Targeting supply and demand is not a new endeavour. Already the abolitionists campaigning to end slavery in the early nineteenth century drew a link between supply and consumer demand for the products of slave labour, thus invoking the morality of consumers as a means of addressing demand.11 The abolitionist movement against prostitution in the early twentieth century also drew attention to the role of demand.12 The inclusion of a reference to demand in the Palermo Protocol was the result of lengthy historical developments, as well as lobbying.13 The concept of demand was controversial in the development of the Protocol, especially since some negotiators considered it ambiguous, judgemental towards men, and harmful for women in prostitution.14 Indeed, during the negotiations demand was largely framed as a question of targeting men, i.e., the clients who buy sexual services.15
Sweden criminalised the buying of sexual services in 1999. The so-called ‘Swedish model’ has been both hailed and criticised, much in line with the underlying ideological approaches to the issue of prostitution.16 Various other countries have adopted the Swedish model, including Norway and Iceland in 2009. Finland debated the issue at length, and eventually in 2006 adopted a partial model that criminalises only the buying of sexual services from victims of trafficking and procuring;17 the law was amended in 2015. More recently, the European Parliament has taken a stance on the issue, encouraging Member States to criminalise the buying of sexual services.18 Since the focus of the demand aspect has largely been on the clients of sexual services, the question arises how the concept of demand can be similarly applied in a labour exploitation context.
Utilising the concept of demand in the context of preventing labour exploitation
As pointed out above, the definition of demand in the context of trafficking is complex and subject to various interpretations. There is an ongoing debate on the concept of demand. Some argue for the need for a clear definition, while others see that there is no need for a strict definition. The broad and lax use of the term “demand”, which is largely used without any clarification of the exact meaning of the term, has been criticised.19 In this view, the term is “without a clear definition, is inconsistently used and is applied to a range of different contexts”.20 The rationale for a clear definition is that researchers should be able to specify demand through outlining who wants to buy what.21 Cyrus and Vogel thus recommend an economic usage of the term, defining it as “the willingness and ability to buy a particular commodity”.22
We acknowledge the need to define the terms used in research, especially if the research is to be evaluated, and if it is intended to be used as a basis for policy-making. However, in this chapter we take an operational approach and align ourselves with the conclusion of the Inter-Agency Coordination Group against Trafficking in Persons (ICAT) of the United Nations, which emphasised that rather than focus on the definition, there is a need for “consensus about the full set of options that can be taken to effectively discourage demand both directly and indirectly, along with a willingness to implement, monitor and evaluate the measures concerned”.23 Demand can be understood as being socially constructed in a given time, place, and context.24 Following this, we see that the manifestations of demand depend on the circumstances in which they arise. It is therefore challenging to provide a clear definition of demand. Rather than focus on attempting to define demand, we find that it is most important to ensure a comprehensive approach to the prevention of trafficking, which includes also the private sector and consumers or buyers of services, and thus includes the element of ‘demand’. This operational approach may not include an exact definition of demand, but acknowledges that those benefiting from transactions that affect victims of trafficking should be addressed in all preventive efforts.
This chapter focuses solely on the exploitation of migrant workers in the labour market (excluding sex work and the sex industry).25 For the purposes of this chapter, we understand demand as constructed through three levels: the consumer/client, the recruiter/employer, and the migrant worker.26 This chapter presents a narrow focus on empirical examples of demand in the context of exploitation of migrant workers in Finland. It aims to explore how the employers’ demand for labour, and migrant workers’ demand for employment, turn into exploitation and ultimately trafficking.
We address the issue of trafficking for the purposes of forced labour through the concept of the continuum of exploitation. The continuum is useful in understanding exploitation and trafficking not as single, separate acts, but as a larger context and continuum of acts that range from less severe to more severe forms of exploitation.27 It has been argued that less serious forms of exploitation can be a breeding ground for more serious acts, leading up to trafficking for forced labour.28 We also argue that in order for any prevention efforts to be effective, the authorities need to address those multiple violations of the labour protection standards, which are more easily detectable and are often precursors to trafficking.29 However, for the purposes of this chapter we do not analyse the different means exploiters use to exploit others and the specific manifestations of how situations of exploitation are created, as they have been discussed in our previous research.30
Contextualising the exploitation of migrant workers in Finland
This chapter draws from two research projects focusing on labour trafficking in Finland. The first was more general in nature and focused on exploring existing forms and awareness of trafficking for forced labour. Within this project, we interviewed 19 Finnish stakeholders and seven victims of trafficking in 2010. The second project focused on the exploitation of migrant labour and trafficking in the cleaning and restaurant sectors in Finland. The data consisted of interviews conducted in 2013 with 28 stakeholders and ten migrant workers who had encountered labour exploitation in the cleaning industry and restaurant work. For the purposes of this chapter, we have used both sets of interviews. The data has been coded and analysed thematically.
In concrete terms, the demand for labour exploitation (of victims of trafficking) comes from intermediaries such as brokers, recruiters, and agents, as well as from unscrupulous employers at the end of the trafficking chain.31 Also, employees’ demand for work plays a part in this equation: many migrants are willing to take risks in order to secure a better future for themselves and their families. Sometimes these risks pay off, but occasionally the person can end up in a situation of exploitation. In our empirical findings, we focus on discussing the role of these various actors and analyse the nexus of employer and employee demand in the context of labour exploitation. We argue that when these two types of demand meet in certain circumstances, the risk of trafficking and labour exploitation increases.
Finland has a relatively small share of migrants overall: in 2014, there were a total of 144,000 foreign-born workers in Finland, making up 6% of the total labour force.32 Labour migration into Finland is a rather recent development. Since the mid-1990s, government policies have promoted the introduction of skilled, mobile migrant labour as a solution to the potential negative economic developments caused by the ageing population, national gaps in skills, and decreases in labour supply.33 Statistics, however, show that migrant workers are over-represented in low-skilled, low-paid sectors. In 2014, 23% of all cleaners and 18% of all workers in the restaurant and catering sector in Finland were migrants.34 Finnish immigration policies have traditionally focused on controlling immigration, and migration has consequently been framed as a potential threat to the internal security of the country.35 Government policies have thus portrayed the management of migration both through control measures, especially at the borders, and through controlling the terms and conditions of work of foreign labour.36 It is, however, questionable whether the current enforcement and control of labour violations affecting migrant workers is sufficient.37
The rights of workers have traditionally been strong in the Finnish labour market. Instead of a general minimum wage, sector-specific collective agreements determine the minimum wage level for each sector. These agreeme
nts also cover unorganised workers, including migrants. The government, trade unions, and employers’ organisations form a tripartite bargaining structure, which negotiates the terms and conditions of work in the Finnish labour market. The tripartite structure and the means of bargaining are currently being challenged because of the economic recession and claims that the traditional labour market bargaining structure is too rigid.38 Inequalities in Finnish society have been increasing since the recession in the 1990s, and the welfare State and its social programmes have been weakened.39 It seems that at the same time migrant workers are excluded from the labour and social policies of the welfare State because of increased global competition and a general flexibilisation of work.40 The poor and fluctuating economic conditions overall seem to be changing the traditional roles of workers and employers. Some researchers argue that employees are no longer the focus of protection in the way traditional labour law assumes, as precedence is given to the economy.41 These changing circumstances naturally affect those who are the most vulnerable. Migrant workers without contracts and knowledge of their rights are thus disproportionately vulnerable, both with regard to the structural changes in the labour market as well as with regard to exploitation at work.42
Employers’ and recruiters’ demand for labour
Our findings focus on two sectors: the cleaning and ethnic restaurant sectors. These industries have both some differences and some commonalities. They both employ many low-skilled migrant workers and demand increasing flexibility from them. This tendency is sometimes in contradiction to the current regulative labour migration policy, which requires that third country nationals should be working full-time43 in order to get a work permit. The difference is that while the cleaning sector offers a lot of part-time or zero-hour contracts, which make it difficult for the workers to accumulate enough hours to meet the minimum income level, migrants working in ethnic restaurants often have another sort of problem: they work extremely long hours, which are not reflected in their wages or work contracts. Instead, they are gravely underpaid despite the hours worked.
The cleaning industry
The cleaning industry has undergone rapid structural change in the past few decades, and now employs an increasing number of migrant workers, some of whom have also encountered different forms of labour exploitation.44 Nowadays, the employers in the cleaning industry have an increasing demand for workers who are extremely flexible and willing to work on only a part-time basis, or late in the evenings, during the night, or early in the mornings. Often migrant workers are seen as the only feasible option to meet this need.
When you find a couple of [Finnish] workers who are capable and willing to work, they don’t want to do the night shift. Or they don’t want to do this and that. In the end you only have one. There’s not a lot of choices left, you have to start looking (for workers) from abroad.
(Employer)
However, the views of the interviewed experts differed on whether an actual shortage of labour was the main cause of demand for migrant labour in the cleaning sector. While the representatives of employers argued that there is a real need for workers in the cleaning sector, trade union representatives disagreed. Also, migrant workers themselves testified that they do not think there is a shortage of cleaners. Instead, they saw a structural problem in how the work is organised, and how certain employers would rather recruit new people on poor terms than extend the work contracts of existing employees or offer them additional working hours.
Interviewee: There is no shortage of cleaners, so those employers they know. They give you 3 months and then they find a new person, they exploit the person, that person goes and then they find a new person. Just a few people get those permanent contracts.
Interviewer: So they might just get money out of it.
Interviewee: So they say that there is a shortage of workers […], I don’t get it.
(Migrant interviewee 1)
Our empirical findings also indicate that the demand for low-skilled migrant labour fluctuates, depending on the demand by those who purchase the cleaning services. Because of these fluctuations, sub-contracting is often used to meet the need for cleaning services. However, since recruitment from abroad may take a long time,45 the need for labour might change before the recruited workers even arrive in Finland.
It was when we had the previous avalanche, when the [migrant] cleaners were granted work permits. The need for recruitment was endless and all kinds of these companies were started; recruitment companies, business companies, cleaning companies – they saw a huge chance. They brought large amounts of cleaners here. And then there were no jobs for them. A couple of years ago it was a clear problem. When they got the [work] permits, the recession came, and there were no jobs for them.
(Inspection authority)
As outlined by the interviewed expert above, there is also evidence in Finland that mala fide operators – as middlemen and recruiters – may infiltrate business operations, quickly supply labour, and charge workers recruitment fees.46 These situations of exploitation at the hands of intermediaries are sometimes referred to as hidden third-party exploitation,47 and may be happening at a level of sub-contracting quite distant from the main contractor, who may be unaware of such situations.48 Sometimes it is indeed the recruiters or middlemen who are the exploiters, rather than (only or just) the employers. They might even be misleading the actual employing companies.
There are cases where the recruitment company tries to take advantage of the workers, and they come and work for an okay company […] where the employer is all right and the exploiter is the recruiter. These big companies, they can’t do this in Finland that they would leave wages unpaid or would do something criminal or act against good manners. It’s the recruiters who are the exploiters or then the employers are smaller companies, perhaps owned by foreigners.
(Trade union representative)
Of course, it is possible that businesses operating legally may not realise the risks or do not recognise signs of exploitation within their own supply chain or even in their own operation.49 Several interviewees mentioned cases where the immediate supervisors of migrant workers may have been misleading them, demanding illegal fees, or exploiting the workers on their own without the knowledge of the employer. This hidden third-party exploitation can occur where “one person holds a position of power over another and abuses that position for personal gain. It is often well hidden by the perpetrators with victims reluctant or too frightened to come forward”.50
It seems that some recruiters try to benefit from such fluctuations and so-called labour shortages by exploiting the most vulnerable workers with false promises and by charging illegal recruitment fees from them.51 At the same time, such labour providers can take advantage of the ignorance of employers who do not know what means of recruitment have been used in the first place, nor what has been promised to the workers. Several such cases where identified in our previous research, including cases with direct indicators of trafficking.52 In these cases, the employers’ immediate demand for labour had been supplied by unscrupulous recruiters or labour brokers who provided them with migrant workers who had been given misleading information about their contracts and terms of employment, and who were grossly overcharged for accommodation and language courses.53 We do argue, however, that it is the responsibility of any good employer to make sure that they only work with agencies and recruiters which have committed to using ethical means of recruitment and have in place strict policies to ensure that no fees are charged of migrant workers.54
The restaurant industry
There is also a need for cheap migrant labour in the restaurant sector, generally in assisting positions, but ultimately there is a special need for migrant workers in the ethnic cuisine restaurants. To date, most of the convictions for labour trafficking in Finland have also concerned ethnic restaurants, the victims being mostly chefs with an Asian background. It was suggested by the interviewed police and inspection authorities that the deman
d for foreign workers in ethnic restaurants is very particular, as certain employers are looking for migrants with poor language skills and lack of knowledge in order to better exploit them. Such employers are not necessarily looking for highly skilled chefs, but people who they can keep under control.
They use as much as possible people from the countryside who don’t have any language skills and who have poorer education. Those you can at least deceive.
(Law enforcement representative)
The interviewed experts noticed that such employers usually have a migrant background themselves. Some of them are simply trying to circumvent the migration regulations by employing their own relatives or people from their home village in order to get them to Finland. Others exploit their own countrymen as cheap labour in very systematic and organised ways.
There’s a lot of it in the restaurant sector, in these ethnic restaurants there is a chain of exploitation: first someone [a worker] comes, is exploited, and then they open their own restaurant and kind of become exploiters themselves.
(Trade union representative 2)
It was pointed out that in many such instances the migrant workers initially consent to the poor terms of employment, because after four years they can apply for a permanent residence permit in Finland and start their own company. However, many have found that the initial promises have been misleading and that the combination of poor wages, long hours, and lack of free time leave the workers with few options and under the power of their employer.
What, then, is the cause of this demand for cheap labour in the ethnic restaurants? A representative of the inspection authority argued that the cost model for many such restaurants is not feasible in the first place. For most such restaurants, it would be almost impossible to earn a profit with their low price level if they have any employees at all and pay them wages mandated by the sector-specific collective agreement and pay taxes according to regulations. Since the wages and the mandatory employer’s fees are often the single largest expenditure for the restaurant owners, certain employers have developed systematic ways in which they can keep these costs at a minimum and keep this hidden from the authorities.
Routledge Handbook of Human Trafficking Page 94
