The only definite information I was able to obtain was:
1. That another department was involved.
2. That the bag of Gold was handed over to a Naval Paymaster by the Police this morning.
3. That if the gold came into the possession of the Norwegian Consul he was entitled to hold it.
I inferred that the “other department” was the Admiralty. And that the gold would, in fact, reach the Norwegian Consul, and I gathered in the course of conversation that a prosecution had been contemplated but would not materialise.
The Police immediately handed over their investigation to the Royal Navy and Marine Saunders was summarily punished and given 3 months detention by a military court. For some this would seem a light punishment for the offence, but at that time Britain had its back to the wall and every soldier, sailor, airman, and Royal Marine for that matter was desperately needed. Indeed, it would have served little purpose to dismiss the long serving Saunders from the Royal Marines. Ironically, after serving his sentence Marine Saunders was seen to be working in the Naval Paymaster’s Office at an unnamed Royal Navy establishment. It would appear that someone in the Navy had a sense of humour and that for Marine Saunders old habits die hard.
Marine Saunders’s treasure. Not all of it was recovered by the Police
By the time the second consignment of gold was safely in the UK Norwegian administration had become more organised and a system was implemented whereby only certain designated signatories could sign for the bullion. One of those nominated signatories was Ole Colbjørnsen and once Glasgow’s consignment of bullion had been safely delivered to London he formally recorded the event:
I confirm having delivered to the Royal Bank of Scotland for transmission to the Bank of England, London the following packages:
39 – thirty nine – small casks
439 four hundred and thirty nine – small cases
317 – three hundred and seventeen – large cases all said to contain gold bars or coins. A number of the seals are not intact.
These packages were delivered ex H.M.S. “Glasgow”.
5th May 1940
Ole Colbjørnsen
Special Representative of the Norwegian Ministry of Finance
As events in London were playing themselves out a third consignment was still to arrive. On May 24th a signal was sent to Home Fleet informing them of HMS Enterprise’s departure from Harstad for the safe anchorage of Scapa Flow. Her speed was advised as 25 knots.
Interestingly, a ‘Most Secret’ naval signal from the Admiralty was sent to HMS Enterprise on May 26th asking her if she had bullion onboard, and if so, how much. The signal had been signed ‘for Head of M’.
Subsequently, a Lieutenant Commander Hutchinson informed ‘M’ that there were 19 tons onboard and that his information had been received from the duty captain. He went on to say that the ship would be heading south for a home port and that the Bank of England, and in particular, Mr Laverack, would be kept informed on the movement of the vessel.
Eventually HMS Enterprise docked in Plymouth. On May 27th ‘M’ wrote to Commander J. E. Jacobsen, the Norwegian Naval Attaché in London.
The Secretary of the Admiralty presents his compliments to Captain Jacobsen, and informs him that HMS Enterprise arrived in this country on the 26th May, with 19 tons of Norwegian gold. Mr. Haslund, Secretary of the Norwegian Ministry of Supply was in charge of the gold and was accompanied by three Norwegian assistants.
HMS Enterprise sailed for Plymouth a little later where she is expected to arrive in the course of tomorrow Tuesday.
Mr. Haslund has requested that the following message might be passed to the Norwegian Legation.
Begins. Please arrange for Ole Colbjoernsen [sic] to receive luggage, Haslund Grieg. Ends.
HMS Enterprise eventually departed Scapa on the 27th at 16:05 and made Plymouth on the 29th. On May 28th there was message from the Admiralty C in C Western Approaches expressing:
19 tons of gold in ENTERPRISE should be handed over to Mr. K.H. Hopkins agent of Bank of England.
It was signed ‘for Head of M’.
On the May 31st the Commander-in-Chief Western Approaches sent another telegram this time informing the recipient of the following:
812P.302 large boxes (approximately 100lbs.) and 245 small boxes (about 50lbs.) said to contain gold, brought from Narvik [sic] in ENTERPRISE were disembarked on Wednesday forenoon, 29th May, 1940, and loaded into two G.W.R. trucks for conveyance to London, accompanied by Bank of England official.
However, it didn’t take long for a small amount of the gold to be released from the vaults of the Bank of England. The Norwegian authorities in London requested that five cases of gold be delivered in to their care.
The undersigned, Norwegian Minister in London, hereby authorises Mr. Johan Georg RÆDER, Commercial Counsellor to this Legation, to receive on my behalf from the Bank of England five cases containing gold belonging to the Royal Norwegian Government.
London, 12th June 1940
Erik Colban
The reference to the luggage was code for gold bullion and was a term composed by the Norwegians at the beginning of the transport with the bullion originally being known as the ‘heavy luggage’. The ‘light luggage’ was code for Norwegian cash.
When HMS Enterprise reached Plymouth on May 29th her bullion was immediately unloaded and transferred to two railway box vans of the Great Western Railway whereupon the vans were sealed and the train commenced its journey to London with Bank of England Agent Mr K. H. Hopkins on board. The consignment arrived at Paddington station without undue incident.
17
Pimpernel Gold
Having invaded Norway on April 9th, albeit delayed in taking Oslo due to the sinking of the Blücher, the Germans had an opportunity to take Norway’s King, parliament and gold bullion in one move. In reality they lost all three and a battle cruiser to boot. Like the UK, and many other countries, Norway had moved the majority of her gold out of the country before hostilities had begun. Approximately 50 tons of it remained behind, but one of the advantages the Norwegians had was that Nicolai Rygg had ensured that the bullion was boxed and ready in advance for it to be moved. That requirement came sooner than expected.
Although the Germans arrived at Norges Bank Oslo on April 10th it took them quite some time to work out what had actually happened to the bullion. The bank was immediately placed under armed guard and a preparatory meeting held with the remaining bank officials including NB Director, Sverre Olaf Thorkildsen, second only to Nicolai Rygg, where the question of gold and deposits in foreign countries was raised. On April 11th around noon another meeting was held and this time it was attended by a Major Fr. W. Neef, an officer with the Wirtschaftstab – a German economic exploitation group – as well as a liaison officer with the OKW for the political leadership and Herr Walter Weber of the German Legation.181 Thorkildsen was also in attendance.182 It is not known what the Germans initial reaction was when they realised that the gold holding in the bank was less than expected, but it could hardly have been a joyous moment when it dawned on them that a considerable amount of gold was probably elsewhere. Discussions took place and an agreement was reached that the Norwegians would not act against joint German and Norwegian interests. This agreement was formalised in writing by the next day. It is pertinent to assume that the Germans would have made a thorough search of the banks in Oslo and interrogated various officials and bank employees in an attempt to gain clues as to the location of the bullion, but the priority of the invaders in the first instance was to secure the capital and the immediate surrounding area. With that particular mission carried out their attentions would have turned northwards.
On April 15th Nicolai Rygg was back in Oslo but more importantly he had returned to the bank where he met up with a four man German delegation including Ministerial leader Sarnow, who wanted to know where the gold was and demanded assurances that it would not be taken out of the country. Sarnow ‘reassured’ the
assembled Norwegians that the gold would only be used in the interests of Norway. Meanwhile, reports had filtered through to the German authorities that the gold was now at Lillehammer. Upon questioning, Rygg agreed that the gold had been moved there, but added that there were no new plans to move the gold again. The Germans, understandably, were not totally convinced that the gold was safe at Lillehammer and returned to the question several times. There were also concerns that the ‘old government’ as the Germans termed them, would somehow spirit the gold to Sweden. The bank denied this would happen and the meeting concluded with the armed German guard being dismissed from duty.
On April 24th, Neef returned to the bank again to confirm that the gold remained at Lillehammer, but it wasn’t until the next day that the Germans realised that something was amiss and that perhaps the gold had disappeared. It would appear that the Germans involved were not quite as sharp as perhaps they could have been: the interrogations began.
What is known is that the Germans had absolutely no firm idea where the bullion had been moved. Their primary concern in the days following the invasion was to arrest King Haakon and his entourage and if they couldn’t accomplish that then bombing the area of the King’s last reported whereabouts was to become the norm. It has been long debated whether collaborators were passing on information to the Germans or whether the Germans were listening in to telephone messages and radio broadcasts or perhaps just relying on rumours. However they were receiving the information on the King, wherever he appeared, an uncannily short time later the bombers would arrive overhead.
It wasn’t until the German capture of Lillehammer on May 1st that evidence was gathered by the Germans on what had happened to the gold. Employees from the town’s banks were arrested, questioned and bullied about their knowledge of the bullion, but no one gave the game away and no one had any knowledge of how to open the vault. Eventually, the Germans hired a locksmith and the lock was drilled open, but to the dismay of the invaders the vault was bare, with the exception of a bunch of keys.
The Germans, having found nothing, reviewed their methods of investigation. It was clear to them that the operation to move tons of bullion from Oslo must have been well organised and have involved many people. It could not have been the sole operation of bank staff; there must have been external assistance. With the southern and central half of Norway secured from the Allies, intelligence began to filter through to those investigating the disappearance of the bullion. Focus now turned logically towards the railways. Unfortunately for the Germans what they didn’t know was that the majority of the bullion was now in the UK having been transported there via HM cruisers Galatea and Glasgow. Unbeknown to them their cause was already lost.
As the German’s attentions focused on the railways, a number of employees were arrested and interrogated, but like the bank workers no one breathed a word.
With the taking of Åndalsnes by the Germans on May 2nd more Norwegians were questioned. Gradually, the Germans were coming to realise that Molde had been the destination for at least some of the bullion, but again they had no idea where it actually was, if it had been taken north or hidden elsewhere. Even the crews of the local ferries were questioned – had they seen any boxes of valuables or unusual cargo? Yet again, no one knew anything.
Although Åndalsnes had been taken on May 2nd it was another three days before the Germans appeared in Molde – four days after Glasgow had left the port with her bullion consignment along with the Norwegian King, government and various VIPs. The Germans really had missed the boat. Nonetheless, once the Germans had secured Molde they began to interrogate various high-ranking people from the town in the hope that they could glean more information.
The interrogation was led by a German called Erich Opitz, an Abwehr radio operator who had worked closely with Major Berthold Benecke (Senior Abwehr agent in Norway) of the German Legation in Oslo.183 Opitz’s cover was that of a commercial attaché with the German Legation. Initially, he operated from the Grand Hotel and then from other less obvious abodes sending messages direct to Berlin. Clearly, prior to the invasion Opitz had been taking measures to be careful with his transmissions, but he wasn’t careful enough as he failed to consider the radio skills of the Norwegian radio amateurs who duly reported their findings to the Norwegian General Staff. On April 4th, and as a direct consequence of these reports, Opitz and Benecke were considered to be ‘persona non grata’ by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the men were requested to leave Norway at the earliest opportunity. However, the invasion on April 9th radically changed the situation and the two remained in Norway to ‘extend their interests’.184
The interrogation experiences of the Norwegians must have been frightening, but again little was given away and credit must be given for having forestalled the Germans as long as they did. What was more worrying for the Norwegians though, was the use of a Norwegian collaborator who appeared to work closely with Opitz. This man was later named as ‘Sandersen’. Apparently, this man was well acquainted with the gold transport; he appeared to know about telephone conversations that had taken place with regards to the identity of the puffers and, even more worryingly, he also had names of accomplices to the transport. The telephone system clearly had been infiltrated, but it would appear only after the transport had left Molde.
NB Subsequent research has failed to reveal the real identity of this Norwegian.
Abwehr Officer Opitz’s interrogations widened. It was clear to him that the transport had been carried out using a variety of transport methods and he could see a pattern emerging. Further Norges Bank employees were arrested and questioned. Some were questioned only for a short time, but others received more rigorous questioning often being interrogated throughout the night.
There ended the German’s frustrated attempts to locate the gold. Thwarted at every turn, Abwehr agent Erich Opitz had failed to break down his captives enough to obtain the information he was after. It was now clear that the bullion, or at least the majority of it, had left Norway for the UK and it became pointless to interrogate the Norwegians further. The Germans, for their part, had developed some of their techniques of interrogation. Those methods would come to haunt many Norwegians in the years to come and in some cases would kill them.
18
Atlantic Sailings
With the gold safely ensconced in the UK and the threat of German invasion uppermost in British and Norwegian minds, it was decided to ship the bullion to Canada and America as soon as possible. After all, Churchill had spirited away the UK gold reserves prior to the start of the war and it was clear to most people, especially after the miraculous Dunkirk evacuation of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF), that the German invasion was only days maybe just hours away. A palpable sense of anxiety lay across the country like an all-encompassing fog. Fortunately, the fear of invasion did not paralyse those charged with the safe keeping of the bullion. Mr Laverack, of the Bank of England, along with Ole Colbjørnsen and Fredrik Haslund at once set about planning to ship the bullion once more on several freighters. Matters concerning the gold were now in full swing as can be seen from the following letter sent to the Bank of England by the Norwegian authorities:
£2½ million to New York and similar to Montreal
We agree to your spreading the New York consignments over more than two vessels. We agree that the insurance should be effected in pound sterling and the journey from London to the British port should be included. The gold to New York should be consigned to the Federal Reserve Bank, New York, to be kept in safe custody for and on behalf of the Norwegian Government. The Norwegian Minister in Washington, Mr. Wilhem Morgenstierne is authorised to dispose of the gold for the account of the Royal Norwegian Government…the 2.5 million pounds to Montreal should similarly be consigned to the Bank of Canada, Montreal, to be kept in safe custody, for and on behalf of the Royal Norwegian Government…
The letter, three pages in length, confirmed that not all of the bullion would be shipped out.
…as explained to Mr Laverack these 547 cases (302 big and 245 small) which were recently landed at Plymouth, are for transhipment to Canada in our own steamers and should not be opened. Mr. Colbjørnsen and Mr. Haslund will take with them a first consignment of 250 cases (130 and 120 small) on the M/S “Bomma” which is now being sent from the EC [East Coast] to Glasgow (she was actually headed for Leith) and is expected to be ready to leave in a few days time. There will be no other cargo onboard…at the same time we ask you to forward to the Royal Norwegian Legation, 10 Palace Green, London, W8, 5 – five – of the big cases. Kindly phone the Legation (the Minister or Mr. Raeder) so that a convenient time for arrival can be agreed upon. The remaining unopened cases 292 in all, whereof 167 big and 125 small, about equal quantities on two further Norwegian steamers…
Erik Colban and Øyvind Lorentzen signed the letter.
As a direct consequence of the letter and its instructions, the gold was taken by rail, part of which was originally from HMS Enterprise, to the port of Falmouth, in Cornwall on June 12th whereupon the boxes were loaded onto a tug to be taken out to the M/S Bomma, which had arrived safely and was now anchored in Falmouth Harbour. For security reasons it was decided to use more than one port for embarkation and to ensure that all went smoothly Colbjørnsen and Haslund were to sail with the Bomma. The bullion was embarked, but three days were to elapse before she sailed along with a convoy of other ships to Baltimore, which she duly reached on June 28th – again without incident. Once there the Americans provided an armed watch over her as she lay anchored in the outer harbour. On July 1st Bomma’s precious cargo was unloaded and then conveyed via rail to the Federal Reserve Bank in New York and to the Bank of Canada in Ottawa.
Gold Run: The Rescue of Norway’s Gold Bullion from the Nazis, 1940 Page 23
