by David Green
These letters do not, however, provide a great deal of evidence concerning military activity in Gascony during the spring of 1356 after Wingfield’s letter of 22 January. The policy was clearly, to harass the enemy, possibly whilst waiting for reinforcements, or a further English invasion, or perhaps simply until the weather improved. The prince also had a number of administrative matters to deal with, such as an appeal of the commonality of Bayonne against the count of Albret, and diplomatic contacts had to be maintained with the count of Foix.26
The frontiers of Gascony were fortified in this period, a task simplified by the support, won and bought, of a number of Gascon nobles who had not participated in the earlier campaign, including Jean de Galard, Bertrand de Durfort and the lords of Caumont and Chalais. The army was deployed along the frontier and, under the command of some of the key figures in the military retinue, made a number of small-scale raids. The distribution of forces along the borders was a useful defensive measure against counter-attacks, also serving to enlarge the Anglo-Gascon ‘Pale’, and it may have reduced any tensions that existed within the army. Despite this, the French retook over thirty towns and castles.27 The difficulties of defending the borders of Gascony would be multiplied many times over when the Black Prince attempted to maintain the political integrity of the much larger principality of Aquitaine.
The raids had begun around Christmas. In Saintonge, the front probably lay along the River Charente, from Rochefort (threatening La Rochelle) to Taillebourg and as far as Cognac, where Burghersh was stationed. From there, he raided northward into Poitou and perhaps beyond. The captal de Buch was particularly successful, recapturing a number of castles in the east of Saintonge before invading Poitou in January and turning south toward Périgeux which he took and handed over to the lord of Mussidan. In the Dordogne, the operational headquarters were at Libourne, with reserves at St Emilion. The earls of Oxford, Salisbury and Suffolk, with Elie de Pommiers and the lord of Mussidan, commanded 1,000 men and raided across the valley of the Dordogne towards Rocamadour. They took Souillac and Beaulieu-sur-Dordogne. The Garonne formed another boundary, although the French had some garrisons west of the river. Warwick probably crossed somewhere near Port Sainte Marie, which was captured by a detachment under the command of Chandos and Audley in January 1356. Warwick then swung northwards along the right-hand bank of the Garonne. Clairac was also taken before he marched on and captured Tonneins. At the time of Wingfield’s letter, he was near Marmande. Chandos and Audley were in the Agenais. They took Castelsagrat after crossing the Garonne and raided towards Agen.28 Baldwin Botetourt (master of the prince’s great horses) was based at Brassac. The first six weeks of 1356 was scarcely less damaging to French royal interests in the south than the grande chevauchée itself and perhaps in strategic terms they were more significant. Territorial gains were modest but important due to their concentration in the north-west march, and the new-found, if unreliable, Plantagenet allies brought further territorial control. Durfort controlled some thirty walled towns, Caumont a further six ,and Galard and Albret were highly significant landholders. More than this, ‘They were the weather-vanes of the south-west’,29 their allegiance marked the ascendancy of the English and the prince; their defection in 1368–9 would, similarly, mark his decline.
1356: Poitiers
The success of the first raid, and the support of new allies and the despatch of reinforcements necessitated a second campaign. Letters of protection were made out for Edward Despenser (Lord Despenser from 1357); William, 3rd Lord Morley, Edward Courtenay (household bachelor and retainer) and 119 others going to join the retinues of the prince and his captains on 28 March 1356.30 It was to be fought under different conditions, however, as on 12 January, Edward III had given the prince authority to undertake peace negotiations with the French.31 The 1356 raid was,l] again, part of a wider strategic programme involving Lancaster and possibly also the king. The intention seems to have been that the prince was to join forces with Lancaster. In retrospect, problems of communication and the pressure and opportunities created by the French defenders meant that if such co-ordination was achieved, it would be more by luck than judgement. Lancaster invaded Normandy in June and was joined by Robert Knolles, Jean de Montfort, Philip of Navarre and Godfrey de Harcourt. They departed on 22 June, resupplied the Navarrese strongholds of Pont-Audemar and Breteuil, and although they avoided battle they diverted attention from the south. On 8 August, Lancaster was commissioned to begin a new campaign in Penthièvre.32
Gascony was again not left undefended, particularly as the prince had received intelligence that Armagnac was likely to attack after his departure. John Chivereston, the seneschal, Bernard d’Albret and Thomas Roos, mayor of Bordeaux, remained behind in command of the defence. The reason given for the expedition was that the prince wished to face the count of Poitiers, now the king’s lieutenant in Languedoc, who was believed to be at Bourges and had been gathering troops since mid-May. Soldiers assembled there in June and July led by Jean de Clermont, Jean le Maingre, the seneschals of Poitou, Saintonge and Toulouse, and the royal secretary, Pierre de Labatut.33
The prince left Bergerac in early August with an army of 6,000–7,000 men.34 They marched north along the east of the Massif Central through Périgord, the Limousin and Poitou. The second raid was not characterised, at least by the chroniclers, as being as destructive as that of 1355, but this is not to say that the Agenais, the Limousin and La Marche escaped without harm. After crossing the Vienne, there was some inconclusive skirmishing outside Bourges, which, despite the absense of the count of Poitiers, was strongly defended. The force attracted attention almost from the outset, and Jean II raised his siege of Breteuil and rode south. The prince’s army headed for the French interior and Edward spent a night at Vierzon, which he burned on leaving. Scouting parties soon made contact with French forces, and Chandos and Audley encountered a French detachment led Philip de Chambly. On about 28 August, the prince learned that Jean’s army was at Orléans and had not joined the count of Poitiers. The Anglo-Gascon army advanced along the valley of the Cher to Romorantin, which fell on the 30th, although the keep of the castle held out for another three days when Marshal Boucicaut and the sire de Craon were captured. The delay caused by the siege gave the French an opportunity to overtake the prince. As in 1346, relatively small gains were given precedence over the potentially disastrous consequences that could result from the time lost to acquire them.35
The raiders marched westwards from Romorantin towards Tours down the bank of the Cher, but they were unable to cross the Loire, near Amboise, thereby precluding any meeting with Lancaster. The prince had been hoping for support and was ‘intending to meet our dear cousin … of whom we heard for certain that he was trying to march towards us’.36 Lacking supplies and ever more aware of the approach of the French army, the prince found himself resting for four days near Tours after a march of 320 miles in thirty-two days. The French royal army had moved more swiftly still, but in doing so had become extended over a considerable distance. After reaching Montbazon on 18 September, the prince’s scouts finally found the French army outside Poitiers. Attempts were made by Cardinal Talleyrand de Périgord to make peace and the prince appeared willing to make a number of concessions. However, the French insistence on total surrender was refused and the battle lines were drawn on broken ground on the plains of Maupertuis.37
There is some disagreement about whether the English forces were retreating before battle was joined. The delay caused by Talleyrand’s attempts to broker a truce may have offered the prince a route of escape and he may have been trying to get away up until the moment of the French attack. On Monday 19 September, following a council held the previous evening, the earl of Warwick led the baggage-train over or towards the River Mioson, probably at Nouaillé. This prompted the French to an immediate attack.38 The prince later wrote:
Because we were short of supplies and for other reasons, it was agreed that we should retreat in a flanking movement,
so that if they wanted to attack or to approach us in a position which was not in any way greatly to our disadvantage we would give battle.39
Although written after the event this does not indicate the prince was looking for a battle at that time, nor did he feel the need to hide the fact that retreat was part of his plan. It is unclear if the prince intended to retreat as early as possible or only if the attack proved to be too strong. It is possible, however, that it may have been a ploy to provoke a French attack.40
The charge led by Audrehem and Clermont was repulsed by the English archers. The Dauphin’s ‘battle’ followed on foot and managed to engage the dismounted Anglo-Gascons, but was similarly driven back. This may have caused the division under the command of the young duke of Orléans to flee towards Chauvigny; this proved critical ‘from the moment this large body of troops turned away from the fight a French victory became almost impossible’.41 The ‘battle’ commanded by King Jean may also have been separated from the main army. Burne places much emphasis on this for the final French defeat. Its approach was slow and gave the Anglo-Gascons time to recover, although some of the force may have pursued the dauphin and Orléans.
These attacks, poorly co-ordinated and impeded by the terrain, foundered against the English forces, and the prince took the initiative by remounting a number of his men for a counter-attack. The most important aspect of this manoeuvre was the flanking strike of the captal de Buch into the left rear of the French army that crumpled under this attack. Burne gave two reasons for the cavalry charge: first that the defensive position occupied by the English was more effective against mounted than dismounted troops, and Jean was attacking on foot; and second, since the morale and resolve of the prince’s troops was ebbing away, he would rely on the surprise and trust of the old cavalry charge, a frontal assault made in conjunction with a flanking manoeuvre. It proved decisive.42
The prince’s forces in 1355–6 consisted of three types of troops: men-at-arms, horsed archers and footmen. This allowed for an extremely flexible tactical response to a variety of situations. It is uncertain whether a set-piece battle was ever intended. If a meeting with Lancaster had been achieved, then the combined force would have been strengthened to such an extent that a successful battle might have seemed likely. Certainly, Crécy provided a precedent. Had additional forces and resources been available, and the arrival of the Black Death not precluded further military action, then the victory at Crécy might well have yielded far greater spoils than Calais and the ransoms and deaths of many of the French nobility. With the later Reims campaign in mind, it appears that a once-and-for-all victory was considered to be the best way of achieving success.
After the defeat at Crécy, the French had made several attempts to combat the English, particularly through imitating their tactics and dismounting their own men-at-arms. Tout suggested the battles of Lunalonge (Poitou, 1349), Taillebourg (near Saintes, 8 April 1351), Ardres (6 June 1351) and Mauron (14 August 1352) were indicative of this. The example of battles such as Courtrai (1302), Morgarten (1315) and Crécy (1346) had affected French military thinking and they endeavoured to find a weakness in the infantry-archer formation. In the event these approaches proved ineffective or were not put into action at Poitiers.43 The use of a mounted force to lead the attack was one such innovation44 but the defeat at Poitiers destroyed the illusion that snch military changes could be effective. The contrast between the French response in 1356 with that of 1359 is very clear. New defensive tactics allowed them to turn the tables on the English, first by denying Edward the crown in 1359–60, and then by reversing the territorial gains the English had gained through the treaty of Brétigny. This was only possible when they had an easily assailable military objective, the principality of Aquitaine.
The location of the battle of Poitiers is highly conjectural, and as the terrain played an important part, this is significant. Jean caught the prince south of Poitiers trying to cross the River Miosson. The prince, it appears, was able to draw his force to an area of broken ground uncharacteristic of the plains of the area. Three divisions defended a position protected by natural obstacles, hedges, trees and marshy areas that allowed the French only two routes of attack. The difficult terrain and the volleys of arrows broke the charge led by Clermont and Audrehem.45
The formations used are also unclear. The French appear to have had a small advance cavalry force, which tried to attack and disrupt the archers at the opening of the battle. Three large divisions led by the dauphin, the duke of Orléans and KingJean fought on foot. The English were also arranged in three major ‘battles’. The Anglo-Gascon vanguard was led by Warwick, Oxford and the captal de Buch, and the rearguard by Salisbury and Suffolk. The bulk of the prince’s retinue was in the centre led by Edward himself, with Burghersh, Audley, Chandos and Cobham. The archers were stationed on the flanks and possibly at right angles to the enemy. Their positions may have been defended with earthworks. The French divisions attacked in turn, although it appears that Orléans fled before engaging the enemy. The flanking force led by the captal de Buch may have included Gascon crossbowmen. The Anglo-Gascon army probably included of 3,000–4,000 men-at-arms, 2,500–3,000 archers and 1,000 other light troops. The French army comprised about 8,000 men-at-arms, 2,000 arbalesters and numerous other poorly trained and lightly armed troops totalling some 15,000–16,000.46 Jean could raise fewer men for Poitiers than his father had ten years before, although contemporaries did not attribute defeat to a shortage of manpower. Rather, and particularly by the author of La complainte sur la bataille de Poitiers, blame was heaped upon the nobility.47 Furthermore, the French had few missile weapons with which to retaliate:
Par son recrutement, et plus encore par sa préparation immédiate, la petite armée du prince de Galles était dans les meilleures conditions pour vaincre.48
The victory at Poitiers combined the defensive tactics demonstrated and witnessed by the prince at Crécy with the chivalric traditions of an earlier age. Only the French vanguard, led by the marshals, was mounted. After the failure of the French attacks, the Anglo-Gascon response was the classic heavy cavalry charge. The battle was thus a fine illustration of the use of dismounted troops who, as at Crécy, in concert with archers in a defensible position, broke the French attacks, then remounted and were victorious by the use of a cavalry attack, which was now uncommon, perhaps even anachronistic.49
Archers and the Longbow
The role of the longbow in the early campaigns of the Hundred Years War is a contentious matter. A number of issues are open to argument and interpretation, ranging from the nature of the weapons themselves, their power and rate of accurate fire, to the disposition of the archers on the battlefield. The archers formed an integral part of the English tactical system, seeking to slow or disrupt an enemy advance. At Crécy, the bowmen were very effective against the French cavalry and at Poitiers against dismounted men-at-arms. These battles certainly showed the superiority of the longbow over the crossbow. At this point, the range of the crossbow was less than the longbow and its speed of fire considerably slower, and at Crécy this may have been further reduced by rain and weather damage. The success of the archers in 1346 altered the structure of future English armies both proportionally and tactically.50 Their importance can also be seen in 1357 and 1369 when the export of bows and arrows was forbidden, and in 1365 archers were forbidden to leave England without royal licence. However, the effective defence of the forces under Charles de Blois and du Guesclin at Auray (1364) demonstrated that close formations of well-armoured soldiers could provide a less easy target.
The use of the longbow, a popular, not aristocratic weapon, demonstrated the need for the king to draw on the support of all levels of society in his (at least theoretical) quest for the French throne. In 1363, instructions were issued requiring everyone, including the nobility, to participate in regular archery training and practice. The Reims campaign would witness the full emergence of the mounted archer and establishment of mixed retinues (
men-at-arms and archers). This in turn led to a shift in the social composition of the military community. The mounted troops gave the necessary mobility that allowed them to participate fully in chevauchées and for such raids to become engrained as the predominant English strategy. The balanced troop composition allowed for an effective and flexible tactical response to a variety of military situations. Such forces were particularly effective when used in defensive positions, preferably prepared in advance or chosen for their advantageous terrain and natural features. The massed power of the archers could thin out the enemy at a distance and slow their advance.
