Although the Frenchmen were stranded they were unhurt, so Keith wished them well and promised to send help as soon as possible. The welcoming party in Salisbury was somewhat dampened. Even with seventeen Cessnas safely home and tucked away out of sight, there was deep concern for the one lying damaged in hostile territory. Fortunately, Keith Corrans knew its precise location and had the necessary details of the damage sustained.
Local tribesmen took the two Frenchmen into their care until FRELIMO officials arrived from northern Mozambique and, fortunately, no Tanzanian officials showed up. The Frenchmen did a first-class con job using language difficulties to maximum effect. This was matched by the senior French pilot in Salisbury who telephoned Maputo direct from Salisbury to ask for FRELIMO’s permission to mount a recovery operation for the ‘French-owned’ aircraft. He explained that the downed aircraft had been flying to Malagasy when it suffered engine problems. This had forced the crew to land on an airstrip on Tanzanian soil very close to Mozambique rather than risk the long over-water leg to Malagasy. FRELIMO’s authorities were assured that this was a purely civil aviation matter in which Rhodesian civil aviation authorities had agreed to give full technical assistance to the French.
FRELIMO, still new in government, took the Frenchman at his word and made no attempt to contact the Governments of Tanzania or Malagasy to verify a request emanating from ‘hostile Rhodesia’. Approval was given for the use of a Rhodesian-registered aircraft to fly Rhodesian personnel in to effect necessary repairs for a one-time flight. They agreed also that the Cessna 337 would need to be flown to Beira for fuel and then on to Salisbury for final repair work before undertaking the long flight to Malagasy.
Group Captain Charles Paxton had been earmarked to become the Commander of the Rhodesian Air Force but he opted for early retirement instead and was then flying for a civilian charter firm. His current employment and Air Force background made Charles the ideal person to conduct the recovery operation. This had to be done rapidly for fear that FRELIMO might establish the true ownership of the damaged aircraft. It meant getting to site immediately, performing the barest minimum of repair work and departing with minimum delay. In the meanwhile the French crew and FRELIMO had arranged for the holes in the runway to be filled in by the locals. The plan worked well. The rear engine was replaced, the nose wheel was jacked up and bolted into place, the front propeller was replaced and engine checks were conducted. A large box of goodies for FRELIMO and the locals ensured full co-operation without interference. Both aircraft then departed for Beira.
Since the Cessna had to fly with undercarriage down, the flight to Salisbury via Beira was a long one. Charles Paxton escorted the Frenchmen all the way for a night arrival at Salisbury. The Cessna was wheeled off to the security hangar and a third celebration marked the conclusion of the second ferry with all eighteen aircraft safe on Rhodesian soil.
With one aircraft requiring major repairs and five others awaiting camouflage paint, the Air Force defiantly rolled out twelve camouflaged Cessna 337s into the open for the whole world to see. It felt and looked great, and the new war-machine became known as the LYNX!
All that remained to be done was to modify the aircraft for their armed role. Work on this started the day after the first flight arrived. Mainplanes had been especially stressed during manufacture to cater for increased ‘G’ loads. Under-wing pylon mountings were installed at New Sarum to allow for the carriage of SNEB rocket pods, bombs, Frantans, flares and teargas. Within a week all 4 Squadron’s pilots had been converted onto type. Fitment of machine-guns had been considered but this was held over for the moment. It is a great credit to all participating technicians and pilots that these aircraft did a marvellous job for the Rhodesian war effort. The Lynx came at the right time and its selection had been a good one.
Charles Paxton.
The first record of a Lynx accompanying Fireforce was on 7 March 1976, though Flight Lieutenant Ed Potterton did not use weapons on that occasion. Fitment of guns came later.
Fireforces back in action
ZIPRA, HAVING BEEN DEALT A few severe blows by SAS inside Zambia in late 1974, and again during 1975, did not seem to be ready to rush into any major offensive actions simply to keep up with ZANLA. Nevertheless its existence necessitated ongoing patrolling in the west. All of ZANLA’s effort was concentrated in the east.
Following their return in January 1976, ZANLA groups moved with great caution into their original sectors Nehanda, Chaminuka and Takawira taking pains not to draw attention to themselves before they were re-established amongst the locals. By early February the game was on once more. ZANLA’s intention to launch on all three fronts had been delayed as previously mentioned, but their presence just across the mountain border near the Mozambican town of Espungabera brought the newly formed Chipinga Fireforce, led by Mike Litson, into its first action on 7 February. Two months later, penetrations in the southernmost sector meant the RSF was tied up along the entire Mozambican border.
Back in the Op Hurricane area, Wing Commander Tol Janeke had anticipated that his Fireforce might be called to action in the rough terrain of the Zambezi escarpment some thirty kilometres northwest of Mount Darwin. So on 6 February, with the concurrence of his Army counterpart, he moved the whole Fireforce to Stacey’s Farm to cut down reaction time.
To help follow the ASR below, the helicopter pilots were Flight Lieutenant Rob McGregor flying K-Car; Yellow 1, 2 and 3 were, respectively, Air Lieutenant Jo Syslo, Air SubLieutenant Venter (Op Polo) and Flight Lieutenant George Sole.
Tol Janeke (left) and Rob McGregor (right).
Air Lieutenant Norman (Bambam) Maasdorp, N4, flew the Provost. The Police Reserve Air Wing pilot, Copper 08, was Hamie Dax whom I have already identified as the most successful of the PRAW recce pilots. The abbreviation PATU stands for Police Anti-Terrorist Unit and c/s is the abbreviation for callsign.
Rob McGregor’s illustration, cut from a 1:50,000-scale map is reproduced to assist the reader in following his ASR. It reads:
On Fri. 6 FEB 76 at approximately 1030B Fire Force Mt. Darwin was tasked to position at Stacey’s Farm in support of a PATU stick c/s BX who was on tracks of approximately 10 terrorists at TS 983757 (A on map). After positioning at the farm, PRAW aircraft c/s Copper 08 got airborne to establish communications with BX and attempt to track the terrorists from the air. At the same time N4 was airborne in a Provost in order to provide armed support if required. After making contact with BX, Copper 08 was able to track the terrorists to position C where a very distinctive path was picked up and followed down the mountain to the valley floor. At the bottom a hut was seen at position B and movement was observed in the vicinity of the hut.
It was then decided to put two sticks with trackers in at position B to attempt to pick up tracks. This was done and at the same time K-Car got airborne to give cover. The trackers were unable to locate any tracks of any significance at position B. Copper 08 and N4 then talked K-Car back up the line to position C. It was noted that the tracks were very distinctive from position C to D but then tended to break up so it was decided to bring in 2 more sticks (c/s 23/25) with trackers and to drop them on tracks at D. They were to track down towards the hut where the initial sticks were left to act as stop groups. At this stage K-Car and Yellow formation returned to Stacey’s Farm and left N4 as top cover.
Tracks were followed to point E where it was decided to leapfrog c/s 25, 23A and the trackers to catch up time. This was done by Yellow 3 to point F. About fifteen minutes later at 1545B c/s 25 called contact. Fireforce immediately proceeded to the scene from Staceys. On arrival in the contact area c/s 25 reported he was being mortared and that the line of flight of the terrorists was down the river-line towards position B. He estimated he had contacted a group of 20 terrorists (8 were killed in the initial contact). K-Car then saw 3 terrorists at position H and engaged them. They ran into thick bush on the river-line where further terrorists were seen and engaged. At this time the K-Car came under heavy fire fr
om the ground. K-Car then called on N4 in the Provost to carry out a strike into the area of the K-Car attack to attempt to flush the terrorists out. N4 carried out 2 attacks with Sneb and Frantans and strikes were observed to be in the area of the target. (5 dead terrorists were later found in the area of K-Car and Provost air strikes.)
During this time c/s 25 had followed up and killed a further 2 terrorists in the riverbed. Very little movement could be seen from the air and K-Car instructed Yellow 1 to carry out dummy drops to the east and west of the river line to attempt to keep the terrorists in the river line and force then towards the stop groups at position B. Shortly after this c/s 23 in the stop group reported contacting one terrorist who was killed. c/s 23 also reported movement in the area of position G which appeared to be terrorists attempting to break over the ridge line. Yellow 1 was then instructed to fire into the thick bush in that area to attempt to flush out anyone who may be there. The following day it was reported that Yellow 1 came under fire but at the time he had heard nothing and the ground forces had not reported anything.
Rob McGregor’s illustration, cut from a 1:50,000-scale map.
The light was now fading fast and follow-up and mopping-up operations continued until last light with no further contact with terrorists.
Wing Commander Janeke’s report reads:
a. This is a splendid example of success resulting from first class cooperation between air and ground forces. The entire operation lasted over a period of eight hours. At no time was there any unnecessary confusion or delay. A total of 17 out of a probable 22 ters were accounted for.
b. The decision to move the Fireforce with air support to Stacey’s Farm was a wise one as it reduced reaction and ferry time to less than ten minutes.
c. Flt Lt McGregor, together with Air Lt Maasdorp, contributed towards the professional control of operations. De-brief of the crews also highlighted the excellent work done by 2nd Lt Nigel Theron of 2 Commando RLI, whose personal leadership and courage led to more than half of the kills. Any Army recommendation for an award to this officer would be strongly supported.
Squadron Leader Harold Griffiths as OC of the helicopter squadron wrote:
I agree with FAF Cdr’s comments re the splendid effort of all forces concerned in this highly successful operation. It is very pleasing to see that such methods as aerial tracking, leapfrogging, positioning of forward stops and dummy drops were used and obviously contributing to the overall successes. A well-written report which is easy to follow.
Griff’s remarks about the employment of techniques used in the past but now almost forgotten are valid. However, in this case, the follow-up on terrorists moving through very rugged unpopulated terrain lent itself to the re-employment of methods used in the days before CTs lived and operated amongst the population.
Tol Janeke was a taskmaster who demanded the best of the men under his command. He was not too popular and some individuals were even frightened of him. One such individual was Flying Officer George Sole who, though a bit of a dandy, was a very nice guy.
When one day the Fireforce callout siren sounded at FAF 4, George rushed to his helicopter, which was already occupied by the soldiers he was to carry into action. Relating to what was to follow, George said, “As I moved onto the step to get into my seat, I let off a friendly fart but shat myself instead!”
George apologised to his gunner and the troops and ran off for a shower and a change of clothing. Tol, seeing one helicopter still on the ground after the others had flown off, enquired loudly, “What the hell is going on?” The gunner said, “The pilot has gone back for a shower and clothing change because he had a bit of an accident.” Tol went through the roof and ran off to find George Sole. George received a telling-off that left him in no doubt that Tol had no sympathy for his situation. “A Fireforce call out takes priority over all things. I don’t care if you are uncomfortable and that everyone will be subjected to your foul stench. You fly the mission and only clean up when it is over!”
A couple of days later George rushed out when the Fireforce siren sounded. In his hurry he tripped over a tent peg and fractured his ankle. Though in absolute agony, he dared not complain and flew the long Fireforce action before seeking medical attention.
The first airstrike by a Lynx was made on 25 March. It so happened that Air Lieutenant Bill (Starry) Stevens was on his first-ever operational deployment and this was his first operational strike. He did well when the K-Car, flown by Flight Lieutenant Dick Paxton, ran out of ammunition due to a runaway 20mm cannon. Sergeant Brian Warren handled his cannon’s misbehaviour coolly and still had CTs visual. Bill Stevens, having watched the K-Car’s strikes, knew the exact location of the CTs and though he could not actually see them was able to kill the lot with Sneb rockets.
On 27 March Selous Scouts controller callsign 69B was visual with CTs two kilometres south of his elevated position within the Mtoko Tribal Trust Land. He called for the Mount Darwin Fireforce, then operating out of Mudzi. Air Lieutenant Childs was flying the K-Car with Major Mike Ainslie of A Company 1RAR as the airborne Army commander, and Sergeant du Preez, as his gunner. Childs and du Preez were both Op Polo men. Air Lieutenant Mike Borlace, with Flight Sergeant Mike Upton as his MAG gunner, led three G-Cars of Amber formation.
Amber lead (Borlace) spotted the terrorists immediately upon arrival over the point the Scouts had given and Mike Upton opened fire. Childs had turned the K-Car away at that moment in an attempt to re-establish communications with c/s 69B. For some time Mike Borlace could not interrupt the K-Car radio transmissions to let Childs and Ainslie know he had the CTs visual. When he did, the K-Car moved to him, picked up the scattering CTs, and opened fire with the 20mm cannon. Heavy fire was being directed at both aircraft as they pursued visual targets.
It was in the second orbit when rounds narrowly missed the K-Car gunner, mortally wounding Major Ainslie and hitting the pilot’s left leg. Air Lieutenant Childs calmly broadcast his situation and instructed Amber 2 to follow him. He landed some way off next to an already deployed stop group to transfer the unconscious major to Amber 2 for casevac to Mtoko. Whilst this was being done Borlace took hits that knocked out the hydraulic servo-system, which operates the cyclic and collective controls.
Mike Borlace, now on very heavy manual control and still carrying troops, refused to disengage the CTs until the K-Car returned. He was still orbiting over the CTs with Mike Upton firing burst upon burst when the gearbox warning light came on. Then, to add to their problems, the machine-gun ceased firing because a CT round had severed the ammunition belt. Undaunted, Mike Upton took an MAG from one of the Army soldiers and continued firing free-hand at visual CTs. Borlace said Mike Upton’s fire continued to be very accurate.
Though wounded, Air Lieutenant Childs returned to resume command of air and ground forces, allowing Mike Borlace to break contact and make a forced landing next to the stop group at whose location Major Ainslie had been transferred. Together with the stop group and the stick that had been on board, the two airmen armed with their personal weapons, took up positions that strengthened the original stop group and provided protection for the downed chopper. The troops that had been in Mike’s helicopter were immensely relieved to be on terra firma. Though used to being at the receiving end of enemy fire, these soldiers had been absolutely terrified by the ground fire whilst totally exposed in the air with nowhere to hide.
FAF commanders such as Tol Janeke and Peter Cooke always highlighted jobs well done by aircrew personnel. In Contact Reports submitted to Army HQ, Army field commanders often praised their own men and the aircrews who supported them. But Air Force officers were generally less forthcoming. So it was good to see the following signal to Air HQ from John Digby who was OC FAF 5 at Mtoko:
1. For atten D Ops.
2. This signal supplements the Air Strike Report submitted by Air Lt Childs on the contact that occurred in this area on 27 March 1976 .
3. Very shortly after the commencement of the contact Maj. A
inslie the Fireforce Commander was seriously wounded and died almost immediately and Air Lt Childs received minor wound near his left knee. Air Lt Childs arranged for the Major’s casevac and then took control of the air and ground forces involved in the contact. He continued this control for approximately one hour until his ammunition was finished and he had to leave the area to refuel and re-arm. FAF 5 and FAF 4 were able to listen in on his transmissions throughout this period.
4. Air Lt Childs’ control of the air and ground forces was outstanding and equal to or better than any within the operational experience of the OCs of FAF 4 and FAF 5. He maintained a clear picture of the situation at all times, showed remarkable qualities of personal control and leadership, and very aggressively progressed the contact until he had to leave to refuel and re-arm. On handing over he gave a very clear and complete briefing to the relieving K-Car.
5. After receiving medical attention, refuelling and re-arming, he returned and resumed his duties with Lt Col Heppenstall as Fireforce Commander. By this time no contacts were in progress and he assisted the Fireforce Commander by advising on the position of ambushes.
6. It is recommended that consideration be given to the award of an appropriate honour to Air Lt Childs in the near future.
ZANLA’s ability to hit our aircraft had improved significantly, indicating that, again no thanks to the Vorster imposed ceasefire, a great deal of effort had been given to antiaircraft training prior to the CTs return to Rhodesia. Almost all engagements hereafter resulted in hits on aircraft, sometimes killing or injuring aircrew and soldiers. The centrally mounted fuel tanks of the Alouettes presented a relatively large surface area and over time they suffered many hits. Fortunately Avtur fuel does not ignite easily and a self-sealing compound wrapped around the tanks prevented fuel loss.
Winds of Destruction: The Autobiography of a Rhodesian Combat Pilot Page 64
