Conclusion: Emerging Smart Power
In the post-Cold War period, extensive writing has depicted India as a “rising power”. The bulk of attention has been paid to the huge potential of its growing economy and significant military build-up. Somehow, the less tangible dimension of India’s strength has been overlooked in the mainstream discourse. Opinions like that of Shashi Tharoor – India as a “land of better story” and its major global status lies in soft rather than hard power – have been largely ignored by the strategic community. This has changed only recently. As more countries heavily invest in increasing their soft power, India is pushing itself to catch up with this global trend.
Without official declarations and much fanfare, India has emerged as major global soft power. This book has brought forward many examples of its tremendous potential, that make India one of the few countries capable of providing an alternative cultural, political and economic model from that promoted in the West or the East. A functioning democracy in a highly diverse and underdeveloped country, the “Mumbai consensus”, which tries to combine economic growth with equality and inclusiveness, or a multicultural society based on ideas of tolerance and pluralism, are features that can make India attractive to many other countries, if not in the whole world then at least in the developing South. The rising and increasingly influential Indian diaspora and economic potential will increase India’s opportunities to shape perceptions of other states and strengthen its impact on international discourse.
Though India has had significant soft power potential at its disposal for some time now, it only started utilising it as a foreign policy tool after 1998. A number of political decisions and official speeches evidence soft power’s strategic and deliberate integration into India’s foreign policy. In recent years, the country’s policy towards its neighbours in South Asia has turned benign, as it has promoted deeper economic interdependence, offered more unilateral concessions, refrained from interfering in their domestic affairs, and showed restraint in using force in response to Pakistani provocations. At the global level, India has worked to build friendly relations with all states and promoted its image as a responsible power.
Greater reliance on soft power is evident in the development of new institutions and instruments. This includes the separate Ministry for Overseas Indian Affairs, established in 2004, the Public Diplomacy Division in the MEA, created in 2006, and the Development Partnership Administration in the MEA, set up in 2012, along with several public bodies and private-public partnerships. India has significantly increased its financial allocation for public, cultural and economic diplomacy, development assistance and strengthened links with its large diaspora. The network of Indian cultural centers abroad has expanded greatly, as has the number of scholarships available to foreign students. These steps show how India’s soft power capacity has been translated into capabilities and used in foreign policy. This means that India is a “passive” soft power no longer. It not only has substantial soft power resources; it uses them actively for realization of foreign policy aims.
Yet, India has emerged as a soft power of different kind. Even though it borrows from Joseph Nye’s idea, it has assimilated it creatively to adjust to a different context. India’s soft power seems more benign and less offensive and it works through inspiration rather than projection. India wants to be seen as a “power of example” that does not seek to impose its values, or political or economic systems on other countries. It understands soft power in behavioural terms as “soft use of power”. Its strategy is not to mask revisionist intentions and mitigate fears of Asian partners, as is the case with China’s charm offensive. Unlike the West, India does not export its democracy, does not condition economic assistance, and does not promote its culture aggressively. To borrow Robert Kagan’s famous statement: whereas Europeans are from Venus, because of their reliance on soft power, and Americans are from Mars, due to extensive use of hard power, Indians would be coming from the planet Earth, as they are in the midway between the US and Europe in their approach to power (Kagan, 2003). India’s approach is grounded in the idea of “enlightened self-interest”, based on the partnership of equals and mutual benefits.
India’s example proves also that soft power is highly contextual. India’s adherence to the principle of non-interference in other countries internal affairs may be attractive to many developing countries but is looked at with suspicion by Western governments and societies that would like India to be more actively promoting democracy. Bollywood movies can be very effective in spreading Indian values in South Asia and parts of Africa but is less appealing to audiences in the West. It can be very difficult for each country, India included, to be a friend with everyone, and has the potential to put India’s image in jeopardy.
At the same time one needs to remember that soft power is not equal to a “soft state”. As the example of the United States demonstrates, clearly, soft power countries can find it even easier to use their hard power capabilities when necessary. Moreover, a strong army and legitimate use of force can even enhance a country’s attractiveness. Thus embracement of soft power does not require renouncement of hard power.
This seems to be well recognised by Indian leaders, as they draw an accurate lesson from their past, when over reliance on one of the two facets of power proved unsuccessful. Bitter experiences encountered in the 1950s and 60s show that soft power alone cannot make India a global power. At the same time, when in the following decades India focused heavily on its hard power and underestimated its soft power, it was not a much more successful approach. Relying solely on soft power is naive; depending exclusively on hard power is myopic. Only a seamless combination of the two can assure the country’s ascent on the global stage and realise its goals in the interconnected world and globalised times.
A revival of a soft power strategy in India does not mean a return to the idealistic foreign policy characteristic of the first two decades of the independent country. On the contrary, it is a sign of a highly pragmatic policy, that has adjusted well to contemporary realities. Unlike in the Nehru period, when soft power was a substitute for its hard power brethren, today, India can use the two “faces of power” to complement each other in an integrated and effective smart power strategy. In this sense, Indian foreign policy has evolved, moving from the spectrum of greater soft power under Nehru, to hard power until the mid-1990s, to smart power in the 21st century.
This book has focused on India’s soft assets, but it is not to say that the Indian government has neglected its hard power capabilities in recent years. On the contrary, military build-up and economic growth remain at the centre of India’s present development efforts. Following multibillion-dollar investments in its army, technology and development, India has emerged as a nuclear power – with ballistic missiles and blue sea navy, a member of a narrow group of countries capable of sending spacecraft to Mars, in addition to being a new engine driving the global economy. As one scholar rightly writes, “since the late 1990s, India has enjoyed the happy situation of seeing its hard and soft power rise remarkably fast and in tandem” (Hymans, 2010).
India’s case confirms, rather, that soft power cannot work effectively when separated from hard power. Contrary to Nye’s initial suggestion, soft power needs strong hard power behind it and successful policies at home and abroad. Soft power does not come only from intangible resources but draws heavily from its material wellbeing and military strength. Limits on India’s hard power are an obstacle also for the country’s soft power. Tense relations with neighbours, the simmering conflict in Kashmir and the North East, the Naxal insurgency, persisting poverty and unequal growth, communal clashes and sexual violence—all pose challenges to India’s internal stability and growth; such detractors also weaken “Brand India” abroad. Stronger soft power requires deepening of its democracy, improving bureaucratic efficiency, boosting its “diplomacy software” and forging a more coherent foreign policy strategy.
It is true that the “so
ft power” concept, 20 years after its introduction in the science of international relations, remains elusive and contested, and needs further theoretical analysis to be better defined and understood. It does not, however, make it less real, as many countries include soft power elements in their foreign policies. In the current globalisation era, where brawn and coercive measures are less acceptable, and the more costly tools of realising state interests, where success in the international arena depends more on a country’s reputation, image, attractiveness and ability to co-opt others and influence their preferences. Perception matters in international relations, with diffused power and empowered citizens, as never before. More often, today, it is beneficial for a state to be admired by others, rather than be feared. A country’s success today, is defined not by the number of enemies it can kill but by the number of allies it can earn. It is important to remember that, “when you can get others to admire your ideals and want what you want, you do not have to spend as much on sticks and carrots to move them your direction” (Nye 2004a: X).
While measuring soft power is difficult, there are already several achievements that would not have been possible for India to reach if it had not used its soft power tools. Thanks to the attractiveness of its culture, appeal of its values and more active economic diplomacy, India has managed to draw more tourists and foreign direct investments, despite persistent development challenges. The soft power approach made India more popular amongst the populace in South Asia and advanced the Look East Policy, minimalising the contest to India’s role of leadership in Asia. The image of India as a non-threatening power gives it an advantage over other major powers, such as China, Russia or the US. Moreover, it has wisely used its image as “the world’s largest democracy” and “natural ally” of the West to engage the US and the EU in strategic partnerships. The perception of India as a responsible and democratic country helped its de facto nuclear status recognition. To see how the soft power of India has played a role in this case, one needs only to note the radically different situation of Pakistan, which holds inadequate soft power sway.
Yet, soft power will be even more important in the future as India strives for stronger role in global politics. Today, as in the past, India has far superior hard power capacities than its neighbours, except China, but it cannot match the muscle of current major powers. This will likely continue for the next few decades, although the gap will narrow considerably if India maintains the current pace of its economic stride. In the 21st century, India will neither fight its ascendance on the global stage neither will it force its smaller neighbours to accept its dominance in South Asia. The use of force in an era of globalisation and nuclear weapons is not a feasible option for India to pursue, and the South Asian states have more alternative friends, such as China or the US, to fend off India’s pressure. Instead, India should persuade its neighbours to accept its leadership in the region by improving credibility and giving them a stake in its success. Still, India waits to be recognized as a permanent member of the UN Security Council in a reformed UN, and to have more influence over the agenda setting by global governance institutions. Certainly, India will need to convince more countries and garner their support in crucial international negotiations, from climate change to non-proliferation. Soft power will be crucial to India to successfully realise all these aims.
With its young, English-speaking, increasingly well-educated, tech-savvy and inspirational population, India is positioned to succeed in this global competition of soft powers. As one of the world’s oldest civilisations, with popular modern culture and a positive record in international affairs, India has accumulated a great deal of natural goodwill. Yet, it is evident from the analysis of global public opinion surveys that India’s image abroad is not as good as expected. It means that India’s immense soft power potential remains largely untappedstill and that much more can be done to further improve perceptions of the country and legitimacy of its foreign policies. India will need to attach even more importance to soft power and dedicate more resources to cultural diplomacy, public diplomacy, economic diplomacy, foreign aid and relations with its diaspora. Also more effective communication is necessary to rebrand India as a modern country and global power.
While India needs the world to fuel its growth, the world also needs India. Its transition from a relatively poor country to a major emerging market, management of multiculturalism and vibrant democracy, makes it a depository of knowledge and experience, all of which is much needed in other parts of the globe. Many countries in the Global South would welcome India’s leadership if it only could go beyond its individual interests and present a larger case for all those underprivileged in trade, climate change or migration negotiations. As a country that successfully has lifted millions of its citizens out of poverty, India should be more active in international development cooperation and a post-2015 development agenda. Europe may be interested in learning from India’s model of tackling diversity and functioning multiculturalism. Friendly relations with most states give India a special edge to lend its diplomatic skills for solving international conflicts and crisis, from Iran and Syria to the South China Sea. Many would see India as a force for a moral international order. Its cultural, spiritual and ideological heritage may be a valuable source of inspiration for a more just, equitable and peaceful world. The UN declaration on World Non-Violence Day on 2 October, the birthday of Mahatma Gandhi, or International Yoga Day on 21 June, are two examples of how this potential can enrich humanity. But India’s aspiration may go beyond that. As one Indian author claims:
In its foreign policy, India can and must play its role as a conscience keeper of the world. […] Half a century ago, a comparatively weak India had a stronger voice in the world because there was a certain morality and therefore a welcome boldness in India’s foreign policy. India was seen as a leader. Mahatma Gandhi, because of his moral and ethical view of life, has probably done more for the cause of peace and the image of India than any Indian. Today, regrettably India is being seen as a cap follower. Perceptions do matter, perhaps more than reality. As a junior partner, India will not make it to the high table. Leadership implies not just economic and military strength, but also ideas that inspire and motivate (Sikri, 2009: p.298).
In the post-Cold War period, Indian foreign policy has been in transition. A policy whose identity is rooted in two interpretations: while some see it to be more pragmatic; for others, it appears as “reactive”, “defensive” and “ad-hoc”. Its international position has been described often in contradictory ways, as a “nuclear power” and “moral power”; “status quo power” or “revisionist power”; an “emerging power” or “hegemonic power”. Many of these labels actually refer to the question of whether India is “hard” or “soft” power. Here, it is argued that India is both: it is a smart power. India deliberately employs the soft power approach in its external relations to supplement, rather than replace, its hard power potential in an integrated smart power strategy.
The electoral victory of the Bharatiya Janata Party, which squarely emphasises the development of soft power, and the policy pursued by the new Prime Minister Narenda Modi, suggests that soft power will play an even larger role in the country’s external relations. The proposition of the idea of five “T’s” – Tradition, Talent, Tourism, Trade and Technology – and announcement of greater use of India’s comprehensive power, mark the beginning of a better-articulated smart power approach. Contrary to the popular perception and fear that the new BJP-led foreign policy would be more militaristic and based on material hard power, the present government is equally eager to rely on its soft power. India’s approach is grounded in the idea of “enlightened self-interest”, based on the partnership of equals and mutual benefits.
There are still potential pitfalls round every corner which can endanger India’s internal stability and international position. For instance, the rising tensions with Pakistan, or the growing alienation of Indian minorities, which can be detrimental t
o the country’s growth and attractiveness. The new government needs to protect the soft assets of India while enhancing its hard power potential. By simultaneously rooting itself in culture and tradition, and also moving forward to meet the challenge of new situations, India can, from this vantage point project itself as an anchor for both its region and the world—as a rising smart power.
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