our bunks. Everyone went to bed and went to sleep.
The cannons started firing during the night and woke us up. We told ourselves that it was the soldiers (former soldiers drafted to Oscarsborg Fort) drilling with the cannons. But then we heard more and more shooting. Someone climbed up onto the window ledge to see out – it was a window high above the ground and shouted ‘it’s a ship going down the fjord, in full flames!’ Then a Fenrik (Lieutenant) opened the door and shouted: “Are you up men? It’s war, get out, get your clothes on and get out!” We got our clothes on, and while we got dressed we heard the torpedo battery fire two torpedoes and then hit the Blücher. When we went outside we saw Blücher, going through Drøbakksundet in flames. It went a little further and went on its side, still burning, then oil started to appear on the water. We saw them [the Germans] go from the deck and up on the side, we saw the propellers. The Germans sang ‘Deutschland Deutschland’. Then the Blücher went down, and there was a lot of oil on the water and it started burning. We heard a lot of shouting for help. They were screaming. They were swimming in oil. Some were swimming towards land towards Drøbak. We were rallied up and the captain came over to speak to us and asked how we were. We talked for a while, but then our captain received a message about planes coming in from the south and that he was afraid that they would bomb us. We were told to follow him down some stairs, and we ended up at the ammunition depot, which was empty, except with lots of empty shelves. More than a hundred men went down there. The big iron doors were then closed behind us. We were now safe from enemy bombing. The planes came and started to bomb the fort. Wave upon wave of planes attacked and dropped their bombs on us. A lieutenant told us to keep our mouths open, because then we would stand the pressure from the bombs much better. We were pretty safe down there, because of 7–8 metres of concrete. There was a tunnel that went all the way from the top and down to the dock, where ammunition was delivered at Borgen. During the day, it became calmer and quieter and some of us opened the iron door and went outside. But then more planes attacked us. Then we ran and they came straight down on us, shooting. I was one of the last ones to come in and close the door. They shot straight at the door, with me just on the other side of it, and as I remember it made a lot of noise!
Blücher’s First Lieutenant Fregattenkapitän Erich Heymann took it upon himself, with complete professionalism and incredible foresight, to complete a report after the loss of the Blücher. This was because all official books, including the War Diary and Ship’s log were lost with the Blücher when she went down. Heymann completed his report in Oslo as soon as he was able to. Magnanimously he freely admits that the recollections are his own and of individual serving officers who survived the sinking, but that his ‘considerations, impressions, and conclusions’ may not have been shared by his commander, Kapitän zur See Woldag, who was intending to comment upon the report, but a short time later lost his life in an air crash in Oslo Fjord.
In his report Heymann gives many clues to how the loss of the Blücher came about and as with all accidents it is a catalogue of errors leading to the final conclusion. Some have placed the loss of the Blücher directly at the lack of planning by the German Naval Staff and poor execution of the operation by its commander, Admiral Oscar Kummetz, but there appears to be no single overwhelming factor, just accumulative errors.
The Blücher was laid down in August 1935 and launched in June 1937 with characteristic Third Reich celebration. However, some design changes were implemented almost immediately, the most dramatic being the change of the bow from a straight stem to a curved clipper bow (also known as an ‘Atlantic’ bow) giving her a most elegant, graceful appearance. On September 20th 1939 the Blücher was finally handed over to the Kriegsmarine. Her main armament was eight 203mm (8 inch) guns arranged in four twin turrets mounted fore and aft. Her anti-aircraft battery was impressive with twelve 105mm (4.1 inch) guns and supplemented with smaller weapons of various calibre.
The next few months were supposed to be spent on extensive, demanding sea trials in the Baltic, but Blücher’s crew were denied this due to the severe weather of 1939/40 – one of the worst on record. The clock was ticking down on Blücher and her crew. Despite the setback of limited trials, the Kriegsmarine had hoped the Blücher would be fully operational by May 7th, but with winter raging in the Baltic this hope was dashed, in fact the Blücher only spent 20 days at sea up until April 1st – not nearly enough time for the crew to be fully proficient in the working up of their ship. Ominously, on April 7th the ship was listed as available for “simple tasks”; but it was Hitler’s lust for Norway that sealed the fate of Blücher and much of her crew.
Heymann writes:29
At the conclusion of dockyard building work, on March 30th 1940, the cruiser Blücher was released from the trials programme, which had already been extended as a consequence of the preceding winter’s especially unfavourable ice conditions. Battle training (including engine room and damage control) had been restricted to individual exercises and theoretical instruction at the battle station. The battle regulations manual for all weapons and sections had been prepared (with the exception of the engine room, which was still in the drafting stage) and numerous emergency scenarios had been played out, with a run-through of solutions. These would be practised over and over if time permitted. On the other hand there had been no battle “exercises” for damage control and the engine room; furthermore, neither the heavy guns nor the torpedo installation had been fired – this had been planned for April, and the ship to be battle ready by May 3rd. In response to an enquiry of OKM on April 7th 1940, it had been reported: “Cruiser Blücher operational for simple tasks; heavy guns not fired, no battle exercises or engine room procedures, no damage control exercises.” The commander and I put the report in this form because (1) the ship had already been in commission for 6 months and the ship’s company was keen for action, and (2) it was still necessary to point out the existing deficiencies. At this point, however, in order that no incorrect conclusions be drawn, I would like to make it clear that when the critical hour came on 9 April 1940 there was no deficiency in the defence of the ship which might have contributed to its’ loss.
Heymann’s report goes on to list more clues:
After leaving the dockyard Blücher was fitted out for five weeks; as a subterfuge, the gunnery officers had been told that the ship was to undergo an extended period of battle training in the eastern Baltic. Despite a great deal of persistence we had still not received delivery of the Marx floats – to my recollection ten to twelve of them each holding from 15 to 40 men – and eventually they arrived the day before sailing after much pressure had been exerted, together with life-jackets for the crew. About 700 of these lifejackets were the rubber type: these were distributed to those men whose action stations were below decks, while the remaining kapok vests were strapped to the guardrails on the superstructure deck. It had been intended to begin gunnery training following our release from the shipyard, and we now had aboard live ammunition plus a year’s supply of practice ammunition for all calibres. The former had to be stowed on top of the latter before sailing, the commander having forbidden the unloading of the practice ammunition for security reasons. This meant ultimately that there was no room in the magazines for the ammunition brought aboard by the army personnel. All ship’s boats, which we might have used for the purpose, were already secured aboard in readiness for the troop landings when we reached Norway.
Blücher was supplied finally with two of the three aircraft promised, both fully crewed. One lodged on the catapult with a small quantity of fuel in the tank and the other in the hanger with an empty tank, but otherwise operational. The four 50kg bombs – two for each aircraft – were also stored in the hangar.
6th April: ‘During the hours of darkness, about 800 men embarked aboard Blücher, bringing with them all their weapons and equipment, including four anti-tank guns plus crates of anti-tank shells, machinegun and rifle ammunitio
n and hand grenades. It weighed 21 tonnes as I remember. Because of the stowage problem in the magazine rooms, it had to be stowed in the torpedo workroom. Army personnel had not been supplied with life jackets ashore and it was not possible to have the items brought aboard subsequently for security reasons.
From Erich Heymann’s well written and concise report it is clear that many of the men aboard Blücher would be lost due to poor decision making, reckless and dangerous stowage of kit and ammunition and a lack of personal safety equipment. His account of April 8/9th makes for very interesting reading:
By now the group was nearing the Norwegian coast and “Clear ship for battle” status was ordered for midnight. The army contingent remained in their assigned locations below decks in their respective groupings. The ship’s landing party would only be piped on deck once the Drøbak Narrows had been passed, in order to avoid confusion with the army groups. It was a clear, but dark night. Shortly before the battle group entered Oslo Fjord a blacked-out vessel appeared ahead, turned on a searchlight and morsed a message. It was apparently a Norwegian patrol boat (Pol 111). Albatros was ordered by Konteradmiral Kummetz to capture it.
9th April – After I had received the reports of the senior gunnery officers I informed the commander at midnight that the ship was “clear for battle.” Kapitän zur See Woldag ordered me to remain on the bridge. Blücher was illuminated by the searchlight batteries situated on either side of the fjord, presumably Bolearne and Rauöy. We responded with our own searchlights. On the bridge we heard the coastal guns fire a round, but as no splash or hit was observed it was assumed to be a warning shot. A little later the coastal beacons at the southern entrance to the fjord were extinguished.
Gold Run: The Rescue of Norway’s Gold Bullion from the Nazis, 1940 Page 4
