by Eric Hammel
Early on February 10, Alpha/1/5 was detached from its parent battalion and ordered to proceed via Phu Bai to the 1st Marines CP in Hue. At 1400, 1st Marines assumed operational control of Alpha/1/5, and, at 1430, the company proceeded by vehicle convoy to the damaged An Cuu Bridge. After dismounting from the trucks and crossing the span on foot, Alpha/1/5 proceeded without incident to MACV and set in for the night. Late in the day, two platoons of Bravo/1/5 were also detached from 1/5 and ordered to the 5th Marines CP, in Phu Bai.
At midnight that night, the 5th Marines CP contacted Major Thompson, who was hunkered down in a hole in the middle of an open, rain-swept field eight or nine kilometers from Phu Loc. Regiment told Thompson to pack up the rest of the battalion and proceed immediately to Phu Bai to take part in a new operation. Thompson later claimed he was so cold he could barely speak. But his operations officer, Major Len Wunderlich, was right in the hole with Thompson, and he thought that Thompson's words were choked more by anger or exasperation than by the cold. In any event, Thompson finally pieced together a reply that conveyed to his superiors that elements of his battalion were in contact with the enemy and that he thought a night disengagement would not be a smart move. He said he would begin to disengage from the contact at first light and get up to Phu Bai as soon as possible. The regimental commander heard Thompson out, said he understood the basis of Thompson's objections, and told Thompson to carry out his order anyway. With that, the main body of 1/5 began a night march through the wind and rain, across flooded fields and freezing, swift-running streams, nearly nine kilometers to Phu Loc.
At first light on February 11,1/5's entire rear echelon was ordered by 5th Marines to move immediately from Phu Loc to Phu Bai. Also at first light, Major Thompson's main body arrived back at Phu Loc. The battalion CP group, escorted by one infantry platoon, left for Phu Bai at 0810. At 0930, as soon as Major Thompson reached the 5th Marines CP, 1/5 was officially passed to the operational control of the 1st Marines for duty in Hue.
When Bob Thompson and Major Len Wunderlich stopped by the Task Force X-Ray CP for a quick check-in chat before departing for Hue, they received a situation briefing that appears to have been every bit as vague as those served up to Hue-bound units on January 31, the first day of combat in Hue. In fact, Brigadier General Foster LaHue, the Task Force X-Ray commander, frankly admitted that he knew little about the situation in Hue; he even asked Thompson to "let me know what's going on when you get there." Thus, when Thompson and Wunderlich left for their battalion's new area of operations, they were supported more by vague rumor than by hard fact.
If Bob Thompson had learned little about conditions in Hue, his Marines had learned plenty—perhaps too much—from members of 1/1 and 2/5 who were filtering through Phu Bai on a score of different chores. Naturally, the old salts told the new guys only the most lurid tales of life and death amid the rubble in Hue. And, naturally, the 1/5 Marines both disbelieved the street-fighting veterans and decided that their own bravery and professionalism were being questioned. In fact, as 2/5's and 1/1's maimed companies had learned, there was no way to prepare for the especially brutal brand of warfare the new guys would face in Hue. They could only learn by doing.
At 1045, February 11, Bravo/1/5 boarded Marine CH-46 helicopters at Phu Bai for a lift directly into the 1st ARVN Division CP compound, inside the Citadel. Within fifteen minutes of lift-off, Bravo/1/5 received its baptism in Hue. Small-arms fire rising to greet the Marine helicopters from the NVA-held portion of the Citadel wounded the pilot of the CH-46 carrying Bravo/l/5's 3rd Platoon. The copilot was obliged to return immediately to Phu Bai so the wounded officer could be treated.
At 1600, Bravo/l/5's 3rd Platoon departed Phu Bai again, this time as security for a road convoy charged with delivering the 1/5 battalion CP group to Hue. The convoy made the obligatory stop at the fallen An Cuu Bridge, and everyone piled out and crossed the Phu Cam Canal single file on a jury-rigged 2-inch-by-12-inch catwalk. On the way up Highway 1, Major Len Wunderlich was awestruck by the destruction he witnessed. Major Thompson conducted a methodical tactical advance along the rubble-choked highway even though many studiously incautious 2/5 and 1/1 Marines were out and about. Thus, it wasn't until after 1800, February 11, that he and Major Wunderlich reported to the 1st Marines forward CP at MACV to learn what was in store for themselves and their Marines.
Thompson and Wunderlich reported to Colonel Stan Hughes, the 1st Marines CO, who was to show them where 1/5 would operate inside the Citadel. Hughes pointed to the Citadel on his map and told Thompson that 1/5 would operate under orders only from 1st Marines, not from the 1st ARVN Division. That was all. When Thompson tried to outline a plan for using his companies in the attack, Hughes cut him off in mid-sentence and said, "Major, I'm not at all interested in what you do with your companies. That's your business."
As Major Thompson was finishing up with the regimental commander, Major Wunderlich went off to confer with the 1st Marines assistant operations officer, Major Bob Kerlich, an old and trusted friend. In the next few minutes, Kerlich told Wunderlich everything he had been able to pick up about how 2/5 and 1/1 had developed the use of tanks, Ontos, recoilless rifles, 3.5-inch rocket launchers, CS tear gas, and other weapons in clearing built-up areas. It was all news to Wunderlich, whose training in street fighting was rudimentary and long ago. The biggest problem Wunderlich faced was finding the equipment and ordnance his battalion lacked. Fortunately, while passing through Phu Bai, Wunderlich had been advised to take his battalion's 3.5-inch rocket launchers out of storage, and he had seen that it was done. Late in the evening, as Major Thompson was arranging for the Perfume River crossing the next day, he was approached by a bespectacled, middle-aged U.S. Army major who, on second glance, proved to be a chaplain. The stranger introduced himself as Father Aloysius McGonigal, and he said right off that he had heard that 1/5 had come to Hue without a chaplain. Thompson confirmed the report, and the priest offered to accompany 1/5 into the Citadel and stay until the Navy sent a new chaplain to join the battalion. Thompson readily agreed, and they sealed the deal with a handshake. Little did either man know how profoundly their lives would be affected by their casual arrangement.
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The plans to move 1/5 into the Citadel to take part in the final clearing operation were well advanced. As 1/5 was staging into Hue on February 11, the five M-48 gun tanks of the 1st Platoon of Alpha Company, 1st Tank Battalion, were on the move aboard Navy LCUs from Danang. In fact, the tanks were landed at a secure quay only a hundred meters east of the Truong Dinh Gate, the secure entrance into the Citadel's northern corner. All five of the tanks were inside the 1st ARVN Division CP compound by 1645. Less than an hour later, at 1730, Alpha/1/5 was picked up by LCUs at the Hue LCU ramp, ferried up the Perfume alongside the Citadel's northeast wall, and landed behind the five M-48 tanks. Thus, by nightfall on February 11, all of Alpha/1/5, two-thirds of Bravo/1/5, and five Marine M-48 tanks were inside the Citadel. Charlie/1/5 and Delta/1/5 were expected to report to Hue the next day, and Major Thompson, his CP group, and Bravo/l/5's 3rd Platoon expected to make the river journey from the Hue LCU ramp to the Citadel the next morning.
The plan for 1/5 was to launch its attack inside the Citadel on February 12, but delays in rebuilding the An Cuu Bridge and the shortage of transport combined to put Major Thompson's battalion a full day behind schedule. Then, on D-day itself, small-arms fire from NVA soldiers atop the Citadel's northwest wall, overlooking the river, seriously threatened the LCU ferry service. As a result, Major Thompson, his CP group, the Bravo/1/5 escort platoon, and Charlie/1/5 did not leave the Hue LCU ramp until late in the afternoon, with a flight of Huey helicopters overhead as surety against enemy fire.
When the CP group finally did land at the quay adjacent to the Citadel's northern corner, Major Thompson personally led it astray, southeast along the northwest wall. The Marines had already progressed several hundred yards in the wrong direction before several Vietnamese civilians c
ame out and stopped them with cries of "Beaucoup VC!" The civilians got the Marines turned around and guided them to the Truong Dinh Gate, but the massive gate was closed and the guards refused to open the portal. They even demanded that Thompson disperse his force lest it draw mortar fire. Not quite the most patient soul in Hue, Bob Thompson reached the end of his fuse and icily informed the gate-guard commander that Charlie/1/5 would make a direct assault on the gate if it was not opened immediately. No sooner had the U.S. Marine battalion commander delivered his ultimatum than the gateway was thrown open. On the other side, the battalion CP group was greeted by the commanders of Alpha/1/5 and Bravo/1/5, which were already inside.
By the time Major Thompson reported to General Truong's CP, it was after 1800. However, in dribs and drabs, three U.S. Marine companies and the battalion CP were assembled within the 1st ARVN Division CP compound by late that evening. Not present was Delta/1/5, which had arrived in Hue intact but had been placed under the operational control of 2/5 for duty south of the Perfume.
Major Thompson was warmly welcomed by Brigadier General Truong outside the ARVN Tactical Operations Center. At the ensuing meeting, which several of Truong's American advisors attended, the ARVN division commander told the U.S. Marine battalion commander, "Major, whatever you want to do, we'll support. We are having a difficult time." Truong's cooperative demeanor put Bob Thompson at his ease; he felt that he could work with the scrappy Vietnamese general. Thompson told Truong what he had in mind; and Truong quickly outlined the deployment of the ARVN units inside the Citadel, his expectations for reinforcements, and how he planned to conduct his renewed attack to clear the reinforced 6th NVA Regiment.
In a radio message at 2015, February 12, Major Thompson informed the 1st Marines CP that
Unless directed otherwise, [I] intend to commence attack at [0800, February 13] as directed by [the regimental operations order]. Two battalions of Vietnamese Marines assigned to conduct search-and-destroy operations in northern sector of Hue on right flank of [1/5] have not arrived, and their time of arrival is unknown.
While 1/5 was moving toward Phu Bai and Hue, the VNMC's Battle Group Alpha, commanded by Major Huong Thong, was moving from Saigon to Hue. The entire VNMC—six infantry battalions and one 105mm howitzer battalion—had been embroiled in the battle to save Saigon. Though the battle there was far from over, the situation had stabilized to the point where two VNMC battalions, an artillery battery, and one of the VNMC's two battle-group (brigade) headquarters were spared for duty in Hue. Battle Group Alpha was to replace the 1st ARVN Airborne Battle Group. Selected for duty in Hue were the 1st and 5th VNMC battalions and one six-gun 105mm howitzer battery. The battle-group headquarters and the 1st VNMC Battalion were ordered to fly from Saigon to I Corps late on February 10, and the 5th VNMC Battalion was to follow as soon as transport could be arranged.
It is emblematic of the slow progress toward normalcy in the wake of TCK-TKN that the VNMC battle-group staff was unable to learn from higher headquarters the precise nature of the situation in and around Hue and Phu Bai. Until he actually landed at peaceful Phu Bai, Captain Ron Ray, the temporary senior advisor assigned to VNMC Battle Group Alpha, had no idea that Phu Bai was secure. Indeed, he did not know he was in Phu Bai until after he had landed, for he had been told that his battalion would be transported directly into Hue's Tay Loc Airfield, inside the Citadel. At Phu Bai, however, liaison officers from Task Force X-Ray greeted the newly arrived VNMC units and provided maps and a briefing on the situation in northern I Corps.
Problems arose almost as soon as the meeting ended. The senior U.S. Marine officers representing Task Force X-Ray made it abundantly clear that they expected the leading half of the VNMC battle group to depart immediately for Hue. Major Thong, the VNMC battle-group commander, refused to be rushed. He wanted to wait until his entire task force had assembled at Phu Bai, by which time he hoped to have arranged for transportation and complete intelligence briefs. The U.S. Marine officers immediately began pressuring Major Thong, but Thong stuck to his guns.
Through the night, the U.S. Marine advisors assigned to VNMC Battle Group Alpha were hard at work trying to get better intelligence data and to arrange for helicopter, motor transport, or landing craft—whatever—to get the VNMC units to Hue. Though Task Force X-Ray wanted the Vietnamese Marines to mount out now, no one seemed willing to help them do so. At a minimum, the Vietnamese Marines needed field jackets to ward off the cold of northern I Corps, and all manner of weapons, gear, and ammunition that had not been replaced in the hurried departure from Saigon.
Toward dawn, February 11, the pot boiled over. Captain Ron Ray was inside the Task Force X-Ray CP, on the radio, trying to talk a U.S. Army helicopter unit into transporting the Vietnamese Marines to Hue. Ray had his back to the door when he heard a loud, authoritarian voice behind him erupt in a stream of derogatory language. Certain he was the target of the verbal abuse, Captain Ray spun on his heel and saw, live and in person, Lieutenant General Robert Cushman, the III MAF commanding general. Accompanying Cushman was Brigadier General Foster LaHue, commanding general of Task Force X-Ray. And behind the Marine generals were a U.S. Army major general Captain Ray did not know and an entourage of U.S. Marine and U.S. Army senior field-grade officers.
Captain Ray had no idea why General Cushman was berating him for not deploying "his" VNMC unit immediately. Ray had no authority over the Vietnamese Marines; he was just an advisor. The man to see was Ray's opposite number, Major Thong. But the young captain was not invited to speak, and he dared not do so. He took his dressing down like a good trooper, in silence, until General Cushman, a World War II Medal of Honor winner, wound down and finally followed General LaHue into LaHue's office for a ten-minute meeting. After General Cushman and his entourage left, General LaHue took Captain Ray aside and assured the younger officer that he, for one, understood the relationship of the advisor to his opposite number, and that he, LaHue, would do everything in his power to arrange for the VNMC battle group's needs.
General Cushman's extreme behavior was probably motivated by orders direct from the MACV commander, General William Westmoreland. The VNMC battle group was under pressure to get rolling because Westmoreland—and probably President Lyndon Johnson—wanted the NLF battle flag lowered from the southeast wall of the Citadel as soon as possible.
Major Thong stuck to his guns until the 5th VNMC Battalion arrived on February 11, and then until both VNMC battalions had been reequipped as completely as possible. Late in the day, Battle Group Alpha, aboard U.S. Marine trucks, mounted out of Phu Bai in the rain and cold. The Vietnamese Marines reached Hue without incident, but even the most battle-hardened veterans were stunned by the extensive destruction that greeted them there. Nothing in Saigon had prepared them for such damage. The VNMC units boarded U.S. Navy LCUs for a quick, uneventful trip up the Perfume River to the quay just east of the Truong Dinh Gate. By the late evening of February 12, the two VNMC infantry battalions, one six-gun 105mm howitzer battery, and battle-group headquarters were ready to jump off into the battle to liberate the Citadel.
As the plan for the final attack to liberate the Citadel from within evolved, Major Bob Thompson's 1/5 was assigned the relief of the entire 1st ARVN Airborne Battle Group, which was operating southeast of the 1st ARVN Division CP compound. Thus, the U.S. Marines would attack with their left flank along the Citadel's northwest wall in a zone from two to four blocks wide. The main body of Lieutenant Colonel Phan Ba Hoa's 3rd ARVN Regiment would continue to operate around the Citadel's western corner, and Major Huong Thong's VNMC Battle Group Alpha would be employed as needed, no doubt to replace the exhausted 1st ARVN Division infantry battalions around Tay Loc Airfield and the Chanh Tay Gate.
The plan of operations and deployment of U.S. and South Vietnamese assets within the Citadel had a strange aspect. Naturally, all the ARVN and VNMC units north of the Perfume were to operate under the direct control of Brigadier General Ngo Quang Tr
uong's 1st ARVN Division. However, Major Bob Thompson's 1/5 would be directly controlled by the 1st Marines commander, Colonel Stan Hughes, despite the fact that the U.S. Marine battalion would be operating adjacent to and as an integral part of the ARVN/VNMC operation. In fact, before Thompson left MACV for the Citadel, he received express orders that he was to deploy 1/5 to deliver its attack to the southeast, with his left flank resting on the Citadel's northeast wall. To underscore the lines of command to which Thompson was to adhere, senior 1st Marines officers specifically enjoined him from obeying General Truong's orders if they were in any way contrary to those issued by his U.S. Marine superiors. Further underscoring 1/5's unique status and its unusual command relationship to 1st ARVN Division, General Truong personally ordered the direct attachment of the small 2nd Battalion, 3rd ARVN Regiment, to 1/5 for purposes of undertaking rear and flank security, mopping up, and civilian-control operations. The ARVN battalion commander would be subordinate to Major Thompson.
In a war in which U.S. units were ostensibly subordinate to the GVN forces, the operation to clear Hue's politically and culturally symbolic Citadel hardly seemed the place to register a tacit but clear misgiving about General Truong's ability to command a U.S. combat unit. Truong personally took no offense; he was happy to have all the help his American allies could provide, and he did everything in his power to facilitate 1/5's role in the Citadel. But, in the midst of the Vietnam War's penultimate political emergency, 1/5's command relationship with Truong was a strange way to deal with the unfailingly competent and aggressive 1st ARVN Division commanding general.
