Faced with such political and economic pressures, the Thai Government has made addressing exploitative labour in, and environmental degradation through, the country’s fishing industry a top priority. To reflect this, the military regime set up the Command Centre for Combating Illegal Fishing (CCCIF) in May 2015, which today is headed by the Minister of Agriculture and Cooperatives53 and reports directly to the Prime Minister. The CCCIF co-ordinates the efforts of all State agencies on illegal fishing and also deals with human trafficking, including through a dedicated committee on the latter.
The CCCIF has since overseen the development of both a National Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing (NPAO-IUU) and a Fishery Management Plan (FMP), as mandated by new fisheries legislation passed in 2015.54 The FMP introduces a ‘limiting regime’, permitting fishing based on the abundance of fish stocks.55 Existing fishing vessels have been recorded and entered into a national database containing 42,000 boats, and the registration of new vessels is currently frozen. Fishing gear is also under scrutiny, with thousands of boats requiring upgrades to comply with regulations.
Further, vessels of above 30 gross tons must carry Vessel Monitoring System (VMS) devices under new requirements, allowing regulators to track their location, movement, and activity. Transhipment at sea has been restricted, and boats operating outside Thai waters are required to have fisheries observers stationed on-board. New Port-In – Port-Out (PIPO) Controlling Centers, established in coastal provinces across the country, inspect equipment and documents in harbours, including those related to crews, with at-sea inspections in Thai waters being intensified as well.
In late 2014, a new Ministerial Regulation concerning Labour Protection in Sea Fishery Work,56 replacing Ministerial Regulation 10, introduced a number of important revisions, in that it applies to all vessels regardless of crew size and fishing territory, imposes requirements of written contracts for all crew members, raises the minimum age for work in sea fishery to 16 years – which has since been increased further to 18 years57 –and mandates minimum rest hours and inspections of fishing crews every 12 months.
In addition, the Ministry of Labour, in November 2015, authorised migrant workers on fishing vessels and in seafood processing factories to change employers within these sectors.58 Given the limitation to two industries only, however, it appears that the Thai authorities have given in to international political and domestic industry pressures, rather than there being a broader recognition of the vulnerabilities to exploitation that such a policy creates more generally.
Further, whilst many of the recent steps point in the right direction – including further revisions to Thailand’s Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act; a new, integrated database system on human trafficking, designed to strengthen inter-agency co-ordination among government agencies, share information on human trafficking cases, and monitor their progress; or the introduction of specialist units for human trafficking in key criminal justice institutions – important weaknesses remain in relation to rights and protection of migrant workers in Thailand’s fishing sector, and indeed beyond.59
In fact, the dysfunctional recruitment procedures, both domestically and through bilateral MoUs, remain largely unaddressed,60 whilst the Ministerial Regulation concerning Labour Protection in Sea Fishery Work maintains numerous exceptions and differences in standards to the LPA.61 This also comprises loopholes for vessel owners to avoid liability for labour abuses – such as when they charter their boats to other persons for fishing operations without their own involvement.62 Further, the ever-increasing array of new regulations, action plans, and committees, whose relationships and interplay have become difficult to comprehend, cannot hide that tangible improvements for people working in fishing will only materialise if the Thai authorities are able and willing to put in place the required enforcement and monitoring mechanisms.
The country’s often erratic record in this respect, compounded by the prevalence of corruption, gives reason for caution.63 Research by the Environmental Justice Foundation (EJF) cites evidence of police involvement in the exploitation of migrant workers on Thai fishing vessels, including by providing protection and assistance to brokers and business owners;64 with a Guardian investigation reaching similar findings and quoting a high-ranking broker as describing the relationship between agents and police officers as one of ‘business partners’ in a profitable deal.65
Corruption in government agencies as well as the industry requires long-term efforts, including against powerful interests, to bring about a change in culture towards compliance and stronger rule of law.66 It is uncertain if the current top-down approach by the country’s military leadership is suitable to see through such fundamental behavioural changes, and whether they have the capacity to establish the structures and procedures required in a civilian administration for a new government to take forward these efforts upon coming into office.
Regional policy and private sector initiatives to counter human trafficking, including in the Thai fishing industry
The transnational dimension of these complex challenges also requires multilateral responses, especially through the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). In fact, ASEAN Member States, in 2015, adopted the ASEAN Convention Against Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children (ACTIP), as well as an ASEAN Plan of Action against Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children (APA), but both fail to recognise and address the fundamental connectedness between labour migration and human trafficking in the region.
Whilst the development of a separate ASEAN instrument on the rights of migrant workers was called for in the 2007 ASEAN Declaration on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Migrant Workers, the timeframe remains unclear, and little progress has been made thus far. In the meantime, ASEAN has allowed for greater mobility of workers in eight skilled professions as part of the ASEAN Economic Community launched at the end of 2015; whereas labour migration in low-skill professions is left to bilateral negotiations and agreements.
Fishing, too, remains unregulated at the ASEAN-level, with only loose and non-binding action plans and guidelines providing direction for national and regional action. Whilst the strategic partnership agreement between ASEAN and the Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center (SEAFDEC) includes the formulation and establishment of an ASEAN Regional Fisheries Management Mechanism (ARFMM), it is unclear whether any significant progress has been made towards that and, indeed, if the ARFMM remains a priority for reform.
Further, many of the regulatory changes introduced by the Thai authorities will have to be implemented by the fishing industry, making it a key stakeholder in the country’s reform process. The immediacy of some of the new requirements initially resulted in resistance from the sector, with a few thousand vessels having remained in ports, and boat owners across Thailand having gone on strike.67 More fundamentally, relevant companies and industry associations were long adamant in their refusal to acknowledge that exploitative labour is indeed a problem affecting the sector. The pressures outlined above, however, have also resulted in changes to the industry’s attitude, and some promising supply chain initiatives have been launched, such as the Shrimp Sustainable Supply Chain Task Force (Shrimp Task Force).
Established in mid-2014, the Shrimp Task Force is led by Charoen Pokphand Foods (CPF) and the US retailer Costco, and brings together international retailers, their suppliers, non-governmental organisations, the key Thai shrimp processors, and feed companies to implement track and trace systems; drive codes of conduct and their monitoring; and to support fishery improvement projects, the latter primarily targeted at environmental sustainability. However, whilst the body has the potential to complement and inform efforts by the Thai authorities, it is currently compromised by its exclusive focus on the shrimp supply chain, and lacks both Thai civil society and worker representation.68
Conclusion
Human trafficking in the Thai fishing industry is embed
ded in a complex net of environmental, economic, labour, governance, and migration factors, requiring long-term commitments and far-reaching changes to be addressed successfully. Confronted with political and economic pressures, the Government has taken important steps to deal with some of the legal and regulatory inadequacies contributing to the exploitation of workers in the sector, although significant weaknesses persist. While the Thai authorities can and must do more, it will require a collective effort by various stakeholders, both nationally and internationally, to effectively counter human trafficking in the country’s fishing industry. This also entails adjustments to the global economic and trade regime, which relies on cheap labour to maximise consumption and economic gains, and thus demands contributions from Western governments and consumers as well.69
Notes
1 See, for more information, United Nations Action for Cooperation Against Trafficking in Persons (UN-ACT), UN-ACT Research Strategy: Vulnerabilities, Trends and Impact (UN-ACT, 2015), p. 2.
2 International Labour Organization (ILO), ILO Global Estimate of Forced Labour: Results and Methodology (Geneva: ILO, 2012), p. 16.
3 Brunei Darussalam has some of the highest economic indicators in Southeast Asia, but with a population of less than 500,000, and an economy that is almost entirely dependent on oil and gas production, it is not further considered here.
4 Asian Development Bank (ADB) and ILO, ASEAN Community 2015: Managing Integration for Better Jobs and Shared Prosperity (Geneva: ADB and ILO, 2014), p. 84; ILO, Labour Migration in ASEAN, the Reality (Tripartite Seminar for Enhancing Social Protection in an Integrated ASEAN Community, Jakarta, November 2015), p. 4.
5 Whilst the focus of this chapter is on patterns occurring in the context of labour, it is acknowledged that human trafficking also exists in areas of child abduction, organ trade, begging, marriage, and forms of sexual exploitation beyond commercial sex.
6 It is understood that human trafficking flows in Southeast Asia are more diverse than depicted here – including significant internal patterns in some States, as well as flows to countries elsewhere, such as China, Japan, and South Korea; or the Middle East, Europe, and the United States.
7 Morgan, G.R. and Staples, D.J., The History of Industrial Marine Fisheries in Southeast Asia (Food and Agriculture Organization [FAO], 2006), p. 2.
8 FAO, National Fishery Sector Overview: Thailand (FAO, 2009), p. 9.
9 See, for more information, Environmental Justice Foundation (EJF), Ending Pirate Fishing.
10 EJF, Slavery at Sea: The Continued Plight of Trafficked Migrants in Thailand’s Fishing Industry (EJF, 2014), p. 12.
11 The number of Thai trawlers dramatically increased from 99 in 1961 to more than 10,000 by the 1980s (EJF, Pirates and Slaves: How Overfishing in Thailand Fuels Human Trafficking and the Plundering of Our Oceans (EJF, 2015)), p. 7.
12 Ibid., p. 7.
13 ILO, Employment Practices and Working Conditions in Thailand’s Fishing Sector (Geneva: ILO, 2014), p. 11.
14 Winn, P., “Trash Fish: It’s Gross, Tainted by Slavery and Possibly in Your Dog Food”, GlobalPost (Bangkok, 18 June 2014).
15 Supongpan, M. and Boonchuwong, P., Thailand: National Report: Bycatch Management in Trawl Fisheries in the Gulf of Thailand (REBYC-II CTI, 28 May 2010).
16 There are an estimated 2 million people in Thailand working directly or indirectly in fishing and related industries. Forty percent are said to be employed either as fishermen or in aquaculture, with 60% found in associated industries including shipbuilding or fish processing (ILO, Employment Practices (n.13)), pp. 14–15.
17 EJF, Slavery at Sea (n.10), p. 5.
18 EJF, Pirates and Slaves (n.11), p. 11.
19 ILO, Employment Practices (n.13), p. 15. Faced with such economic and other pressures, some Thai boat owners have responded by converting their ships and engaging in the smuggling of economic migrants from Bangladesh, and of Rohingyas fleeing persecution in Myanmar, to Thailand or Malaysia – see Stoakes, E., Kelly, C., and Kelly, A., “Revealed: How the Thai Fishing Industry Trafficks, Imprisons and Enslaves” The Guardian (Ranong, 20 July 2015).
20 ILO, Review of the Effectiveness of the MOUs in Managing Labour Migration Between Thailand and Neighbouring Countries (Geneva: ILO, 2015), pp. 4–5.
21 Ibid., p. 1.
22 IOM, Migrant Information Note: Issue #29 –March 2016 (IOM, 2016).
23 See Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Kingdom of Thailand and the Government of the Union of Myanmar on Cooperation in the Employment of Workers (adopted and entered into force 21 June 2003); and Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Kingdom of Cambodia and the Government of the Kingdom of Thailand on Cooperation in the Employment of Workers (adopted and entered into force 31 May 2003).
24 ILO, Review of the Effectiveness of the MOUs (n.20), p. vii.
25 United Nations Thematic Working Group on Migration in Thailand, Thailand Migration Report 2014, pp. xix & 18.
26 IOM, Migrant Information Note: Issue #25 –December 2014 (IOM, 2015).
27 ILO, Employment Practices (n.13), p. 46.
28 ILO, Regulating Recruitment of Migrant Workers: An Assessment of Complaint Mechanisms in Thailand (Geneva: ILO, 2013), p. 42.
29 The employers’ co-operation has been limited in light of the LCCs’ inability to address the significant labour shortages in the industry, currently estimated to amount to 50,000 workers – see EJF, Broken Promises: Why Thailand Should Stay on Tier 3 in the 2015 US Trafficking in Persons Report (EJF, 2015), p. 2.
30 There are other acts and regulations of relevance, including the Alien Working Act, B.E. 2551 (2008), but with limited influence on recruitment practices and employment conditions.
31 ILO, Review of the Effectiveness of the MOUs (n.20), p. 20.
32 See, for more information, IOM, Trafficking of Fishermen in Thailand (IOM, 2011), pp. 11–12.
33 See ILO, Review of the Effectiveness of the MOUs (n.20), p. 21, for more information on the conditions under which regular migrant workers may request a change in employer.
34 Ibid., pp. 20–21.
35 Workers on long-haul boats made up less than 20% of the sample, which explains the much lower overall average – see ILO, Employment Practices (n.13), pp. x & 46.
36 Ibid., p. 48.
37 Following the discovery of jungle camps including mass graves of primarily Rohingyas along the Thai-Malay border in 2015, a Guardian investigation documented strong links between the camps and human trafficking in the Thai fishing industry. For more information, see Stoakes, E., Kelly, C., and Kelly, A., “Revealed: How the Thai Fishing Industry Trafficks, Imprisons and Enslaves” (n.19).
38 IOM, Trafficking of Fishermen in Thailand (n.32), pp. 11–12 & 18–19.
39 ILO, Employment Practices (n.13), p. xi.
40 IOM, Trafficking in Fishermen in Thailand (n.32), p. 19.
41 In addition to other sources mentioned, see, for example, UN-ACT, Human Trafficking Trends in Asia: Migration Experiences of Cambodian Workers Deported From Thailand in 2009, 2010 & 2012 (UN-ACT, 2015). See, also, Mirror Foundation, Trafficking and Forced Labour of Thai Males in Deep-Sea Fishing (Bangkok, 2011).
42 See, for example, United Nations Inter-Agency Project on Human Trafficking (UNIAP), Exploitation of Cambodian Men at Sea: Facts About the Trafficking of Cambodian Men Into Thai Fishing Boats (UNIAP, 2009), p. 5. See, also, Hodal, K., Kelly, C., and Lawrence, F., “Revealed: Asian Slave Labour Producing Prawns for Supermarkets in US, UK” The Guardian (Songkhla, 10 June 2014).
43 Hodal, K. and Kelly, C., “Trafficked into Slavery on Thai Trawlers to Catch Food for Prawns” The Guardian (Songkhla, 10 June 2014).
44 Debt bondage in the Thai fishing industry has been documented, among others, in Solidarity Center, Human Trafficking & Exploitation of Migrant Fishing Boat Workers in Thailand (Solidarity Center, 2009). It is typically linked to recruitment costs, and involves the workers having to pay for their placements, whic
h the boat captains or the companies owning the boats advance to the brokers. The terms and conditions of repayment, and the value of the work assessed for deduction, however, are often significantly manipulated and unclear – see ILO, Employment Practices (n.13), p. 30.
45 Robin McDowell, Margie Mason, and Martha Mendoza, “Hundreds Forced to Work as Slaves to Catch Seafood for Global Supply” The Globe and Mail (Benjina, 26 March 2015).
46 Gade, F., Mason, M., and McDowell, R., “Thai Man Arrested on Boat Believed to Be Carrying Slave Fish” Associated Press (Sabang, 26 September 2015).
47 Rogers, C., “Indonesia’s War on Maritime Slavery Continues” Mongabay (Jakarta, 3 March 2016).
48 This chapter captures regulatory reforms and assessments of these until 1 July 2016.
49 See, for more information, European Commission, “EU Acts on Illegal Fishing: Yellow Card Issued to Thailand While South Korea & Philippines Are Cleared” EC Press Release IP/15/4806 (Brussels, 21 April 2015).
50 Larson, E., “Slave-Labor Loophole Closed by U.S. Senate After 8 Decades” Bloomberg (Washington, 12 February 2016).
51 Mendoza, M., “Federal Officials Are Preparing to Enforce an 86-Year-Old Ban on Importing Goods Made by Children or Slaves Under New Provisions of a Law Signed by President Barack Obama” U.S. News (Washington, 25 February 2016).
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