In a newspaper interview after the war Captain Legernes explained that the second trip with the Legona was to take boxes to HMS Glasgow. Due to the weight of the boxes and kegs, Legernes and his crew soon worked out that the cargo was gold. The captain stated that he carried 114 boxes and 25 small kegs and although they were very heavy there was plenty of help from British sailors to load the gold quickly [most probably with the use of the ship’s crane] onto HMS Glasgow. The operation was almost certainly concluded at around 01:00 (April 30th) as Captain Legernes states that an aircraft flew over from a westerly direction and it was at this point that anti-aircraft guns on the cruiser opened up.132
Legona returned to her ‘humanitarian’ duties, but left Molde shortly after due to the amount of enemy aircraft circling overhead. Legona and Rovdehorn had done their duty.
The research of primary and secondary sources has revealed a variation in accounts with the movement of the gold to HMS Glasgow. Haslund’s report states that 316 large crates, 440 smaller crates and 39 kegs were ferried to HMS Glasgow by the two small ships. However, a number of accounts from Royal Navy veterans state otherwise and that the gold was manually hauled aboard HMS Glasgow via gangplanks to the Quarter Deck.
Royal Navy veterans interviewed by the author in 2004 all stated that they were ordered off Glasgow and onto the quay to manhandle the bullion back on to the ship. One naval rating clearly remembers soaping the gangplank at the edges so that the crates and kegs could be pushed up the wooden plank and on to the ship.133
D/S Legona. Photo credit: E Birkeland – Molde
There were also accounts of men accurately guessing the approximate weight of the cargo as they lifted the boxes and barrels. Others also complained that whilst the boxes were easy to lift with two men, only one person could lift the kegs and that this was difficult and cumbersome.
With the descriptions given by Haslund and those of Glasgow’s crew it would appear that some of the gold was brought onboard via the crane and lowered into the ship and that a further amount was taken onboard via manual handling from the quayside.
As the loading continued with a frenetic urgency, suddenly and without warning out of the swirling ruddy coloured smoke a German bomber appeared. No bombs were dropped and it shot across the fjord with at least one gunner on Glasgow opening fire. This was more than enough warning for Captain Pegram and he ordered the sailors aboard and the lines to be let go before the loading of the gold was complete. Just as Glasgow was about to pull away Haslund spotted a Member of the Storting, Mr Ole Colbjørnsen, hurriedly embarking Glasgow. He shouted to him that he would get the remainder of the gold transported north. With the King and Crown Prince safely aboard, along with members of the Norwegian Government and various other officials, she reversed out into the fjord. Some of the quay collapsed as one line was still secured there, such was the haste to depart.
HMS Glasgow 1938. Picture credit: Maritime Picture Library.
HMS Glasgow pulled away stern first into the black abyss of the fjord and it would appear the ship maintained this position for some distance and time. Numerous Glasgow naval veterans have commented on this stating that they have never sailed astern for so long and for so fast. An officer in his report also made mention of this feat and it was clear that skillful use by Glasgow’s navigation officer of a stop-watch and dead-reckoning amounted to seamanship of the highest order. Close checking of the ‘Ship’s Log’ reveals that the ship did not alter course significantly for at least an hour turning 320° at 02:10.
Captain Pegram takes up the story once more:134
At the request from His Majesty King Haakon, approximately 25 tons of gold bullion was embarked, but as the ship was sailing in formation a message was received that a certain quantity had not yet arrived down on the jetty. Tallying had proved impossible under the conditions prevailing. Whilst the ship was alongside the town of Molde was further subjected to bombing attacks and an unsuccessful attack was made on the ship…
Certain members, I believe a majority, of the Norwegian Government desired His Majesty to be landed at Mosjoen. I discussed the matter with His Britannic Majesty’s Minister [Sir Cecil Dormer] and with His Majesty, and strongly advised his going to Tromsø, for I felt it is quite probable that the ship would be attacked by bombs before His Majesty could be landed unless we went further north. I pointed out that it was always possible for His Majesty to move south unobserved in small craft through the inner lead, should he wish to do so. His Majesty was convinced that the Germans knew of his departure and privately told me that he wished to go to Tromsø, and that I might, perhaps, tell his Government I was not prepared to take my ship elsewhere. Fortunately, after a further council meeting the government agreed to go to Tromsø.
On emerging from Romsdalsfjord at 02:25/30, I steered to the westward, in order to be well clear of the coast by daylight, and at 02:30/30 course was set for Tromsø.
On Wednesday, 1st May, after a Cabinet Meeting I was requested to make the arrival in the Tromsø area as inconspicuous as possible. His Majesty did not intend to land at or establish himself in the town itself for he felt sure that it would be bombed when his presence was known. I therefore flew off the Walrus (aircraft) at 13:00 to proceed to Tromsø and to arrange for some small local craft to meet HMS Glasgow on arrival in Malangenfjord. His Majesty, the Crown Prince and the Government were disembarked into the armed vessel Heimdal in Malangenfjord at 20:18/1 (NB Thirty five years previously King Haakon had sailed from Denmark to Norway on the Heimdal to be enthroned as the King of Norway).
Although it must seem impertinent on my part to refer to this, I am unable to refrain from remarking on the tremendous impressions made on us all by His Majesty and the Crown Prince. His Majesty had undergone the severest ordeal, he was feeling broken-hearted at the fate of his country; he had remained in his field uniform for days on end, and had been subjected to continuous bombing whilst without sleep, his embarkation and departure had taken place under most trying conditions, with night bombing occurring for the first time; under these circumstances, his quiet composure and dignity, his kindliness and thoughtfulness for others, his confident, even cheerful, bearing when in public were an inspiration to all of us and unforgettable.
During His Majesty’s stay on board, I had many opportunities of private and confidential discussion with him. I believe that His Majesty spoke with complete frankness and freedom, and in confidence I am therefore forwarding by hand direct to the Admiralty a report of the impressions I gained from these conversations.
After consultation with His Britannic Majesty’s Minister, I have informed Colonel Ljunberg, and the Minister of Defence, of the evacuation of Åndalsnes and Namsos. It was already known of His Majesty and the Norwegian Government that some evacuation was taking place before they embarked, and after hearing the Prime Minister’s speech on the 2nd May, and the Defence Minister, who by then felt sure that both places were being evacuated, was most anxious to be told what the situation was.
I have told him that the evacuation has taken place, and that the troops are to be re-formed for further operations in Norway, but that I was not in a position to say where. I told him also the purpose of His Majesty King George’s message to King Haakon, and impressed upon him that the failure to take Trondheim and the evacuation do not indicate any withdrawal from Norway on our part, and that I was sure it was our intention to do all in our power for them, though I, of course, had no idea what plan was contemplated.
I have received the impression, both from the Norwegians themselves and from His Britannic Majesty’s Minister, that they have felt very much out of touch with our plans. Colonel Ljunberg made it clear to me that he felt Trondheim to be the key position, and that as we had not been able to take it the situation for this country was almost hopeless.
After the departure of His Majesty, I proceeded to fuel HMS Jackal in Malangenfjord; one at a time, the other ship remaining on A/S [anti-submarine] patrol to seaward (255 tons to HMS Jackal, 214 tons to HM
S Javelin. After making the arrangements for His Majesty’s disembarkation, the Walrus refueled at Tromsø and proceeded to Harstad in accordance with the Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet’s 1345/30.
Sailed from Malangenfjord for the Clyde at 0110/2, setting course well to the eastward at 1935/2, HMS Jackal was detached to Sullom Voe to replace Asdic Oscillator and rejoin us as soon as possible.
The conduct of all the officers and men was all that could be desired under arduous conditions. I was most impressed with the cheerful bearing under adversity of the trawler crews and base staff; they were embarked at Molde under trying conditions. They had had a bad time. Amongst the officers were several quite elderly gentleman, peers of the realm and army colonels of the last war, now Sub-Lieutenants, RNVR, whose only wish was to remain in Norway fighting, or to get back to their trawlers again as soon as possible. Captain Denny asked me especially to mention the name of Sick Berth Attendant David Wright, official number C/JX 57232, who had been in charge of the wounded, in case he should not be able to do so. This rating’s cheerful bearing and quiet competence under difficult conditions were worthy of all praise.
P.H Pegram: Captain – May 1940
The following is a signal sent to the Admiralty in the early hours of the 30th April from HMS Glasgow:
Secret. Message.
From H.M.S. GLASGOW. Date 30.4.40
NAVAL CYPHER D BY W/T
Addressed Admiralty. Repeated F.O. Narvik, C. in C. Home Fleet.
IMPORTANT
My 0250. Following also embarked British French and Danish Ministers with wives and some of legation staff. Norwegian Prime Minister, finance, defence, justice, and other members of government. Crew of trawler sunk (corrupt group), convoy HN17. Commodore Boase and Captain Cecil Allen. Base staff and unit of Royal Artillery. Also approximately 23 tons of gold bullion. Bombing attacks while alongside and on leaving at 01:00. No hits on ship.
If the Heinkel 111 flying low over her had not caught out Glasgow then it is difficult to say whether all the gold would have been taken off by the cruiser, but there was just too much air activity for Captain Pegram’s liking and with the dawn fast approaching he was concerned that his ship would be caught like a sitting duck in the fjord in the cold light of day; events proved that his concerns were correct.
As Glasgow sailed for the UK from Molde, Oscar Torp, the Norwegian Finance Minister dictated a letter that was to be used as a power of attorney to nominated Norwegian officials in the UK. Torp was well aware that difficulties could arise once the bullion was placed dockside and he needed to ensure smooth transfer to the Bank of England and that the bullion was not misused in any way.
Torp’s letter. Photo credit: author
Commander Cuthbert, later, Vice Admiral Sir John Cuthbert, was an experienced naval officer on board Glasgow. He later penned his thoughts about his experiences in Norway. As with Captain Pegram’s account and that of the crew, his observations provide a valuable insight into the events of that dramatic night.135
After three strenuous weeks off the Norwegian coast, working everywhere between Bergen and Namsos during the German’s initial advance the Glasgow slipped into Scapa Flow on Sunday 28th April 1940 to fill up once more with oil fuel. Things were not looking too good in the Trondheim area and we expected our stay to be short, so it was with some surprise that after topping up we remained at anchor, although at short notice.
In the afternoon the Admiral sent for our Captain and gave him his secret orders. These were to be passed on to no-one, but as the Captain pointed out, the odd bomb might write him off as we crossed the North Sea and the job would be left undone. It was therefore agreed that the Commander might be told that the Glasgow, with two destroyers as escort, was to take the King of Norway from Molde to “a place of safety”.
Because of the secrecy, preparations could not be made onboard but word was passed around that as Molde had been heavily bombed it might be necessary to evacuate some civilians and the Commander’s cabin was given an extra furnishing to be ready for “the Mayor” [King Haakon]. At the same time it was also rumoured that the Admiral might shortly transfer to the ship and so the signalmen were set to make an Admiral’s flag.
At this time of the year complete darkness could not be hoped for but it was decided to close on the coast in the evening as German bomber activity usually died down after seven or eight o’clock and did not start again until six in the morning. When still a long way off, great columns of smoke could be seen rising from the burning villages, but the bombers also managed to find time to give us a bit of a welcome though they achieved nothing except a few holes in the sea. As we entered the fjord more bombers could be seen flitting around like bats in the half-light and further bursts of flame shot up into the sky from the tortured town. On turning the corner the blaze looked so intense that it seemed doubtful whether we should be able to get alongside but luckily there was a light onshore wind which gave a small working space between the edge of the pier and its burning sheds. A few men had been sent to the pier and its burning sheds… [And others] had been sent to the pier by boat to take our hawsers as the normal way from the town was blocked by fire.
As soon as we were secured, work was started on putting out the nearest fires, which were showing up the ship in the most unpleasant manner. In the meantime a little puffer had come alongside our starboard side and from it up the pilot ladder, clambered the tall figure of His Majesty followed by the Crown Prince [some unconfirmed reports suggest he came earlier]. They were both in field uniform which, indeed, they had not taken off for days and their personal luggage required no large working party for its sum total was a couple of suit cases and haversacks.
Following in the wake of the King were men and women of many nationalities and styles of dress carrying a few odd pieces of hand luggage; the obvious privations they had endured may perhaps give us some excuse for not recognising at once the Norwegian Government and the ‘Corps Diplomatique’. The thoughts of everyone, from His Majesty downwards was to cause the least possible inconvenience to us and no more charming, helpful and appreciative passengers could be imagined despite the obvious discomforts of a Wardroom designed to accommodate some twenty five when it receives a further influx of ninety.
The King and Prince Olaf were escorted to the Captain’s after cabin while the government parked themselves temporarily in the dining cabin.
They expressed great willingness to fall in with any plans the Captain wished to make for sailing, the destination naturally being a matter for subsequent discussion. They did however express a particular desire to be accompanied by the Norwegian Gold Reserve and to this the Captain agreed on the understanding that nothing was to prevent sailing at 01:00 in order that we might be well clear before the morning strafe.
Meanwhile, in the Commander’s cabin, our Captain and various other senior officers were putting the local British Senior Naval Officer (SNO) (subsequently Admiral Sir Michael Denny) and his meagre staff into the general picture and giving him the plans for the general evacuation. Owing to the bombing of the wireless set he had had no signals for days, though judging by the number [signals] that were being pushed out at that time it is perhaps doubtful if he would have been much the wiser had he received them.
On deck too, things were happening. Just as we were approaching the fjord we had received a signal telling us that food might be short and we were to land as much as we could spare without delaying our departure. This we felt was a delightfully vague way of passing on the baby of ignorance.
We knew of course that the evacuation was about to begin, but nobody knew exactly when it would be complete, nor was it possible to guess how many troops would be involved. We certainly didn’t want to leave food behind for the benefit of a hungry enemy. I forget what decision was reached but before we berthed there was a substantial stack of food waiting on the quarterdeck. In the event, none was required as it was decided that there was no further chance of troops reaching Molde and that we should evacua
te all who were already there with the exception of the S.N.O. and a small party who were determined to see things through until the end.
By 23:00 the fire on the pier and its vicinity had been sufficiently subdued to let an ambulance through to the ship with wounded; the gold also began to arrive by lorry and boat. Here a slight snag arose, as it was naturally foreign to the nature of any treasury official to part with unlimited quantities of gold without carrying out some check on it. A careful tallying of all the boxes was therefore started but when it was represented, somewhat forcefully, that if this done there would be time to embark only a very small proportion, the habits of a lifetime were cast aside and the sailors got down to it. Lower deck was cleared and everyone not closed up at his gun or standing by in the engine room went out on to the jetty and returned with a lifetime’s pay on his shoulders – and then went back for more. As there was no time to stow it at once the quarterdeck was soon stacked high with bullion. The greater part was in cases, easily portable, but some of these had naturally suffered in their journeying and one broken case was retrieved by the Paymaster who whisked away temptation by putting it in his safe. A certain amount was also in traditional kegs, these proved more awkward as they were too heavy for one man to lift and yet too small for two to get round easily and quickly. Eventually, these were rolled and bumped up a steep gangplank some eighteen inches wide, fitted with treads but no sides. The gold was struck down into X and Y magazines where it remained until we eventually reached the UK.
For an hour and three quarters the work went on, the last load being embarked as the hands went to stand by wires – Captain Denny, in person, was letting go the shore ends. Just as we slipped an enemy bomber passed overhead so low that it seemed certain to hit our masts. There were subsequently several claims from guns’ crews that it had been destroyed but these I fear were optimistic, though it is probable it didn’t escape without damage. Once clear of the light from the burning town it was our policy to try to remain unseen so we held our fire, though the destroyers blazed away merrily whenever an aircraft was heard or sighted.
Gold Run: The Rescue of Norway’s Gold Bullion from the Nazis, 1940 Page 16
