On 22 March I found a plum target and counted thirty-eight CTs moving out of a their well-defined base camp. Unfortunately the Mtoko Fireforce was not available, so the Grand Reef Fireforce, led by Mike Litson, responded instead. An agonising fifty-five minutes elapsed before the Fireforce came into view. I put Mike onto the campsite first for orientation purposes and, considering the long delay, it was fortunate that my guess at where the CTs might be found turned out to be correct. In the action that followed, sixteen CTs were killed, one was captured unhurt and seventeen escaped, most having been peppered with 20mm shrapnel from the K-Car.
Although I read all the Air Strike Reports in Air HQ it was not the same as seeing for myself the existing problems of having too few Fireforces. They had to cover many thousands of square miles in which ever-growing numbers of CT groups were operating. I wondered if employing a new approach might offset the shortage of Fireforces and allow air recce finds to be less dependent on their availability.
PRAW recce training camp, at Marandellas Airfield. Names that appear in this book are: Standing: Ray Haakonsen 7th from left, PB between catering ladies, Hugh Chisnall (bald next to blonde lady—he was the pilot who found John Smart’s missing helicopter). Squatting: Phil Haigh and Francois du Toit (left), Sarel Haasbroek (2nd from right). Sitting: Cocky Benecke (centre) Hamie Dax (right).
Lieutenant-Colonel Tony Stevens, commander of the horse-borne troops of the Grey’s Scouts, listened to my ideas of using his Grey’s Scouts as an alternative to the heli–borne Fireforce. He leapt at the opportunity and we made plans to give it a try the next day in the St Swithins Tribal Trust Land. This was to have a force of twenty horsemen moving along a predetermined line at a gentle walk whilst I conducted air recce five kilometres on either side of their line.
I found the force immediately I arrived at the appointed RV and the sharp accent of the Grey’s Scouts major made me realise he was Australian. He confirmed the line he would ride and I confirmed the procedure I would adopt. Not ten minutes passed before I found a base under trees on high ground, commanding an excellent view of surrounding grasslands in which were some bare maize fields, very few trees and three small villages.
My 1:50,000-scale map showed a shallow depression running west to east 500 metres to the north of the base but this was not obvious from my recce height. I had no knowledge of horse-borne tactics for approaching targets unseen. Having given him the relevant grid references, I asked the major’s opinion on the cover the depression would afford him. He assured me he could get to a position 500 metres north of the base without being seen and said he would call me across two minutes before his arrival there. At the time I was about five kilometres away, having maintained a routine orbit line, but I could see the horses clearly even when they passed through tree cover. The speed at which the horses covered the ground was very impressive.
When the force turned right to move directly towards the base, ten pairs of horsemen surged forward, galloping at different speeds to place them in a wide crescent before the centre horsemen came to a halt and dismounted. In no time there were ten pairs of men surrounding the base site. The nearest troops to the base were about 150 metres away. No more than ten minutes had passed from finding the base to having it surrounded by men who had dismounted to commence a cautious approach towards the base.
Disappointingly, the base was empty, having been vacated about two hours earlier. Nevertheless it was clear to me that this silent force would have achieved complete surprise and total encirclement. Had there been serious opposition, a status quo could have been maintained for as long as it took for a regular Fireforce to reach them.
Unfortunately, the success of the trial ended abruptly. I had continued searching for another target when I saw smoke rising from two villages close to the base. I could not raise the major on radio so flew back to see what was going on and was horrified to find all huts of the third village in the process of being torched. My presence overhead brought the major back to his radio set and we entered into a very heated exchange. The major maintained that the locals needed to be punished for feeding the CTs. I objected and insisted that these same locals, who really had no alternative but to feed CTs, would more willingly support ZANLA following this senseless action.
I terminated the trial even before a whole hour had passed because I needed to discuss Grey’s Scouts’ procedures and attitudes with Tony Stevens. He was very apologetic about his Australian major’s actions and assured me that appropriate action would be taken. Nevertheless, Tony was delighted to learn that, in my opinion, Grey’s Scouts could be employed in a Fireforce role in support of air recce and Selous Scouts. Regrettably I never found another opportunity to pursue the matter personally and the concept was lost.
Testing American equipment
BOB CLEAVES RETURNED FROM USA with the equipment I had requested for field trials. The gyro-stabilised binoculars were mind boggling on the ground. Superb magnification and a rock-steady image, no matter how much one trembled, made them a perfect aid for game-viewing. In the air, however, the binoculars were only useful to inspect selected points during a gentle orbit. The moment one tried to keep an eye on a point whilst in forward flight, even at 4,000 feet above ground, the rate of scan induced precession of the gyro beyond its limits and toppled the spinning mirror.
This was a great pity because from 4,000 feet one could clearly distinguish between an FN rifle and an AK-47. The only airman who showed any interest in the unit was Sergeant Pete McCabe who was also the only man I knew who used standard binoculars in flight. How Pete managed to see anything through binoculars when flying in helicopters that vibrated so much I do not know; but he was as successful with them as he was firing his machine-gun or cannon.
Having been designed for security surveillance, the night-vision unit worked wonderfully on the ground. In flight, there were too many problems in trying to match what one could see through the bright night-vision unit with one’s dimly lit map. Only regular pathways through open ground could be seen but all hills and bush lacked any perception in depth.
The US bulletproof vests were better than the few we had previously acquired from some other source although one of these had saved Vic Cook’s technician. The American vests were subjected to destructive testing from our own FN rifles and a variety of communist rifles and machine-guns firing 7.62 mm ammunition. Though the vests gave no protection against armour-piercing rounds they were considered both suitable and essential for Fireforce aircrew and airborne Army commanders. Thanks to Bob and his US contacts, our order for these life-saving items was met and became standard operational wear for aircrew and airborne Army commanders. Many men owed their lives to these vests.
I was keen to develop better ceramic platelets to produce our own protective vests and to use as protective cladding on helicopter engines. Doctor Patrick Grubb of the University of Rhodesia took up my challenge and succeeded in producing ceramic platelets that gave full protection against armour-piecing rounds fired from 100 metres. He was still negotiating with a manufacturer to produce them on a large scale when our war came to an end. For his efforts Pat Grubb was given clearance to use the technology for his own benefit but, so far as I know, this was another successful Rhodesian development that faded to nothing.
COMPOS established
FROM THE MID 1960S UNTIL MARCH 1977, overall control of operations vested with the Operations Co-ordinating Committee whose secretarial arm was the Joint Planning Staff. The OCC still comprised the Commanders of Army and Air Force, the Commissioner of Police, and the Director of Central Intelligence Organisation. The Chairman of JPS acted as secretary and he was responsible for the execution of all joint service decisions and directives emanating from OCC, whereas individual heads handled single service matters. Because service in the top posts of the Army and Air Force was limited to four years and the Police to five years, only Ken Flower of CIO served continuously on the OCC.
Under OCC were the Provincial Joint Operations Centres
, JOC Hurricane (Bindura), JOC Thrasher (Umtali), JOC Repulse (Fort Victoria), JOC Tangent (Bulawayo) JOC Grapple (Gwelo) and JOC Splinter (Binga). At each JOC the Provincial Head of Internal Affairs was a permanent member. Other government departments, such as road and telecommunications, could be co-opted on an ad hoc basis. Below each JOC there were two or more Sub-JOCs. For instance, under command of JOC Hurricane were Sub-JOCs Sipolilo, Centenary, Mount Darwin and Mtoko.
At no level was there a recognised supremo. Chairing of JOC meetings was done in rotation between the Army, Air force and Police. This style of command and control expected “Reasonable men to act responsibly in co-operation with one another”. So long as we were experiencing total successes against ZIPRA and ZANLA in the years prior to 1974, the system worked remarkably well. However, by late 1976 it had become clear to everyone that ZANLA was gaining ascendancy and that Rhodesia’s resources were being stretched to the limits. It was also clear that, whereas ZANLA was working to a specific strategy, JOCs and sub JOCs were doing their own thing in the absence of clearly defined political and military strategies upon which to formulate plans and tactics.
Considerable enterprise was shown at every level in all services; but these unco-ordinated initiatives were not all good for the country. In the absence of a supreme commander with a staff of top line planners to give executive direction, it was not surprising that strong initiatives by men and units, all driven by frustration and the will to win, too often achieved negative results.
From my viewpoint, the most obvious of these was the negative mindset of many Army and Police officers towards the Selous Scouts, even though the Scouts were directly responsible for the majority of our internal counter-insurgency successes. Much of this arose from a lack of understanding of pseudo operations, and more so because Selous Scouts had to fight red tape and prejudice for everything they needed in terms of men and equipment. Ron Reid-Daly’s fiery character and deep-seated secretive manner did little to help this situation.
It appeared to me that only the RLI, Air Force and Special Branch gave the Selous Scouts support and credit for the incredible work they were doing. Like others, I was often niggled by Selous Scouts ‘freezing’ areas in which pseudo teams were working when I myself had planned to operate over those same areas. But the reason for disallowing any security forces into the ‘frozen areas’ was so obviously intended to avoid misidentification and unnecessary casualties that one learned to live with the situation. Besides, I repeat, most of our successes were coming from the ‘frozen areas’.
I believe the real reason for the Air Force’s positive attitude was that, almost from the start, helicopter crews deployed and recovered pseudo operators to and from their screened-of ‘forts’, so they got to know the Scouts operators personally and were involved in most of their pseudo successes. Apart from this, the Air Force was totally unaffected by Selous Scouts manpower and equipment needs.
A major problem in not having a national military strategy was the periodic misuse of the SAS due to differences in opinions on how the specialist unit should be employed. When made available to JOC Hurricane, the SAS were correctly used to disrupt ZANLA’s external communication routes. When detached to JOC Repulse, they were often used incorrectly on internal Fireforce tasks.
Another weakness in not having an executive command was that a general lack of co-ordination and co-operation went counter to ensuring the optimum utilisation of resources. Provincial JOCs hung jealously to whatever was theirs, often showing a marked reluctance to assist in matters outside of their boundaries—even though ZANLA’s operational zones overlapped our provincial boundaries.
The consequence of all this, and ZANLA’s ever-increasing numbers, was that an air of depression set in and many Rhodesians were emigrating in what was unkindly referred to as ‘the chicken run’. Almost every able-bodied white male was involved in military call-up and everyone could see that the political assurance that Rhodesia would win through was no more than a smoke screen. The Rhodesian press and radio boasted high successes against ZANLA, but studiously avoided telling the civilian population that, for every ZANLA killed or captured two or more replacements flowed in. There was clearly a need to turn things around and indications that such action was about to be taken came when Ian Smith was seen moving around the op areas more than usual.
Pilot John Annan with Prime Minister Ian Smith and the Air Force Commander Air Marshal Mick McLaren about to take his seat. Army Commander General Peter Walls is on the other side of the aircraft. The aerials on the front of the aircraft were for the Becker Homer device that made locating callsigns so much easier.
The move came in March 1977 when a major change in command structure was implemented in an attempt to emulate the direction Britain had taken in handling a similar situation in Malaya during the early 1950s. The British Government appointed General Gerald Templar as Supreme Commander over every arm of government with instructions to reverse ever-mounting Chinese communist successes in their bid to take control of Malaya. As Malaya’s Supremo General Templar’s successes had been spectacular so now, almost too late in the day, Rhodesia aimed to follow suit.
Lieutenant-General Peter Walls was appointed Rhodesia’s Supremo and his new HQ, known as Combined Operations Headquarters (COMOPS), was established in Milton Buildings next to the Prime Minister’s offices. This same building housed Air Force HQ and the Treasury.
Throughout the military, there was a general air of expectancy and hope because most officers were familiar with the Malayan success story. Rhodesia’s ‘C’ Squadron SAS had been formed to serve in Malaya and was used as an extension of ‘A’ and ‘B’ Squadrons of the British Special Air Service. In that war, the Rhodesian unit had borne the title ‘C’ Squadron Malayan Scouts and had been commanded by General Peter Walls, then a major.
When General Templar took control of Malayan affairs, he first planned his strategy to counter communist forces that had been giving the authorities a severe mauling. From the start he knew that arms alone could not win the war. He realised that success depended on every governmental and private organisation acting in perfect unison with well-honed, balanced and unified military forces all acting in harmony to gain the confidence and total support of the Malayan people. Neither petty jealousies between or within any structures nor any weakness in leadership could be tolerated. The enemy had to be denied access to the civil population along with the destruction of his hitherto safe-havens deep inside the jungles. But above all, the ‘hearts and minds of the Malayan people’ was recognised as the key to defeating the communists.
To achieve his political and military aims General Templar needed, and was given, enormous power to act unilaterally. He started by firing the Commissioner of Police and followed through by dismissing many high, and middle-ranking civil and military officers. Ignoring career planning for individuals, he promoted go-getters and soon gained the willing co-operation of the armed forces and the civil authorities. Everyone knew General Templar’s overall plan and how they, individually, fitted into it. The rest is history.
General Templar’s plans worked because he had the power to remould all organisations and dovetail their efforts to support and implement his clearly defined strategy. He did not involve himself in tactics or the nitty-gritty, day-to-day activities, but watched the overall situation closely to ensure that timely corrective actions were taken where and when necessary.
COMOPS had been established for the right reasons, but General Walls was not afforded the powers General Templar had enjoyed. Without these I believe he was stymied. Within a couple of weeks of its formation, it became clear that COMOPS was not going to bring about what we were expecting. Our hopes of receiving clearly defined military direction were dashed because General Templar’s single most important need to ‘win the hearts and minds of the (African) people’ found no place as the firm foundation upon which to build a total strategy. This vital issue was simply ignored. Furthermore there was no effort made to eliminate weakn
ess in leadership at any level.
The real strength of the Rhodesian Army at the time lay in its battle-experienced colonels, lieutenant-colonels and majors, but they stayed in their positions whilst officers of questionable character and performance remained in harness. The same applied to the Police and many government ministries. I believe that, being the smallest of the three armed forces, Air Force leadership was sound at all levels.
General Walls (left) and Group Captain Norman Walsh (right), four years later after taking on his most difficult posting as Commander of the Air Force of Zimbabwe.
In effect COMOPS had merely replaced OCC, but with more people attending lengthier meetings of what became known as the National JOC (NATJOC). The selection of COMOPS staff officers was left to individual HQs and this resulted in General Walls failing to receive the powerful planning staff he needed.
The Air Force approached the formation of COMOPS seriously by posting in Group Captain Norman Walsh, a battle-experienced pilot with outstanding qualities in leadership and bags of common sense.
The same could not be said of Army HQ’s approach to COMOPS needs. Army’s initial allocation of officers was astounding considering it possessed many top-line leaders so essential to Rhodesia’s all-important strategy-formulating body. Instead, it sent officers who were unsuited to appointments demanding clear thinking with proven records of operational proficiency and excellence in both personality and leadership. COMOPS should never have given space to any prima donna.
All too soon it became clear that the new command was not going to serve its intended purpose but would make Rhodesia’s already difficult situation even worse. Instead of formulating strategy, COMOPS involved itself in the day-to-day running of operations, occasionally even instructing JOCs where to move small units. Proven Principles of War were ignored. In fact the only useful function I remember COMOPS performing at that time was ordering reluctant JOCs to pass over their Fireforces to adjacent JOCs when such a need arose.
Winds of Destruction: The Autobiography of a Rhodesian Combat Pilot Page 73
