In the modern days of globalisation and with the rise of non-state actors, nation branding exercises should not be confined to activities of the administration alone. India needs to better use the large potential of its media, civil society and business community to this end. They need to be engaged and encouraged to get involved in projecting India’s image abroad. There is a lot to be changed still.
There are over 2 million non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in India, the largest number in the world, but they are almost exclusively focused on domestic issues. As a result, India has no influential NGOs like Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International or Greenpeace, which have become valuable tools of soft influence from Western countries. Conferring the Nobel Peace Prize in 2014 to Kailash Sathyarthi has been a historic recognition for the work done by Indian civil society, and it will no doubt improve its voice on the global arena. As Indian NGOs concentrate on massive challenges at home, they have rich experiences in areas that are in high demand in many developing countries. The example of vocational training programmes, run since 2008, in Afghanistan by the Self Employed Women’s Association (SEWA), shows the model that could be replicated in other places (Timmons, 2012). Instead of curbing their freedom of operations, the government should consider opportunities to strengthen their capabilities for external activities.
Indian research institutions are already enthusiastic to play a more active role in this regard and are significantly natural allies of the government in informing global debates on international affairs. India is a country with one of the largest number of think tanks. According to the one of the most influential University of Pennsylvania rankings—which compares the world’s think tanks—in 2014 there were 191influential institutions from India (2015). Those with more think tanks than India were only: the United States – 1,830, China – 429, the United Kingdom – 287, and Germany – 194. India is ahead of countries such as France (177), Argentina (137), Russia (122), Japan (108), and Canada (99).
Still, the quality of these organisations is not always fully recognised. In the top 100 Think Tanks Worldwide list (Non-US), there were four Indian institutions listed: the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) (31), the Centre for Civil Society (CCS) (51), the Energy and Resources Institute (TERI) (81) and the Observer Research Foundation (ORF) (82). When the list includes all think tanks, taking into account American ones, which traditionally have a numerous presence, then among 150 institutions, there were six from India: the Centre for Civil Society (50), the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) (100), the Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations (ICRIER) (105), the Energy and Resources Institute (TERI) (107), the Observer Research Foundation (ORF) (114), and Development Alternatives (DA) (129). On the list of the top think tanks from China, India, Japan and the Republic of Korea, only India has 15 institutions mentioned.
When ranked by area of research, two categories are interesting, especially in terms of soft power. Among the 85 top Defense and National Security Think Tanks, India has three representatives, as compared to 22 from the US, five from the UK, four from Germany and only two from China. These Indian institutions were: the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) (40), the Observer Research Foundation (ORF) (54), and the Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS) (72). In the listing of the top 85 Foreign Policy and International Affairs Think Tanks, India had two institutions (the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, IPCS, 72; and ORF, 81) in comparison to 16 from the US, four from the UK and three from China. These organisations are important actors in Track-II diplomacy and can make India’s perspective better heard globally.
Other areas for nation branding, which have not been fully explored so far, are sport events and international awards. India is the only country amongst the nations of BRICS that has not organised a major global sport competition in recent years, and it does not plan any in the foreseeable future. Despite having the largest cinema industry in the world, India has no awards comparable to those assigned by the Western world. The American Oscars or French Palme d’Or (“Golden Palm”) not only set trends in the entertainment industry but also can be seen as soft power tools that promote certain values and decide important contemporary issues. Similarly, the Nobel Peace Prize, conferred by Norway or the Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought, awarded by the European Parliament, are means to promote European values on the global stage. One major Indian political prize, the Jawaharlal Nehru Award for International Understanding, administered by the ICCR, is hardly known beyond South Asia, and its influences are limited. In the global competition of ideas and values, these symbolic actions and political prizes can legitimise certain policies and behaviours. That explains China’s establishment of its own peace prize – the Confucius Peace Prize – in 2010. India, with its democratic credentials, is much better positioned to strengthen prestige and international appeal of its Nehru Prize or create a new award that can more effectively challenge the Western-driven international agenda.
Finally, India should better use its media for foreign policy goals. Today, although journalists can play an imperative role in influencing short-term policy decisions, the Indian media, in general, remains Indo-centric and focuses mostly on local and national issues. Major Indian newspapers and TV channels have few foreign correspondents, who are based mostly in Washington and London, which hampers international reporting (Markey, 2009: p.195). Despite their large circulation in India, Indian newspapers are hardly available abroad, and India is the only country among the major powers lacking a round-the-clock TV news channel to disseminate Indian perspectives on global affairs. The most popular private news channels (such as News 18 India, part of the TV-18 group, as well as NDTV 24x7) can hardly compete with major news stations such as BBC or Al Jazeera. Interestingly, as Thussu observes (2014), “the Indian state broadcaster, Doordarshan, remains one of the few major state news networks not available in important global markets at a time when global television news in English has expanded to include inputs from countries where English is not widely used, including Japan and Iran.” Thussu ascribes this fact to “bureaucratic apathy and inefficiency” in India.
The media can be also helpful in educating domestic society about increasingly complex international relations, India’s foreign policy, and building bridges with other nations. One respectable example, which can be replicated in other countries, is the Aman Ki Asha campaign (Hope for Peace), run jointly by the Times of India and Pakistani Jang media house. The programme contributes to a better understanding between people in two rival countries. Providing special programmes and financial incentives, the government could encourage more activism by private media in external relations.
Indian public diplomacy must be more proactive in countering the negative presentation of India abroad. Reaching out to foreign audiences with its own positive message is an uphill battle, as good news does not attract attention of the media as easily as negative news. Still, public institutions appear to be rather passive. Surprisingly, the PDD had no strategy to swiftly counteract the negative fallout on India’s international image following the Delhi gang rape in 2012. As one PDD official explained, this needs no official mitigation strategy as “time itself would heal the image and set the record right” (Interview with PDD official, New Delhi, April 2013). Without a more proactive approach, the negative stereotype of India as a land of oppression, sex violence and discrimination against women and other minorities will be only strengthened. This passivity is a mistake, as India has many good stories to tell about women, empowerment, gender equality and the fight against poverty.
It is important for the government to go beyond spreading the message about its achievements and successes, by also better explaining India’s domestic challenges to foreign audiences. Although poverty will remain a major hindrance in the projecting of India’s international reputation, the government should be more vocal about efforts undertaken to tackle the problem. Shying away from debate on its internal
difficulties or going into denial about its major shortcomings is not a reasonable option in the current globalised era, in which there is easy access to information and growing international scrutiny of every country. In fact, it must be openly explained to the world that the underdevelopment is not the result of indifference of the independent India to the plight of its citizens, but rather, a result of centuries of colonial exploitation and an unfair post-World War II global system.
There is no shortage of initiatives that the Indian government has implemented to eradicate poverty and unleash the potential of its citizens. But international public opinion knows very little about them and has limited occasion to hear about them from official sources. Although many people in the world have heard about Brazil’s social programme, BolsaFamilia, far fewer have heard about India’s many schemes, such as the massive Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act, which provides 100 days of work to rural households. India runs several affirmative action endeavours and social programs. According to the UNDP, India has increased central government spending on social services and rural development from 13.4 per cent in, 2006–2007, to 18.5 per cent, in 2011–2012. And social services as a proportion of total expenditure rose from 21.6 per cent, in 2006–2007, to 24.1 per cent, in 2009–2010, and 25 per cent, in 2011–2012 (HDR, 2013: 3). In order to the change the perspective that the international community has about India, it needs to devise a better communication strategy to promote knowledge about the efforts undertaken to eliminate poverty, ease domestic tensions, and to realise the potential of its young and vibrant population.
As a country that has made enormous progress in eradicating poverty and has slowly turned, from being a recipient of foreign aid, into a donor of assistance to other countries, India is in a position to play a leading role in contributing to international discussions about development cooperation, the global fight against poverty and new development goals in the post-2015 period. Soft power instruments—from information campaigns to international conferences and track-II dialogues, are useful not only to project a positive image of India abroad but also to discuss and explain the complex reasons behind the persisting negative elements in its functioning. It is important to remember, “If a country fails to tell its own story, its image will be shaped exclusively by the perceptions of others” (Byers, 2009: p.1).
Addressing the Hard Power Deficit
India’s case seems to confirm the opinion that significant soft power is possible only if based on solid hard power foundation. It is argued, rightly, that a country tells a better story when it has strong hard power credentials and achievements as “no state or population seeks to emulate or follow a weak or poor state” (Lee, 2010c: 7). The Indian government’s efforts to promote a new image of modern and developing India will not be successful as long as there will be easily visible malnourished children aplenty on the streets along with images of poor infrastructure. Without solving its most persisting economic problems and providing more opportunities to its society, India’s image abroad will continue to remain flawed. The major challenge is thus to deal effectively with its problem of poverty. As convincingly summarised by Tharoor: “India can’t be a superpower and super poor at the same time” (The Hindu, 31 October 2011).
Although India managed to reduce its poverty levels from 49.4 per cent, in 1990, to 32.7 per cent, in 2012, it continues to be home to the largest population of impoverished people on the planet (HDR, 2013). Despite almost 5 per cent income growth annually, on average between 1990 and 2012, India’s per capita income is still low, around US$ 3,400 in 2012; and its position on a number of socio-economic indicators remains below the global average. In 2012, India was ranked at 136th place out of 187 countries in the Human Development Index. Its infant mortality rate is still relatively high (48 deaths per 1,000 live births), and one in three malnourished children in the world is Indian, which former Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh recognized as the “national shame” (BBC, 2012b).
At the same time, there are a growing number of billionaires in India, with 36 people listed on the Forbes list of the world’s super-rich. Economic disparity is not confined to differences between the rich and poor, but also between different states and regions, numerous social castes and ethnic groups. What is even more worrying, as shownby one recent study, is that this rapid economic growth has widened economic inequality, limiting “the impact of growth on poverty alleviation” (Kohli, 2012: XI). The stunning contrasts of India’s economic and social strata, aired on the international media, does little to build up a good reputation of the country.
Moreover, the poverty of its citizens constrains state actions in other spheres and complicates realisation of a more ambitious foreign policy. For instance, many people in India and abroad object to the country’s foreign assistance in situations where aid is required at home, as many parts of the country and numerous Indians are striving for limited resources in the first place. Why should India provide scholarships to foreign students when it cannot accommodate the rising educational needs of its own citizens? Similarly, some technologically advanced and ambitious achievements are seen not as reason for pride and soft power, but, on the contrary, are points for questioning and annoyance. One example is the remarkable success, from 2013, when India sent a mission to Mars, joining the elite club of space powers. The space program, in a country where children are dying from hunger and curable diseases, was, for many, an absurd notion. As pointed out in an article in the New York Times: “The inescapable question is why does primary health care in India not have the sort of scientist-hero founder, the dedicated researchers and the extraordinary government support that its space program has enjoyed?” (Manu, 2013).
Poverty and underdevelopment are, therefore, not only a crucial limitation of India’s hard power but also of its soft power. Tharoor is right when he writes (2012: p.312) that India will not be a good brand and will not appeal to others, unless it becomes “a healthy and prosperous place for all Indians.” Luckily, this has been well recognised by the Indian government, which, consequently, regards sustained, fast and inclusive economic development as its most important strategic goal. Achievement of this goal will determine the fate of India’s future and further shape its soft power aspirations.
Along with economic underdevelopment, the other hard power deficit – security threats – severely undermines India’s power of attraction. A country with the strong Maoist insurgency (Naxalism) affecting a sizable chunk of territory; violent separatism in Kashmir and the North-East states; over 30 officially recognized, and over 40 active terrorist organizations; and the unresolved conflict and border dispute with Pakistan, India comes with many flaws affecting its attractiveness to others. Indeed, India is one of five countries most affected by terrorism, and terrorist attacks, and those incidents, such as the one in Mumbai in 2008, painfully expose the country’s vulnerability. The internal instability draws domestic resources, increases political risk for investors and undermines India’s international legitimacy.
One special case is the Kashmir dispute. This has been one of the longest conflicts in contemporary times and is regarded as a potentially major flashpoint on the planet, with the possibility of escalating events that could even lead to nuclear war. Border skirmishes, terrorist attacks and anti-India protests in the Jammu and Kashmir states provide many opportunities to portray the country in a negative light. The Kashmiri diaspora and international human rights groups regularly criticise India for the militarisation of the area, human rights violations and failure to pay attention to the demands of the local population. Although the situation in the region has improved considerably, in comparison to that of the 1990s, with India largely managing to fend off any international involvement in this dispute, the Kashmir issue constrains the country’s leadership in South Asia and its global rise. The fact that it is Pakistan helping to keep this issue boiling is of little help to India. Finding a sustainable and peaceful solution to this problem is crucial for Indi
a to considerably improve its international image and free itself from important constraints in foreign policy. As this appears to be nowhere in sight, for the moment, Indian diplomacy will have to try harder to better communicate its stance on the issue, minimise the risk of civilian casualties and improve its human rights record in order to mitigate the negative fallout from the crisis. Improving internal security and stability will remain a daunting task for some time to come and will limit the country’s soft power.
Reforming Bureaucracy
The Indian bureaucracy may be credited for its professionalism and contribution to the endurance of the Indian state, but it contributes, just as often, to the country’s bad name. Rampant corruption, ineffective public institutions and outdated regulations not only undermine India’s global image but also bear weighty economic costs. According to the Corruption Perception Index, prepared by the international think tank—Transparency International, in 2013, India was ranked in the distant 94th position out of 177 countries, behind United States (19th), Brazil and South Africa (72nd), China (80th) and Sri Lanka (91st), but performing better than Pakistan and Russia (127th) (TI, 2013).
India is ranked 134th in the World Bank’s 2013 Doing Business Report, between Yemen and Ecuador. The ease of doing business in India is assessed worse than that in all developed countries but also worse than other emerging powers: South Africa (41st), Russia (91st), China (96th), Brazil (116th); and even worse than most of India’s neighbours in South Asia: Sri Lanka (85th), Nepal (105th), Pakistan (110th), and Bangladesh (130th) (World Bank, 2014). Numerous, lengthy and costly procedures to start a business, complex tax regulations, difficulties with obtaining construction permits and disappointing protection for enforcing contracts are major obstacles for entrepreneurs in India. The weak and ineffective state is a target of criticism of many liberal-minded scholars and journalists in India. Unlike in China, where the economy grows, thanks to the government’s strong role, in India, the economy grows despite the state. As Indian economist Gurcharan Das illustratively writes, “India grows at night, while the government sleeps” (Das, 2012: 1).
India’s Soft Power: A New Foreign Policy Strategy Page 20
