THE WARS BEING FOUGHT IN the Portuguese territories, like Rhodesia and South Africa, were to prevent liberation movements, inspired and supported by communists, from taking control by force. We all knew that the Soviets planned to form a bridge of states across Africa from which to drive for their ultimate prize, South Africa. Should they succeed the Soviets, and possibly the recently involved Chinese, would have access to the vast mineral wealth of southern Africa and control of the strategically important sea route around the Cape of Good Hope.
As in other African countries, the emergence of Rhodesian liberation movements was made possible by white politicians’ actions and laws that placed many constraints on the black people. Contrary to the glowing history lessons given to my generation of Rhodesia’s pioneers, our black folk were presented the contrary view that their territory had been taken by political intrigue and force of arms before laws were introduced to ensure their subservience. Whereas the N’debele and Shona people attempted to reverse this situation during the Matabeleland and Shona rebellions of 1896 and 1897 they failed in the face of superior weaponry and white rule was established.
Nevertheless the country developed rapidly to the mutual benefit of all Rhodesia’s citizens. An impressive infrastructure was already in place when the African National Council (ANC) was established in 1934 with the intention of gaining black political inclusion in government. This should have worked to everyone’s advantage, judging by later constitutions drawn up by Rhodesians. These all made unimpeded progress to majority rule a clear objective. However the new worldforce, communism, had been created following the Bolshevik Revolution. This new order, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, considered white governments in Africa to be a major stumbling block to its stated intention of gaining total domination of the entire world.
The communists turned full attention to acquiring control of the mineral and oil reserves of Africa and the Middle East that, combined with those of the USSR, was key to gaining the economic subservience of Europe, the Americas and the Far East. This was approached on two fronts. One worked southward from the USSR and the second was to develop a ‘bridge across Central Africa’ from which to launch southward to the Cape of Good Hope. The objectives of the second front were to be achieved by a ‘divide and rule’ philosophy which was to undermine the white governments created by Portugal, Britain and Belgium and promote black nationalist forces to oust them.
The Soviets were fully aware of black inexperience in managing any country they may acquire but counted on this inexperience to bring about situations in which they would move in later and take control without a shot being fired. By using a combination of approaches that enhanced African desire for power, the Soviets exaggerated existing grievances that blacks had against whites and cleverly engineered many new ones. Whether existing or created, the Soviets knew they could get the black folk to take up arms and fight ‘wars of liberation’ intended for the ultimate benefit of the USSR.
Thirty years after the formation of the ANC by Aaron Jacha, and following the formation, amalgamation and fragmentation of a number of black parties, the first act of communist-inspired terrorism occurred when the ‘Crocodile Gang’ of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) murdered Petrus Oberholzer.
White Rhodesians in general held the black folk in high regard, hoping in time to elevate their status, lifestyle and opportunities as the infrastructure expanded and the economy strengthened. But to achieve this meant retaining government in responsible hands. We realised how important it was to deny black power-seekers opportunity to destroy our beautiful country in the manner we could see occurring in newly independent African states to our north. History has proven that we were fully justified in attempting to do this. But instead of lessening burdensome laws on the black folk, more were added, making it increasingly easier for nationalist parties to associate with communist ideals and the communist states themselves. This suited communist planning perfectly. Yet for most Rhodesians talk of communist objectives was not taken seriously. Before we came to properly understand the reality of the threat, we had tended to think our government a bit paranoid in ‘seeing communists under every bush’. When reality eventually caught up with the likes of myself, we were not to know that Russian communism would eventually flounder but we knew for certain that any black nationalist government would destroy the economy and infrastructure of the country.
Nowhere in Africa was more done to elevate the black people within the limits of Rhodesia’s financial resources. At the time there were twenty blacks to every white, placing too great a burden on the drivers of the economy, the whites, who nevertheless wanted to provide good schooling and services to everyone. The great majority of black people were subsistence farmers living as they had for centuries. In less than eighty years their numbers had blossomed from around 400,000 to over six million due to white medicines and the curtailment of tribal wars. The population explosion was way larger than the rate at which schools could be provided and this angered many young blacks who neither accepted nor understood the realities of the situation. Attempts to elevate the economy to improve schooling and create new jobs for black people involved bringing in more skilled white immigrants to the country. But sanctions and mandatory military service for all white male adults had reduced immigration to a trickle by 1972.
ZAPU and ZANU both claimed to have the majority following of black Rhodesians yet both organisations resorted to destroying the very infrastructures intended for the good of the people they claimed to lead. Schools were burned down and cattle dips were either destroyed or the tribesmen were instructed not to observe Rhodesian Government efforts designed to protect their primary measure of wealth, cattle, from deadly tickborne diseases. Contouring of agricultural land to prevent soil erosion also received negative attention.
Bored and unemployed youths were excited into destructive activities that turned youths against their parents and parents against their children. This resulted in the banning of ZAPU and ZANU with many leaders being imprisoned or escaping into political exile. Despite their early efforts ZAPU and ZANU exiles, having turned to arms, became deeply frustrated when they realised both urban and rural folks preferred the benevolence of their white government to fighting for a vote that could not be eaten, sold or screwed.
Inside the country the majority of black people were content, showing no desire to leave home for military training in foreign lands before returning to fight a war they neither wanted nor understood. Consequently ZANU and ZAPUresorted to press-ganging Rhodesian youths who had gone to Zambia for higher education. Many black expatriates returned to Rhodesia, allowing our intelligence services to draw up detailed lists of those outside the country. Special Branch also took opportunity to send trained agents to Zambia, posing as students, to be press-ganged into ZAPU and ZANU ranks.
Josiah Tongogara of ZANU was a prime mover in bringing about the changes that led him to become overall commander of the military arm of ZANU (this was ZANLA—Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army). He headed the fourth ZANU intake at Itubi Training Camp in Tanzania where he showed his determination to improve training and redirect ZANU’s military efforts towards something more worthwhile than had been achieved by party politicians. He realised from the outset that prospects for joint action with ZAPU were dim. ZANU was essentially a Shona organisation and was trained by Chinese communists, whereas ZAPU were N’debele-led and Russian-trained.
Joshua Nkomo was the leader of ZAPU and was generally, but mistakenly, hailed by the leaders of Africa to be father of the Zimbabwean (Rhodesian) nation. In consequence, President of Zambia, Doctor Kenneth Kaunda, being related to Nkomo by marriage, favoured ZAPU and paid little attention to its rival ZANU. Initially FRELIMO also favoured ZAPU to keep in Kaunda’s good books in a quest for unrestricted use of Zambia as a rear base. This is why FRELIMO repeatedly offered ZAPU free passage through Tete to reach the Rhodesian population, believing implicitly that Joshua Nkomo was the true leader of all Rhod
esia’s black people. But ZAPU kept stalling on this offer.
ZANU’s Tongogara faced enormous problems that any lesser leader would not have overcome. He knew that only through improved performance in Rhodesia could ZANU gain the support of African leaders and receive financial assistance from the OAU’s liberation funds. However, having led his organisation into improved preparedness for military operations, he faced difficulties in transiting men and materials through hostile Zambia. This was overcome with FRELIMO’s secret and somewhat reluctant connivance to allow ZANU men and equipment, dressed and assigned in FRELIMO’s name, to transit Zambia.
Even as late as 1970 ZANU was still committed to the ‘no win’ routes across the Zambezi River where Rhodesian forces blocked all hopes of turning in an improved performance. Tongogara realised that ZANU’s salvation lay with FRELIMO for unimpeded access via the Tete Province, which FRELIMO now controlled, to the black population that straddled theRhodesia/Mozambican border.
A meeting between FRELIMO and ZANU eventually took place in mid-1970 when FRELIMO agreed to assist ZANU. This was because FRELIMO had finally realised that ZAPU was not going to accept the long-standing offer of assistance. Despite Nkomo’s claims, FRELIMO had made contact with the Shona people inside Rhodesia and learned that ZAPU had absolutely no support outside of N’debele territory. Also established was that ZANU enjoyed much wider support in Rhodesia. Yet of greater importance to FRELIMO was ZANU’s obvious and urgent desire to prosecute a war of liberation in the manner FRELIMO supported, understood and practised—the Chinese communist way. Nevertheless cooperation started on a small scale.
Tongogara sent four of his senior men to report to FRELIMO’s Jose Moyane, Commander of the Tete Front. They were integrated into FRELIMO’s ranks for the purpose of gaining first-hand knowledge of FRELIMO’s war against the Portuguese, their control of local tribesmen, their handling of recruits, caching of arms and so on. The lessons learned were passed back to Tongogara who sent increasing numbers of his men to learn from FRELIMO.
A few men within ZANU’s ranks had received Russian training before crossing over from ZAPU to ZANU. This caused differences in opinions between the advocates of Russian and Maoist philosophies. In a nutshell the Russians believed in direct confrontation for a quick result whereas the Chinese approach accepted that a long period was needed to adequately prepare the ground for widespread insurrection and protracted armed action. Whereas the Russians relied on arms, the Chinese relied on people.
FRELIMO settled the matter by insisting that only the Maoist approach would work. ZANU were given directions on how they had to prepare their firm support base amongst the people for recruits, security, intelligence and the subsistence needed to support large numbers of fighters on a continuous basis over a protracted period.
In the meanwhile many ZANU men were being prepared for combat at Mgagao in Tanzania. This new training base had replaced Itubi in 1971. It was in this year too that our doubts about Portuguese forces’ ability to contain FRELIMO were confirmed when Rhodesian forces came into contact with FRELIMO forces along our border during an operation codenamed ‘Lobster’. By early 1972 ZANU was ready to make its first reconnaissance probes into Rhodesia, FRELIMO having secured the ground right up to the border and having also concluded preliminary arrangements with some tribal chiefs inside Rhodesia.
Special Branch detective Section Officer Peter Stanton, who I would come to know quite well, had warned of ZANLA’s imminent arrival in the northeastern sector of Rhodesia. First indications from sources inside Zambia showed that ZANLA would be probing on a wide front. Then civilians coming over our border seeking refuge from FRELIMO domination told Peter that ZANLA reconnaissance units were based near the border east of Mukumbura. In late March they named one location as Matimbe base. This was confirmed when the SAS (Special Air Service) mounted an operation that resulted in a number of kills. All the bodies were dressed in FRELIMO uniforms but documents confirmed most were ZANLA men.
Documents captured at Matimbe base revealed two important things. One was that indoctrination of headmenwithin Rhodesia had already succeeded in obtaining willing recruits to swell ZANLA’s numbers, thus eliminating any further need to press-gang for recruits in Zambia. The other confirmed that ZANLA intended to infiltrate on a wide front to spread Rhodesian forces and interrupt the smooth running of the economy by forcing an increase in the call-up of Territorial Army soldiers.
External recce training
4 SQUADRON’S RECCE TRAINING AREA WAS limited to ground west of where the SAS had contacted ZANLA at Matimbe Base. I had a fair idea of what we would be looking for in Mozambique but felt apprehensive about teaching my men whilst learning the ropes myself. Although I was only expected to teach pilots recce, I decided that the technicians should participate to involve them directly and to see how they took to the task. To make things manageable, separate periods of ten days were allocated to each of two halves of the squadron.
Following introductory flights to study tribal patterns near Gwelo, I took the first half of the squadron to Kariba to compare animal paths with those of humans. We then moved to Gutsa Airfield sited on the west bank of the Musengezi River at the base of the Zambezi escarpment and forty-six kilometres south of the Mozambican border.
Air Force Volunteer Reservists under Flight Lieutenant Geoff Fenn, who had his faithful old servant ‘Sixpence’ in tow, had already prepared Gutsa base for us. In addition to the tented accommodation, Geoff had set up an operations tent with radio and telecommunication facilities. The camp lay under tall mopani trees between the runway and an established Army base. At the time D Coy RAR under command of Major Bruce Hulley was there.
It was the start of winter so the weather was pleasant and relatively cool. This was important because, in the very hot conditions of the valley during summer, it would not have been possible for the Trojan aircraft to take off with full fuel and four men. As it was we had to turn right when airborne to avoid the high banks on the eastern side of the Musengezi River and climb along the course of the river until high enough to turn for Mozambique.
Gutsa base camp.
On our first night at Gutsa I noticed abnormal drum-beating activity both close and far off downriver. I asked Bruce Hulley what this was all about. He said that in all his previous stints at Gutsa no such drum-beating occurred other than during customary beer-drinking parties every Saturday night. Yet during this spell there had been many drums beating every single night. The abnormal activity worried him and he had made this known to Army HQ.
One night the drums stopped their perpetual throbbing because, at the request of the local tribal chief, Bruce had undertaken to shoot a troublesome crocodile. The beast had lived in a large pool on the Musengezi River for as long as the chief could remember and it had been responsible for killing a number of people. Recently the dreaded reptile had dragged a young girl screaming into the river. She was never seen again.
I accompanied Bruce and two of his men to the large boomerang-shaped pool in which the crocodile lived. We were all armed with FN rifles and Bruce had a powerful headlamp plus four hand-grenades. The intense beam of light tracked back and forth over the water and along the reeds of the far bank searching for crocodile eyes that reflect light like bright stars. There was no sign of the brute so Bruce lobbed two widely separated grenades into the water. As the grenades went in, I slipped on the steep slope of the high bank overlooking the pool and very nearly went over the sheer drop into the water just as the dull thuds from the grenades mushroomed in the water. My slide was checked in time to see the huge crocodile’s eyes light up in the beam of torchlight midway between the turbulent patches of water. We all fired together hitting the croc several times. When spray from the hail of bullets settled there was no sign of the brute, which was never seen again. Next night the drums were beating again.
4 Squadron needed to make detailed reconnaissance of almost 3,000-square nautical miles of territory. This was divided into five overlapping se
ctors and each crew was allocated to a sector that was changed every day to allow everyone to work every inch of the entire area twice. I flew with all crews in turn and from the sixth day roamed the entire area in my own aircraft checking on previous day reports and picking up on any information that had been missed.
Within the first four days the Ops Room map had every path, village and field plotted. The fields were marked accurately to show size and shape for future comparison. Villages were marked in two colours. One colour showed occupied villages with the number of huts in active use whilst the other colour recorded the position and size of abandoned villages.
Once the primary and obvious information had been acquired, we commenced a search for hidden habitations. This resulted in the location of a handful of hidden camps complete with bashas, which were judged to be for civilians in hiding. They were difficult to see from our operating height, which I had set at 2,000 feet above ground. All crews had been briefed that, under no circumstance, were they to descend below this height. In the event that a crew located something that needed a second opinion, they were either to call me over or ask another crew operating close by to do so.
During the morning of the seventh day, with three days still remaining before the second half of the squadron was due to arrive, John Blythe-Wood and David Rowe disobeyed my instruction. These two young officers and their two technicians located a place in a line of thick riverine bush where faint human paths (they proved to be toilet paths) suggested that there was a camp hidden under the trees. Rather than bother me, they decided to make a low pass to get a close look under the tree canopies.
I was about forty-five nautical miles away when John Blythe-Wood called to say that he was returning to base. His transmission was distorted and unusually weak but I gathered a fire had been put out, the turbo-charger had failed, level flight was being maintained and he would reach base safely. I was not concerned because John’s voice, though faint, was calm. Some time passed before I heard him call finals at Gutsa; so I put the matter out of my mind and continued my work.
Winds of Destruction: The Autobiography of a Rhodesian Combat Pilot Page 42
