Joshua Nkomo.
The next day I was surprised to find General Walls, Air Marshal McLaren and Brian Robinson laughing their heads off in the passageway next to Mick’s office. I took this to be normal because Brian was usually very humorous. He saw me and beckoned me to come over to share the joke. No wonder there was such mirth. Brian had brought the news that Nkomo had told reporters he had been at home when the SAS attacked but managed to escape through his toilet window. Anyone hearing or reading this had to be amused by the thought of the enormously fat Nkomo going through an incredibly small window—but the same picture painted in Brian’s words caused us long-forgotten laughter pains.
Kazungula ferry
AT THE SAME TIME THAT the SAS force was moving towards Lusaka, a smaller SAS team was engaged in another clandestine operation. This was at the point where the borders of Rhodesia, Zambia and Botswana meet at Kazungula. The target was the Kazungula ferry owned by Zambia and serving as a vital road link to Botswana across the Zambezi River. For Zambia, it was one of only two active links to Botswana and South Africa, the other being the Victoria Falls rail and road bridge.
Despite Rhodesia’s repeated warnings to both Botswana and Zambia not to allow the ferry to be used for any activity aimed against Rhodesia, ZIPRA was known to be using it freely. Whereas neither Botswana nor Zambia openly sanctioned ZIPRA’s use of the ferry (in fact these two countries forbade it) there was clear proof that ZIPRA was employing clandestine methods to move large amounts of men and equipment into Botswana via Kazungula.
Sneaking men and matériel onto the ferry for the easy road route to Francistown was a much quicker and safer option than walking the long, slow and dangerous overland routes through northern Matabeleland. From Francistown it was a simple enough matter to move to any location in Botswana to launch small forces across the ill-defined border with Rhodesia. JOC Tangent in Bulawayo had repeatedly urged COMOPS to take any action that would put an end to this state of affairs.
COMOPS had been giving consideration to destroying the Kazungula ferry long before Ian Smith warned neighbouring countries, following the Viscount disaster, that they must face the consequences of supporting ZIPRA and ZANLA. In fact a Danish airline that had been flying ZAPU recruits from Botswana to Zambia took the Rhodesian threat to intercept and shoot down its aircraft seriously. The flights ceased immediately; but the ferry remained available.
Whereas it had been considered a simple enough task for SAS specialists to destroy the ferry, the economic consequences of disrupting the route had been assessed as too damaging to South Africa, Botswana, Malawi and Zaire. This all changed when ZIPRA shot down the second Viscount and its invasion plans had become known.
The SAS team moved to the border fence with Botswana after dark. Part of the force eased its way to the ferry’s landing point on the Botswanan shore where it submerged a large explosive charge directly under the position the ferry would dock. The charge was then rigged for a command detonation by radio when the ferry was docked above it.
Well before sunrise on 13 April 1979, all members of the team were hiding next to the border fence inside Rhodesia to wait for the critical moment. Flying out of hearing distance, a Lynx stood by as back-up to the ground party, just in case the ground party’s radio transmission failed to activate the explosive charge. For technical reasons the ferry did not cross the river at its scheduled time of 08:00. It remained on the Zambian bank of the Zambezi for another two agonising hours before setting off for the Botswanan bank where many vehicles and people awaited its arrival.
Considering that there were people to be dropped off on the south bank and others waiting to get onto the ferry, the SAS had a very small time-window in which to blow the ferry when it was empty. This they achieved with a perfectly timed vertical thrust that broke the huge ferry in two.
It was only when the Selous Scouts objected strongly to COMOPS for having destroyed the ferry that I learned how important it had been to undercover agents moving to and from Zambia. Obviously General Walls and others knew this, but ZIPRA’s invasion plans took priority and the ‘need to know’ principle had been strictly applied.
This eventful week rounded off on 21 April when the country went to the polls to vote for its first black government. For some reason, Josiah Tongogara had instructed ZANLA not to interfere with voters and, for the most part, his instruction was heeded. ZIPRA tried to interfere but with limited success and an amazing turnout of 63% of voters occurred. Six weeks later Bishop Abel Muzorewa became the first black prime minister of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia.
Cheetahs
AIR COMMODORE NORMAN WALSH HAD made a secret visit to the Middle East, probably in late 1978, to arrange for the purchase of second-hand Bell 205 helicopters. This helicopter had given excellent service to the Americans in Vietnam where it was known as the ‘Huey’.
Seven of these machines arrived at New Sarum in a somewhat dilapidated state. However, our ever-brilliant technical staff stripped the machines completely, removing many kilograms of sand in the process, and in no time had them spick and span and performing well. This was a particularly noteworthy achievement considering that Warrant Officer Johnny Green and his team had no technical manuals from which to work.
Air HQ gave the Bell 205 helicopter the name ‘Cheetah’ and all seven aircraft passed to No 8 Squadron. Although the Cheetahs were sometimes used on Fireforce work, in which they could carry two Alouettes-worth of troops, they became almost exclusively earmarked to support increasing levels of external operations.
Opportunity was taken during the earliest Cheetah test fights to conduct para-trooping trials. Though these were entirely successful, Dakotas continued to be a more cost-effective method of deploying paratroopers on over-border tasks.
Uncomfortable times in COMOPS
FOR SOME TIME IT HAD been clear that ZAPU and ZANU were receiving forewarning of some of our cross-border operations. It was also clear that the warnings were being given very close to the times of attack. Nkomo’s absence from his home was the last straw. We later learned that the warning had reached him from someone in CIO at about the time the attack force was crossing the Kafue Bridge. Nkomo apparently called for a doubling of the guard before he and his wife moved away to the safety of President Kaunda’s State House. He seemed untroubled by leaving his staff to a fate he failed to warn them about.
Probably prompted by Ron Reid-Daly’s opinions, General Walls made it known that he suspected there was a mole in COMOPS. We were all stunned by this accusation, each considering it a personal affront. The entire staff became very angry that such an opinion existed, never mind that it had been aired in an unnecessarily brazen manner. This occurred immediately after Brigadier Peter Rich was posted in to replace General Barnard as Director General Operations. In discussions with Peter Rich, the COMOPS staff suggested that he should ask General Walls to exclude anyone but COMOPS and the operators from any knowledge of the timings of impending externals. General Walls accepted the idea.
Although CIO and appropriate agencies were always kept in the picture on what was being planned, selected operations were launched earlier than these agencies expected. Every time this was done, we gained maximum surprise because no forewarning to the enemy had been possible via the unknown mole; and General Walls’ trust in his staff was restored.
Unrelated to the mole issue, COMOPS had acquired such a bad reputation amongst Army officers that this made being a member of COMOPS staff distinctly uncomfortable. However with Brigadier Peter Rich as DG OPS, the situation soon changed because COMOPS directives, instructions and queries were all processed through the correct military HQ channels. By mid-year many old tensions had fallen away and co-operation improved noticeably.
When I first joined COMOPS, General Barnard had made some snide remarks about the Air Force taking time off work to suit themselves whilst the Army slogged on. Initially I was perplexed because this could not possibly apply to Norman Walsh, Griff, Dag, Terence or me who regularly worked
long hours, seven days a week. Then it dawned on me that his remarks had been aimed at Mick McLaren who played golf every Wednesday afternoon.
Mick McLaren seemed to me to have become a very secluded man who worked quietly in his office on specific tasks and only appeared amongst the planning staff for special operations’ briefings. He attended all the NATJOC meetings chaired by General Walls where he showed irritation over general ramblings and recurring deferrals on matters that needed urgent resolution.
Just before lunch one Wednesday, I was alone with the air marshal in his office when he told me that Wednesday afternoon golf was essential to keep him sane in a job where, in spite of his position as Deputy Commander of COMOPS, he was neither fish nor fowl. He lacked the authority and job satisfaction that he had enjoyed as Air Force Commander.
It was obvious to COMOPS staff that Mick’s disposition has changed radically and his frustration ceased whenever, in the absence of General Walls, he was in charge. On these occasions he played no golf and was to be seen everywhere in COMOPS. His style of dealing with staff was friendly but forceful, and his chairing of NAT JOC meetings was completely opposite to that of General Walls.
Invariably Mick was faced with long lists of matters that had been repeatedly deferred; a situation he could not abide. I attended a few of his NATJOC meetings to give briefings on various matters and witnessed the marked difference in atmosphere to meetings chaired by General Walls. In his strong South African accent, Mick opened one meeting by pointing out that the only establishment represented at NATJOC with no outstanding items was the Air Force. He insisted that this had to be equalled by all establishments before the next meeting.
Deferred subject after deferred subject was addressed directly to the appropriate head, giving the length of time that had elapsed since the matter was first raised, together with all the reasons previously given for deferrals. In most cases Mick offered his personal opinions on resolutions then directed that the matter be cleared immediately or, at the latest, before the next meeting. He concluded by saying “Gentlemen, I want action. Let me emphasise, yet again, that a wrong decision can be turned around or modified, but no decision is inexcusable.”
By the time General Walls returned to chair a NATJOC meeting, no pending matters remained. Unfortunately, however, new subjects needing decisions started to pile up; and Mick returned to playing golf every Wednesday afternoon.
So far as I was able to judge from general opinion amongst COMOPS officers and those in Army, Air Force and Police HQs, Rhodesia’s forces would have been better off with Mick McLaren as the supremo and Brigadier Peter Rich as his Director-General of Operations. Under such leadership, COMOPS would have fulfilled the purpose for which it was created, and correctly handled directives and instructions would have been dealt with in a manner that avoided the unnecessary antagonisms and mistrust that had been created.
Black government
THE ADVENT OF CHANGE FROM white government to a black majority government had little effect on the management and execution of military aspects of our war—we continued as before. It seemed strange however to have Bishop Abel Muzorewa attending meetings in COMOPS in place of Ian Smith. This dapper little man wearing a dark suit, dog collar on purple clerical vest and outlandish black and white Mafia-styled shoes was very different to the PM we had all come to know well. In his hand, Muzorewa carried a colourful beaded stick that was to be his personal hallmark in the manner of President Kaunda’s white handkerchief and President Kenyatta’s bull-tail switch. Apart from the PM, I only had personal dealings with one black minister.
Minister Francis Zindonga was thickset and enormously pleased with his newfound authority. He had already proven himself to be the only politician with the guts to go into troubled areas to address the tribal folk and tell them about the principles and thoughts of the new government. He had gained a good reputation at COMOPS before I accompanied him to meet white ranchers in the Nuanetsi District Commissioner’s offices in the southern lowveld.
Muzorewa in typical dress seen here with that despicable rat Lord Lord Carrington; ultimate architect of Rhodesia’s demise
At the time, cattle rustling in the south had become a major problemalong with the wilful destruction of miles and miles of fencing. Because of this martial law had been applied to the region. It so happened that Zindonga had been plagued with the same problems himself on his own ranch in the Wedza district. Consequently, he fully sympathised with the ranchers who were up in arms about CT-inspired theft of their highly bred herds.
Zindonga listened to many ranchers tell of how herds were being driven so fast and so far that many of the cattle were found dead along the drive trails. In some cases the herds had been deliberately stampeded to flatten fences resulting in serious injuries that necessitated the destruction of many suffering animals.
When he had heard all that had to be said, Minister Zindonga rose and told the farmers just what they wanted to hear. There were too many cattle rustling events that, together with calls to CT targets, made it impossible for Fireforce or troops to respond to all situations. Because of this, Zindonga gave ranchers the authority to take the law into their own hands and shoot rustlers on sight. The new government would fully support such ‘self defence’ actions in these critical times. From COMOPS’ point of view this dangerous talk highlighted the difference in approach to problems between the old and new orders.
Civilian convoys and rail protection
BY NOW ZANLA GROUPS WERE actively attacking trains on the southern route to Beit Bridge. Even prior to the main offensives, the precaution of escorting all civilian traffic along the route had been taken following deadly ambushes in 1976 on a pair of South African motorcyclists and a lone car. Thereafter nobody was allowed to travel alone, day or night. All civilian vehicles accumulated at the starting points (Fort Victoria—southbound and Beit Bridge—northbound) at published starting times for two convoys a day in each direction, all in daylight hours.
When proceeding to South Africa on holiday with my family in 1976, the convoy commander adjudged me to be driving the slowest vehicle because I had our large Turner Swallow caravan in tow. Because of this I was instructed to be the pace-setter behind two armed Land Rovers. At the rear of 150-odd civilian vehicles were another two armed Land Rovers and another two that roved up and down the three-kilometre convoy length for the three hour-twenty minute drive to Beit Bridge. No pee—breaks were allowed!
The convoy system became a way of life for locals and visitors alike and there were few difficulties or incidents on the roadway. This was because CTs preferred to attack at night to give themselves ample opportunity to move well away before sunrise. Close by on the railway line, things were not so comfortable because it was impossible to confine all rail traffic to daylight hours and flexible response to attacks was not possible for trains in motion.
The greatest threat to rail traffic came from track sabotage, though surprisingly few incidents of this nature went undetected before a train reached any point of damage. Ambushes proved to be more troublesome until ex-Air Force 20mm Hispano cannons were mounted on special wagons—three per train. These armed railway wagons switched from northbound to southbound trains when gun crews were changed over.
Most of the gunners were coloured soldiers, nicknamed ‘goffles’. They did a good job of silencing or limiting CT ambushes, providing they opened fire the moment an ambush was sprung. Sometimes, however, these soldiers were not as wide-awake as they should have been. Following two particularly damaging attacks, it was established that the goffles had picked up prostitutes to provide them ‘comfort’ on their usually uneventful and boring rides. But female distractions resulted in the CTs having sufficient time to lay down damaging fire before cannons responded. In consequence, the armed rail wagons changed name from Cannon Wagons to ‘Nanny Wagons’.
British Conservative government
ON 3 MAY 1979, THE BRITISH public voted the Conservative Party into power and Margaret Thatcher b
ecame the UK’s first female prime minister. Having been so badly let down by a communistically inclined Labour Government, there was good reason for Rhodesian morale to be uplifted. Margaret Thatcher’s statements concerning the need to forget the past and judge the Zimbabwe-Rhodesian situation in the light of the present situation reinforced our hopes in her. She even intimated that Zimbabwe-Rhodesia had done enough for the Conservatives to grant the country recognition and remove sanctions. This all came as a breath of fresh air giving hope that communist ZANU and ZAPU would not be coming to power. Unfortunately history proves that we were wrong. We had yet to learn that the Conservatives were bigger ‘snakes in the grass’ than their predecessors who, it has to be said, did not speak with forked tongues.
Flechette success
IN EARLY MAY I RECEIVED an urgent message from the Duty Officer at JOC Thrasher to say that a TF callsign of 4RR was asking for an immediate jet-strike. The callsign was in an OP on a prominent mountain ridge overlooking a known CT entry route that ran from the Revue Dam area in Mozambique into the Burma Valley, Rhodesia. This callsign had noticed high levels of activity in four villages with many women moving to and from a section of bush lying between the villages carrying bowls and dishes on their heads. The callsign commander told JOC Thrasher he was 100-per cent certain that a large group of ZANLA CTs were being fed and, since he was FAC trained, he could talk jets directly onto the target.
It so happened that a pair of Hunters had just been scrambled for an internal target. I cannot recall who was leading but know for certain that the wingman was Ginger Baldwin. My gut feeling was that the Mozambican target deserved priority, so I requested Air HQ Ops to divert the Hunters to the Burma Valley area. The pilots were unprepared for this change and did not have large-scale maps of the target location. Fortunately Burma Valley was very well known so it was easy enough to give the TF callsign position as the third border peak on the south side of the valley.
Winds of Destruction: The Autobiography of a Rhodesian Combat Pilot Page 87
