Debacle at Verneuil
While war raged in the northern counties of England, Louis had been pressing the siege of Verneuil hard since early July. Defending the line of the river Avre,102 this fortress town stood as a bastion loyal to Henry II between two principal areas of disaffection on the southern frontier of Normandy. Torigni greatly exaggerates in claiming that the French army contained 7,000 knights and many other troops,103 but Louis had nonetheless assembled a powerful host, including the forces of counts Theobald of Blois, Henry of Champagne, and Robert of Dreux, as well as troops from Burgundy.104 Raising and maintaining such a force in the field was a major logistical and financial challenge for the Capetian king, whose resources were proverbially scanty when compared to those of Henry II.105 To fund it, Louis had levied a special tax throughout his lands: the royal collectors had been ruthless in its collection, while the land had been stripped of supplies and beasts of burden to provision the great army that now encircled Verneuil.106 The town put up a spirited resistance. Its defences, strengthened by Henry II since Louis’ attack in 1152, consisted of a powerful castle and a number of separate boroughs, each defended by its own walls and water-filled moat.107 It had a strong garrison, commanded by its constables Hugh de Beauchamp and Hugh de Lacy, the latter lately come with other marcher lords from Ireland, while its citizens, who had been granted special privileges by Henry, remained staunchly loyal.108
The attackers desperately tried to fill in the ditches with rocks and wood in order to create a level surface over which to wheel great siege towers higher than the walls, while their stone throwers endeavoured to smash the battlements.109 The castle remained impregnable, so the French chose to concentrate their attacks on the largest of the boroughs, known as the ‘great borough’ or the ‘Queen’s borough’. It sheltered a large number of the poor and indigent, and after almost a month of blockade, the inhabitants were beginning to starve. Aware of their growing plight, Louis offered them a respite of three days in which to summon aid from King Henry. Should this not be forthcoming, they would surrender without harm, and the hostages given to guarantee the agreement would be returned in safety. The desperate citizens accepted, and the Young King, counts Theobald, Henry and Robert, and Archbishop William of Sens swore to uphold this agreement.110 The granting of such respites and terms of conditional surrender was common in warfare of the period, but the space of only three days allowed for Henry to come to the relief of Verneuil was unusually short. Chivalric convention made it hard to refuse the request for a beleaguered garrison to seek its lord’s aid before surrender, but after so major an operation, the French were clearly determined to make the chances of the town’s relief as slight as possible.111
Henry II, however, reacted swiftly to news of Verneuil’s plight. From his base at Rouen, he immediately marched to Conches on 7 August at the head of a powerful army. In strategic terms, the withdrawal of Count Philip from north-east Normandy had enabled Henry II to concentrate his forces against Louis and the Young King.112 He had been busy recruiting large numbers of Brabançon mercenaries, and during the early summer the Plantagenet lands must have seen the passage of many disparate bands or rutae of these feared and hated mercenaries flocking north from the Midi to Henry II’s service. It is hard to give credence to the figures of upward of 10,000 claimed by the chroniclers, but they undoubtedly constituted a formidable fighting force.113 Crucially, moreover, their loyalty to the king was assured, though not, observed Howden dryly, ‘without the high pay which he gave them’.114 Accordingly, treasure from Winchester was at the same time being transported via Southampton across the Channel to fund the heavy costs of defence, for as Newburgh noted, ‘there was an abundant supply of money from the royal treasures, which were not to be spared in such a crisis’.115 The provision of armed guards for flotillas, such as that of the chamberlain’s ships and the royal esnecca bringing treasure to Normandy in May 1173, indicates Henry’s awareness of the possible threat of attack by the naval forces of the Young King’s allies.116
After further reinforcements had come up to him at Conches, Henry II advanced to Breteuil, just seven miles from Verneuil, where he drew up his army on rising ground.117 With his forces in readiness, Henry II issued Louis with a formal challenge either to withdraw from the duchy unharmed or to face him in battle.118 His choice of ground was as much symbolic and psychological as tactical, for Breteuil was the principal Norman lordship of Robert, earl of Leicester. The provocation to Leicester was deliberate; would the rebel earl dare to recover his patrimony by facing Henry in the field? According to William of Newburgh, ‘at first the French, by nature both aggressive and arrogant, mocked this ultimatum, especially as they seemed to have superiority in numbers and in military equipment, and they imagined that Henry would certainly not dare to carry through such a plan’.119 Yet such bluster masked the fact that in reality Henry II’s bold gambit had presented the allies with a grave dilemma. If they did not confront Henry, Verneuil might be relieved, and a month’s hard and costly fighting would have been wasted. The resulting loss of face would certainly both shame the French and damage the Young King’s cause within Normandy and the other Plantagenet domains. It was true that, on more than one occasion in the past, Henry had shown his reluctance to attack the person of his lord, Louis VII.120 But he was now fighting a desperate war of defence within the borders of his own duchy, and his resolve appeared unshakable.121 Were the allies prepared to risk the uncertain outcome of a major pitched battle? For the armies of the kings of England and of France to meet in a major set-piece engagement was extremely rare. Indeed, the last occasion had been back in 1119 when, as Louis was uncomfortably aware, his father Louis VI had suffered a crushing defeat at the hands of Henry I.122 Despite displaying considerable personal bravery on the Second Crusade, Louis VII’s own military record did not inspire confidence, while that of his opponent justified his reputation as one of the finest military commanders of the age. The presence, moreover, of so many Brabançons in Henry II’s army at Breteuil did not augur well for the allies. Their professionalism, not least as well drilled and steady infantry, would ensure a hard-fought engagement in which the French cavalry might not prevail, while their reputation for ruthlessness only heightened fears of heavy casualties. For the Young King, the dilemma was acute: could he bring himself to fight directly against his own father? Chroniclers describing young Henry’s rebellion spoke readily of the sin of parricide, but despite his determination to make war against his father to force political concessions, the Young King almost certainly did not desire the violent death of Henry II. The rebellious Robert Curthose had unhorsed his father at the siege of Gerberoi in 1079, because initially he had not recognized him; once he heard William’s voice, however, Robert at once dismounted and gave his father his own horse as a means of escaping further harm.123 But in the confusion of battle there was no certainty that the Young King would be able to safeguard his own father’s life.
For his own part, Henry II doubtless had similar qualms about joining battle with an army that contained the Young King and perhaps his other sons Richard and Geoffrey. Yet he had long since gained the measure of Louis’ character, and his actions were carefully calculated. Had he been intent on forcing a decisive engagement, Henry could have launched a direct attack on Louis’ army as it lay before Verneuil. Instead, his challenge from Breteuil was a show of strength, but one that allowed the allies room for withdrawal. His instincts were confirmed when Louis, increasingly alarmed by the prospect of an imminent attack, sent Archbishop William of Sens, Count Robert and Count Theobald to parley. Meeting the king riding ahead of his main army with a small retinue, they informed him that the king of France wished to hold talks concerning the establishment of peace between Henry and his sons.124 Henry II granted them a truce until the following day, and retired with his army back to his camp at Conches, evidently assuming that his preparations for battle and his challenge to Louis had constituted the formal relief of Verneuil. The next morning, 9 August,
he again moved up to Breteuil, but waited in vain for the French.125 For Louis had used the pretence of talks to buy time to occupy the great borough at Verneuil. The French cordon around the town must have prevented the receipt of any further messages bearing news of King Henry’s arrival at Breteuil or of the ensuing negotiations, and somehow Louis was able to convince the burghers that no help was forthcoming and demanded their surrender according to the terms of the respite. Thus duped, the townspeople duly capitulated to Louis, but the French immediately violated the agreement, sacking and burning the borough and carrying off the townsmen and their goods to France. Louis’ forces then beat so hasty a retreat, however, that they were forced to leave much equipment, baggage and supplies behind.126 ‘He fled thus vilely and ignominiously with his army,’ noted Roger of Howden, ‘to his shame and everlasting opprobrium, not daring to await the attack of the army of the king of England.’127 Alerted to this perfidy only by the smoke from the blazing town, Henry set off in hot pursuit of the retreating French, but could cut off just part of their rearguard, taking many prisoners.128 Henry II chose not to pursue Louis or his son further into France, but returned to Verneuil that evening, where his men plundered the abandoned French camp in which they found ‘a great stock of corn, wine, and foodstuffs, together with an assortment of furnishings’.129 The king formally entered the town amidst celebrations, praised its defenders for their gallant resistance, and ordered the destroyed or damaged walls to be rebuilt.130
Ruse, guile and ambush were commonplace in twelfth-century warfare, and were not in themselves deemed unchivalric.131 But to violate a sworn promise of surrender and safe conduct was a dishonourable act, unbecoming in a knight, still less a king.132 Louis, moreover, had not only violated his word, failing to keep a pact which young Henry had himself sworn to guarantee, but had profaned the vigil of the feast day of St Laurence, his own patron saint. As Roger of Howden indignantly wrote: ‘In order that these events may be kept in memory, be it known that this flight of the king of France took place on the fifth day of the week, upon the vigil of St Laurence, to the praise and glory of our Lord Jesus Christ, who by punishing the crime of perfidy so speedily avenged the indignity done to his martyr’.133 The reverence displayed by young Henry to St James during the siege at Drincourt suggests he may well have been affronted by his father-in-law’s blatant disregard for the feast of St Laurence, some of whose relics were among the treasures of the abbey of Mont Saint-Michel.134 Whatever part, if any, the Young King had in the treacherous attack on the great borough at Verneuil, he shared in Louis’ dishonour and humiliation. In a martial culture where deeds of prowess gained honour and reputation, headlong flight brought ignominy and ridicule.135 ‘So it was’, commented Newburgh, ‘that those who a little earlier seemed as lions with fierce spirits and the roaring of high sounding words, were suddenly found to be like hares in retreat and flight.’136 It was for good reason that in his poem, written in the immediate aftermath of the war and urging reconciliation between father and son, Jordan Fantosme told of Count Matthew’s death at Drincourt, but studiously avoided any mention whatsoever of the siege of Verneuil. More immediately, the French withdrawal spelt disaster for those Norman lords on the southern frontier, such as Gilbert Crispin, who had come out in support of the Young King. Gilbert had rebelled from the castle of Damville, to the north-east of Verneuil, but with no further hope of reinforcements its garrison surrendered to Henry II’s powerful army on 10 August as it marched up the valley of the Iton.137
War in the West: Brittany
Despite the failure at Verneuil, the impetus of the allies’ attack was far from spent. The Breton frontier was still in turmoil. As the situation had worsened from March 1173, Henry had summoned the Breton magnates and required them to take an oath of loyalty to him. Though many obeyed, Ralph of Fougères ignored the king’s summons and had begun to reconstruct his great fortress of Fougères. The Young King sent to his aid a force of picked knights under the command of Hasculf of Saint-Hilaire, one of his leading familiares, and William Patrick, who rode across Normandy by circuitous routes to avoid detection by Henry II’s men.138 They were joined by Hugh of Chester, whose influence in the Avranchin was strong, and by Eudo, viscount of Porhoët.139 It was probably the arrival of some of these reinforcements that allowed Ralph to launch a counter-attack on a force of Brabançons who had been sent by Henry II to devastate the lordship of Fougères.140 His knights fell on one of their foraging parties between Fougères and Saint James de Beuvron, killing many of them. Following up this success, he took and burned the castles of St James and of Le Teilleul. While Eudo strengthened the castle of Josselin and took that of Ploërmel, Ralph managed to capture the castle of Combour and the city of Dol by suborning the royal castellans,141 an indication of the fragility of loyalty to the Old King. The situation in Brittany was now deteriorating fast, and Henry II, realizing that he must respond with greater force, sent an advance guard led by William du Hommet, the constable of Normandy, and part of the Norman host, supported by a strong contingent of Brabançons.142
On 20 August, the allied forces led by Ralph of Fougères, Hugh of Chester, Hasculf of Saint-Hilaire and William Patrick met in battle with the royal army outside Dol.143 Why the Young King’s supporters chose to give battle, if indeed the choice was theirs, is uncertain; they may not have felt confident about the strength of Dol’s defences, as Jordan Fantosme suggests, or they may have risked an attempt to defeat Henry’s advanced units before the king himself could come to reinforce his men.144 The result, however, was swift and decisive. At the first royalist attack Ralph’s knights broke and fled, leaving the infantry to be cut down in large numbers.145 Despite the leavening of knights from the Young King’s familia,146 the rebels’ hybrid force had stood little chance against the fearsome combination of the elite of Henry II’s own household knights and the professional Brabançons. William, Hasculf, fifteen knights and others of rank were taken prisoner, either in the battle or in the rout, and were sent to Pontorson.147 As William du Hommet had sent part of his force to prevent the escape of the rebels, Ralph, Earl Hugh and some sixty of their knights found their way barred and had no option but to take refuge in the town of Dol. The Brabançons pressed home their attack, overran the town and forced fugitives into the final refuge of the castle’s keep.148 Here they were closely besieged by the routiers, the king’s knights and the local peasantry raised from the Avranchin, while word was quickly sent to the king at Rouen.149
Henry II received the news on the evening of Tuesday 21 August. He moved at once to ensure that the ringleaders neither escaped nor were relieved by Eudo or other Breton insurgents.150 Henry’s speed of movement was proverbial, but in a march that astonished contemporaries he covered the distance of nearly 200 miles between Rouen and Dol in just two days, arriving before the castle on 23 August.151 In such a dash, the king could only have been accompanied by a comparatively small retinue, but a number of siege engines, possibly already sent for from neighbouring ducal castles, were subsequently set up to begin a bombardment of the keep at Dol. The defenders, realizing their situation was hopeless, surrendered the castle on 26 August after the king had offered lenient terms, agreeing to spare life and limb. The haul of prisoners was enough to show why Henry had regarded the siege of Dol as crucial.152 It included Earl Hugh, Ralph of Fougères, Ralph de Haye and eighty knights ‘of great name’, said to be of the Young King’s household.153 In time of war, the small numbers of knights permanently retained in the household of a king or great magnate would be temporarily swelled by stipendiary knights, of whom there was always a ready supply. Those taken at Dol included sons or kinsmen of prominent rebels who had taken the Young King’s wages, while others, such perhaps as the warrior known simply by the nickname ‘Springald’, were freelances, raised from various regions of France.154
To the surprise and approbation of contemporary observers, Henry II dealt mercifully with his defeated opponents at Dol. Some were soon released after giving hostages
and pledges, others were kept with him ‘in open custody’, though Earl Hugh was sent as a prisoner to Falaise castle.155 His capture removed a major supporter of the Young King not only in south-west Normandy but also in north-west England, and it is notable that, unlike the garrisons of the earl of Leicester, little is heard of the activities of Hugh’s castellans in England.156 The Old King’s treatment of rebel lands and castles was more ruthless. He sent his Brabançons on a punitive campaign deep into Brittany, during which they harried and burned Le Porhoët, destroyed the castle of La Guerche, and demolished Fougères and Ralph’s other castles.157 Nonetheless, some of young Henry’s adherents on the marches of Anjou and Brittany fought on, waging a guerrilla war from the forests and raiding the lands of the Henry II and his supporters.158
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