by Peires, Jeff
Cathcart also promised the chiefs that they would henceforth ‘be allowed to govern their people strictly according to their own laws’.64 Cathcart was convinced – and rightly so – that Sir Harry Smith’s foolish attempt to cut down the chiefs and depose Sandile was one of the major causes of the War of Mlanjeni. His entire administrative policy was based on the principle that the colonial authorities should recognise the legal jurisdiction of the Xhosa chiefs and rule the people through them. There can be no doubt that Cathcart was absolutely sincere when he promised the Xhosa chiefs that their domestic powers would be respected. But this did not make his promise any more trustworthy, as we shall see in the next chapter.
We cannot leave the War of Mlanjeni without tracing the fate of the enigmatic individual who gave it his name. We have already mentioned that the failure of the Riverman’s charms to protect the warriors from European weapons came as a great shock to the Xhosa who had trusted implicitly in his magical protection. In the wake of their disillusionment, they had attempted to make peace with the colonial government. Indeed Sandile had thoughts of capturing or killing Mlanjeni himself and then sending him to Sir Harry Smith as a peace offering. Chief Xhoxho, Sandile’s brother, actually attempted to seize the Riverman but did not succeed. Even Chief Siyolo, under whose military protection Mlanjeni lived for most of the war, loudly condemned the prophet for inducing him to fight under false pretences, and did his best to make a separate peace.65
And yet, in spite of all the disillusionment and frustration his prophecies had called forth, the power and influence of Mlanjeni never entirely disappeared. Messengers from distant African nations – the Sotho, the Thembu, the Mpondo, the Mpondomise66 – all sent to him for war charms or for the secret of catching witches. Many Xhosa chiefs seem to have continued to ask Mlanjeni to interpret the omens concerning specific military undertakings. Our information is scanty and we do not know enough to say for certain whether or not Mlanjeni directed the overall strategy employed by the Xhosa during the course of the war, but we do know that at some time in August 1851, he urged them to go into the Fish River bush, and that the very next month they gained a significant victory over the Queen’s Regiment in that precise area. The wreck of the Birkenhead and the recall of Sir Harry Smith were presumably credited to his miraculous powers.67
Such successful prophecies, or coincidences, did much to enhance the reputation of Mlanjeni, which rose and fell with the fortunes of war.68 When the Xhosa failed he got the blame, but when they succeeded his credibility was restored. Since we shall shortly be encountering prophecies even more wondrous and even more fatal than those of Mlanjeni, it is a matter of some importance to consider how the prophet managed to preserve the faith of his followers despite repeated disappointments. The most comprehensive contemporary statement on the subject was that of Commissioner Brownlee, who explained it as follows:69 many Xhosa who used his charms enjoyed miraculous escapes for which they thanked Mlanjeni, while those who were killed were hardly in a position to complain. Most importantly, Mlanjeni had virtually indemnified himself against failure by giving orders which could not possibly be complied with. Many of the common people who died were alleged to have contravened Mlanjeni’s orders to remain celibate during the period of preparation for battle. This injunction is remembered today and at least one descendant of Soga, the Christian Xhosa who directed the Christmas Day attack on the military villages, still maintains that all Mlanjeni’s sayings were true but that everything was spoiled by a number of young men who just could not leave the women alone.70 We seem to be dealing here with the phenomenon described by the American psychologist Festinger who suggested that people who have staked their lives on the truth of a belief do not give it up without a struggle, and that they will renew their efforts and even resort to fresh prophecies in order to conceal from themselves the unhappy fact that their faith was mistaken.71
Even though Mlanjeni’s reputation long survived the war, the Riverman himself did not. After the arrest of Siyolo and the collapse of the Xhosa war effort in the Fish River bush, he seems to have thrown himself on the mercy of Chief Mhala, who allowed him to take up residence near the Qumrha River in a distant corner of his domains. Mlanjeni told the people there that he had been across the sea, where he saw a great rock with a large hole in it. He entered and saw the spirits of his fathers who told him that the Xhosa had failed because the time was not yet ripe, but that the proper time would soon be upon them. Mlanjeni himself never lived to see the great day of which he had so often spoken. In August 1853, some six months after the end of the war, he died quite unexpectedly of tuberculosis. But a great deal of the Riverman’s power had come from the insubstantial and enigmatic qualities which had marked him off as a being from another world, and these qualities were enhanced rather than reduced by his sudden and youthful death. It was rumoured that he said just before he died ‘that he should not be buried … but he would go over the horizon across the sea, towards the setting sun, there to meet with [the revered and mysterious figure known as] Sifuba-Sibanzi. His last promise was that all those killed during the war would rise up again.72
This promise was Mlanjeni’s final legacy to the Xhosa nation.
1 There is no good account of the War of Mlanjeni. Harington (1980), Chapters X and Xl, is probably the best treatment but is necessarily limited in scope as it is part of a biography of Sir Harry Smith. J Milton (1983), Chapters 20 and 21, is clear and accurate but rather light on analysis. Godlonton and Irving (1851) is a compilation of newspaper reports up to June 1851. Numerous memoirs by soldiers have been published, but only WR King (1853), J Mackay (1871) and T Stubbs (1978) have much substance. There are many unpublished manuscripts of soldiers’ diaries and letters which will be cited in the appropriate places. Of all these sources, only the diary of L Graham, Acc 8402-5, National Army Museum, London, shows even the remotest sympathy for the Xhosa.
2 For the Xhosa attempts to make peace, see BK 433 W Fynn-G Mackinnon, 23 Jan. 1851 and Holdich Journal, Staffordshire Regimental Museum, 5, 8 March. For the text of Smith’s extermination order, see Godlonton and Irving (1962), pp.89-90; for his private letter, Acc 983, Cape Archives, H Smith-C Andrews, 14 Jan. 1851. For his desire to hang the chiefs, Elwes deposit 2/1, VDC Elwes-Mother, 30 Oct. 1851, Lincolnshire Archives, Lincoln.
3 For Maqoma’s question, see Milton (1983), p.182. The description of the Amathole Mountains is from the Grahamstown Journal, 29 Aug. 1846.
4 See, for example, the episode described by King (1853), pp.48-60.
5 Mqhayi (n.d.), p.112.
6 Mackay (1871), pp.178-9. There was a continuous movement of Xhosa and Khoi in and out of the Waterkloof, and Mackay might well be correct in arguing that the figure is an underestimate.
7 ’United Services Magazine (1852), I, p.592.
8 ’Imperial Blue Book 1428 of 1852, H Smith-Earl Grey, 19 Nov. 1851, p.202; Earl Grey-H Smith, 14 Jan. 1852, p.254. Grey’s opinion of Smith was undermined by a series of vicious letters from W Hogge. See Earl Grey Papers, University of Durham.
9 ’There is a detailed description of the Fish River bush in WT Black (1901). Edinburgh Evening Courant, 27 Jan. 1852 for attempts to burn the acacia bushes.
10 ’G Cathcart (1857), pp.88-9. For Mhala’s attitude, see BK 431 J Maclean-G Mackinnon, 10, 14,17 Jan. 1851.
11 Imperial Blue Book 1635 of 1853, J Maclean-‘My dear General’, 9 Oct. 1852, p.181. Maclean’s own account of the affair shows just how unprepared Siyolo was for imprisonment, and just how underhand was the means pursued: ‘He [Siyolo] evidently expected me to receive his surrender by merely handing over his gun, and that I would permit him to return to his family … I therefore retired to my dresing room, and Seyolo being suddenly called to hear his statement read over, I told him that I had guaranteed his life, but that his remaining in custody was imperative … D
uring this short conference I managed to get a few men to my dressing room, and he was taken off quietly. I am satisfied … that he would have bolted if I had acquainted him with my intention to apprehend him.’
12 Godlonton and Irving (1851), pp.268-72.
13 Cory (1965), V, pp.435, 463; Edinburgh Evening Courant, 16 March 1851; Imperial Blue Book 1635 of 1853, W Eyre-A Cloete, 6 Dec. 1851, pp.1-3.
14 SM Mitra (1911), p.272. During the first attack, which came as a complete surprise, Fort White was defended by only 18 soldiers and 5 civilians.
15 Grahamstown Journal, 6 June 1846.
16 Edinburgh Evening Courant, 23 March 1852.
17 King (1853), pp.122-3; Holdich Journal, Staffordshire Regimental Museum, 19 Feb. 1851; Edinburgh Evening Courant, 20 Jan. 1852; Diary of TH Bramston, Greenjacket Regimental Museum, Winchester, 16 July 1852.
18 John Rich diary, Black Watch Regimental Museum, Perth, n.d. [March or April 1852]. For rockets, see MS 588, Cory Library, 23 Feb. 1852. For the Minie Rifle, see S Lakeman (1880), passim.
19 JB Currey, ‘Half a century in South Africa’ (typescript), p.51.
20 Holdich Journal, Staffordshire Regimental Museum, 12 Sept. 1851; Illustrated London News, 22 Sept, 1851; Nottingham Journal, 26 Dec. 1851; Mackay (1871), p.47.
21 In fact, Smith’s victory over the Xhosa in 1835 was very largely due to the treacherous capture and subsequent murder of the Xhosa king, Hintsa. As Smith’s then superior, Governor D’Urban wrote to him, ‘It was a fortunate circumstance, Hintsa’s coming in, and so putting an end, most seasonably for us, to a sort of warfare … which, in our secret mind, we confessed our inability to have prosecuted further.’ Quoted in Peires (1981), p.112.
22 Stubbs (1978), p.135. See also G Cathcart (1857), p.349; C Seymour-F Seymour 20 Sept. 1852, 17 March 1853, Seymour of Ragley Papers, Warwickshire County Record Office.
23 Imperial Blue Book 1428 of 1852, H Smith-Earl Grey, 17 June, 6 July 1851; J Marincovitz (1985); Holdich Journal, 20 June 1851, Staffordshire Regimental Museum.
24 Imperial Blue Book 1428 of 1852, H Somerset-H Smith 16 July 1851, pp.91-2.
25 Acc. 8011, National Army Museum, London, Journal of JCG Kingsley, 24, 25 Dec. 1851.
26 Illustrated London News, 10 Jan. 1852.
27 Among the various memoirs of Eyre, the diaries of L Graham, National Army Museum and John Rich, Black Watch Regimental Museum, are particularly vivid. See also PS Campbell (n.d.), pp.59-63; Stubbs (1978), p.155.
28 Acc 8402-5, National Army Museum, Diary of L Graham, 24 May 1852, 22 June 1852, 14 Oct. 1852; NRA 33, Black Watch Regimental Museum, Diary of John Rich, 28 Dec. 1851.
29 Elwes Deposit 2/1 Lincolnshire Archives. VDC Elwes-Mother, 30 Oct. 1851.
30 MS 575, Cory Library, C Brownlee-H Smith, Feb. 1852; Acc 8011, National Army Museum, JCG Kingsley Journal, 30 Jan. 1852; NRA 33, Black Watch Regimental Museum, 28 Jan. 1852.
31 MS 584, Cory Library, J Michel-n.a. 18 Feb. 1852.
32 The extensive correspondence on the peace proposals is printed in Imperial Blue Book 1635 of 1853, H Smith-Earl Grey, 16 Feb. 1852 and enclosures, pp.23-37.
33 DDHV/73/23 Humberside County Record Office, Beverley, Letters of H Robinson. H Robinson-Mother, 30 Oct. 1852; King (1853), p.131; Grahamstown Journal, 12 Feb. 1853; Royal Greenjackets Regimental Museum, Winchester, Diary of TH Bramston, 20, 22 July.
34 King (1853), p.265.
35 Godlonton and Irving (1851), I, p.174; Mackay (1871), pp.63-4.
36 Stubbs (1978), p.155.
37 JH Soga (n.d.), pp.76-7; Mackay (1871), pp.41, 151, 221; NRA 33, Diary of John Rich (reference to the War of the Axe).
38 Brownlee (1916), p.158; King (1853), p.119; Holdich Journal, Staffordshire Regimental Museum, 29 March 1851; Acc 8402-5, Diary of L Graham, National Army Museum, 7 April 1852.
39 The story of the horrible death of the Bandmaster Hartung was particularly notorious. King (1853), pp.92-3. See also Lakeman (1880), p.104.
40 Mackay (1871), p.44. See also Mellish of Hodsock Manuscripts, University of Nottingham, [Captain Roopes] – n.a., 9 Feb. 1853. ‘Not but that some things done [by the British soldiers] were bad enough, I should not like to say all I have seen and known and suffered when possible but great excuse is due when you consider on a white man falling into their hands, they not only kill, but torture him, and treat his remains with the most wonderful brutality.’
41 Lakeman (1880), pp.94-5. For another similar case, see Stubbs, p.176.
42 Peires (1981), p.112. For Smith’s personal participation in these horrors, see PR 3563, Cory Library, autobiographical manuscript of HJ Halse, p.20 in which Smith sends a pair of ears to one of his subordinates as a joke.
43 Elwes Deposit 2/1, Lincolnshire Archives. VDC Elwes-Mother, 11 Feb., 13 March 1852.
44 Currey, (1986), p.49.
45 Mackay (1871), p.136; Cape Frontier Times, 16 Jan. 1853; Godlonton and Irving (1851), II, pp.78-9.
46 Stubbs (1978), pp.161, 169.
47 Mackay (1871), p.152; DDHV/73/23, Humberside Country Record Office, H Robinson-Uncle, 12 April 1853; H Robinson-Mother, 16 March 1852.
48 Mackay (1871), pp.218-19; Lakeman (1880), p.103.
49 For Cathcart’s liberal pretensions, see his conversation with Commissioner Brownlee, Brownlee (1916), p.124 and the private letter in which he says, comparing settlers and Xhosa, that ‘the [Xhosa] is much the finer race of the two’. Cathcart (1857), p.349. For the negative attitude of his men, see for example, DDHV/73/23, Humberside County Record Office, H Robinson-Mother, 9 May 1852, Acc 8108, National Army Museum, Journal of Lieutenant WJ St John, 9 Dec. 1852; Acc 8402-5, National Army Museum, L Graham Diary, 1 May 1852.
50 Cathcart (1857), p.41.
51 Most of the army felt, after the event, that the recall of Smith had probably prolonged the war. This is probably correct, but it should be pointed out that, in a war of attrition, Cathcart’s dilatory methods were probably as effective as Smith’s energetic ones – and probably cost less lives. For examples of pro-Smith sentiment, see DDHV/73/23, Humberside Country Record Office, H Robinson-Mother, 9 May 1852, 4 June 1852; Acc 8402-5, National Army Museum, Journal of JG Kingsley, 6 March 1852.
52 Mellish of Hodsock Papers, University of Nottingham, Diary of Private EG Richards, 3 Nov. 1852.
53 Ibid; King (1853), p.271; J Fisher-Mother, Greenjackets Regimental Museum, Winchester.
54 Cathcart (1857), pp.41, 107-8; Acc 8402-5, National Army Museum, Diary of L Graham, 18 Feb. 1853.
55 Mackay (1871), pp.252-4.
56 H Pearse, ‘The Kaffir and Basuto campaigns of 1852 and 1853,’ United Services Magazine (1898) and, for the massacre, Acc 8108, National Army Museum, Journal of WJ St John, 23 Dec. 1852.
57 Grahamstown Journal, 5, 8 March 1853; Cape Frontier Times, 8 March 1853; Seymour of Ragley Papers, Warwickshire County Record Office, C Seymour-F Seymour, 17 March 1853; CH 19/8 C Owen-G Cathcart, 11, 16 Feb. 1853.
58 Acc 6807/231, National Army Museum, L Graham, Diary of the Crimean War.
59 Cape Frontier Times, 8 Nov. 1853.
60 GH 8/28 C Brownlee-J Maclean, 24 Jan. 1856.
61 They were encouraged in this illusion by memories of the retrocession of Queen Adelaide Province in 1835 (see Peires (1981), p.115) and by rumours that the influential liberal, Sir A Stockenstrom, had appeared before a committee of the House of Commons.
62 Acc. 8402-5, National Army Museum, Diary of L Graham, 15 March 1853.
63 Cathcart (1857), pp.189-215; BK 69 C Brownlee-J Maclean, 14 July 1853; Cape Frontier Times, 26 May 1853.
64 GH 8/28 J Maclean-W Liddle, 15 Feb. 1856; GH 8/28 C Brownlee-J Maclean, 24 Jan. 1856.
65 Holdich Journal, Staffordshire Regimental Museum, 3 Feb., 12 July 1851; Imperial Blue Book 1428 of 1851, Deposition of Toyise, 3 Aug. 1851; Edinburgh Evening Courant, 3 Feb. 1852.
66 CO 4386 Statement of Qotshi, 5 Dec. 1851; CO 4386 J Thomas-J Appleyard, 10 April 1851; Holdich Journal, Staffordshire Regimental Museum, 30 March 1851; Imperial Blue Book 1428 of 1852, H Smith-Earl Grey, 18 Sept. 1851, pp.148-9.
67 Holdich Journal, Staffordshire Regimental Museum, 4 Sept. 1851; MS 2783, Cory Library, J Ross-Mrs Paterson, 16 June 1852; W Hogge-Earl Grey, 4 Sept. 1851, Earl Grey Papers, University of Durham.
68 Imperial Blue Book 1428 of 1852, H Smith-Earl Grey, 18 Sept. 1851, pp. 148-9; Earl Grey Papers, University of Durham, W Hogge-B. Hawes, 17 Sept. 1851; Holdich Journal, Staffordshire Regimental Museum, 3 Feb. 1851.
