by Nick Barratt
Kemp: Yes, at your place, 1.15 pm.
Lucy: There will not be any cocktails or anything like that.
Kemp: Oh, that’s all right.274
This was an extraordinary risk on Bystrolyotov’s part, but it was considered a risk worth taking as it was possible, albeit unlikely, that Kemp might himself be the source. Equally, there was a very real chance that Bystrolyotov was walking into a trap, so the day before he contacted Lucy to arrange the meeting with Kemp, OGPU ensured that his pistol was delivered to him. The mutual understanding was that if he was arrested he should use it on himself.
Bystrolyotov sat in Hyde Park on his ‘usual bench by the lake’, where he had prepared Oldham five days previously and was shocked to find that the operative who had been sent to hand over his weapon, along with his passport in the name of Alexander Gallas, was none other than his wife. Realising that this could be the last time they might see each other, Bystrolyotov later recalled, ‘We said farewell to each other as if before a battle’.275
Bystrolyotov arrived at 31 Pembroke Gardens shortly after Kemp, who was already regaling Lucy with his concerns about Oldham’s recent behaviour. To Bystrolyotov’s dismay, she reciprocated, giving Kemp details about her husband’s activities, including the fact that he had recently stolen a briefcase marked ‘His Majesty’s courier’ as well as a ‘red passport’ for himself, items usually carried by King’s Messengers on their journeys overseas. In addition, he had managed to obtain a passport for a ‘scoundrel’, no doubt the passport he’d secured in the name of Robert Grenville.276
Kemp quickly asked if she could remember anything about the man to whom it was issued but she said she could not recall anything. This was sufficient to confirm Kemp’s suspicions that ‘a foreign spy was somewhere near Oldham’ and he announced that he had been ‘entrusted to find him’. Realising that the game was virtually up, Bystrolyotov thought quickly and tried to direct Kemp’s line of investigation elsewhere. He played on the growing international fears about Hitler’s Germany that were being reported with increasing frequency in the press and offered to help Kemp locate the spy. He deployed his own cover story, as a representative of a German bank, to great effect.
I know the family business situation and have some ideas about what’s going on. The tracks lead to Germany where the family owns significant property. I’ll risk disclosing some family secrets, although, as the trustees of a solid bank, I’m forbidden to do so. Let’s not tire our lady with boring detail. May I invite you to the Ritz for lunch tomorrow, at one o’clock?277
It was a desperate ploy, but it worked. Kemp agreed, Bystrolyotov booked the table over the phone and the two men parted on good terms – Kemp thanked Bystrolyotov and shook his hand ‘especially meaningfully’.
As soon as he had left, Kemp returned to the Foreign Office to debrief his superiors about the conversation he’d just had with Lucy and Perelly. It would appear that Harker was in attendance, for he placed a call from the Foreign Office to MI5 instructing the General Post Office to add 31 Queen’s Gate to the surveillance warrant. He informed Ottaway that Oldham ‘was in the habit of going in and out and S11 should therefore be instructed to take up observation on this address’. In the light of Kemp’s information, a discussion took place about what action, if any, should be taken against Oldham. Harker’s notes were placed on file the same day:
In connection with the case of Oldham, saw Mr Norton and Mr Howard Smith and discussed the legal position. Decided that I should see DPP and consult him unofficially.278
Howard Smith was by now the Chief Clerk while Clifford John Norton was the private secretary to the Permanent Under-Secretary of State, Sir Robert Vansittart. ‘DPP’ was an indication of just how seriously this had now become and referred to the Director of Public Prosecutions, Sir Edmund Tilbery Atkinson QC – a lieutenant in the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve during World War I before switching to the Royal Air Force as a major.
Despite Atkinson’s professional background – he was the legal representative for the UK during the peace negotiations and therefore in Paris with Oldham – he had been a somewhat surprising choice as Director of Public Prosecutions when he was appointed in 1930. Indeed, on being summoned to the Home Office to be offered the job, it is said that he refused because he believed that it was some sort of joke and left the room, before being summoned back to formally accept the role. You could understand why; he was not a criminal lawyer, had no previous experience of working with the department and knew none of the key staff. Most of his first two years in post were spent worrying that he might do something wrong. Some of this hesitancy was displayed during his involvement in the Oldham case.
Saw DPP who pointed out that, as regards the story of the key, two courses of action were open to us:
1. To arrest and search on a charge under the Official Secrets Act – an act preparatory to commission of offences under Section 1.
2. To interrogate and if necessary make use of the provisions of Section 6 of the Official Secrets Act 1920, bearing in mind the fact that any disclosures he may so make could not be used against him in any future prosecution.
Finally DPP unofficially gave his opinion that, in the circumstances of the case, he would deprecate a prosecution, mainly in view of the disclosures which would be made about the Foreign Office.279
Parker then returned to the Foreign Office to relay the news. The head of the service, Sir Robert Vansittart, was present for the next meeting. Vansittart had also attended the Paris Peace Conference and enjoyed various promotions afterwards, serving as private secretary to Lord Curzon before performing the same role for Prime Ministers Baldwin and MacDonald between 1928 and 1930. In January 1930 he was appointed to run the Foreign Office.
Subsequently saw Mr Norton, Mr Howard Smith and Sir Robert Vansittart. Sir Robert said that, before any official action was taken, he wished us to try and see whether we could discreetly ascertain what papers etc Oldham might have at the nursing home. It would appear from the statement made by Mrs Oldham to Mr Kemp that he is in possession of a document called in the FO a ‘red passport’, but which is actually a parchment given to any messenger of the FO carrying despatches.
There appears to be some doubt in the minds of the officials at the FO as to how – if he has obtained this document – he has done so. Mr Norton was of the opinion that his possession of this document constituted larceny, but until we know (a) whether he has it and (b) how he got it, it is quite impossible to give any definite opinion on this point. If he merely retained one which had been officially given to him, in the view of DPP, this would not be larceny but merely a departmental misdemeanour.280
Meanwhile, as the mandarins of the Foreign Office were discussing what to do next, Bystrolyotov made tracks for 31 Queen’s Gate to alert Oldham about what had transpired back at his house. He was still there at 5.50 pm when Oldham placed a call to his wife. Whether it was the strain of the day’s events or the cumulative effect of Oldham’s alcoholism that had ruined their lives, Lucy snapped. Because the conversation was recorded on the phone tap, the moment that their marriage finally ended is recorded.
Ernest: Is that you, Lucy?
Lucy: Yes.
Ernest: Ernest speaking. Can you bring me some handkerchiefs, socks and pyjamas?
Lucy: Yes.
Ernest: Joe is here. I hear Kemp has been – what for?
Lucy: What is that to do with you?
Ernest: I suppose you told him everything.
Lucy: No, I didn’t but it’s about time I did. How long are you staying there?
Ernest: Not much longer.
Lucy: Well, you won’t find me here. I’m finished. You’ve done nothing for me.
Ernest: Oh, yes I have. I will get Joe down if you like and ask him.
Lucy: I waited and you have done nothing. I have finished. Goodbye.281
Bad news kept raining down on Oldham. With Kemp expecting a meeting the following day and the net starting to close in, Bystrolyotov gav
e notice of his intention to leave England in the morning, advising Oldham to keep out of trouble. Sure enough, Kemp had been instructed to keep his meeting and find out as much as he could from Perelly. According to an OGPU report:
ROLAND soon established that HANS was not at the hotel he had named and the police reported that no one with HANS’s name was registered in London, which meant that he had used another name to gain entry to the country.282
Kemp returned to the office, but was somewhat coy about the incident and seems not to have fully debriefed his superiors. However, he had suggested that it would be more difficult than first thought to obtain access to Oldham’s things at the nursing home. Harker put his initial thoughts down for Kell to review.
As I explained to you this morning, our arrangements for having a quiet look at Oldham’s things have broken down. The question arises – what action is to be taken?
As you know, the man is at present under observation. I would suggest that he be kept under observation for another three or four days and, if nothing suspicious is seen – by which I mean we do not find him meeting persons outside the nursing home or receiving correspondence of a suspicious character – he should be interviewed, providing the Foreign Office have fully made up their minds that they do not propose to prosecute him.
In the first instance, I would suggest that the interview should be conducted on quite friendly lines and Oldham should be asked whether he is in possession of a ‘red passport’ and, if so, to hand it over. He should then be asked to explain the circumstances of his visit to the Foreign Office on the evening of 13 July. Should he prove recalcitrant and refuse to reply, I think we have got quite sufficient grounds for serving him with a notice under Section 7 of the [Official Secrets] Act of 1920.283
Section 7 stipulated that anyone found to have attempted or made preparations to commit an offence under the Official Secrets Act would be treated as though they had actually carried out the offence. In other words, the investigators thought that he was guilty of planning to do something wrong, but were still not entirely sure what the exact nature of this wrongdoing might be. Nevertheless, time was clearly running out for Oldham, with plans to bring him in for interrogation only a case of when, not if.
The question then for consideration is – who should conduct the interview? Whether it should be left to a police officer from Special Branch to do so, or whether it should be done by a member of this office who is a superintendent of police under the provisions of the Official Secrets Act. In any case, whoever conducts the interview will have to be specially authorised by an order under the signature of the commissioner of police.
All these points will, I think, have to be finally decided after discussion both with the Foreign Office and the DPP.
I would suggest that I should interview him, accompanied either by Mr Ottaway or, if it is thought better, by a member of the Foreign Office staff. I suggest this latter alternative as Mr Norton, when I last spoke to him, seemed to consider that this might be advisable.284
Kell agreed with Harker’s suggestion that Oldham be kept under further surveillance, thus delaying the need to make a decision. A further discussion took place on 21 July, but as before they simply ran over the same ground without reaching any conclusions, other than the terms under which Oldham should be questioned:
1. Is the interview to be conducted without invoking in any way the assistance of the Official Secrets Act? That is to say, are we merely to interview Oldham and try to get out of him (a) the diplomatic passport if he has it and (b) some sort of explanation of his conduct on the 13 June [sic]? DSS [Director of Secret Service] points out that, if he declines to give us any information, our bluff is called and we can do nothing.
2. If it is proposed to proceed under Section 6 of the Official Secrets Act 1920, it is obvious as a corollary that we should have in readiness, under Section 9 of the Act for 1911, a search warrant which, in the event of his refusing (a) to answer and (b) to admit possession of the passport, could be sued to find out what he has got. In these circumstances it is further a question for consideration, if it is found necessary to use the search warrant, who is to be employed, eg, a Special Branch police officer. All these points will have to be considered at a joint meeting at the Foreign Office early next week.285
By this stage, Oldham had hatched an elaborate plot – with Bystrolyotov’s help – to leave the country. A report prepared by Ottaway on 26 July outlined his daily routine.
During the time he was at 31 Queen’s Gate, which is a nursing home, he was visited occasionally by his wife and a Mr Parelli [sic]. He daily visited the local public houses, drinking lots of beer and some afternoons sat in Kensington Gardens reading and sleeping, but he was not seen to associate with anyone.286
Then, on 22 July, Oldham left the nursing home and made a trip in preparation for his imminent departure.
On Saturday 22nd inst at 12.20 pm he called at the offices of the American Express company, 6 Haymarket, where he remained five minutes and afterwards returned to 31 Queen’s Gate.287
This was almost certainly an attempt to secure some funds for his trip. Two days later, on 24 July at 6.15 pm, he placed a phone call to his wife with the help of a nursing home operator.
Ernest: Is that you…? Ernie speaking. I am going to Vienna with Joe tomorrow so shall be packing tonight.
Lucy: Ahem!
Ernest: Don’t talk like that.
Lucy: Ahem!
Ernest: I shall be home after dinner. I thought I had better warn you, that’s all!
Lucy: All right! Don’t worry about that.288
The next morning, Oldham duly packed his belongings together and left the nursing home. He was monitored for a while by Ottaway.
Continuous observation was kept on 31 Queen’s Gate from 19th to 25th inst, on which date Oldham left the address about 10.30 am and was driven direct to his home, 31 Pembroke Gardens, by taxi cab.
He had with him a small suitcase and small attaché case and stated that he was flying that day to Vienna.289
However, in an indication that he perhaps knew that he was under surveillance, or perhaps because he was naturally cautious, Oldham was able to demonstrate the elusive qualities that had so infuriated Bystrolyotov in Paris throughout 1930 and 1931 and managed to lose the people who were tailing him. Later that day, Harker submitted a report outlining just what had gone wrong.
Information was received at 10.00 am that Oldham had made arrangements to leave the nursing home and was proposing to go to Vienna by air.
Immediate steps were taken to shadow him and at about 10.30 am he left the nursing home in a taxi which proceeded in the direction of Victoria. Unfortunately, it was missed.290
One can sense the growing panic as Harker and Ottaway realised Oldham had disappeared. They immediately alerted the authorities in the Foreign Office.
Various enquiries were started and at 10.45 am I was able to get in touch with the Foreign Office and inform then what had happened. Mr Norton discussed the matter with Sir Robert Vansittart and it was finally decided that, if we could find out how he was proceeding abroad, C should be informed and arrangements were to be made to warn all our controls and steps were to be taken to search him, should Oldham attempt to use the diplomatic or ‘red’ passport which he is alleged to possess.291
‘C’, incidentally, referred to Admiral Sir Hugh Francis Paget Sinclair who had helped to establish the Secret Intelligence Service. On his instruction, passport control officers across Europe would be watching out for Oldham.
Spoke Major Vivian personally who informed me that this would be done as soon as we could give him the necessary information.292
Major Vivian – nicknamed VeeVee – was one of Sinclair’s trusted officers in SIS and a veteran of the Indian police service. His work specifically focused on the activities of Comintern. However, on this occasion, neither MI5 nor SIS were able to prevent Oldham from escaping.
About 2.30 pm, information was received from Mr Can
ning to the effect that Oldham had left Croydon in an aeroplane leaving for Paris at 2.00 pm. This information was immediately telephoned to Major Vivian’s secretary.293
Superintendent Canning was a member of Special Branch, yet another organisation involved with the hunt for Oldham – perhaps underlining the disconnected nature of British intelligence services during this period, as well as the seriousness of the situation.
Later in the afternoon information was received from Mr Canning that Oldham had a single ticket from Croydon to Geneva and that he was due to arrive in Cointrin [Geneva airport] at 6.45 pm, whence he was proceeding to Geneva. Major Vivian immediately informed.294
With Oldham gone, there was little more that the investigating team could do. However, in an unconnected development, steps were finally taken to secure the Foreign Office, ironically on the same day that Oldham had flown to Geneva – a case of literally locking the stable door after the horse had bolted.
Draft letter to the stationery office stating that, as it has become necessary to change the locks and keys of a considerable number of presses in which highly confidential documents are kept in the Foreign Office within the shortest possible period, the services of a second locksmith will be required and requesting that Messrs Chubb may be asked to supply such a man, if possible one who has previously been employed in the Foreign Office.295
With her husband gone and Bystrolyotov still on the continent, Lucy was left abandoned, with no idea what would happen to her. However, just when she thought things could not get any worse she received a letter from Oldham’s uncle, Henry George Holloway, containing some more bad news. Without her knowledge, her husband had been borrowing large sums of money. She phoned Holloway at 10.00 am on 26 July to find out what was going on.
