India’s Soft Power
A New Foreign Policy Strategy
PATRYK KUGIEL
First published 2017
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Contents
Abbreviations
Introduction
1. Soft Power in International Relations: A Conceptual Framework
2. Evolution of Power in Indian Foreign Policy
3. Sources of India’s Soft Power
4. Soft Power in Indian Foreign Policy
5. Effectiveness of Indian Soft Power Strategy
6. Augmenting India’s Soft Power: Modi and Beyond
References
Abbreviations
AFSPA Armed Forces Special Powers Act
BASIC Brazil, South Africa, India, China
BBC British Broadcasting Corporation
BIMSTEC Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation
BRIC Brazil, Russia, India, China
BRICS Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa
CII Confederation of Indian Industry
CNN Cable News Network
DPA Development Partnership Administration
FDI Foreign Direct Investment
FICCI Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry
FTA Free Trade Agreement
GDP Gross Domestic Product
IBEF India Brand Equity Foundation
IBSA India, Brazil, South Africa
ICCR Indian Council of Cultural Relations
IFC India Future of Change Initiative
IGO Inter-Governmental Organisations
IMF International Monetary Fund
INGO International Non-Governmental Organisations IT Information Technology
ITEC Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation
MDG Millennium Development Goals
MC Ministry of Culture
MEA Ministry of External Affairs
MOIA Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs
MT Ministry of Tourism
NGO Non-Governmental Organisations
NRI Non-Resident Indian
OCI Overseas Citizen of India
PDD Public Diplomacy Division
PIO Person of Indian Origin
PPP Purchasing Power Parity
SAARC South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
SSC South-South Cooperation
UN United Nations
UNDEF United Nations Democracy Fund
WTO World Trade Organization
Introduction
On 21 June 2015 the world stood still. Hundreds and thousands of people around the globe, parks and streets, shopping malls and airports, practiced asanas to celebrate first International Yoga Day established by the United Nations a few months earlier. As the “Indian gift to the world” – yoga – basked in its universal acclaim, India’s global image got a boost. Although much attention has been focused on India’s economic progress and military achievements in recent years, its soft power is no less important. The growing popularity of yoga and the more vibrant diplomacy of the new Indian government under Prime Minister Modi suggest that India is on the right track to make the optimum use of its many strength. As this case shows, it is not only the number of rockets and tanks which can decide India’s global position but, increasingly, there are other less tangible elements that can create its credibility and attractiveness.
Soft power describes the ability to influence the actions of others by virtue of one’s culture, values and policies rather than by force. Unlike hard military or economic power, it works through attraction and cooptation rather than coercion and payoffs. India is familiar with this field and offers an interesting case for comparative studies of soft powers. It proves that the concept is not confined to the Western world, and that the United States faces a strong competitor in India. Yet soft power is not an alternative to hard power but rather, its supplement. An effective amalgamation of both in a comprehensive external strategy is what can make a country a smart power. As yoga cultivates harmony of the body and mind, smart power assumes mindful balance of hard and soft power assets. If India can translate this rule in its foreign policy it is set to emerge even more as a major global player.
Though less celebrated, soft power became especially important in the changed realities of the post-Cold War international scenario. Globalisation and increasing interdependence among nations limited the acceptance of use of military force or other coercive measures in foreign relations. A strong army or vibrant economy is often not enough for countries to maintain their objectives. In this information age, with free movement of people, capital and ideas, perceptions matter more than ever. It is claimed that, “communication strategies become more important, and outcomes are shaped not merely by whose army wins, but also by whose story wins” (Nye, 2011b:p.18).
Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea may have suggested that the use of military force in international relations is not over. In practice, this example proves that the “use of force is more costly today than was the case in the past” (Gray, 2011: p.21). Russia has already paid the price for its actions: it now suffers from international condemnation, political isolation, economic sanctions, and unified anti-Russian sentiments in many nations. These factors dealt a severe blow to Russia’s image, which had just been propped up by its massive investment in the 2014 Winter Olympic Games in Sochi—planned as a showcase of national power. Russia, despite its muscle flexing, chose not to send regular troops to Ukraine, but engaged in “hybrid warfare” and “creeping invasion”. This choice clarified that incredibility of the soft power theory—that, there is no acceptance for using 19th century means in the 21st century.
Since the term “soft power” was coined in the early 1990s it has enjoyed a spectacular international career. Although originally designed for the United States, as the sole superpower, soft power has been, gradually “de-Americanised” and incorporated into the foreign policy strategies of many countries. In India, this subject has been insufficiently studied and unfortunately, has been marginalised in the discourse on international relations. For a country with civilisational richness and positive record in international affa
irs, this marginalisation of soft power is intriguing. One possible explanation of this puzzle is that, “Indians take their soft power for granted” and thus, there is no need for further scrutiny of the subject (Interview with Indian diplomat, Warsaw, 2013). Another reason may be the fact that, when the term “soft power” was created, India was looking ahead to the next stage, which focused on hard power. For the last few decades, discourse on foreign and security policy in India has been dominated by realist analysts focusing solely on the material attributes of power. For them, soft power is a confession of state weakness, and many confuse “soft power” with a “soft state” (Hymans 2010). Another possibility is that soft power is resented and rejected simply as a Western concept that does not fit into the Indian context. Such an interpretation would be a mistake, as India is no stranger to the soft power concept; disregarding it would dispose of decades of progress in this alternative model.
In fact, India is sometimes labelled a “soft power by default” (Wagner, 2010), and is believed to have substantial potential in this field. It was one of first countries to pursue a soft power strategy, under the leadership of Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, long before the term was coined. However, after the defeat in the 1962 war with China, India gradually shifted towards a hard power approach, and its foreign policy became more pragmatic and driven by realpolitik. Until recently, soft power played a negligible role in strategic and security discourse in India, and there was no single declaration or strategy to announce its greater infusion into the country’s foreign policy. Only after 1998 did India rediscover the utility of its soft power in external relations.
Historically, the roots of Indian soft power can be traced back to the philosophical concepts of ahimsa, the pacifism of the Buddhist Emperor Asoka, the universalism of Hinduism and the non-violent independence struggle led by Mahatma Gandhi. From classical dance and music, old traditions of yoga and Ayurveda, to cuisine, fashion and Bollywood movies—Indian culture is a great resource of the country’s power of attraction. The Indian diaspora – over 20 million strong and spread across the globe – is a powerful asset for disseminating a positive image of the country. India’s fast economic growth – witnessed over the last decade – is a source of great attraction for foreign investors. A positive record of South-South cooperation and a long-held solidarity with developing countries is another source of Indian soft power in many parts of the world.
But though international literature on soft power has grown considerably over the last two decades, India has remained a glaring exception. Unlike in the case of America, analysis of soft power has played only a nominal role in Indian academia, drawing limited attention from scholars and policymakers. It is no coincidence that a hallmark publication on Indian foreign policy prepared by the Foreign Service Institute (2007) did not include a single article specifically addressing soft power, and only three out of 58 chapters dealt with any aspect of it—(role of the diaspora, culture and media). Similarly, a special 2010 issue on Indian foreign policy, brought out by International Studies – a leading academic journal on international relations, published by the Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi – completely disregarded the subject of soft power in its many articles (International Studies, 2010). A recent document, Non-Alignment 2.0, A strategy for India’s new foreign policy, prepared by leading Indian experts and intellectuals, did not lend a single chapter to soft power (Khilnani, et al., 2012), despite acknowledging the value of ideas and perceptions in external relations.
In contrast to China, where dozens of books and reports have been published on soft power, India had no major monograph on this phenomenon until 2013. The book by Daya Kishan Thussu,Communicating India’s Soft Power: Buddha to Bollywood, is the most comprehensive and up-to-date analysis of India’s potential in this area, but it is limited to the perspective of a media and communication specialist rather than international relations, and focuses principally on India’s assets—not on its foreign policy. In recent years, several authors have written articles on this aspect of Indian foreign policy (Wagner, 2005, 2010; Tharoor, 2008; Purushothaman, 2010; Lee, 2010c; Malone, 2011; Mukherjee, 2013). Some experts have also underlined the importance of soft power in their books on India’s foreign policy (Nayar and Paul, 2003; Tharoor, 2012). There are several publications that focus only on specific aspects of soft power. For instance, Varma (2007) and Bashar (2009) underline the importance of culture and civilization values as special assets. Others consider the Indian diaspora as the most useful tool of Indian soft power (Mohan, 2003; Kapur 2003; Gupta, 2008). Observers have also focused on recent changes in public diplomacy (Hall, 2012, 2013) and foreign assistance (Chaturvedi, 2012; Mawdsley, 2011, 2012; Ganguly and Mullen, 2012; Chanana, 2008) as a sign of India’s shift towards soft power in its foreign relations. Unfortunately, this litany of authors and their accompanying work represents shards of a shattered mirror rather than a whole and comprehensive approach properly reflecting India’s soft power.
Moreover, the existing literature on India’s soft power is ambiguous and inconclusive. One can distinguish two groups of opinions about India’s potential in this area. The first group comprises those who already recognise India as a major soft power and point at its potential in the field. The best-known representative of this group is Shashi Tharoor, a diplomat and writer who has long claimed that soft power is India’s single most important asset in foreign relations. Another analyst, Purushothaman (2010), argues, “India has a substantial amount of soft power and has the potential to augment it.”Also, Joseph Nye, the author of the soft power concept, recognised potential of India in this regard and saw it as a future “smart power” (Nye, 2006b).
The second group of scholars, even if they do note certain aspects of India’s power of attraction, points to a number of obstacles that hamper the effective use of India’s soft power strategy. Wagner (2010), who was one of the first to recognize a shift from hard to soft power in India’s foreign policy strategy, claims that India does not use its potential effectively and is a “defensive soft power”. Malone (2011b) opines that the Indian government is somewhat defensive and selective in projecting its soft power. Hymans (2009) argues that many of India’s soft power strengths also constitute its own “soft vulnerabilities.” Others complain that though India was a soft power in the past, it has lost its attractiveness in recent years. For example, Abraham (2007) claims that India has denied itself much of its soft power since it turned “to a foreign policy built around the projection of hard power.” Gupta (2008) regrets that India “has not adequately utilized soft power resources” – pointing to Indian spirituality. There is a general feeling that India’s soft power is weak and consistently falls short of expectations (Lee 2010c; Mukherjee 2013).
This summary suggests that analysis of India’s soft power has just started, and there is need for further scrutiny of Indian foreign policy in this context. Therefore, the book aims to fill the remaining gaps in the literature on India’s soft power and shed more light on this neglected aspect of contemporary foreign policy. This study is not about the potential of India’s soft power alone; rather, it discusses how such a capacity is being transformed into capabilities and observes its practical implementation in Indian foreign policy. It is located in the context of Indian strategic thinking and presented in the framework of Indian policy making. It would be interesting for all students of international relations, soft power theory, Indian foreign policy and an evolving international system.
More specifically, this work has been undertaken in pursuit of the following objectives: to comprehend the evolution of power in Indian foreign policy and explain subsequent shifts from soft power to hard power and smart power approaches; to critically analyse the resources and potential of India’s soft power in all its dimensions; to analyse the implementation of the soft power approach by successive governments in India; to evaluate the effectiveness of new strategies in foreign policy; and to examine limitations and suggest ways of wielding of sof
t power. The author seeks to answer several research questions: What are the main strengths and weaknesses of India’s soft power? How is India incorporating a soft power approach into its foreign policy? What are the main tools India uses for projecting its soft power abroad? What kind of power is India likely to become?
Two working hypotheses were also tested during the course of this study: First, that India has great soft power potential that can be useful in realisation of the country’s foreign policy objectives. Second, that India deliberately employs a soft power approach in its external relations to supplement, rather than replace, its hard power in an integrated smart power strategy.
The book is divided into six chapters. The opening chapter introduces the concept of “soft power” and summarises the international debate on the idea of power in international relations. It starts with detailed characteristics of the term as seen by the “father” of soft power, Joseph Nye, to describe the subsequent evolution of the concept. It tries to provide answers to questions raised in the debates over soft power: What constitutes soft power? Who can have it? How can it be measured? How does it work?
In the second chapter, there is a general discussion about how soft power is transferred to the context of India and evaluated from a historical perspective. By analysing different approaches to national power in post-independence India, this chapter underlines the tension between idealists and realists in Indian strategic thinking. It provides argument that soft power is back in mainstream foreign policy in India, and a more strategic method to combine soft and hard power approach is emerging since the turn of the millennium.
The third chapter deals with the question of India’s soft power resources. It expands Nye’s categorisation of assets to examine five elements that decide India’s power of attraction—along with culture, political values and foreign policy, the author also introduces the importance of the Indian diaspora and the country’s economic growth.
The fourth chapter analyses the use of soft power resources in the state’s foreign policy. It focuses on such instruments of the country’s external relations as: public diplomacy, economic diplomacy, cultural diplomacy, foreign assistance and relations with its diaspora.
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