Even though there was no single strategic document and doctrine, the shift towards soft power could be seen in several crucial foreign policy decisions, the development of new instruments and mechanisms devoted to soft power projection, and speeches of Indian leaders and politicians. A new “softer use of power” is illustrated on several pivotal decisions taken directly after 1998.
To alleviate the negative fallout of the nuclear tests, the BJP government quickly announced a unilateral moratorium on further testing and engaged in intensive diplomatic dialogue with the U.S. In the coming months, to build its image as a responsible nuclear power, India vowed to adhere to a strict non-proliferation regime while being outside the NPT and in 1999 adopted a nuclear doctrine of “no first use”. This helped India to “salvage some soft power” (Purushotaman, 2010) and reassure the international community that it would not contribute to a nuclear disaster in South Asia.
Secondly, India changed its position on democratic promotion at the global level, discovering the possible utility of this issue in relations with Western powers. Although India originally supported democracy in South Asia, at the global level, it kept away from any policies that could have been seen as an export of ideology and a violation of the principles of non-interference in other country’s internal affairs. Now, the Indian government skillfully employed the label of the world’s largest democracy to rebuild relations with the U.S. and successfully promoted the idea of a “natural partnership” between the “two largest democracies”(Muni, 2009). In June 2000, India became a founding member of the Community of Democracies at the conference in Poland. In 2005, India co-funded the UN Democracy Fund and became the second largest contributor to the UNDEF budget (with US$10 million). Indian leaders referred more openly to the old Nehruvian image of India as a normative power and employed newly available tools and instruments of diplomacy to get its message through. In a more active approach, the Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Sinh said in 2005: “For us, the democratic idea lies in the common heritage of mankind. Those fortunate to enjoy its fruits have a responsibility to share the benefits with others” (Singh, 2005).
The new soft power approach was further manifested in relations with Pakistan. India showed a restrained response to the Pakistani military intrusion in the Kargil area of Jammu and Kashmir in spring 1999, which could have led to nuclear war and forced the Western powers to intervene diplomatically to diffuse the tension. India’s calm reaction to Pakistani provocations convinced the U.S. that India was a responsible partner, and U.S. President Bill Clinton exerted pressure on Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to draw back Pakistani troops (Mohan, 2003). This was a turning point in U.S.–India relations and subsequently paved the way for Bill Clinton’s visit to India in March 2000, which opened the way for strategic engagement between the two countries.
Moreover, despite the Kargil war, Indian leaders pushed for peace talks with Pakistan, one initiated in Lahore in 1998 (the Lahore process), and another with a meeting with the new Pakistani military dictator, Pervez Musharaff, in Agra in 2001. Following the next serious crisis in 2001–2003, India entered into a “composite dialogue” with Pakistan in January 2004. The same restrained reaction to Pakistani provocations was followed by India after the terrorist attacks against the Indian Parliament on 13 December 2001 and again after attacks on multiple targets in Mumbai on 26 November 2008. Despite strong evidence of Pakistani-trained terrorist involvement and strong pressure on the government for retaliatory strikes, India did not resort to military power and, instead, increased diplomatic pressure on Pakistan to curb terrorism on its soil. Although these reactions looked too “soft” for many hawkish commentators in India, they rather illustrated a deliberate soft power approach. The scaled-back responses were partly designed to reinforce the image of India as a responsible nuclear power and a benign military power committed to peace and stability in South Asia.
Finally, since 2000, India has relied less on the hard power of military strength and more on economic interdependence and attractiveness of its own example in relations with South Asian countries. It was supportive of greater integration and trade among the members of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and increased funding for economic assistance and cultural promotion in the region, including Afghanistan, Nepal and Sri Lanka. It became less prone to use military power in foreign policy but relied more on building up a positive image of the country.
Together with these foreign policy decisions, which showed the softer character of India’s approach, since 1998, different Indian governments have created and strengthened new instruments and institutional structures to augment soft power and use its resources effectively in foreign policy (for details, see chapter 4). In 2004, it established a new Ministry of Overseas Indians Affairs to tap the potential of the diaspora for India’s interests; the new Public Diplomacy Division within the MEA was created in 2006 to manage India’s image abroad and explain the country’s foreign policies to both domestic and foreign audiences; a separate Development Partnership Administration in the MEA was set up in 2012 to coordinate increasingly ambitious and comprehensive foreign assistance programmes. Since 2000, India has pursued a more active cultural diplomacy, establishing new cultural centers abroad and expanding scholarship programmes, as well as stepping up its development assistance both in South Asia and in Africa.
Although India began to pay more attention to its soft power in the last period, it does not mean that it has neglected its hard power. On the contrary, economic growth and national security have remained prime preoccupations for policymakers and IR pundits in New Delhi. Following the end of the Cold War, and even after the nuclear tests, India has not stopped investing in its hard power capabilities. It has considerably expanded its military and economic power over the last two decades. India has been growing even more rapidly: it quadrupled its economy between 1991 and 2012 and emerged as one of the most attractive global markets. The country increased its defense budget and stepped up modernisation of its army. In 2011, it emerged as the world’s largest arms importer, responsible for nine percent of the volume of international arms imports (SIPRI, 2011). It is also technologically advanced, being one of few countries that has sent a space mission to the Moon and Mars. It is also preparing a manned mission to the Moon in the coming years. Unlike in the past, India has not sacrificed one dimension of power for another, but is in the midst of building up a comprehensive smart power strategy.
Even though soft power has never been officially proclaimed as India’s formal doctrine, its increasing role has been seen more often in speeches of important politicians and policy makers. In 2004, the External Affairs Minister in the BJP-led NDA government – Yashwant Sinha – explained the soft power approach of India quite openly. His words, in fact, closely resembled Jawaharlal Nehru’s speech in 1947 while saying (Sinha, 2004):
India distances itself from the conventional idea of power as the ability of a nation to bend other nations to its will through coercive use of force. It is also essential to make clear at the very outset that India approaches the notion of power with an alternative vision. Our pursuit of power is firmly anchored in a mission aimed at eliminating war, protecting international law, strengthening the UN and striving for a new deal for developing countries. […] India’s influence has spread on the strength of our culture, religion and philosophy. As the land of Gandhi, India has an international image that few others can claim. India’s track record as a democracy, our diverse society, independent judiciary and vibrant press also stand out. Needless to say, the success of our IITs and the IT industry has spawned a novel stereotype of an Indian as a workaholic computer whizkid.
Similar views were presented by representatives of the next Indian Government of the United Progressive Alliance led by the Indian National Congress party, which came into power in mid-2004. For instance, in 2007, while talking to the students of Jammu University, former Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh claimed that the “hu
ge potential of young women and men”is “this soft power, not just military strength, which will be the real maker of India’s greatness” (Singh, 2007). A year later, he talked at length about the importance of soft power to young Indian diplomats:
The soft power of India in some ways can be a very important instrument of foreign policy. Cultural relations, India’s film industry – Bollywood I find wherever I go in Middle East, in Africa – people talk about Indian films. So that is a new way of influencing the world about the growing importance of India. Soft power is equally important in the new world of diplomacy” (Singh, 2008).
The former Prime Minister Manmohan Singh also acknowledged the importance of culture in foreign policy. At the meeting with the Indian diaspora in Delhi in 2011, he said that “India’s soft power is an increasingly important element in our expanding global footprint […] The richness of India’s classical traditions and the colour and vibrancy of contemporary Indian culture are making waves around the world” (Singh, 2011). During the same meeting, he acknowledged a special role for overseas Indians in building a positive image of India abroad. He asserted that “India has a message for the world. It is a message of pluralism, of tolerance, of the balance between individual rights and collective responsibilities. It is this message that every daughter and son of this great Mother Land of ours symbolizes. Each one of you – living in different countries, different faiths, different languages, and different beliefs – is a symbol of that great idea of ‘unity in diversity’ that India represents” (Singh, 2011).
At one point, Singh even gave the exact recipe for making India a smart power, when he declared in a speech to Commanders of the Army in 2006: “We are today in a situation where the pursuit of national interest requires the use of an integrated approach combining political, economic, military and other levels of both soft and hard power” (Singh, 2006). Interestingly, Singh pushed the enevelope for the new smart power strategy first, much before U.S. President Barack Obama’s endorsed it in 2009.
The notion of soft power has been more often recognized by Indian politicians, diplomats and journalists. One of the most vocal supporters of the idea of soft power is Congress politician and former UN diplomat, Shashi Tharoor, who in numerous speeches and articles popularised the soft power concept in India. According to him, “Today’s India truly enjoys soft power, and that may well be the most valuable way in which it can offer leadership to the twenty-first-century-world” (Tharoor, 2012: p.312). The Joint Secretary in India’s Public Diplomacy Division of MEA, Navdeep Suri, wrote in 2011: “The idea of India – an ancient civilization that nurtures a vibrant democracy, a secular ethos and a rapidly growing economy – is a powerful one. Cinema, dance, music, literature, yoga, Ayurveda, Mahatma Gandhi, Rabindranath Tagore and even the IT industry constitute a formidable array of soft power assets; each of these contributes in its own way to the attractiveness of India to global audiences” (Suri, 2011: 299).
This discussion was even more vibrant in Indian newspapers with the rising number of articles suggesting the strengths of India’s soft power and its better use in foreign policy. In 2003, an Indian strategist, Raja Mohan, designated the Indian diaspora as the greatest asset of the country’s soft power. Some have criticised the “unfortunate outgrowth of ‘hard power’ fundamentalism”, according to which “India’s economic growth and military might be all that is needed to be admitted as a legitimate member of the club of great powers” (Chaulia, 2007). Others have called for a clear positive image or “zeitgeist of New India” to be more alluring in international affairs (Khanna, 2012). There were more voices that “the time is ripe to revisit the value of soft power resources as tools of a grand strategy and foreign policy for this emerging power” (The Hindu, 2011). Naturally, discussion on soft power in the Indian media has not been as vibrant and dominant as security and economic topics, but it has shed some light on the rising interest in soft power theory.
Although it was the NDA government of Atal Vajpayee that had laid the foundation for stronger soft power from 1998, the policy was furthered and strengthened by the next UPA government of Manmohan Singh from 2004. After 10 years later and considerable investments in soft power, this approach is likely to be continued under the new government of the BJP. It seems that soft power has become a bipartisan idea, regardless of who is at the helm of affairs in New Delhi. In fact, in 2014, the BJP manifesto made an explicit reference to India’s soft power for the first time. It said:
India has long failed to duly appreciate the full extent and gamut of its soft power potential. There is a need to integrate our soft power avenues into our external interchange, particularly, harnessing and focusing on the spiritual, cultural and philosophical dimensions of it. India has always played a major role in world affairs, offering a lot to the World. This has been its tradition since time immemorial. The magnetic power of India has always been in its ancient wisdom and heritage, elucidating principles like harmony and equity. This continues to be equally relevant to the world today in today’s times of soft power. We will adopt Proactive Diplomacy to spread the same. India was reckoned not only as Vishwaguru but also a vibrant trading society. Our ancestors used to trade with foreign nations through the routes of sea, centuries ago. This was based on the strength of our business acumen and integrity, our products and crafts. The symbols of our ancient civilizations stand as a testimony to our architectural and urban planning excellence. We will revive Brand India with the help of our strengths of 5 T’s: Tradition, Talent, Tourism, Trade and Technology (BJP, 2014).
A resounding victory for the BJP in 2014 elections has also given a new impetus for celebrating India’s soft power. In a wave of commentaries in Indian press, there is a rising understanding of importance of this dimension of power. The new advent of smart power in Indian foreign policy is well elaborated by Amitabh Mattoo (2014):
All those who had expected the Modi foreign policy doctrine to be defined by a new muscularity or even machtpolitik – the wielding of the conventional stick – will probably be disappointed. Instead, there will be a renewed emphasis on using the carrots of economic levers and soft power. This suggests a thoughtful understanding of the importance of what Nye terms “smart power”: a clever combination of the tools of conventional hard, or military and economic, power and soft power. It is this integrated approach that will best serve India in a complex, interdependent world, which is defined as much by conflict and competition as it is by cooperation and the need for greater coordination in confronting common global threats.
The birth of a more articulated Indian version of “smart power” was revealed in the address of Indian President Pranab Mukherjee to Parliament on 9 June 2014, when he presented the new government’s aims in foreign policy. He said: “India’s foreign policy, with its civilizational roots and heritage, is based on the principles of developing peaceful and friendly relations with all countries. We will pursue our international engagement based on enlightened national interest, combining the strength of our values with pragmatism, leading to a doctrine of mutually beneficial relationships” (Mukherjee, 2014). This “enlightened self-interest” may soon emerge an as Indian version and response to the Western smart power strategy. As the concept refers to the ancient Greece philosopher Aristotle, who claimed that the more you benefit others the more you are benefited yourself, one can expect India to promote situations based on “win-win” solutions. Similar to the old doctrine of “principled pragmatism” the new foreign strategy will try to combine high moral ideas with political pragmatism, or in other words, soft and hard power.
Conclusions
This chapter discussed how the idea of power and its practical use in foreign policy of India has evolved over the last six decades. It argues that India initially embraced a soft power approach in its foreign policy, believing that it could transform the nature of international relations and help construct a more peaceful and just international order. The soft power approach was not purely idealistic, as it evol
ved from a realistic assessment of India’s power resources and international context in the first years after gaining independence. Despite some success in promoting its image as a credible state, at least among other developing countries, India confronted serious practical challenges with pursuing principle-based foreign policy and has become increasingly pragmatic.
Defeat in the war with China in 1962 “showed up the basic unrealism of a policy based on soft power and forced India to come to terms with the proposition that the pursuit of a major power role in the absence of hard power, or military capabilities, was a chimera” (Nayar and Paul, 2003: p.19). The death of Nehru in 1964 and advent of the leaders who followed in the country drove India to shift to a hard power approach and invest mostly in military and economic power. The end of the Cold War forced India to rethink its foreign policy strategy again and opened an opportunity to emerge as one of the new poles in the multi-polar world system.
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