Undaunted, Mick picked up the trail and established two alternative bases for which a first-light attack by RAR was planned. Due to scepticism following the abortive attack of the previous day, the local RAR commander approached his task in an uncaring manner, causing Mick Hardy to realise that his target of about thirty CTs would be lost if he did not take the initiative. He did this by dealing directly with the Air Force.
Following the action that accounted for eight CTs killed and four captured the RAR, who came to the party late, proudly claimed all to their own credit. This was an ongoing difficulty for the Air Force; not that it should have mattered who achieved the successes. But apart from niggling the airmen, problems caused by ground forces claiming most Air Force successes, a consequence of inter-company rivalries, could prejudice annual allocation of funds to Air Force by the Government Treasury. Fortunately a more balanced situation developed as time went on but the reader can judge who did what in this particular action. The Air Strike Report is difficult to follow without an accompanying sketch, but it gives a fair idea of the widely spread actions involved. As with most hurriedly written ASRs, little attention was given to grammar.
Juliet 4 and Yellow section consisting of 4 helicopters were scrambled to just north of Banji acting on information received from c/s 91 that 14 terrs were heading in a north westerly direction from their location. This group was not seen and whilst orbiting overhead 4 terrs were seen to run into a thicket north east of 91’s location. J4 then directed two choppers onto either side of a stream that they had gone into, to act as stop groups and the one helicopter came under fire. J4 put in a strike using front gun and Sneb with no results. J4 remained in the area and saw one terr running east along the river just south of Bobgarande School. He carried out a front gun attack and was hit in the process. J4 was then informed of 4 terrs running in the fields to the south of the river and was directed to them. A strike was carried out by J4 and one terr with an RPD fell. E4 arrived at this time and carried out an attack on the subsequent three. All 3 fell, 1 then got up and started running again. E4 carried out another attack on him and he fell again. E4 then directed ground forces onto their position. The last terr to fall opened fire on the ground forces and he was shot by them. The other two who were shot by E4 were found dead by ground forces. J4 returned (from rearming) and directed ground forces to the body with the RPD; he too was dead. E4 then departed to rearm. J4 then directed troops to the area just south of Bobgarande School where he had come under fire. An air strike was carried out by J4 and the subsequent sweep revealed 1 dead terr. J4 returned to rearm and R4 took over. More firing had started from the same area, which was a thick reed area on a riverbank. J4 then rejoined R4 and led a further strike that resulted in 1 dead and 4 surrendering, all of whom were wounded. J4 returned to rearm. R4 did a further 2 strikes; as a result 2 more dead terrs were found.
Gungwa mountain
FOLLOWING A BREAK AT THORNHILL I returned to ops earlier than planned on 4 May. This was in response to a call from JOC Hurricane at Bindura. SB had received reports of a large ZANLA base just across the border in the vicinity of a high feature known as Gungwa mountain, upon whose summit was one of the border beacons. I was asked to pinpoint the base.
Flying a Cessna, I searched outwards from the mountain but failed to find any base. Only one place remotely resembled the type of temporary camp found inside Rhodesia. This lay in dense jesse bush at the base of Gungwa mountain itself. Because it was not possible to remain overhead for a detailed look, I had to fly all over the place before returning for a second and then a third look. I was not convinced that this was a base but I could not reject it either because too many cattle paths ran in parallel lines within and outside the jesse bush. If in fact it was the site of a CT base, I decided it was for no more than ten CTs residing on a temporary basis.
At Bindura I reported that there were no CT camps near Gungwa and that only the large patch of jesse bush offered the remotest possibility for a mere handful of CTs. I thought no more about the matter believing an OP (observation post) callsign would move in to monitor the site. However, a couple of days later I received instructions to fly to New Sarum and report to OC Flying Wing. On arrival, Wing Commander Bill Jelley told me that I was to fly lead Vampire on 6 May for the biggest air strike to date on the Gungwa mountain base. This was to be followed by every available helicopter making a vertical envelopment with RLI troops. I protested and made it quite clear that I felt that Air Force was being drawn into a huge ‘lemon’. My objections were noted, but SB interrogations of captured CTs had satisfied JOC Hurricane that the jesse bush lying at the base of Gungwa mountain fitted with the intelligence. The strike would go ahead as planned. It was then that I came to realise that the whole fiasco was going to be recorded on film. In fact I saw myself on national television giving the air briefing for the very air strike I had tried to prevent.
I flew in the lead Vampire piloted by Justin Varkevisser. We marked with a full load of 20mm cannon and two 50-gallon Frantans and were followed in rapid succession by two Vampires, six Hunters and three Canberras. Four Provosts came from behind the mountain just ahead of about twelve helicopters. The whole operation went like clockwork on a patch of bush that was devoid of any ZANLA presence.
As expected, I was used as the scapegoat for the wastage of air weapons. Because of this I refused, with Air HQ support, to be involved in a similar situation in late 1974.
Countering Strela missiles
AS I HAD PREDICTED, WE needed to lose aircraft to Strela missiles before the Treasury hurriedly provided funds for the research and modifications needed to protect helicopters and piston-driven aircraft. Flight Lieutenant Archie Ramsbottom was appointed the technical officer for the project. I became involved with him immediately on an ad hoc advisory basis and together we paid a visit to CSIR in Pretoria for discussions on Strela missiles and the steps to be taken to render them harmless.
These were the first schematic drawings from CSIR.
Strela missile
missile launcher
A sensor that could ‘see’ objects radiating infrared energy in the 2-micron wave band controlled Strela flight. Highest intensity emissions were from the relatively small exposed sections of exhaust pipes and hot engine parts. However, the cumulative value of infrared radiating from an entire standard airframe, although apparently cold, presented a good target. Strela would initially home on the entire heat signature of an aircraft and only seek out the hottest spot late in its flight; hence the strikes on the exhausts of the two Trojans.
Exhausted gas plumes did not present any problem but it was quite obvious that hot exhaust stubs and any exposed sections of engines had to be shielded. This needed some clever design and engineering work, which our technicians managed quite easily. Surface paint was the bigger problem. We established that colour was not the main criteria in selecting a paint mix that exhibited low radiation properties in the 2-micron wave band. In fact, and surprisingly, it was easier to achieve this with white paint than in the camouflage colours we intended to retain.
Archie worked long hours with paint manufacturers and the Paint Shop at New Sarum to develop the ideal paint mixes for our camouflage colours. What they eventually produced virtually eliminated radiation of infrared energy in the critical wavelength sector, even when the surface was hot.
The dedication and enthusiasm of Air Force technicians and paint manufacturers made Archie’s job easier and the results were impressive. Provosts and Trojans looked the same as before except for strange-looking fibreglass fairings shaped like half cups that screened exhaust stubs that had been turned to face upwards. Simple screens were also used to disallow Strela from ‘seeing’ hot components through the cooling-gills under the engines.
Dakota exhausts required a different solution. This involved extending the exhaust pipes all the way to the trailing edge of the mainplanes where the pipes turned upwards to exhaust gases vertically. A wide tunnel-like fairing through which air
flowed to keep the outer surface of the tunnel cool surrounded each long exhaust line. At the trailing edge of the mainplane, the tunnel fairing rounded upwards to screen the hot upturned outlet of the exhaust pipes.
Counter-Strela modifications for Alouettes and Cessna 185 aircraft were created by SAAF in conjunction with CSIR. The Cessna modifications were much the same as those developed for the Trojan. Alouette helicopters presented bigger problems because the entire engine and exhaust pipe were exposed. As with fixed-wing aircraft, it was necessary to modify the jet pipe to exhaust upwards and the entire engine was shrouded in a bath-like shield. This shield was without a top to allow access for engine servicing in the field. Because of this, the engine and jet pipe could be seen from the ground when a helicopter banked steeply.
Pre-mod (top)—engine fully exposed, Post Strela mod (above)—engine screened.
All anti-Strela modifications were very successful and many Strela missiles were wasted against our slow aircraft.
Jets, however, could not be protected to the same degree. There was no easy fix to the exposed ends of jet pipes. All that could be done was to paint the airframes with the new paint to minimise total radiation, thereby limiting Strela’s ability to acquire target until a jet aircraft had passed its operator’s position.
When all the Strela protection work was completed, Archie and I paid a visit to Air Rhodesia’s top managers to suggest to them that their Viscount airliners should be protected along the lines of our Dakotas. The reason for our visit arose from tests we had conducted with a Strela missile that had been acquired by Air Force to evaluate our counter-missile work.
The missile’s firing mechanisms were neutralised and a battery pack replaced the regular pyrotechnic generator. As a mobile test bed, this modified missile worked very well. Our tests confirmed that our light aircraft and Dakota modifications were satisfactory, and that the missile could not easily ‘see’ Canberras and Hunters until after they passed abeam. During these tests we noted that, whereas a Viscount produced a stronger signature from its four exhausts than either a Hunter or a Canberra, its entire airframe and large under-wing exhaust pipes made the aircraft highly visible, irrespective of range and direction of travel.
We were told that Air Rhodesia’s engineers and upper management were fully aware of what had been done to protect Dakotas and they agreed that a similar style of engineering could be employed to shroud Viscount exhaust pipes. The matter of repainting the Viscounts presented no special problem. However, despite a very cordial meeting, both Archie and I sensed that there was no real interest because Air Rhodesia’s managers seemed unable to accept that Strela would ever be a threat to civilian airliners.
Army Sub-JOC commanders
ON 4 JUNE 1974, LIEUTENANT-COLONEL Dave Parker, the Army Commander at JOC Darwin, asked me to take him along on a recce flight. He had been impressed with air recce successes and wanted to gain first-hand knowledge of how we searched for CT camps and what ground patterns attracted a pilot’s attention. His open-mindedness and desire to learn from direct experience was very refreshing. Throughout our flight his questions and observations made it plain that he was very switched-on. Having shown Dave a few bases I had found previously we were fortunate to find a new one that appeared to be in use. Surprisingly he saw the base more easily than many of the pilots I had trained and his excitement was infectious.
Three helicopters brought in twelve RLI troops. Dave could see immediately that they were going to be too thin on the ground to have any chance of boxing in the area around a camp site that offered the CTs a number of escape routes in good cover.
Tree-ship Fireforce.
I directed the lead helicopter to position 150 metres to one side of the CT base by calling “Camp centre 150 to your right... NOW.” Troops were put down simultaneously on three sides of the camp before the lead helicopter climbed to 1,000 feet to direct the troops towards the camp. The other two put in dummy drops in gaps between the troops in an attempt to make CTs uncertain of which way to break. They then returned to Mount Darwin for more troops.
Contact was made before Dave and I saw two groups of four CTs breaking at high speed through a huge gap between the soldiers. Being unarmed I could do nothing about this, and the orbiting helicopter was already engaging CTs inside the camp. We had to be content with two CTs killed and one captured wounded with no less than eight CTs seen to escape. This experience certainly highlighted for Dave Parker the reason why Air Force had been asking to concentrate helicopters with permanent reaction troops, not simply to reduce the size of gaps, but to improve soldiers’ efficiency under the direction of their own airborne commanders. Greater levels of immediate intelligence flowing from Selous Scouts made the availability of this type of reaction group all the more important.
There had been a few successes when helicopters and troops were brought together with an Army commander directing his troops from a helicopter. For the most part, however, helicopters had been penny-packeted to meet far too many unprofitable calls. This had been at high cost considering the unacceptably low returns for effort expended.
It so happened that two Alouette gunships were used for the first time on this very day, though neither one was available for our small action. Earlier in the day, Flight Lieutenant Rob McGregor and Sergeant Henry Jarvie had flown top cover to trooping helicopters. When the trooper helicopters had left the scene, a well-known wounded CT leader, who was hiding in a hut with other wounded CTs, pinned down the ground forces. This gave Rob and Henry opportunity to employ their 20mm side-firing cannon, which resulted in the death of all the CTs. During the late afternoon Flight Lieutenant John Annan and Sergeant Morris fired their cannon in another action but with no confirmed results.
The arrival of gunships, improving Selous Scouts effectiveness and Dave Parker’s influence in the field made it possible, at last, to introduce the permanent reaction force the Air Force had been advocating for some time. The Air Force had not been alone in seeking this concentration of forces because a number of RLI commando commanders had been pressing for the same thing. To my own knowledge these included RLI Captains Jerry Strong, Pat Armstrong and Dumpy Pearce.
As with the Portuguese assault force at Estima, this involved grouping troops, trooper helicopters, helicopter gunships and armed fixed-wing aircraft. We could not possibly match the lift capacity of the Portuguese but we had the advantage of having very aggressive RLI soldiers and could provide their commanders a seat in a gunship from which to observe and direct them. The continuous presence of a gunship overhead each action also facilitated immediate supporting fire to ground troops or to engage targets moving beyond their reach.
Within a few days this reaction force, soon to be called Fireforce, was put into effect and the results achieved over the following six months were astounding. Dave Parker had much to do with bringing the first permanent combined force into being at Mount Darwin.
Dave was a truly superb individual who was held in high regard by all who knew him. He was blessed with many talents that included flexibility of mind and a desire to actively seek and receive the opinions of others without regard to their rank. He absorbed everything he heard before reaching decisions that were reduced to clear-cut plans and instructions. He also had the rare ability to admit to occasional error, never offering excuses for his own mistakes. It was no wonder that the RLI troops nicknamed Dave Parker ‘The King’.
Five weeks after my flight with Dave Parker I flew with Lieutenant-Colonel Bert Barnard, an RAR officer. Bert was the Army commander at JOC Centenary, the post he had held from the outset of Op Hurricane. Along with most Army and Air Force officers I found Bert Barnard to be the exact opposite of Dave Parker. He was pompous, highly self-opinionated and intolerant of opinions emanating from any rank below his own.
My Flying Logbook shows that he accompanied me on a visual recce sortie that lasted for only one hour and twenty-fve minutes. Bert became bored and asked to return to Centenary on the pretext of matters requ
iring his urgent attention; a marked contrast to Dave Parker’s flight of over six hours, following which he had expressed disbelief at having been airborne so long.
Fireforce might have come into effect much sooner, admittedly without gunships, had Bert Barnard listened to Air Force and RLI opinion. However, none of us had yet realised that we should have pressed for penny-packeting of helicopters to bring him, inevitably, to the opposite view of needing to concentrate forces.
Fireforce and Scouts
ON COMPLETION OF TRIALS AND training for the new 20mm helicopter cannons, helicopters and RLI commandos teamed up to form two assault forces, initially comprising one 20mm gunship and four trooper helicopters, each carrying four soldiers. Mount Darwin and Centenary had one force each.
To distinguish between gunships, Rhodesian troopers and SAAF troopers, abbreviations were introduced. Influenced by a popular British Police TV series then showing in Salisbury and entitled ‘Zed Cars’, the helicopters became:
K-Car (Kay)—gunship (killer)-cum-command post
G-Car (Gee)—trooping and general purpose—Rhodesian
Z-Car (Zed)—trooping and general purpose—SAAF
The first action out of Mount Darwin occurred on 21 June 1974. John Annan, flying the gunship with Sergeant Garry Whittal as his gunner, led four trooper helicopters and a Provost. Two G-Cars were crewed by Squadron Leader Eddie Wilkinson (OC 7 Squadron) with Sergeant Pete McCabe and Flight Lieutenant Ken Law with Flight Sergeant Farrell. Two Z-Cars were crewed by Captain du Plessis with Sergeant Hulatt, and Lieutenant Anderson with Sergeant Veldman. Air Lieutenant Steve Baldwin flew the Provost.
Winds of Destruction: The Autobiography of a Rhodesian Combat Pilot Page 57
