Winds of Destruction: The Autobiography of a Rhodesian Combat Pilot

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Winds of Destruction: The Autobiography of a Rhodesian Combat Pilot Page 68

by Peter Petter-Bowyer


  What we saw was very disturbing. Bombs exiting the bomb box into the very high turbulent airflow, particularly at the rear of the bomb bay, gyrated, tumbled and jostled with each other. Some bombs were even blown back into their compartments before emerging again to join other wildly twirling and twisting bombs. Why film recordings such as these had not been made and studied previously, I cannot say; but it made us realise that the Board of inquiry into the Canberra disaster had not come up with the correct reason for the premature detonation that destroyed the Canberra.

  First drop tests of the Alpha bombs were recorded in the same way and we were delighted to see how cleanly they dropped away and how rapidly they spread out and trailed back from the aircraft. Because the concrete Alphas suffered little damage on impact, we were able to gather them up for repeat drop trials, including releases at low level. All low-level runs were filmed from the bomb bay, by a chase Vampire and from the ground. The results were very encouraging. Impact with the ground was occurring well behind the aircraft, lateral spread was better than expected and every unit skipped back into flight.

  Bev had designed and produced a small number of multidirectional fuses for first non-explosive trials. Our first live trial only involved five Alphas fitted with delay fuses amongst concrete units. No explosive was included to allow post-strike inspection of each fuse. Two of these fired instantly on impact with the ground, two functioned correctly and one failed to fire. Inspection of the latter showed that the initiating cap had fired but the delay link failed to transfer to the detonator cap. In the case of the two instantaneous bursts, initiating caps’ flame had flashed past the delay links directly to the detonator caps.

  Modifications and rectification followed rapidly and we were soon testing whole clusters of Alphas charged with explosive. During this time we established that the Alpha bomblets exhibited two unexpected but highly desirable characteristics due to the rubber balls interface. The first was discovered when one bomblet had been deliberately detonated in the midst of a pyramid of unexploded bomblets (UXBs). It failed to cause a sympathetic detonation of any of the other bomblets as occurs with other explosive units—our problem was to find the widely scattered survivors for independent destruction. The second peculiarity was that we were finding hundreds of thin 20mmround shrapnel pieces that propelled like spinning saws and sliced their way into the hardest of trees. Formed by the 147 rubber balls that pressed out discs from the outer casing they spun like crazy saws aligned with their direction of flight.

  By the seventh week, one week behind schedule, the engineers were totally exhausted from their intense work schedule and many sleepless nights. However, we were ready to demonstrate to the Air Staff a full-scale Alpha strike on a 1,200 x 200-metre target that had been prepared by the Range Warden, ‘Kutanga Mac’. Hundreds of cardboard and steel targets were set above ground and in trenches throughout the length and breadth of the target.

  OC 5 Squadron, Randy du Rand, had not been too interested in our work at the start of Project Alpha, probably the consequence of my early tests with lead balls. However, once the project started to show positive results, nobody could have given greater support and assistance to the project team than Randy.

  The Commander and his senior staff officers flew to Kutanga Range to witness the demonstration and see for themselves if the Alpha system was ready for ‘the real thing’. The project team had witnessed many trials but this was to be the first full-scale drop. We had reduced the original 400 Alphas per Canberra load down to 300 to facilitate easy loading and because we had come to realise that the reduced load covered a greater strike length than the original 800 metres we had set for ourselves. The 25% cost savings was not the reason for the reduction, but it was a huge bonus.

  There was great anticipation and mounting excitement as Squadron Leader Randy du Rand opened his bomb doors late on his run-in at 400 feet at a speed of 300 knots. None of the Air Staff expected such a spectacle of dust and multiple airburst flashes as 300 bomblets did their thing. That the Alphas were bursting at perfect height well behind the Canberra was obvious to all before the sound of the explosions reached the observation point. This came as a thrilling continuous thundering of overlapping explosions.

  The Commander was quite overcome by what he witnessed and showed it by shouting, “Bloody marvellous. Absolutely bloody marvellous!” Everyone present congratulated everyone else before we all set off to walk the full length of the prepared target area.

  First inspection made it clear that the Alpha bomb system was just what we needed. When the visitors left, the project team commenced the detailed study that showed that the effective coverage of 300 Alphas was 1,100 metres in length by 120 metres in width. We had achieved more than we planned for! Fourteen unexploded bombs (UXBs) were defused for inspection in our ongoing attempts to reach 100% efficiency but, with 5% bomblet failures, the system already rated slightly better than the USA and UK guidelines for acceptable UXB rates in any cluster-bomb system.

  The important thing was that the Alpha system was cleared for operations and the Canberra had been given the antipersonnel punch it deserved. Training of crews had been done but it was considered necessary to prepare for formation attacks, initially by three Canberras. This involved flying a very flat echelon with the aircraft spaced 100 metres apart. In this way a strike length of better than 1,000 metres and a width exceeding 300 metres could be assured. The reason for the very shallow echelon was to make certain that formating aircraft did not fall back into the curtain of shrapnel rising from the exploding bombs dropped by adjacent aircraft.

  This photo shows the first half of 300 Alpha bombs dropped at a demonstration in South Africa. Note the distance of explosions behind the Canberra. The second aircraft is a long way off on photochase.

  Pyrotechnics and boosted rockets

  TARGET MARKING BY FIXED-WING aircraft using phosphorus rockets had been on going and all Army units carried smoke grenades and flares to mark FLOT and enemy positions. However, helicopters lacked the ability to put down markers from which to give other aircraft and ground troops direction. Rocket launchers were considered but discounted on the basis of weight and the fact that they would hinder rapid emplaning and deplaning of troops. Normal smoke grenades were unsuitable because they disintegrated when dropped from height.

  I read all ASRs and, having noted pilot requests for a longduration, pyrotechnic marker device, I took this on as a project to run concurrently with the Alpha Project. Besides, there was another pyrotechnic project already in hand for a RAMS requirement.

  Air Force technicians at New Sarum had recently developed a ground marker system for night bombing by Canberras. The system, known as RAMS (Radio Activated Marker Service), involved two ground flares, one of which was ignited by a radio receiver in response to a coded signal from an attacking aircraft. The other flare was manually ignited by troops on the ground. The purpose of RAMS was to give ground troops the ability to call for precision bombing of CT targets at night. This involved placing one flare as an inner marker within 300-500 metres of a live target. Having placed the inner (radio activated) marker, a bearing was taken from it to the centre of the target. The second (manually activated) flare was then sited as an outer marker on a reciprocal bearing that might be as much as 1,000 metres from the target.

  To prepare for a RAMS attack, a Canberra crew needed a fairly accurate grid reference of the target itself, the magnetic bearing from outer flare to inner flare and the distance from inner flare to target. For this type of attack, bomb-aimers (Canberra navigators) used a method known as ‘off-set aiming’. It involved calculating the difference between the normal direct aiming angle at the planned bombing height and the steeper angle given by the inner flare position. The bombsight was then depressed to the calculated ‘off-set’ angle. There was nothing to prevent a reciprocal attack-line being used, in which case the sighting angle would be shallow, but it was more comfortable to over-fly the outer marker before bomb release.

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nbsp; When approaching target on the assigned attack heading, the pilot instructed the Army callsign to activate the outer flare for initial line-up. Thereafter the coded radio signal from the aircraft ignited the inner flare on the ground. Final adjustment to flight path was made to ensure correct alignment of the aircraft with the flares and bombs which were released the moment the bombsight crossbar reached the inner marker. 5 Squadron had practised and perfected the offset bombing system, all of which had been done at fairly high level.

  Randy du Rand was happy enough with the existing RAMS system but felt it necessary to improve on the intensity of the flares for low-level night attacks. He was looking ahead, having visualised the need to use the proven offset bombing method for low-level delivery of Alpha bombs. Randy’s initiative was surprising on two counts. Firstly, the Alpha system had not yet been proven when he asked for brighter flares and, secondly, the new flares only became available in the nick of time for Randy’s first night attack with Alphas.

  Bev introduced me to an eccentric American pyromaniac who revelled in flames, smoke and big bangs. He was an extremely difficult man to give direction to because he kept going off at a tangent to any subject being discussed. Nevertheless, he was a real boffin when it came to producing prototype smoke generators and immensely bright flares.

  Bev made the steel containers into which the American loaded his concoctions. When we were satisfied with results we asked for repeat samples, but none gave identical results because the crazy fool kept changing ingredients without ever recording them. To pin him down was impossible and he refused point-blank to allow Bev to assist him so that Bev could establish precisely what chemicals were being used, and in what quantities. Much messing around occurred before it was realised that the man, already receiving good money for his work, sought to make a fortune from his secrets; so he was dropped, but not before Bev had established the primary chemical ingredients he had used.

  It took some time for Bev to perfect a very robust smoke generator for helicopters to use as a ground-marker device. These manually activated generators were dropped over the side of helicopters from as high as 1,500 feet above ground, which subjected them to immense impact forces. It was essential to ensure each unit could survive high-speed collision with solid rock and still generate three minutes’ worth of dense white smoke. Many failures occurred and it took many weeks before reliable smoke markers became available.

  A modification to the pyrotechnic composition for existing RAMS flares achieved the intensity of flame Randy sought. Here again much trial and error was involved along the way and without Bev’s incredible effort and technical expertise we would not have been ready for the first low-level night attack on Madula Pan. This attack will be discussed shortly.

  One simple project Ron Dyer and I took on was to rectify the poor returns Lynx pilots were getting from their 37mm Sneb rockets. All we had to do was ask our engineering colleagues to manufacture in steel the same extension tubes used for phosphorus marker rockets. These tubes were then filled with RDX-TNT.

  Tests showed the heavier 37mm (boosted) rockets were noticeably slower in flight than the lighter smoke markers, but they were just as stable. More importantly the shrapnel effect of boosted 37mm SNEB showed a ten-fold improvement over standard ones. Thousands of 37mm extension pieces were produced and filled at Thornhill over the next three years.

  CS pellets

  MOST FIREFORCE ACTIONS OCCURRED ON hills, in forested areas and riverine vegetation because this is where CTs enjoyed best cover. Most of the hills (kopjes) possessed huge granite boulders and vast granite surfaces. When CTs managed to get into good cover between or under granite boulders they became a dangerous menace and were almost impossible to flush out. Cannon fire and Frantans were seldom effective and too many soldiers were killed or wounded when attempting to kill or dislodge them. On two occasions I recall dogs attempting to flush men from hiding but they were killed.

  I considered many possibilities in trying to find a way to incapacitate or force CTs into the open and even looked into firing rockets or dropping containers filled with anaesthetising fluid, but none of these ideas was practical. Then I came upon information about talc pellets impregnated with CS (teargas). I cannot recall where I read about this but remember the effects CS pellets exhibited on trials.

  Teargas grenades employ a pyrotechnic cake from which CS is released when the charge burns. The resultant gas is hot and initially visible but its spread tends to be upward and the resultant gas cloud is wholly subject to wind drift. Irritation effects are short-lived and affect some people more than others. Dogs can tolerate CS gas because they do not possess the irritable sweat glands of human skin. CS pellets act differently in that they release invisible gas over a long period of time. The unheated heavier-than-air gas spreads out at ground level and migrates into every nook and cranny. Above all its presence makes it quite impossible for any human to remain where pellets are present.

  I discussed the matter with John de Villiers and Vernon Joynt of CSIR and asked if they could produce CS pellets. They liked the concept and thought it possible providing they could establish a suitable talc powder binder to form pellets. I left the problem with them and returned to Rhodesia to design and manufacture an appropriate dispenser that would disperse the pellets over large areas. The dispensers worked well but unfortunately the CS pellets never materialised because CSIR had more urgent matters to attend to.

  Hispano cannons for Scouts

  THE SELOUS SCOUTS HAD EXTENDED their roles beyond pseudo operations within and outside the country. During May and June 1976 they conducted vehicle-borne operations across the border into Mozambique. On one excursion, they went into the Gaza Province in an attempt to stem the tide of ZANLA forces that were using the road and rail from Maputo to Malvernia. Air support for this operation was limited to one Alouette for casualty evacuation and one Lynx flying at great height to act as a radio relay between the ‘flying column’ inside Mozambique and the Scouts’ forward HQ inside Rhodesia.

  For over a year Selous Scouts’ over-border operations had been conducted with the clear understanding that no air support would be given, even if the units ran into lifethreatening situations. This restriction applied equally to operations in Botswana and Zambia. Even after the new President of Mozambique, Samora Machel, closed the border with Rhodesia on 3 March 1976 and vowed to provide full support to ZANLA, the ‘no air support’ ruling remained. Machel’s statements were, in effect, a declaration of war, but this made no difference. Political restraints on the external use of air support were almost certainly intended to keep international pressure off Prime Minister Vorster; otherwise we might have experienced further disruptions in our supplies from RSA.

  This situation was no less frustrating for the men on the ground than it was for the Air Force. We knew that Scouts had suffered the loss of Sergeant-Major Jannie Nel, killed at Mapai on 26 June 1976. In the same action, Lieutenants Dale Collett and Tim Bax were seriously wounded. Tim recovered after many months, but Dale’s bullet wound confined him to a wheelchair for life. Although I did not know the exact details, the lack of air support and possible limitation in ground firepower led me to make a telephone call to Ron Reid-Daly.

  Some time in April 1976, I had approached Major Brian Robinson at his SAS HQ to ask him if he was interested in 16 of our 20mm Hispano cannons that had been removed from four time-expired Vampires. Considering the great weight of these guns and the nature of SAS operations, Brian could see no use for them at the time, but he did not close the door on the offer. My approach to Ron Reid-Daly met with a totally different response because he was in urgent need of improved firepower for his mobile columns operating in Mozambique.

  Within an hour of the call I met with Captain Rob Warraker and a small group of Selous Scouts territorial engineers at New Sarum. With Air Force armourers and myself, the Scouts engineers lay under a Vampire to be shown how the cannons were mounted on swinging arms that allowed them to rock backwards und
er recoil, and forwards from the press of sturdy rear-mounted springs. This rocking action was used to retain a powerful spring in the BFM (belt-feed mechanism) that was fitted next to the cannon. The BFM was the essential component that pulled the heavy ammunition belt from the ammunition-bay and fed rounds into the gun’s breach.

  Air Force had considered mounting the cannons in purposemade swivel platforms for vehicles assigned to airfield defence, so we had a good idea of what technical work needed doing. The Scouts engineers picked up the ideas immediately and Rob Warraker, fearing we may change our minds, hastily left with the four cannon and 20,000 rounds of ammunition he signed for. In no time at all the Scouts completed the mountings and finalised range testing. Three vehicles were fitted with these cannons for a forthcoming external operation against a large base in Mozambique where ZANLA groups were assembled, armed and briefed before being launched into the Thrasher area.

  Captured CTs repeatedly referred to ‘Pungwe Base’, which they said was sited on the banks of the Pungwe River, but photo-reconnaissance along this large east-flowing river failed to find anything. Then, quite by chance, Squadron Leader Randy du Rand was returning from an unrelated Canberra task when he happened to fly directly over Pungwe Base. His navigator spotted the large camp through an opening in the cloud and rolled the cameras just before cloud obscured the ground again.

  When the JSPIS interpreters at New Sarum viewed the photographs of this large base, they were astounded to see hundreds of people gathered in a box formation around a flagpole in the centre of a large parade ground. What excited them was the fact that the flagpole itself stood at the centre of an outline of Rhodesia that was fashioned from whitewashed rocks. The word ZIMBABWE, also laid out in painted rocks, clearly identified the base as belonging to ZANLA.

 

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