72. Herald, July 24; Tribune, July 27. (Ib., July 31, prints a letter saying TR was misquoted, but TR himself admitted to Lodge that the speech was reported “with substantial accuracy.” Mor.637.)
73. Lee. 106. Long had suffered a nervous breakdown in 1896.
74. Mor. 637.
75. TR’s own phrase. See TR to Bellamy Storer, Sep. 2, 1897; also Mor. 691.
76. Pau.365.
77. Ib.; see also chart 4, “The Navy Department,” in Mor.627; see Karsten, Peter, The Naval Aristocracy (N.Y., 1972), on the Navy as a social phenomenon in 19th-century America.
78. Mor. 655, 673.
79. Adams, Henry, The Education of HA (Houghton Mifflin, 1974), 417.
80. Mor. 637–65 passim.
81. LON. diaries passim.
82. Mor.662. Reading through TR’s correspondence with Long during the summer of 1897, one cannot help noticing how scrupulous he was in upholding the Secretary’s dignity. The letters, for all their amusing insistence that Long extend his vacation, are models of frankness and courtesy. See Mor.639–64.
83. Ib., 647.
84. Ib., 652, 4, 61.
85. Ib., 664.
86. Sun, Sep. 5, 1897; Proceedings of the U.S. Naval Institute (23) 509 ff. (1897).
87. TR.Scr. For sample comment, see Sun and Boston Journal, Sep. 5, 1897.
88. Whi.299 speaks of “that summer day” in describing his first meeting with TR, but elsewhere refers to it as “autumn.” Late August or early September seem most likely.
89. Reprinted in Boorstin, Daniel, ed., An American Primer, U. Chicago Press (1966), Vol. 2, 584 ff.
90. These paras. based on Whi.296–9; also Joh. passim.
91. Whi.297.
92. White (ib.), writing in the late 1930s, says the lunch took place at the Army and Navy Club. This is probably a slip of memory, given TR’s fondness for the Metropolitan Club, not to mention its double lamb chops, which White nostalgically describes. TR’s papers for the period are full of Metropolitan chits for double lamb chops: he seems to have had an insatiable passion for the dish.
93. Whi.298.
94. Ib., 297–8.
95. Ib.
96. The following account is taken from the Herald, Sep. 9, and Sun, Sep. 9 and 24, 1897.
97. Charles H. Cramp. qu. Pau.397.
98. The party included Frederic Remington, the artist, as well as two reporters carefully selected by TR as part of his naval public-relations effort.
99. Mor. 680.
100. Mor.675, 90; see TR to HCL, Sep. 24, Mor.689.
101. Ib., 676. The account of the following conversation comes entirely from this letter.
102. Carpenter, Frank, Carp’s Washington (McGraw-Hill, 1960), 179.
103. Descr. of McKinley based on Whi.292, 333–5; Carpenter, 27; John Hay to HA, Oct. 20, 1896 (Hay.3.78); Bee.480; pics. and pors. For the President’s extraordinary gaze, see, e.g., Lor.360 and the last por. in Morg; also LaFollette qu. Lee.38–9: “The pupils of his eyes would dilate until they became almost black, and his face, naturally without much color, would become almost like marble.”
104. Mor.677.
105. TR to B, Sep. 17; Mor.685, 717; Karsten, 592. (Ib. notes how closely TR’s plan matched the actual course of the war.)
106. Mor.682–9.
107. Un. clip, TR.Scr.
108. Senator Chandler’s letter was dated Sep. 25 (TRP), but since that was a Saturday, it follows that it would have been neither delivered nor read until Monday Sep. 27, the date of TR’s reply.
109. The following account is based on Nicholson, 223–6, plus other sources as cited below.
110. Mor.691.
111. Ib., 691–2.
112. TR.Auto.216.
113. Sprout, 224; Nicholson, 226.
114. Mor.692, 915; TR.Auto.217.
115. Dewey, George, Autobiography, 169–70; TR.Auto.216. Although the main facts of Dewey’s appointment, as detailed above, are borne out by many sources, there is some ambiguity about the time-sequence of events postdating Long’s return on Sep. 28. According to Spector, 38, it was not until Oct. 16 that Senator Proctor reported McK’s favorable response to his appeal. But Dewey (Autobiography) and Nicholson, 224–26, both imply that things were settled on the day that Long returned. If so, TR would only have delayed Sen. Chandler’s letter by a few hours, until the Secretary recognized Dewey’s appointment as a fait accompli. It is hardly possible that he could have held on to the letter until Oct. 16. Whatever the case, there can be no doubt that TR was in large part responsible for making Dewey C-in-C of the Asiatic Squadron, and for the infinitely larger consequences of that appointment. (Spector, 32–9; Bea.63; Mor.822–3, 915; Nicholson, 227.)
116. Mor.694–7, 710.
117. Lod.286; TR to B, Oct. 17 and 28; Mor. 702–9.
118. TR.Wks.XI.xi.
119. Mor.750, 66, 713, 707.
120. Pau.459.
121. Mor.713; TR to B, Nov. 30, 1897.
122. Grenville, 35.
123. Mor.1.717 (italics mine).
124. Qu. Pau.460.
125. Mor.790.
126. Eve. Post, Jan. 4, 1898. See Bur.49 and TR.Wks.XIV.427–37 for more on the Personnel Bill.
127. Proceedings of the Biological Society of Washington, XI.271–5 (Dec. 17, 1897).
128. See Woo.45 ff.
129. Sep. 19, 1897.
23: THE LIEUTENANT COLONEL
Important sources not listed in Bibliography: 1. Paullin, Charles Oscar, Paullin’s History of Naval Administration 1775–1911 (U.S. Naval Institute, 1968).
1. Mil.93.
2. The Maine had been in Key West since December 15 of the previous year, “under confidential instructions to proceed at once to Havana in the event of local disturbances which might threaten American safety.” (Ib.) The Consul-General, Fitzhugh Lee, was given responsibility for determining when that moment might be. “Two dollars” was to be followed by a second code message, upon receipt of which Captain Sigsbee would leave for Havana instantly. (Ib.) See also May. 135.
3. The following account of TR’s interview with JDL is taken from the latter’s Journal, Jan. 13, 1898, in LON. Extracts from the Journal are published in Mayo, Lawrence S., ed., America of Yesterday (Atlantic Monthly Press, 1923) and Long, Margaret, ed., The Journal of John D. Long (Rindge, N.H., 1956).
4. Long, Journal, Jan. 13, 1898, LON.
5. Mor.758. TR also wrote on the same day to Col. Francis Vinton Greene in a similar vein.
6. Mor.755; TR to B, Jan. 9, 1898.
7. TR to B, Jan. 17, 1898; Mor.767. For a chilling anecdote about TR’s determination to make a “fighter” out of Ted, see Bradley, John, ed., Lady Curzon’s India: Letters of a Vicereine (N.Y., 1985), 133.
8. This attitude has become a characteristic of the Roosevelt family as a whole. But.146.
9. Mor.759–63 has the text of this memo.
10. Ib., 760.
11. Ib., Mor.763; Her.209, 206–7; Mil.93; May.137.
12. De Lôme qu. May.137. See also Mil.58; Morg.356.
13. Mil.97–8.
14. Ib., 95–6; Her.210.
15. TR to B, Jan. 20, 25, 27, 1898; Mor.767.
16. Mor.765, 766, 767
17. See Pri.203 ff. Pra.226, quoting HCL.
18. Morg.356; N.Y. Journal, Feb. 9, 1898.
19. De Lôme qu. Mil.98.
20. See ib., 98–9; Gov. 73–74; Morg. 356-9).
21. This anecdote is based on Bee.546 ff. Beer’s own source was Mlle. Adler’s precisely-dated account of the meeting with TR, which he found in her brother’s papers.
22. MH qu. Bee.548.
23. Mrs. Wainwright qu. Her.210.
24. Mil.96, 100–1; Her.212; Azo.12–14.
25. Long, Journal, Feb. 16, 1898, LON.; Mil.102.
26. Ib., 102; Lee.166.
27. Brown, Charles H., The Correspondents’ War (NY, 1967), 120–1. Ib., ff., gives the fullest account of press coverage of the Maine tragedy.
28. Mil.105; Her.214;
ib., 212 (author’s copy has “88” survivors, an obvious typographical mistake for “8”). Because the explosion was forward, only two of the dead were officers.
29. Mil.104, 106.
30. See May. 139–41.
31. Long, Journal, Feb. 17, 1898, LON.; see Lee.166; Mil.108, N.Y. Journal, Feb. 17.
32. Hag.LW.I.141.
33. Mor.775. This was a private letter, written to Benjamin J. Diblee on Feb. 16, as “a Jingo” and “one Porc man to another.” TR was of course scrupulous about expressing such opinions in public.
34. Mor.775, 783. See, e.g., ib., 773–4.
35. N.Y. Journal, Feb. 17, 1898; Brown, Correspondents, 123; Her.217; Mil.108.
36. Ib.; also 110.
37. Sun, Feb. 22, 1898; un. clip in TRB.
38. TR to B, Feb. 19, 1898; Mor.783; ib., 785, 804.
39. Mor.785.
40. Long, Journal, passim, LON. See, e.g., ib., Feb. 25, 1898.
41. Ib.
42. Mor.784–5.
43. Dewey qu. TR.Auto.218. Mil.87 and Her. 12 concur.
44. It will be remembered that the Atlantic Squadron was already menacingly moored off Key West. Her. 209.
45. Long, Journal, Feb. 26, 1898, LON.; Dewey, qu. TR.Auto.218; Bea.61–2; Her.219–20; Mil.112; see also Gar. 186.
46. Mor.784.
47. Long, Journal, Feb. 25, 1898, LON.
48. Ib., Feb. 26, 1898.
49. Not only that, but JDL confirmed it the following day with a redundant order echoing TR’s own words: “Keep full of coal, the very best that can be had.” Perhaps the Secretary wished to give the impression that TR had been anticipating his own policy. In any case, TR was entirely within his rights to act the way he did on Feb. 25. A written memorandum of JDL, dated Apr. 21, 1897, states specifically: “… You will, at all times when the Secretary of the Navy shall be absent from the Department, whether such absence shall continue during the whole or any part of an official day, perform the duties of the Secretary of the Navy and sign all orders and other papers appertaining to such duties.” (TRP.)
50. Long, Journal, Feb. 26, 1898, LON.
51. See, e.g., Bea.61–3; Her.220; Mor.784 fn. For a critical view, see Lee.169. The fallacy that HCL helped TR draft his Dewey telegram has been laid to rest by Gar.186. TR.Wks.XII. xviii. Modern historians tend to agree with Dewey as to TR’s seminal role in bringing about the Battle of Manila. “The Assistant Secretary,” writes Howard K. Beale, “had seized the opportunity given by Long’s absence to insure our grabbing the Philippines without a decision to do so by either Congress or the President, or at least of all the people. Thus was important history made not by economic forces or democratic decisions but through the grasping of chance authority by a man with daring and a program.” (Bea.63.)
52. Mor.786, 787.
53. Ib., 790.
54. May.149–150.
55. Ib., 148–9.
56. Tabouis, Jules Cambon, author’s translation.
57. Mil. 115, Morg.363–4.
58. May.149; Morg.364; Mil.117. Of course this is not to say there were not many absentees. The actual vote was 311–0 in the House, 76–0 in the Senate.
59. Morg.364; Her.223.
60. Mor.789.
61. Long, Journal, Mar. 8, 1898, LON.; see Her.223–4 for details of the naval expansion program. Morg. 364; May.149.
62. The following anecdote is taken from Flint, Charles R., “I Take a Hand in Combining Railroads and Industries,” System, Jan. 22, 1922.
63. The Nictheroy arrived ahead of schedule, was rechristened Buffalo, and did good service in the Philippines. Flint, “I Take a Hand,” 31.
64. Wood in TR.Wks.XI.xvi.
65. Hag.LW.I.141. Dun.266 describes Wood as McK’s “favorite.” Mor.792.
66. Elizabeth Cameron to Henry Adams, March 21, 1898, ADA.
67. TR.Auto.216; Mil.123; Her.225; Pra.246; Rho.51; Mil.123.
68. Proctor qu. Rho.51–2.
69. Rho.52; May.144–5; Morg.365; Pra.246 ff; Mil.124.
70. Rho.53.
71. Mor.798.
72. Herrick, Naval Revolution, 230.
73. Rho.53.
74. Bee.551; Evening Telegraph, Mar. 27, 1898; Chicago Chronicle, Mar. 29. Hanna’s personal opinion, which he never altered, was “War is just a damn nuisance.” Bee.554.
75. Mil.127; Her.214–216. For text of the report, see Senate Exec. Docs., 55th Cong., 2nd Session, No. 207. Herrick has a good analysis of the evidence, and reveals that there was considerable dissent among members of the court before the unanimous verdict was reached. In 1911 another U.S. Court of Inquiry, which obtained funds to raise the Maine, upheld the findings of the first. There remained, however, a considerable amount of doubt in the minds of many impartial analysts, due to the inconclusive nature of the evidence. As the Spanish-American War faded from memory into history, the U.S. grew increasingly embarrassed about its assumption of Spanish guilt in 1898. According to Weems, J. E., The Fate of the Maine (NY, 1941), TR’s fifth cousin Franklin D. Roosevelt made a lame attempt to atone for it in 1935 by sending Madrid a Navy Department statement absolving Spain of all suspicion. The Maine disaster remains an unexplained mystery to this day, although contemporary opinion is that the explosion was accidental. See Rick-over, Adm. Hyman, How the Battleship Maine Was Destroyed (Washington, 1976).
76. Kipling, Rudyard, Something of Myself (London, 1936); EKR to TR Jr., July 13, 1927, Library of Congress.
77. Mor.799; ib., 806; Levine, Isaac Don, Mitchell: Pioneer of Air Power (NY, 1943) 20. Samuel Pierrepont Langley was the head of the Smithsonian Institution, and had become friendly with TR during his Cosmos Club days. The Langley flying machine, or “aerodrome,” was demonstrably capable of powered, unmanned flight over distances of up to one mile. Kipling, in Something of Myself, recalls accompanying TR to one of Langley’s experimental launchings, which unfortunately ended with a nosedive into the Potomac. Gen. Greely, Chief of the U.S. Signal Corps, was another enthusiastic Langley backer, and worked with Assistant Secretary Roosevelt to set up the Davis Board. $50,000 was eventually appropriated by Congress for further Langley experiments, none of which were successful. TR and Greely were assisted in the Senate by John Mitchell of Wisconsin, father of Gen. Billy Mitchell, the air power visionary of the 1920s.
78. The best and most sympathetic account of McKinley’s pre-war agony is in Gov. 76–90. See also Lee.181; Kohlsaat, H. H., From McKinley to Harding (Scribner’s, 1923) 66; Rho.31.
79. See May. 153.
80. Rho.63; Mil.131.
81. JDL found the President bleary and befuddled from lack of sleep on Apr. 14. Long, Journal, same date, LON. Mil.133; Mor.812, and, e.g., 812: “I have preached the doctrine to him [McK] in such plain language that he will no longer see me!” (TR to W. Tudor, Apr. 5, 1898.) Also Sun, Mar. 29 d.l., TR.Scr.: “Of all the executive officers with whom Mr. McKinley has held consultations … there has been only one who has not ceased to use every endeavor to influence the President … to end the Cuban trouble without further delay.” The same article praises TR’s loyalty, but says that McK found him embarrassingly outspoken: “He has been set down as too radical for further advice.” For more on McK’s war message, see Mil.133–4; Morg. 368–72; also Rho.63–4; May.153–4.
82. Mor.802–3. For a more labored, public explanation of his views, see ib., 816–8.
83. Bigelow in Long, John D., Papers (Mass. Hist. Soc., 1939) Vol. 78, 103.
84. Rho.61; Morg.372; Mil. 135.
85. Rho.57.
86. Un. clip, TR.Scr.; Mor.814; Mil.137–8; Morg.373–4; Rho.63–4.
87. Ib., 143.
88. Mor.812; TR.Wks.XI.6. (This volume of ib. contains the complete text of The Rough Riders, and will be cited henceforth as RR.)
89. Azo.23; TR.War.Di. Apr. 17, 1898.
90. RR.6; TR.War.Di. Apr. 16, 17, 19, 1898.
91. See TR.Auto.226.
92. Her. 12; Sprout, Harold and Margaret, The Rise of American Naval Power (Princeton, 196
6) 231; Bea.63; Bur.47–8.
93. Her.234–5 balances out the two fleets, showing how Spanish naval strength existed largely on paper.
94. Morison, Samuel Eliot, The Oxford History of the American People (Oxford, 1965) 802; Her.204 (TR drafted the Congressional bill arising out of his Personnel Bill himself; it was finally passed in 1899); Paullin, History, 429; Bea.63; Woo.43ff.
95. Mil. 143–4; Hag.LW.I.143.
96. Sun, Apr. 17 and 18, 1898; Ada. 172; Winthrop Chanler to Margaret Chanler, Apr. 29, 1898, qu. Cha.285; Long, Journal, Apr. 25, LON.
97. McClure’s, Nov. 1898. Sun, Apr. 18; Chapman qu. Howe, M. A. de Wolfe, John J. Chapman and His Letters (Houghton Mifflin, 1937) 134.
98. Mor.817. John Hay, at least, understood TR’s need to fight. “You obeyed your own daemon,” he wrote sympathetically. Tha.2.337.
99. Rho.66.
100. Mil.144, 145; Her.231.
101. Mil.148; Hag.LW.I.145. The idea of a southwestern volunteer cavalry regiment had been formally suggested to the Secretary of War in early April by Governor Miguel Otero of New Mexico. See Wes. Ch.1 for background.
102. Sun, Apr. 25 d.l., TR.Scr.; Hag. LW.I.145.
103. RR.6.
104. Hag.LW.I.145 says that it was Wood’s understanding that Alger was going to offer him a command anyway, the idea being that he and TR should each have a regiment. See also TR.Auto.222–3.
105. JDL’s message: “War has commenced between the United States and Spain. Proceed at once to Philippine Islands. Commence operations at once, particularly against the Spanish fleet. You must capture vessels or destroy. Use utmost endeavors.” Qu. Mil.149. There is some question as to the exact authorship of this cable. See Lee.192. Rho.71.
106. Azo.23.
107. See Paullin, History, 432–3 for details of Naval War Board; also Her.227–8. The war plan was not, as is commonly supposed, one TR submitted to Mahan on Mar. 16, 1898. That document was drafted by President Goodrich of the Naval War College, whom TR considered an inferior strategic thinker. While flatteringly allowing Mahan to work on Goodrich’s plan, TR continued to refine his own, “a plan which pretty fairly matched that of the actual war.” Karsten, Peter, “The Nature of ‘Influence’: Roosevelt, Mahan, and the Concept of Sea Power,” American Quarterly, 1971.23(4). See also Grenville, John A. S., “American Preparations for War with Spain,” Journal of American Studies (GB) 1968.2(1), passim; TR to Mahan, Mor.796, 797, 798 (note the chilly politeness of the last letter, where Mahan has overstepped himself).
The Rise of Theodore Roosevelt Page 99
