by David Green
It is, of course, arguable that Gascony let alone the greater Aquitaine, could not be governed by a resident English lord; examples abound of the failure of such schemes but the situation in the principality in the 1360s went beyond previous experience and was exacerbated by social, cultural and political traditions. For example, the traditional seigneurial right to make private war was tenaciously upheld throughout Languedoc and the Valois kings had had little success in curbing such instincts. The main example of such strife was the Foix-Armagnac feud. The authority and territorial holdings of these protagonists were such that a network of alliances had developed, subsuming many other issues within that struggle. In 1362, at the battle of Launac, Gaston Fébus, count of Foix, defeated the Armagnac faction, which included the Albret family. The enormous ransoms that were demanded may well have encouraged the appeal to Charles V beccause of the financial benefits which Valois loyalty would bring.19 Armagnac’s ransom after Launac was about £42,500. Seeking allies and stability and showing some rare diplomatic instincts, the prince had assisted with payments. As a result, prior to the Spanish campaign, Armagnac owed Edward £8,300. However, Pedro’s failure to fund that expedition left the prince indebted to the count for war wages amounting to about £28,300. With the loan repaid several times over, Armagnac had freed himself from his difficult obligation and could return to his natural allegiance. Albret, who had also suffered financially in the expedition across the Pyrenees, also appealed to Paris, and like Armagnac was suitably remunerated for his change of heart. He was granted a pension of 10,000 l. by Charles V and marriage to the king’s sister.20
The ‘Gascon’ revolt has also been attributed to the nature of the prince’s administration and his personal relations with the Aquitainian nobility. Certainly, this reason has often been highlighted as among the main causes of the collapse of the Brétigny agreement. It should be noted however, that much unrest had probably been fomented in secret by Charles V and Louis of Anjou. In this matter the issue of the prince’s personal style of rule is crucial.
Chapter 17 of Machiavelli’s Prince asks if ‘it is better for a prince to be loved or feared’. The resolution of the argument is that since love is out of a prince’s control, and fear is something he can instil, the latter is the preferable option for governing effectively. The story in the Anonimalle Chronicle of the prince forcing some of his nobles to wait on their knees perhaps for hours before addressing him also puts one in mind of a later incident. Queen Elizabeth I was arguing with Lord Burghley. Burghley by this time was an old man; he was also a subject and thus required to remain on his knees when addressing the queen. Commentators at the time were startled by the queen’s kindness when she called, not for Burghley to rise, but for a cushion for his knees. The comparison has often also been drawn with Richard’s court which will be discussed further below. Clearly the situations are not directly comparable and concepts of kingship (and queenship) had developed and nor, clearly, was the Black Prince a king, but nor was it necessarily something very far out of the ordinary; what was different were the cultural and political forces at work in Aquitaine.21
It has been strongly argued that the ‘anglicising’ of the Gascon/Aquitainian administration was another key element that caused the discontent that erupted in 1368. The choice of officials was often governed by political motivations and most of the new seneschals were English, often military men such as William Felton, seneschal of Poitou, and Richard Totesham, seneschal of Angoumois and governor of La Rochelle.22 Nonetheless, some effort was made to offset such appointments and there may have been a programme of establishing concentrations of politically supportive families in various towns and cities.23 In an attempt to win over the port of La Rochelle, Edward III chose several of the chief officials of Saintonge from among the municipal elite. William Seris was appointed president of the sovereign court, to hear appeals from Saintonge.24 He also became governor of Benon. However, he returned to the French fold in 1369 and Charles V rewarded him with the office of president of the Parlement of Paris.25 By contrast, the Poitevin, Guichard d’Angle, King Jean’s seneschal of Saintonge, was retained in office and gave his full allegiance to England. He became the master of Richard II’s household and was rewarded with the earldom of Huntingdon.
A comparison with another area where the prince also experienced difficulties in dealing with his nobles, the March of Wales, may be useful. There it was believed most constructive to affect ‘a surrender of power into the hands of those who were already the economic and social leaders of the community’. The English did not have any form of traditional power base in much of the new principality and despite their efforts they failed to create one.
Similarly in Wales, while the Black Prince employed Welsh officials particularly for raising revenue, the key posts went to Englishmen with the result that ‘The feeling that they were “outsiders” in the governance of their own country was not an insignificant cause of disaffection on the part of Welshmen … it almost certainly played a prominent role in the build-up to the Glyn Dwr revolt.’26 This should not only been viewed in ethnic and racial terms, however, as exploitation of the Welsh by Welshmen was certainly not unknown. For example, Rhys ap Roppert, who was descended from Ednyfed Fychan, the great minister of Llewellyn ap Iorweth, prince of Gwynedd, served as escheator of Caernarvon and Merioneth from 12 December 1347 and leased the offices of sheriff and raglot of Flint for two years from 3 December 1353. He was an extremely repressive official and exploited his position for his own benefit; it is unlikely that he brought much profit to the Black Prince. His sons, Ieuan and Magod, fought with the Welsh condotierre, Owain Lawgoch, on the side of the French and Rhys was accused of sending money to them.27 However, despite the similarities between Wales and Aquitaine, the governmental procedures enforced by the new regime in the greater Gascony compared closely to those previously employed by Jean II. French administrative practices (if not personnel) were maintained in the newly acquired seneschausées although most of the new seneschals were English.
The period of the principality was a time of constant political reassessment, a process that continued in the 1370s. Loyalties were elastic and transitory, a state conditioned by both culture and politics. It is brought sharply into focus in the role of the Great Companies and individuals therein. For example, it is particularly interesting that in the interval between the battle of Launac (1362) and the peace settlement, that the Armagnac faction recruited members of the Companies led by John Amory and John Creswell, both close associates of the Black Prince. Amory, in the way of such things, had fought with Gaston Fébus against Jean d’Armagnac at Launac. Elsewhere there were links to Navarre that give the lie to the suggestion that this was a period of peace. The captal de Buch and Chandos, as constable of Aquitaine and more particularly as lord of Saint-Sauveur, were to lead twin forces against King Jean although in the event, matters changed and the Navarrese were defeated at Cocherel. The clearest example of such flexibility with regard to service was in the Spanish campaigns: du Guesclin’s so-called crusade which toppled Pedro the Cruel from the throne of Castile and the Nájera expedition led by the Black Prince that replaced him albeit briefly. Among du Guesclin’s commanders were Hugh Calveley, Mathew Gournay, Walter Hewitt, John Devereux and Stephen Cosington, all of whom then fought with the prince to reinstate the monarch they had so recently deposed. With regard to the Companies and the prince’s regime, it should be remembered that during the bulk of the lifetime of the principality, Aquitaine enjoyed a far more peaceful time than the rest of France. It did not suffer the depredations of the condottieri until very late in the day. Indeed, it might be argued that the tide turned against the Black Prince and the English, when they could no longer depend on the support of the Great Companies.28
If the prince was more or less responsible for the conditions that led to the loss of the principality, he was entirely responsible for the chief instrument that confirmed (if not precipitated) that loss. The ransoming of Bertrand du Gue
sclin after his capture at Nájera was certainly ‘crass stupidity’.29 After once again securing the Castilian throne for Enrique in 1369, he returned to France, was appointed Constable, and fought against his former captor in Aquitaine from July 1370. He took advantage of, and brought about, military advances in tactics and recruitment which resulted in a great upturn in French fortunes.
The rebellion that allowed the participation of du Guesclin was not spontaneous, not in the cases of Armagnac and Albret, and certainly not for those that followed in returning to French royal allegiance. The count of Périgord waited some time to see ‘how the wind was blowing’ despite being offered 40,000 francs by Charles V. However, once momentum was gathered fresh appellants appeared in the hundreds, mainly from the regions in Aquitaine bordering ‘France’. Motivation varied, patriotic sentiment certainly played a part, various long-standing disputes with the prince or his officials including questions of failed litigation over land following the transfer of territory after 1360 were also a cause for rebellion. Bribes were offered to others such as the viscount of Castelbon. In most cases the fouage was only an excuse although it may have been symbolic of other grievances.30
The prince may well have been aware of the worsening political climate and took suitable precautions; there were considerable movements of troops from England to Gascony in the later months of 1367. Such stalwarts as Duncan Felton, John Thurston (Chandos’ yeoman), James Audley (possibly not Chandos’ companion-in-arms since he was described at this time as the prince’s esquire), Robert Morley, John Harpeley, John del Hay, and Aubrey Vere (the future earl of Oxford), together with reinforcements, set sail for the principality or received letters of protection and other documentation regarding their service there. Measures were also taken in England and Wales for the defence of the realm.31
On 22 December 1368, the duke of Anjou wrote to the nobility of Aquitaine regarding the incipient return of hostilities and commenting on the prince’s rule. He spoke of the ‘ordonnaces, indictions et exactions de fouages et autres griefs et nouveletés à eux faites par nostre cousin le prince de Galles, duc de Guyienne et autres seneschaux et officiers de dits pais pour luy’. Phrases such as ‘droit, raison [et] justice’ were interspersed with economic arguments and emotional and nationalistic appeals regarding ‘grant amour et loyauté envers eux aux preddecesseurs de mondit seigneur, roys de France’.32 It appears to have been very effective. In January 1369, the prince was summoned to Paris to answer the appeals. He refused, although Froissart and Chandos Herald claimed he did offer to visit the capital in the company of an army. Further reinforcements were dispatched from England adding to those the prince had been raising since his return from Spain.33 They mustered at Northampton in the winter of 1368/9. John Montviron, the prince’s marshal of the household, oversaw the arrays in north Wales, which were co-ordinated by the justice and chamberlain.34 Others were recruited from Cheshire, the array probably being organised with the assistance of Thomas Wetenhale, seneschal of the Rouergue. The Northampton muster gathered in September 1368 and included 369 men-at-arms and 428 archers; it did not arrive in Aquitaine until April of the following year. Many of them served with Audley and Chandos in Poitou and Saintonge.35 Further reinforcements were sent in 1369, including retinues under the command of Gaunt and Walter Hewitt.36
The erosion of the principality began in the Rouergue. Najac was the first town to renounce its fealty to the prince on the appearance of forces commanded by Louis of Anjou.37 This may have taken place even before the proclamation of the count of Armagnac, issued at Rodez on 22 February 1369. Intermittent fighting began in the district (a major area of support of the count of Armagnac) in the spring. On about 9 January, the count’s son (also Jean) took the castle of La Roque-Valsergue and used it for a base for further incursions into the Rouergue. The defence of the province, organised by Thomas Wettenhale (seneschal), David Cradock (his deputy) and James Mascy (castellan of Millau), was hampered by a lack of troops and these three retreated to fortresses at Villefranche, Castelmary and Millau respectively. The revolt quickly spread; by 18 March over 900 castles and towns in Armagnac, Rodez (the town had opened its gates to the invaders on about 19 February), Limoges, Quercy and the Agenais had deserted the prince. Further noble support had also been lost, including the vicomte de Rochechouart and the lords of Chauvigny and Pons although loyalty to the English proved to be stronger in the north.38
This was not purely a rebellion, Valois support for the rebels was conspicuous; the French force was estimated to be around 4,000 strong and commanded by Raymond de Rabastens, seneschal of Toulouse, acting in the name of King Charles V, whose claim to the lands of the principality he vigorously and vociferously upheld. He was supported by Jean d’Armagnac.39 Such hostile action demanded that all available English resources be diverted to the principality. Possibly as a result of the prince’s failing health, Chandos was recalled from retirement at Saint-Sauveur in Normandy, Knolles was brought in from Brittany, and Calveley from Spain. Armagnac’s lands became a base for launching attacks and were also the focus of English retaliation. Chandos tried to draw the French away to Toulouse and Albi and then north to Quercy. Further English reinforcements arrived throughout 1369, most notably the forces led by the earls of Cambridge and Pembroke. They linked with Chandos after failing to hold Périgord and captured La Roche-sur-Yon. James Audley, one of the mainstays of the English resistance, died during the siege. On 30 November 1369, Charles formally announced what he was actively acquiring the confiscation of Aquitaine and it was once again a time of war.40
By the end of 1369, Rouergue, Quercy and the Agenais had been lost and Bigorre and Comminges were unlikely to remain loyal for long. Partly due to the incapacity of the prince and the loss of a number of the commanders that had assured his earlier triumphs, such as Audley, a lack of co-ordination marked the English defence. The earl of Pembroke refused to follow Chandos’ command since he was ‘only’ a banneret and when Sir John died after a skirmish at Lussac on 2 January 1370, the collapse was hastened, further encouraged by the loss of the earls of Warwick and Suffolk. The prince’s own health had deteriorated steadily since his return from Castile and he was by now virtually incapable of leading troops. By the end of 1369 the French had reached Bazas. In the Rouergue, Thomas Wetenhale was killed, and Bigorre had also fallen to the duke of Anjou. With the help of du Guesclin, Moissac and Agen were taken. In 1370, the attack turned towards the centre of English rule, Bordeaux.41
Walter Hewitt was dispatched from England with a retinue of 200 men-at-arms and 300 archers. Robert Knolles led a chevauchée from Calais; it was a retaliatory action following a co-ordinated attack led by the dukes of Berri and Anjou and the count of Armagnac, which may have been aimed at the prince himself, bedridden in Angoulême. Lancaster and Warwick tried to reconquer Ponthieu but failed to bring the French to battle. Warwick died of plague on the march. Louis of Anjou retook Porte-Saine-Marie, Montpezat, Tonneins and Aiguillon. In the Agenais, he took Villeneuve, Astafford and La Sauvetat. On 8 August, he was at Agen. Armagnac entered Bigorre on 1 September and took Tarbes.42
The speed with which the principality fell was startling and shaming and may explain the reaction of the prince and his commanders to the desertion of Limoges. The surrender of the town, commanded by Jean de Vinemur to the duke of Berri, resulted in the prince, accompanied by Lancaster, Cambridge and the captal de Buch, laying siege on 19 September 1370. At the time, the prince’s headquarters were at Cognac. His forces numbered about 1,200 men-at-arms, 1,000 archers and 1,000 foot soldiers. The siege was brief, lasting only six days. The walls were mined and Froissart suggested that 3,000 were killed in the ensuing massacre. The order to respect all churches in the city seems to have been generally observed although there was damage to the cathedral. However, it is entirely possible that the massacre of civilians never took place, at least not on the scale that has been popularised. The event is not attested in any local chronicles and the extent of that retribution is que
stionable as is the culpability of the Black Prince. That military action took place and the city was sacked is not in doubt, but the scale of the slaughter may have been much exaggerated and it has been suggested that only 300 died. As for personal responsibility, at Limoges the prince is said to have directed operations from a litter and may only have been in nominal command. Under the strictures of the laws of war, the actions said by Froissart to have taken place at Limoges were entirely justifiable and it may be that ‘What Froissart is depicting is the expected behaviour of a successful army after a siege; he does not deny the Black Prince’s right to carry out such deeds when he suggests that mercy would have been well-placed.’43
Nonetheless, it was certainly brutal but ‘If one condemns the Black Prince, then one condemns virtually all medieval siege commanders.’44 That Froissart saw fit to indict the prince for his actions at Limoges whilst lauding the slaughter and destruction of the 1355 chevauchée was a consequence of the author’s condition and circumstances at the time of writing rather than great moral indignation. A French chronicle records that the English ‘put many of the citizens to death because they had turned French’.45 Attitudes to noncombatants were changing and affected by a variety of influences. In practical terms, the attitudes of besieging commanders had been altered by improvements to urban defences. As the 1346–7 siege of Calais demonstrated, it was a long and very expensive business to reduce the walls of a strongly fortified town and extreme penalties were imposed to discourage resistance. According to Honoré Bouvet no besieged city or fortress could make a truce or treaty to save itself from the consequences of an assault after its walls had been breached. If the inhabitants failed to make terms, they were at the besiegers’ mercy. Attitudes to treason had also changed, at least in England by the 1352 Act and similar developments took place in France. One of the first examples of the use of quartering as a punishment took place in 1346 when a poor unfortunate named Simon Pouillet murmured too loudly that Edward III should be king rather than Philip of Valois. ‘Like a slab of meat in a butcher’s shop [he was] stretched and bound on a slab of wood … and was there beheaded and dismembered, first his arms, then his legs, and then his head; and finally [his corpse] was hanged on the gibbet.’46 It is not unlikely that the English considered the people of Limoges to have committed treason. In such a circumstance retribution was expected, even required.
