Child trafficking for camel jockeys has been reported almost exclusively in the GCC countries where camel racing is a long tradition. The use of foreign boys for camel racing dates back to the 1970s. As the sport developed into a profitable commercial activity and the demand for jockeys rose, illicit trafficking networks got involved in the lucrative business of recruitment, transportation, and exploitation of children.
According to reports from the early 2000s, children as young as 2 to 3 years old had been recruited as camel jockeys from poor families in Bangladesh, Mauritania, Pakistan, and Sudan.21 Most of them had been given to ‘agents’ by their parents, who had often been deceived about the nature and conditions of their future work. Frequently, they entered the country of destination on forged identification documents concealing their real age. Initially, many of them were working without receiving any pay in order to pay back their ‘agents’ for their travel, placement, and visa fees. These children had been ‘stripped of their childhood’ and were physically and psychologically abused.22 Exposed to extremely hazardous conditions, they were forced to race for long hours, with minimal rest, they were deprived of food in order to stay light to be able to race faster, they did not attend school, and they were separated from their families. Many of them had been seriously injured while racing and others had been sexually assaulted.
In response to the wide press coverage of the phenomenon, and under the pressure of strong criticism from the international community, most Gulf States – the main destination countries for child trafficking for camel racing – have undertaken a series of measures and initiatives to eliminate trafficking for camel racing. These include banning the use of children under 16 –the age limit was later amended to 18 –and partnering with UNICEF on a project for the repatriation and social re-integration of trafficked children.23
Trafficking associated with armed conflict
Organised crime and human trafficking rings thrive in places torn by wars and armed conflicts, where the rule of law is abolished, human rights are being systematically violated, law enforcement is weak, and social cohesion is extremely poor. Under such circumstances, in parts of Syria and Iraq where the extremist Islamic State is in control, traditional conflict-related forms of THB have been intensified and new trafficking trends have emerged, with manifestations that extend beyond the established trafficking typologies.
Firstly, trafficking of child soldiers has been widespread in the region, further exacerbated by the ongoing Syrian conflict and the dominance of Islamic State. Although the practice is prohibited by Sharia Law,24 child soldiers are widely used in conflicts in the region, in Palestine, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen.25 Children are often abducted from poor homes by military, paramilitary, extremist, and terrorist groups. They are taken to isolated military camps where they receive violent and brutal fighting training. With the aim of developing them into fearless and ruthless fighters, children are heavily indoctrinated to the point that their perceptions of morality and ethics are totally distorted.26 Syria, for instance, has been persistently criticised for not effectively prosecuting and eliminating the use of children as soldiers and human shields, by both State and armed opposition groups.27 It is also common practice that Yemeni children are recruited as soldiers by armed groups, especially Houthi militias and tribal forces.28
At the same time, an intra-regional trafficking flow has been reported in the context of ISIS operations. Fighters kidnap young women and girls, residents of the regions they occupy, especially those belonging to non-Muslim minorities, such as Yezidi, towards whom they exercise particular cruelty. They hold them in captivity and subject them to sexual violence, such as mass rapes. Often they sell these women as slaves to other fighters, or they subject them to forced marriage.29 A recent report by the Human Rights Office of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), in cooperation with the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, covering the period of December to April 2014, estimates that 3,000 to 3,500 men, women, and children had been in ISIS captivity where it is alleged that they were subject to forced labour, sexual violence including sexual slavery, and trafficking in women and children.30 Such persons would straightforwardly be identified as victims of (internal) trafficking.
Finally, a novel human trafficking form has recently emerged in the region, consisting of young women and girls from the West being recruited to join ISIS fighters as Jihadi brides. In cases where the movement of women and girls involves their recruitment by means of deception and is linked to their exploitation, they can be considered victims of trafficking.
ISIS uses the Internet, social media in particular, to recruit its victims, employing tactics similar to those used by paedophiles to approach children online. Although the girls do consent, their consent may have been obtained through deception, such as portraying a distorted, glorified image of ISIS and the exciting life with Jihadi fighters, concealing the extreme violence used by ISIS and the pain and destruction it causes.31 In the case of minors, it is widely accepted that consent is irrelevant anyway for them to be identified as trafficking victims.32
Upon arrival in their destination, these girls and young women are often isolated and abused. As this trend has started being reported very recently and there is scarce evidence from women who have been there and back, an assessment of the extent and the content of the exploitation that these girls are subjected to remains unclear.33 Based on historical evidence on women who have joined terrorist groups, as well as on the particularly violent, inhuman, and misogynist profile of ISIS, it is likely that victims are forced into marriage, suffer ill-treatment, and are subject to living conditions that amount to domestic servitude or sex slavery.34
Major region-specific areas of concern
Taking into account the prevalent manifestations of THB in the region, it is evident that there are several factors that inhibit both the effective prevention of the phenomenon and the protection of its victims. The principal challenges mostly relate to States’ participation in international human rights and labour conventions, the domestic regulatory framework that governs residency and employment of migrants, the involvement of intermediaries in the labour market, and the lack of effective mechanisms and procedures to identify and protect victims of trafficking.
Lack of effective engagement with International Law
All Middle Eastern States, with the exception of Iran and Yemen, have signed and ratified the Palermo Protocol35 and, in accordance with its provisions, have adopted legislation criminalising trafficking in persons and providing for strict penalties for traffickers. Nevertheless, their engagement with international human rights and labour law instruments has been especially weak.
A number of treaties adopted with the aim of protecting the rights of migrant workers and to prevent and eliminate forced labour and trafficking for labour exploitation have had limited effect in most countries of the region. Namely, the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families contains provisions that apply to both documented and undocumented migrants, and can also be applicable to victims of trafficking for labour exploitation. In the region, which primarily consists of migrant-hosting countries, only Egypt and Syria are parties to this treaty, which has been ratified by very few countries of destination of migrants in general.36
On the other hand, although the two relevant fundamental ILO Conventions adopted for the abolition of forced labour, the Forced Labour Convention No.29 and the Abolition of Forced Labour Convention No.105, have been ratified by all States in the region, no Middle Eastern country has yet ratified the 2014 Protocol to the Forced Labour Convention adopted to address gaps in the protection afforded by the Convention.37 The Protocol, which entered into force in 2016, despite its low coverage so far, is of substantial significance for victims of trafficking of labour exploitation. It establishes, inter alia, the obligation on States to protect all victims of forced labour, irrespective of their legal
status (Art.4(1)), and the principle of non-prosecution and non-punishment of victims of forced labour for unlawful acts that have been committed as a direct consequence of them being subject to forced or compulsory labour (Art.4(2)).
Furthermore, with the aim to prevent and eliminate trafficking for domestic servitude and labour exploitation, ILO Member States have adopted the Private Employment Agencies Convention No.18138 and, very recently, the Domestic Workers Convention No.189.39 The former establishes the obligation to regulate the operation of private employment agencies and contains provisions that protect workers who use their services, making special reference to services offered to workers recruited from foreign countries (Art.8). Israel is the only country in the region to have ratified the Convention, demonstrating its will to prevent and punish any abusive and fraudulent practices of such agencies, which contribute to the rise of many forms of THB, as outlined earlier. On the other hand, the Domestic Workers Convention, adopted in 2011 and entered into force in 2013, has not been ratified by any Middle Eastern country. This is particularly unfortunate as the Convention contains provisions that establish a number of significant obligations, including the duty to adopt a regulatory framework providing for freedom of association and collective bargaining (Article 3(2)(a) and 3(3)), to implement measures for the elimination of forced labour (Article 3(2)(b)) and for the protection of victims of abuse (Article 5), to regulate the conditions of employment of domestic workers (Articles 6–7), and to set up an effective complaint mechanism to ensure their enforcement (Article 17).
Finally, reference should also be made to the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict,40 which constitutes the principal international instrument addressing the issue of child soldiers. The Protocol sets the minimum age when direct participation in hostilities is allowed to 18 years old and regulates compulsory and voluntary recruitment of children in armed conflicts. Most countries in the region, with the exception of Iran, Lebanon, and the UAE, have ratified the Protocol and have engaged in a constructive dialogue with its treaty body, the Committee on the Rights of the Child (CoRC). However, in some cases, especially in countries where ISIS has a strong presence, compliance with the Protocol’s provisions has been particularly challenging. For instance, in its recent Report on Iraq, the CoRC has expressed its deep concern at the widespread use of child soldiers and the inability of the government to take effective measures, in compliance with the Protocol, to prevent it.41
The Kafala system
A significant challenge to the effective prevention of THB is the Kafala system, established across most parts of the region. Ranging from more permissive to very restrictive regimes, in many Middle Eastern countries at varying degrees, the legal status of foreign workers is attached to their employer, who is ‘sponsoring’ their visa and guarantees their employment permit.42 This system, known as ‘Kafala’, has received intense criticism, including from treaty bodies and other international human rights monitoring mechanisms, for severely restricting the mobility of workers, and for being inherently problematic, creating ‘an unequal power dynamic between the employer and the worker’.43
Firstly, victims of trafficking, sponsored by their traffickers/employers, are definitely more vulnerable to exploitation by their sponsor, in view of the uncertainty of their irregular status and the fear of deportation. Secondly, their attachment to their sponsor impedes their access to justice. Their freedom of movement is restricted and they are often deprived of their identification documents. Under these circumstances, escaping an abusive employer would automatically infringe immigration laws and trigger criminal prosecution and deportation. Thirdly, because of the above, many cases of trafficking remain undetected and unreported.
Furthermore, one alarming practice that has been reported in the context of the Kafala system involves ‘kafeels’ (individuals or company sponsors) abusing the system by recruiting and sponsoring foreign workers for non-existent jobs and subsequently auctioning the visas of these workers to the highest bidder. This unlawful and highly exploitative distortion of the system further increases the vulnerability of workers who are found in a limbo situation of an irregular legal status, fearing deportation, and thus extremely susceptible to coercion and exploitation.44
Some countries have adopted measures to relax the strict restrictions of Kafala. For instance, Bahrain was the first GCC country to amend the sponsoring scheme to enable migrant workers to change employers without the prior consent of their current employer, subsequently subject to the condition of completing one year of employment with the current employer.45 However, the amendment does not cover domestic workers, and the reform’s effective implementation faces challenges, such as poor awareness and lack of effective enforcement. Generally, the pace of reforms has been particularly slow and incremental and the afforded protection is still largely inadequate.46
Regulations and distortions of the employment sector
Besides the widespread Kafala system, immigration policies and employment regulations in most parts of the region are very restrictive and establish a significant imbalance in the relationship between the employer and the worker. For instance, foreign workers are not allowed to become permanent residents, and they face disproportionate restrictions in their freedom to change employer or sector of employment. Domestic workers in particular are more often than not excluded from the labour law. Moreover, migrant workers are not allowed to participate in collective bargaining or negotiate their employment contracts. These restrictions increase their vulnerability to trafficking networks, and demonstrate the governments’ failure to protect them in cases of exploitation and abuse.47
Nevertheless, many countries have adopted measures to reduce the risk of trafficking of migrant workers that are arguably moving in the right direction. For instance, Jordan is the first country in the region to include domestic workers in its labour law, thus affording them wider protection.48
Not quite as bold, most other Middle Eastern States have opted for the introduction of the scheme of ‘unified contracts’, which contain prescribed conditions of employment, are signed by both the employer and the worker and are submitted to public immigration authorities.49 Additionally, many countries have signed bilateral agreements with countries of origin to regulate employment conditions of labourers and domestic workers. Unfortunately, both unified contract and bilateral agreements usually afford reduced protection compared to national labour laws and have been criticised as failing in the areas of monitoring and enforcement.50 Their limited scope and inadequate protection have often resulted in tensions in bilateral relations between countries of origin and destination. In this context, governments of countries of origin and destination have been issuing temporary bans on the recruitment of domestic workers from and to their countries, respectively. For instance, when the Philippines imposed stricter conditions (higher minimum salaries) for its citizens to be employed as domestic workers, Saudi Arabia in 2011 and Qatar in 2012 both imposed bans on the recruitment of Filipina domestic workers. Conversely, in 2015, in response to the execution of two Indonesian domestic helpers convicted of murder in Saudi Arabia, the Indonesian government banned its citizens from working as domestic workers in 21 countries – the majority in the Middle East.51
On the other hand, as outlined earlier, the fraudulent and sometimes abusive practices of private employment agencies (PEAs) undertaking the recruitment, transportation, and placement of migrant workers across the Middle East are crucial factors that facilitate the exploitation of migrants in the region and their susceptibility to trafficking networks. It is precisely the recruitment undertaken by means of deception by those agencies that initiates the destructive cycle of trafficking for sexual or labour exploitation. These agencies frequently do not comply with existing national regulations on the operation of private employment agencies. They deceive migrants about the nature and conditions of their work in the destination country, or they migh
t even recruit them without any specific job description. They charge excessive fees for their services, essentially subjecting the migrants recruited to a situation of debt bondage. They often change the migrants’ employment contract upon their arrival at the country of destination, when the latter no longer have the choice to reject the offer and are already indebted to the agency. Additionally, as they operate across different countries of origin and destination, it is particularly challenging to effectively monitor their activities.52
Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Bahrain, and the UAE are among the countries that have adopted laws regulating the establishment and operation of private employment agencies. For instance, Jordan adopted a law in 2009 to prohibit PEAs from charging placement fees to workers.53 Similarly, in Kuwait, recruitment and transportation costs of the migrant worker are to be borne by the sponsor.54 Equivalent legislation has also been adopted in Lebanon and the UAE, forbidding PEAs to receive any direct or indirect remuneration fees from workers.55 These laws definitely denote positive progress. However, PEAs continue to play a key role in the escalation of THB in the region, exploiting vulnerable groups and undertaking fraudulent operations. This indicates that the implementation and monitoring of relevant legislative measures is still weak and requires further strengthening.
Lack of effective victim protection
A further area of concern generally shared across the region is that of inadequate victim protection. Firstly, most Middle Eastern States lack effective mechanisms to identify victims of trafficking and to distinguish them from illegal/irregular migrants and, as a result, often fail to offer immediate support and assistance to the former, as required.56
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