Rex listened to my story then expressed his mirth with his typical deep belly laugh rolled into his rough smoker’s voice as he said, “He will be in for a tough time now! Everyone here has seen you and heard you talk. First they may wonder why you went to Timothy, but will then come to the conclusion he was passing information on ZANLA’s activities to you in Salisbury.”
The implications of this were frightening, so I asked Rex to make sure no harm came to the young man. “Do not worry,” said Rex, “he will not be hurt too badly. After what you did for him he deserves a bit of rough treatment for letting you down.” (In July 1980 Timothy was disbanded and visited us in Salisbury. He was well and confirmed that he had been severely harassed, “but not too badly hurt.”)
Of all the Commonwealth Monitoring Force teams in the ZANLA bases, only the Fijian team at AP Hotel appeared to be popular with the inmates where there was a modicum of order and discipline. This probably had a lot to do with the colour of the Fijian’s skin. Otherwise all ZANLA APs were packed with scruffy, ill-disciplined mujibas who scowled andslouched about. As already mentioned, there was very little evidence of men possessing the calibre and looks that typified the ZANLA operators we had either killed or captured in operations. Other than the Swiss sniper rifles, weapons were old and dilapidated. The operational weapons inside Rhodesia were very obviously still in the field with many hundreds of ZANLA’s regulars involved in electioneering work.
ZANLA mujibas.
Unlike General Barnard and me, General Acland and Brigadier Gurdon seemed impressed with what they saw, whereas Lookout Masuku and Dumiso Dabengwa were horrified and their disdain for ZANLA showed clearly in their facial expressions.
No notice whatsoever was taken of our comments about the types and state of weapons until these Brits saw how ZIPRA’s men were armed.
Visits to ZIPRA APs
AFTER ZANLA, ZIPRA LOCATIONS WERE like a breath of fresh air. It certainly opened the eyes of the Brits and might even have made them realise why we insisted that all ZANLA APs were full of mujibas. The reason Rhodesians preferred ZIPRA was immediately apparent to General Acland and Brigadier Gurdon. They could see that the ZIPRA men were dressed in clean, crisply pressed uniforms; they moved with purpose, smiled easily, displayed good discipline and acted with courtesy.
It was possible to walk around without an escort, which I enjoyed. Wherever I went I was saluted and greeted in a friendly manner and also drew men who wanted to walk and talk with a Rhodesian Air Force pilot. It was only at AP Romeo, the very last Assembly Point to be visited, where Lookout Masuku had unusual events planned.
As our helicopter was making its long descending approach to Rukomechi Mission, one could not help but notice, from about five kilometres out, that many anti-aircraft guns were tracking the Puma helicopter. Lookout Masuku had forewarned the RAF crew of the guns so the helicopter captain was perfectly happy to maintain direction and descent.
Because nothing had been said to any of us in the rear cabin, the sight of those tracking guns put fear in the eyes of Simon Muzenda, Rex Nhongo and Tungamirai’s deputy. I was also feeling uncomfortable until I saw the smile on Lookout’s face as he winked at me.
When we alighted from the helicopter, the bush that surrounded the small LZ came alive as hundreds of armed ZIPRA men rose from the cover they had used to camouflage their presence. The Brits seemed impressed and ZANLA shrugged it of as unnecessary bravado.
Guard of honour.
This style of marching, both fascist and communist.
A guard of honour awaited our arrival and General Barnard was invited to inspect the men dressed in East German fleckcamouflage uniforms. Their goose-step march-past made my skin crawl, but one could not miss the fact that we were watching trained soldiers.
This style of marching, both fascist and communist, made my skin crawl.
After the usual briefing, this time by ZIPRA officers, we were invited to a parade to be followed by a weapons demonstration. Some 2,000 ZIPRA soldiers were formed up in tiered lines from ground level to the top of the long earth embankment that served as a grandstand for the mission’s football field. The visiting party formed up in a line facing the assembly with CMF and ZIPRA officers behind.
Lookout Masuku moved forward and gave a short message to his troops. He then said that he would introduce the members of the Ceasefire Committee individually. Lookout gave place of honour to the Rhodesians and for reasons already known to me I was introduced first. I simply took one pace forward, saluted and stepped back into line. General Barnard followed me. Next Lookout introduced General Acland and Brigadier Gurdon before ZANLA.
Rex Nhongo was standing right beside me. As he stepped forward to salute, he was greeted with the menacing metallic sounds of heavy weapons being cocked. Being so close to him I went cold, expecting to be shot at any moment. Rex ignored the deliberate insult, saluted and stepped back. When Tungamirai’s deputy stepped forward, weapons were cocked again. ZIPRA’s hatred of ZANLA had been shown in a very graphic but typically African way!
Formalities over, we were asked to turn around to watch anti-aircraft crews deploy and fire their weapons. In the absence of an air target, a prominent white rock on a large hill about three kilometres away to our left was declared to be the target. Whistles were blown and out of the bush to our right emerged three crews pulling wheeled guns to a position some thirty metres to our front. One 23mm and two 14.7mm guns were set up quickly, and one of the 14.7 pieces commenced firing but jammed after expending about ten rounds. The others then opened fire, creating one hell of a dim. Green and red tracer rounds raced away with the red 23mm rounds travelling noticeably faster than the green ones. The accuracy was impressive.
The senior ZIPRA commander of AP Romeo insisted that I should take a close look at the guns. He boasted that these had shot down some of our aircraft at Kariba. I did not argue with him because he seemed so pleased about something that never happened.
Back row: S. Karoulis, K. E. Wainer, Pte (RWS) C. A. Brooking, H. F. Dixon, WO2 J. Knight, C. Gardiner, C/Sgt (RWS) M. S. Finch, Cpl (RWS) K. M. Anderson, M. M. Partington. Centre row: A. Webb, Lt N. Dunn, Lt-Col B. G. Robinson OLM MCM, Maj A. M. Linder OLM, Maj A. B. C. H. Dalton OLM, Sqn Ldr R. R. MacGregor, Col H. Meyer, Wg Cdr C. J. Dixon DCD, A. J. Barthorpe, I. Young, S. Stevenson, Sgt R. D. Williams, W. Ackhurst. Seated: C Supt R. H. H. E. Harvey, Lt-Col J. M. Templer, Lt-Col P. J. Burford MLM, P. R. Cocksedge, Brig L. Jacobs MLM, B. Page MLM, Lt-Gen B. P. Walls GLM DCD MBE, Air Mshl M. J. McLaren CLM, Maj-Gen A. B. Campling DCD, Gp Capt P. J. H. Petter-Bowyer MLM DCD, Asst Cmmr G. E. Hedhes, C Supt A. J. Worden, Col E. M. Willar (Rtd) MLM DMM.
Elections
UNTIL A NEW GOVERNMENT WAS elected into power, management of the country vested with the British Government in the person of Governor Lord Soames, though law and order remained in the hands of NATJOC. In terms of the Lancaster House Agreement, Lord Soames had the responsibility of preparing all polling stations and ensuring voters enjoyed total security and freedom of choice. Of greater importance was his responsibility to ensure that no political party indulged in the intimidation of voters during the lead-up to elections. Any party found guilty of intimidation was to be disqualified wholly or in part by proscribing specific electoral zones.
In this task Lord Soames failed dismally. Mugabe’s ZANU party not only disregarded its undertaking to get all ZANLA into the APs, it kept 90% of its forces in the field with orders to indulge in cruel electioneering methods including murder of important members of black opposition parties. Soames knew this was going on but refused to invalidate Mugabe’s party either wholly or in those areas where intimidation was greatest. The British had neither the courage nor integrity to stand by the very agreement they had brought upon the four contesting parties. Appeasement in the face of threats from the OAU and black Commonwealth leaders was obviously more important to Britain’s long-term objectives than the future of the people of Zimbabwe-Rhodesian. When Henry Kissinger met Ian Smith many months
later he explained the paradox like this. “The politics of convenience has little to do with truth or logic!”
We had become accustomed to British duplicity but could not abide what we perceived to be total inaction by our NATJOC in forcing Lord Soames to act on British undertakings. The NATJOC’s attention seemed wholly distracted by other matters.
For some weeks a team had been assembled in COMOPS to monitor loads of incoming data to pre-determine the final outcome of elections. Information poured in from all provinces giving voter numbers and their political leanings. As I recall it, the opinion being expressed to NATJOC was that Ian Smith’s RF party would secure all twenty white seats and Joshua Nkomo was sure to get at least twenty N’debele seats. Muzorewa and Sithole only needed to win eleven seats to allow a coalition between these parties to block Mugabe’s ZANU party. The team advising NATJOC was adamant that Muzorewa alone would do better than this.
I was having a drink in the small COMOPS pub one evening when, inevitably, the elections became the topic of conversation. Some time earlier I had come to the firm conclusion that, short of proscribing ZANU, there was absolutely no hope of stopping Mugabe coming to power. I expressed this opinion but had no chance to qualify it because a fiery COMOPS lieutenantcolonel was so put out by my words that he leapt across the bar counter intending to strike me with his fist. Major Peter Burford quickly came between us and told his colleague not to be a bloody fool. “I think the Groupie may be right. Give him an opportunity to tell us why.”
My contention was this. The electorate could be counted on to give Smith and Nkomo a total of forty seats. For a number of reasons I thought this left the remaining sixty seats open to Mugabe. In terms of the Lancaster House Agreement, Mugabe should already have been ruled out of the elections for blatant and widespread intimidation and murder. But, the Brits were obviously not going to do this and, from what we could see, the NATJOC seemed either misinformed or too weak to force the issue, even though the Lancaster House Agreement had placed it in control of all security matters. NATJOC was specifically tasked with ensuring that the entire election process was conducted in a free and fair manner. With intimidation peaking and time running out, this made the NATJOC’s perceived inaction all the more intolerable.
Muzorewa had shown himself to be weak and indecisive, whereas Mugabe had told the people that only he could stop the war. In Harare Township the urban people, who had been on-side throughout the war, were now openly singing Mugabe praise songs. To my way of thinking, the writing was on the wall. Eighty per cent of the black electorate lived outside Matabeleland, and all of these would vote ‘for peace’. They had suffered most and were now thoroughly sick and tired of a war they genuinely believed could only be stopped by Mugabe. That was my contention, but General Walls and the NATJOC obviously saw things differently.
Possibly because he believed the information being fed to him and wished to uphold the morale of his forces, General Walls called a meeting of Army and Air Force officers at the New Sarum Sports Club. As I recall, no member of COMOPS staff was included.
Since I did not attend the meeting addressed by General Walls, I cannot say exactly what was said. I do know, however, that he gave the assembled officers his personal guarantee that he would not allow Mugabe to come to power. I also know that the general’s speech left most officers with a clear understanding that military action would be taken against ZANU in the ‘unlikely event’ that it gained a majority at the polls. This notion, however, was very much at odds with what General Walls had told his own staff. In COMOPS we had been informed, categorically, that no unconstitutional action would be considered. General Walls said, “There is no question of Rhodesians indulging in a military coup.”
The ‘whites only’ election was held on 14 February and went off smoothly with Ian Smith’s RF party gaining all twenty white seats, as expected. On 27, 28 and 29 February the ‘common roll’ voters went to the polling stations where illprepared London Bobbies and other Commonwealth observers watched the long lines of voters ‘to ensure that no intimidation was taking place’. They had no idea that ZANLA had told harassed tribesmen that the reason for three days of voting was simple. Day One was for all people voting for Mugabe; Day Two was for Muzorewa and Day Three for Nkomo. Anyone not voting on Day One would be dealt with very severely.
The observers, most on African soil for the first time, were blissfully unaware of subtle intimidation going on right under their noses or of blatant intimidation against people approaching from beyond their sight; this was at its worst during Days Two and Three. But Rhodesians who watched could clearly see ZANLA’s underhanded methods. Intimidation was rife and people were told that voting for Mugabe had been extended to include all three days. “The spirits and special spies will reveal any individual who did not place his mark in favour of ZANU.”
The news coming in from all around the country seemed to undo any false hopes amongst members of the NATJOC. High levels of frustration were evident with much toing and froing between COMOPS and Government House. General Walls sent an urgent signal to Margaret Thatcher in an attempt to stop the rot. He received no reply until elections were over, and there was not the faintest hint that any action would be taken by Britain against ZANU.
Whilst this was going on, I continued to spend most of my time with ZIPRA and ZANLA. ZIPRA knew what was going on in the field and were thoroughly depressed. ZANLA knew what was going on in the field and were elated. Throughout the day of 3 March, results of the elections kept coming through but no clear-cut trend emerged until late that night. Things looked bad when I eventually retired to bed.
I recall sitting at my desk the next morning when a sensation of overwhelming panic struck me just as a cup of tea was placed before me. Even though I thought I was fully prepared, final confirmation over the radio of Mugabe’s whopping fifty-seven seats victory floored me. It must have been really awful for those who had been so confident that Muzorewa would get more than eleven seats because he only gained three! During the afternoon the Ceasefire Committee held its closing meeting and a final photograph was taken on the steps outside the conference room.
In a stunned state I wandered up to Air HQ to be near friends and to gaze out of the window of the office I once used for my projects work. Salisbury’s streets and avenues were filled with celebrating blacks. Open lorries were parading about, filled with excited people, flapping their arms and uttering the sound of a cockerel crowing at dawn—ZANU’s election symbol.
Front row: General Barnard, Rex Nhongo, General Acland, Dumiso Dabengwa, PB. Middle row: Brigadier Gurdon, the pretty Rhodesian lady (half hidden) Miss C. Gardener who took notes for COMOPS, Lt-Col Parker Bowles, Lookout Masuku.
Back row: Left: Rhodesian Army intelligence officer (face remembered but name forgotten). Not present: Josiah Tungamirai who had not yet returned from ZANLA’s pressure-electioneering campaign.
Because I was a member of the Ceasefire Committee with continuing liaison duties between COMOPS, ZIPRA and ZANLA, it is not surprising that I was totally unaware that SAS and RLI were on immediate standby to take out ZANLA’s hierarchy in the event of a Mugabe victory. However, high hopes following detailed planning and rehearsed tasks, which included the employment of tanks and other heavy equipment, turned out to be a damp squib. The secret codeword to launch this top-secret operation was never given. Incensed by General Walls’s assurance that Mugabe would not be allowed to come to power, the disgusted SAS named the situation ‘Rhodesia’s Walls Street Crash’.
At all of Salisbury’s major road intersections vehicle-borne troops waited for trouble whilst trying to put on a brave face for passing civilians—but nothing happened. Overhead, helicopters orbited, watching for any breakout of looting—but this did not occur. An air of depression and uncertainty hung over all who opposed ZANU as well as many who had been coerced through fear into voting for Mugabe’ party. Many people went home, shops closed and almost all work had ceased by midday.
Radio and telev
ision stations ran some regular programmes, but for the most part Mugabe’s victory held prominence. Repeatedly listeners and viewers were reminded that Robert Mugabe would address the nation at 8 pm.
When he came on air, Mugabe projected himself as a decent chap, preaching reconciliation and the need to put the past behind us. He was at pains to give hope and asked every citizen of the new Zimbabwe to move forward with faith and determination to build on its vibrant economy in a non-racial society. Whilst he was speaking, I sensed considerable relief. However, when he had finished, I thought things through.
When released from prison in 1974 to participate in the Zambian-South African sponsored talks in Lusaka, Mugabe had broken solemn undertakings by escaping into Mozambique. He had failed to meet any promise made to Nkomo. Yet now, having blatantly broken every agreement with Britain and three other parties at Lancaster House, he was projecting himself as an honest and fair-minded man. I could not accept this. The Mugabe leopard was not about to change his spots; he was a Marxist through and through and could be counted on to change direction whenever it suited him.
Within an hour of the speech my mind was made up. I had to resign from the Air Force and decide if I should stay in Zimbabwe or sell up and move my family away from a Marxist government that would undoubtedly become a oneparty dictatorship, just like the rest of black Africa. Personal enrichment for Africa’s leading politicians had deprived their peoples of pre-independence wealth and their pathetic management had destroyed previously strong economic foundations. Zimbabwe would be no different!
Winds of Destruction: The Autobiography of a Rhodesian Combat Pilot Page 95
