by David Green
Edward’s motivation in the course of the campaign and indeed in this general period of the war remains an area of contention and is very much open to question. Clifford Rogers has argued strongly against traditional opinion and the fabian military advice of Vegetius that Edward III intended to bring his opponent to battle as he had singly failed to do in earlier expeditions and ‘to win his rights by force of arms’.11
La Hougue and Barfleur were attacked on 13 and 14 July respectively. There was continuing support from the fleet which burnt and laid waste the whole seacoast from Barfleur as far as the Fosse de Colleville near Caen, and likewise burnt the town of Cherbourg and the ships of La Havre, so that ‘one hundred or more great ships and other vessels of the enemy’ were burnt.12 Alongside the policy of devastation, attempts were made to incite rebellion against the Valois monarchy. There was certainly support for Edward, but whether this was gained through intimidation or political sympathy is not clear. In any case, ransom payments made to the English and resistance in the Cotentin was very limited.13
The army was divided into three ‘battles’ or divisions. The vanguard, under the nominal command of the prince, included the earls of Northampton and Warwick, the constable and marshal respectively. The king was in the main body, while the earls of Suffolk, Arundel and Huntingdon led the rearguard. The three marched on a wide front to maximise the destruction. The vanguard reached Pont Hébert on 21 July where the bridge, broken by the retreating Robert Bertrand, marshal of France and sire de Bricquebec, was rebuilt. Bertrand had responsibility for the defence of the Cotentin coast from Honfleur to Mont-Saint-Michel. This was no easy task as, apart from Cherbourg, there were no notable fortifications.14 On the following day, believing erroneously that Bertrand intended to give battle, Edward knighted Henry Burghersh, another member of the family with close links to the royal family. After capturing Saint-Lô and sacking the town with particular viciousness since it had offered token resistance, they burned their way to Caen. Edward III arrived there on 24th while the prince was at Cheux, two miles to the west. The forces in Caen were commanded by Raoul, count of Eu and constable of France, the lord of Tancarville, and the recently arrived Bertrand. The numbers of defenders is very uncertain; estimates vary between 1,000 and a less likely 6,000 men-at-arms, Genoese mercenaries and militia. The prince set up camp to the north, near the deserted Abbaye aux Dames.
Despite orders from the king, the western gate was seized and the earl of Warwick, who had been sent by the king to recall the attackers, joined in with the fighting, and entered the town followed by Northampton and Richard Talbot leading a disordered contingent. The battle spread along the river and overran the defenders, the constable surrendered to Thomas Holland, future earl of Kent, and the chamberlain to the prince’s retainer, Thomas Daniel. Captives from Caen were taken to England by the earl of Huntingdon. Those who were not worth ransoming did not fare so well.15
Shortly after, on 29 July, Philip VI proclaimed the arrière-ban, recalling the duke of Normandy from the siege of Aiguillon and leaving only a small detachment to defend against the expected attack from Flanders as the king concentrated his defences on the Seine. The abrupt departure of the army from Aiguillon meant that horses, tents and other equipment were left behind and captured by the English. In this, one of the prince’s associates and sheriff of Merionneth, ‘That arch-spoilator Walter Mauny took the lead.’16 Lancaster then led his troops in pursuit of the duke northwards. Meanwhile, Philip tried to slow the invaders by breaking the bridges along the Seine.
At this point the English army formed two columns and slowly marched east toward Rouen. It was repulsed at Pont de l’Arche and moved towards Paris, storming Longueville and killing the garrison, although it failed to take the bridge of Vernon. The prince spent a night at Mounceaux.17 On 11 August, while near the bridge of Meulan, the earls of Warwick and Northampton and a detachment from the prince’s division were sent to investigate the possibility of forcing a crossing but they were taunted into a disorganised assault and driven back.
On 12 August, the army came within twenty miles of Paris causing panic and hastening defensive preparations. Although he had a larger army than Edward (some 8,000 men-at-arms, 6,000 Genoese and a large number of infantrymen), Philip could not defend the city from all sides. The bridge at Poissy was broken, headquarters were established at Saint-Denis and the army was encamped at Saint-Cloud. The English occupied Poissy and Saint-Germain-en-Laye where the prince stayed in the old palace. Despite French attacks, the bridge was rebuilt.18
Philip withdrew to the plain between Paris and Saint-Denis on 14 August, and from where he issued a challenge to Edward, which was probably accepted as the French army assembled in battle order near the abbey of Saint Germain on the southern wall of Paris. From there, they marched to what was, presumably, the proposed battleground among the vineyards of Bourg-la-Reine and Antony. This allowed Edward to retreat northwards after burning Poissy and breaking the Auteuil bridge. Philip hurried in pursuit. Rogers suggests that although Edward accepted the challenge, he did not accept either the time nor place of battle, which appears unlikely.19 In a succession of forced marches covering about twenty-five miles a day, the French then raced to beat Edward to the Somme. Part of the reason for the English failure to reach the river with any time to spare, despite their head start, was the indiscipline of the prince’s vanguard. A day was wasted attacking the insignificant village of Vessencourt. They were stopped on the point of assaulting Beauvais, but could not be prevented from burning the suburbs and most of the outlying churches, while the walls of Poix-en-Beauvais were undermined and assaulted in direct contravention of the king’s order. The prince spent the night of 16 August at Grisy-le-Plâtres and the 18 August at Milly. On the following day he reached Grandvilliers and on the 20th Molliens. When they finally reached the River Somme, it was found to be impassable. Warwick failed to force a passage on the 22nd at Hangest, and the French approach forced a retreat towards the coast turning north at Oisemont to the mouth of the river. Shortly after midnight on the 24th, the English army discovered a ford across the river at Blanchetaque.20 Godemar du Fay (later to become seneschal of Beaucaire and Nîmes)21 defended it on the opposite shore with 500 men-at-arms and 3,000 infantry. Northampton, Hugh Despenser and Reginald Cobham led 100 men-at-arms and archers of the vanguard across the stream. When they were in range, the archers opened fire, providing cover for the men-at-arms to attack the north bank and establish a bridgehead while the others then crossed behind. Godemar was forced to retreat while Philip, who had pursued the English to Blanchetaque, was beaten by the tide. At about this date (24 August), the Flemings abandoned their campaign after failing to take Béthune. Philip returned to Abbeville then took the Hesdin road to try to cut Edward off from the north. The English army halted near the village of Crécy.
It may have been the numerical superiority of the French army that led to the English withdrawal over the Somme and then to Crécy. Alternatively, rather than fleeing from Philip, the entire campaign strategy may have been an attempt to bring him to battle. Edward had failed to do so at Vironfosse in 1339 and, a year later, Philip had declined to confront him at Tournai. The expense of these failures was such that Edward may have decided that only a major large-scale victory could secure the French throne or sufficient political leverage. Perhaps the devastation wrought during the march from La Hogue was designed, in addition to damaging the tax revenue, to cause baronial discontent and induce the French to attack. The plan may have been laid out in particular detail since in view of the speed with which he took up position after crossing the Somme, the battlefield must have been reconnoitred in advance and certain defences prepared including pit-traps to hamper the French cavalry. The route taken during the retreat from Paris was convoluted and the time wasted in attacking Oisemont, and in the two days following the Somme crossing could indicate that Edward hoped to induce a battle. Certainly, Giovanni Villani, the Italian chronicler, noted Edward was looking to sele
ct a suitable site for the encounter.22 The king had faith in his cause, his army, and its commanders. Warwick, Arundel and Suffolk had seen service in Scotland, Flanders and Brittany, and Warwick and Arundel had fought at Sluys in 1340. Northampton had commanded forces in Flanders and Brittany (including at Morlaix in 1342). Edward III had fought in all these theatres and was noted in particular for his victory at Halidon Hill. Morale was good and the army was perfecting a tactical system that had defeated odds of 10 to 1 at Dupplin Moor. Although the English were exhausted after marching over 300 miles in the previous month, they did have time to prepare. Furthermore, the move towards Flanders provided the possibility of bringing in reinforcements or offering a route of escape in the event of defeat, and there may also have been financial considerations. Parliament had advised the king to seek battle. The 1344 subsidy had been granted on that condition and he had publicly and privately proclaimed this intention. It was in his best financial interests to seek a swift resolution since taxation revenue had been all but exhausted.23 The delay could simply have been due to indiscipline and/or poor geographical awareness, but it may be significant that a similar ‘mishap’ befell the Black Prince in the days leading up to the battle of Poitiers.
… about midday [26 September] new reports came to King Edward that King Philippe was ready and arrayed his men in three lines of battle. King Edward rejoiced … drew up his men and marched to the bridge at Crécy, and about the hour of vespers or a little before he saw the enemy approaching. The English had by now fasted a long time, having stood so as to be ready for the French.24
After the French had reconnoitred the strength of the English army and its formation, Philip decided to attack, despite advice to the contrary. The French army was organised in three battalions, one behind the other. In front of these were Genoese mercenaries armed with crossbows commanded by Carlo Grimaldi and Otto Doria. French reinforcements continued to arrive throughout the afternoon. Philip probably commanded 12,000 men-at-arms, 6,000 Genoese and several thousand infantry, creating a force of 20,000–25,000 soldiers.
The English made their stand at the end of an expanse of gently rising ground with their backs to the forest of Crécy-Grange and the sun. The prince led the vanguard with Warwick and Northampton as well as Kent, Godfrey de Harcourt, and Chandos. The king commanded the centre, and the bishop of Durham with the earls of Arundel and Suffolk led the rearguard.25 The archers were probably deployed on the wings of each ‘battle’, but may have begun the encounter in front of the dismounted infantry. There were also a number of cannon, which were used primarily to frighten the French horses. It was one of the first appearances of artillery on a battlefield.
The French attacked in the rain of the late afternoon led by the Genoese. Outranged by the English archers and without their shields, which were yet to arrive, they soon fled for their own lines and were cut down by the furious French cavalry, who, led by the count of Alençon, then attacked the English vanguard. The archers heavily disrupted the charge but some reached the English lines and a fierce fight ensued. The standard fell and was raised again by the prince’s retainer, Thomas Daniel26 and the prince himself was struck down and rescued by his standard-bearer, Richard FitzSimon.27 The French cavalry repeatedly wheeled, rallied and charged. It was during one of these attacks that entreaties may have been made to the king to ensure his son’s safety. Edward is said to have responded that he should not be sent for
as long as my son is alive. Give them my command to let the boy win his spurs, for if God has so ordained it, I wish the day to be his.28
As the French attacks failed, the horses were brought up from behind the English lines and, as they were to do at Poitiers, the men-at-arms remounted and charged the surviving French troops. At this, the bulk of the army fled leaving Philip with only a handful of companions, his personal bodyguard and some infantry levies from Orléans. After being injured, he was led away by John of Hainault abandoning the Oriflamme and the royal standard.29
On the following morning 2,000 infantry reserves, still following from Abbéville, arrived, unaware of the battle. They were scattered in a single charge by Northampton, Suffolk and Warwick and perhaps the prince.30 English casualties from the battle were very low. Only 40 men-at-arms were reported missing, although presumably many more infantry and archers were killed. By contrast, French casualties were extreme. This was a result of Edward’s orders, before the battle, that there was to be no plundering of the dead and no quarter for the living. This also followed from the French deployment of the Oriflamme, which, as at Poitiers, was seen as a sign of ‘guerre mortelle’.31 Reginald Cobham, Michael Northburgh and others counted 1,542 French knights and squires who fell near the prince’s lines alone.32 Amongst them were John, the blind king of Bohemia, and his knights, said by Froissart to have been tethered together so he might strike a blow in the conflict. It may have been from John, possibly slain by the prince himself, that Edward adopted the ostrich feathers as his device as Prince of Wales. Another of the fallen was Jean de Harcourt, Godfrey’s brother.
Crécy provided the blueprint for the troop composition of the prince’s later expeditions. Although it may not have begun as a chevauchée, the complement of the English forces in the 1346 campaign demonstrated the benefits of recruiting a balanced army of men-at-arms and archers who could offer a range of effective and flexible tactical options. In real terms, this meant a combination of dismounted men-at-arms and archers fighting together in a defensive position to repulse a numerically superior opponent. The archers reduced enemy numbers at a distance and disrupted their approach, giving the advantage to men-at-arms fighting in close formation. The combination of dismounted knights and archers was not new – William the Conqueror had used such a blend at Hastings – but it was considered innovative by contemporaries such as Thomas Gray in his description of the battle of Courtrai (1302) and still held good nearly fifty years later.33
The traditional view of the battle of Crécy has attributed the English victory to the stout yeomen archers and their longbows, but this was not the only advantage. ‘L’armee d’Edouard III etatit remarquable … par sa discipline et son esprit combatif.’34 However, despite these qualities, the French assault failed, at least partly because of a lack of coordination. The French army was multinational and this caused communication problems. By contrast, the only foreign troops in Edward’s army were the Welsh who were organised in small groups with English-speaking commanders. In the past, Philip had successfully avoided battle. This challenge proved too great to evade, and he was forced into combat more by domestic political concerns than military necessity, as Enrique of Trastamara was to be at Nájera over twenty years later. It is uncertain why he felt the need to attack before his troops were all assembled. The destruction of the Genoese crossbowmen might have been averted, or at least mitigated, had they been equipped with their shields (pavises), which were en route from Abbeville even as the arrows were falling. The lack of tactical direction from Philip, who had proved himself no mean general at Cassel in 1328 – the French victory there was one of the last battles to be won by an opening cavalry charge and may have coloured Philip’s actions at Crécy – and the impatience of the French nobles, especially Alençon, contributed much to the defeat. There seems to have been some success in the attack on the vanguard but it proved ultimately indecisive, and was, in any case, no real solution to their tactical problem.35 The role of the prince himself and his division should not be overlooked either. For all the superiority of the archers, the victory at Crécy depended on the ability of the vanguard to hold against repeated charges of those knights who, before that day, had been numbered among the finest in Christendom. The French cavalry displayed great skill in the battle. Despite the defensive preparations that had been made, the use of cannon to frighten the horses, the lack of central direction and control, and the threat of the archers, they managed to repeatedly charge, wheel and reform to attack again. The lack of central co-ordination did not stop the French
aristocracy from ably fulfilling its traditional military role, although to no avail. Perhaps unfairly, blame was heaped upon them by contemporaries for attacking in disorder and allowing themselves to be defeated by dismounted men-at-arms and mere archers, ‘gens de nulle value’.36
The victorious army, urgently in need of supplies, marched slowly to Calais. The king’s decision to lay siege to the town does not appear to have been discussed in advance, and consideration may have been given to assaulting Boulogne, which was certainly attacked by English ships on 4 September. The siege of Calais began the day before and lasted until 4 August 1347, and may have involved up to 32,000 soldiers over the course of the operation. The coastal port may seem a meagre reward after the scale of the victory at Crécy, and in part it was. Certainly, the length of the siege and the consequent cost in money and manpower was excessive. The distinction between the sieges of the 1340s and those of the 1440s and the comparitive efficacy of artillery is very apparent. However, Calais was highly significant: it provided an extremely valuable base and the launching point for many subsequent campaigns.
The prince’s role in the siege is not clear, but there was extensive administrative activity leading to reinforcements, supplies and assorted provisions being sent from Cheshire, Wales and throughout his demesne to Calais. The loss of the central pay accounts makes the reconstruction of the army at Calais difficult. Ayton has pointed to a number of other documents that appear to be partial transcriptions from the originals and which may show the assembled siege force. He has also emphasised the problems associated with such transcripts, the most famous of which is Wrottesley’s Crécy and Calais.
