by Peires, Jeff
Grey now proposed, in his own words, to ‘gradually undermine and destroy’ Xhosa laws and customs by replacing the Xhosa chiefs’ rights to judicial fees and fines with a fixed monthly income in colonial money which would, again in Grey’s words, make the chiefs financially ‘dependent on the Government of the country’. The councillors, who assisted their chiefs in return for a share in the judicial fines, would likewise receive salaries and would thus likewise become dependent on the government rather than on their chiefs. The chiefs and their councillors would still judge legal cases, but they were to be ‘assisted in their deliberations and sentences’ by a British magistrate, specially chosen from ‘the ablest [white] men this country affords’.
European laws will, by imperceptible degrees, take the place of their own barbarous customs, and any [Xhosa] chief of importance will be daily brought into contact with a talented and honourable European gentleman, who will hourly interest himself in the advance and improvement of the entire tribe, and must in process of time gain an influence over the native races, which will produce very beneficial results.7
The existing situation in British Kaffraria, Grey wrote, was no better than an ‘armed truce’ which must sooner or later dissolve in another war. Only a complete revolution in Xhosa thought and government offered the stable basis of common interests necessary for a lasting peace.
Chief Commissioner Maclean protested in vain that Grey’s new system broke Cathcart’s promise to respect chiefly prerogatives and threatened the peace of the country.8 The friendly Mfengu were conceivably ready for Grey’s suggested measures, but the Xhosa were unwilling to be ‘civilized’ and they were not yet sufficiently conquered in body or in spirit to permit the colonial government to impose its wishes by force. However much the Xhosa commoners might resent individual chiefs, they nevertheless clung to the political institution of chieftainship ‘as a power which is of and which represents themselves and their race’. Maclean concluded by strongly recommending that the Governor defer his proposed innovations to some future time.
Grey swept these objections imperiously aside. Every argument which he heard in contradiction of his cherished plans only served to reinforce his belief in their essential rightness.9 He wanted them adopted as soon as possible. He told Maclean, quite untruthfully, that his official dispatch was already sent off to England, and that the Chief Commissioner’s objections ‘put a rope around his [Grey’s] neck’. ‘You [Maclean] must endeavour to induce [the Xhosa chiefs] one by one to adopt the proposed system,’ he ordered bluntly.
The Xhosa chiefs did not, in fact, put up the stiff resistance to Grey’s system that Maclean and the other local officials had expected.10 They were naturally reluctant to give a flat refusal to any proposal of government, they temporised, and they were lost. Instead of contesting the central principle of the new proposals, they contested minor details such as the disposition of fines for murder. Instead of refusing a magistrate outright, they agreed to the suggestion but asked that it be a person of their own choosing. Instead of taking the responsibility on themselves, they procrastinated, each waiting to see what the other chiefs would do. Maclean and his subordinates were able to play on these internal divisions, and by getting some chiefs to accept the system, isolated others who wished to oppose it. Some of the more cunning chiefs seem to have thought that they could manage to keep the money but contrive to evade the interference of the magistrate. The generous salaries (£96 per year for Sandile, for example, and £180 per year for his councillors) were great inducements to many chiefs, whose revenues had suffered from the impoverishment of their followers and who had, moreover, acquired a taste for alcohol satiable only through colonial money. Both Sandile and Maqoma ‘were anxious to finger the silver as soon as possible’, according to Commissioner Brownlee. It was the councillors, not the chiefs who raised the most pertinent objections.
[Old Soga, Sandile’s councillor] was particularly strong in his opposition to the measure, as breaking down the customs of the [Xhosa], depriving the chiefs of the concession which Sir George Cathcart had made them of governing their people according to their own laws, that the receipt of money would bring the chiefs into trouble …
It was also asked why the Governor wished to change the present system, who had complained of it, and if he could change what Sir George Cathcart had conceded to them why cannot he change what the former Governor had done with regard to the land, and restore their country to them.11
Unfortunately for the Xhosa, this sort of forthright opposition on principle was the exception rather than the rule. The chiefs’ petty objections were overridden one by one, and the first of the new magistrates took up their posts in November 1855.
British Kaffraria now hovered on the brink of the great catastrophe with which this book is primarily concerned. Before we proceed, let us take advantage of this pause, while Grey’s magistrates are, as it were, riding out to meet their chiefs, to introduce the main actors in the forthcoming drama.
Grey could have had no more ideal subordinate in British Kaffraria than its Chief Commissioner, John Maclean, a Highland Scot who had served in the eastern Cape since 1835. It was largely through Maclean’s adroit management that almost all the Ndlambe Xhosa remained neutral during the War of Mlanjeni, and Governor Cathcart rewarded him in 1852 with the Chief Commissionership. Sharing as he did Cathcart’s view that the power of the Xhosa chiefs should be respected, Maclean received Grey’s instructions for the ‘better management’ of British Kaffraria with horror and resentment. Aware, however, that he would bear the blame for any failure, Maclean worked hard to make Grey’s system a success.12 As the events of 1856-8 unfolded, revealing that Grey was no woolly philanthropist but a ruthless imperialist, the Chief Commissioner warmed to his task. Maclean was no liberal; he never liked the Xhosa and he never learned to speak their language. But he had an intimate and shrewd appreciation of Xhosa politics and personalities, which enabled him to direct Grey’s blows where they would hurt most. Moreover, he was infinitely loyal and obedient to the Governor, qualities which were very important to Grey.
The next most senior official in British Kaffraria was the Ngqika Commissioner, Charles Brownlee. The son of a missionary, Brownlee had grown up among the Ngqika Xhosa and spoke their language fluently. His reputation as a great administrator, which rests mainly on the continuing popularity of his book, Reminiscences of Kaffir Life and History, is greatly exaggerated. Brownlee was a passionate advocate of the advance of European civilisation, and he did not understand the Xhosa nearly as well as he thought he did. His intimate knowledge of the personal and political affairs of most Ngqika Xhosa earned him their resentment rather than, as he ingenuously thought, their love. Nevertheless, Brownlee was, by the standards of his time and place, a humane and liberal official, who genuinely liked the Xhosa and sincerely wanted to see them happy. Maclean despised him for being ‘soft’ on the Xhosa and resented his superior knowledge of the Xhosa world, but could not do without his assistance. Brownlee’s role under Sir George Grey personifies the dangerous trap which the liberal government official poses to a colonised people. On the one hand, Brownlee’s advice was disregarded by Grey and Maclean while, on the other hand, his obviously genuine sympathy and concern were most effective in getting the Xhosa to accept policies which neither he nor they liked or wanted.13
Brownlee naturally fitted into Grey’s new dispensation as the magistrate with Sandile, the highest ranking Xhosa chief in British Kaffraria. Chief Sandile was neither particularly clever nor particularly brave, he had a dread of making decisions or taking responsibility, and he had a club foot. But for all that, he was deeply respected by his people and was possibly the best loved of all the Xhosa chiefs. Sandile was extremely amenable to popular feeling and exceptionally generous with his cattle.14 He never took a decision without consulting all his councillors and, as far as possible, all his people as well. His word, when it finally came forth, was usually a
t one with the popular will. Although Sandile’s proceedings were thus democratic in the extreme, it is not unfair to say that when confronted by challenges such as Grey’s new system or the Cattle-Killing which followed hard on its heels, Sandile failed to give his people the sort of lead that they required, and simply drifted from crisis to crisis, inevitably running aground on the rocks and getting the worst of all possible worlds. Besides Sandile, Charles Brownlee also acted as magistrate for his brother Xhoxho and his nephew Feni, both of them chiefs of little weight.
Second in rank to Sandile among the Ngqika Xhosa was Maqoma, the hero of the Waterkloof and the greatest fighting general the Xhosa ever produced. Maqoma was everything that Sandile was not – brave, intelligent, strong-minded and decisive. He was also more than 20 years older than Sandile, but through the lower rank of his mother, he was inferior by birth to his despised younger brother. As a young man, Maqoma had shown some interest in Christianity and English culture, but these inclinations had been quickly killed off by the colonial authorities, who expelled him from his native valley in 1829 and chased him out of his refuge near Fort Beaufort in 1853. Frustrated thus in every direction, Maqoma’s behaviour became increasingly erratic, which greatly reduced his popularity among the ordinary Xhosa. Lieutenant Henry Lucas, the young officer appointed as magistrate to Maqoma and his neighbour, the 80-year-old Bhotomane of the small imiDange chiefdom, was contemptuously ignored by both chiefs and exerted no influence whatsoever on either of them.15
Anta, the other of Sandile’s brothers to get a magistrate, was a capable man, but of low rank on account of the low status of his mother. Anta had formerly lived with Sandile and had been his close associate up to the time of Mlanjeni. The brothers had quarrelled during the war, and Anta had become bitterly disillusioned with Xhosa traditions on account of the failure of Mlanjeni’s promises. After the peace of 1853, he took up residence high in the Windvogelberg in the extreme north of the Ngqika country. He welcomed his magistrate, a Scottish officer named Eustace Robertson, because it accorded him a status he did not possess by birth. Near Anta lived his nephew, the young chief Oba.16
The Gqunukhwebe Xhosa chief Phatho who had resided with Maclean throughout the recent war, a semi-hostage for his people’s good behaviour, and the young Ndlambe chief Jali were placed in the hands of Herbert Vigne, a young gentleman from the western Cape and the only one of Grey’s appointees who was not a military officer. Vigne was not incapable and he worked himself hard, but Phatho was a very popular chief and too skilled in the art of dissimulation to permit him any measure of control. With Phatho lived his brother-in-law, Stokwe, chief of the small amaMbalu chiefdom, who had lost all his lands and most of his people in the Fish River bush. Phatho’s younger brother, the model Christian chief Kama, received the Ngqika Xhosa lands around Middledrift as a reward for his pro-colonial stance. He and his immediate followers were fiercely loyal to the British government, but there were too few of them to fill up the whole of their vast district and their ranks were augmented by large numbers of Phatho’s land-hungry followers, headed by his son Mate and his brother Lama. The magistrate at Middledrift was Captain Frederick Reeve, a tough product of Colonel Eyre’s dreaded 73rd Regiment.17
The Ngqika Xhosa chiefs had all lost their lands on account of the War of Mlanjeni. The Ndlambe Xhosa, under Maclean’s guiding hand, had remained neutral and thus in possession of their lands – with the sole exception of Siyolo, now expiating his error on Robben Island in the far western Cape. Siwani, Siyolo’s unpopular senior brother and a long-time colonial client, had his own magistrate, Major Robert Hawkes. Toyise, a usurper dependent on colonial support, and Dyani Tshatshu, a Christian chief much distrusted by Maclean, lived close to King William’s Town and were cared for part-time by two British Kaffraria officials. The key to the Ndlambe district was Mhala, the senior Ndlambe Xhosa chief. A man of lowly birth, Mhala had risen to eminence by cunning and deceit. He was an enthusiastic prosecutor of witchcraft cases and an acquisitive predator of his followers’ cattle. Among colonial officials, Mhala was renowned for never giving a straight answer to any question and for his bad habit of feigning illness in awkward situations. Mhala was very nearly killed during the War of Axe, and had a deep and bitter hatred of the colonial government and all its works. He had strongly urged his followers to join in the War of Mlanjeni, but was frustrated by some of his senior councillors and by the influence of Maclean.18 In Major John Cox Gawler, Colonel Eyre’s former adjutant, Mhala found a magistrate worthy of his steel. The battle between them was to be of titanic proportions and of profound importance to the future of British Kaffraria.
This section would not be complete without a reminder to the reader that not all of Xhosaland belonged to Great Britain. Colonial domination was confined to British Kaffraria, that is the territory west of the Great Kei River. All the chiefs of the Ngqika and the Ndlambe Xhosa who inhabited British Kaffraria were descendants of Chief Rharhabe, who died in 1782, and therefore junior in rank to the descendants of Rharhabe’s senior brother Gcaleka (d. 1778) who lived and reigned in independent Xhosaland across the Kei. Sarhili, great-grandson of Gcaleka and King of all the Xhosa, lived at Hohita just beyond the borders of British territory. Sarhili’s influence over the Xhosa chiefs in British Kaffraria was enormous in theory though limited in practice. He was the great judge of the Xhosa nation, the arbiter of disputes between the chiefs and the ultimate authority on all matters relating to Xhosa custom and religion. He even had the right, though only in theory, to call out the whole Xhosa nation for the purposes of war.19 In precolonial times, the powers of the Xhosa King had been resisted by the Ngqika and Ndlambe Xhosa chiefs. But now, suffering as they were under the sway of colonialism, the eyes of the Xhosa of British Kaffraria turned increasingly for guidance to Sarhili, their King across the river Kei.
1 For Cathcart’s policy see GH 8/28 J Maclean-W Liddle, 15 Feb. 1856, and the many documents enclosed therein, particularly G Cathcart-J Maclean, 12 April 1853.
2 GH 8/28 G Cathcart-J Maclean (private), 12 April 1853.
3 Peires (1981), p.115.
4 For Grey’s first meeting with the chiefs, see Imperial Blue Book 1969 of 1855, G Grey-G Grey, 14 Feb. 1855, pp.52-3. For the chiefs’ response, see BK 70 C Brownlee-J Maclean, 5 Feb. 1855.
5 For Grey’s statement of the matter, see Imperial Blue Book 2096 of 1856, G Grey-W Molesworth, 18 Dec. 1855, pp.14-5. For another analysis (which owes nothing to Grey!) see Peires (1981), pp.31-9. Once again, one should note how close Grey’s ideas on this point were to the disastrous experiments of Sir Harry Smith.
6 The one at Chief Mhala’s already mentioned, and another at Chief Toyise’s in 1855. For the incidence of witchcraft more generally, see Peires (1981), p.206 (Note 83).
7 Imperial Blue Book 2096 of 1856, G Grey-J Maclean, 17 Sept. 1855, G Grey-W Molesworth, 18 Dec. 1855, pp.15-16, 24-5.
8 Imperial Blue Book 2096 of 1856, J Maclean-W Liddle, 4 Aug. 1855, pp.18-19.
9 For example, Grey’s minute, 21 Aug. 1855, in GH 8/27 J Maclean-W Liddle, 14 Aug. 1855.
10 Imperial Blue Book 2096 of 1856 has a great deal on the chiefs’ reactions. See for example, J Maclean-G Grey, 3 Nov. 1855, pp.25-6.
11 Imperial Blue Book 2096 of 1856, C Brownlee-J Maclean, 27 Sept., 9 Oct. 1855, pp.27-9.
12 For interesting references to Maclean’s personal reactions, Wilmot (1856), p.67; GH 8/27 J Gawler-J Maclean, 17 Nov. 1855.
13 For Maclean’s contempt for Brownlee, see Acc 611/7 J Maclean-J Bissett, 19 March, 4 June 1860; J Maclean-R Southey, 18 March 1860. Gawler considered Brownlee ‘a good and conscientious though weak man’. J Gawler-Earl Grey, 14 Nov. 1873, Earl Grey papers, University of Durham.
14 Imperial Blue Book 2096 of 1856, C Brownlee-J Maclean, 8 Aug. 1855, p.22, gives the following figures: Sandile had rec
eived 300 cattle in fines during the past two years, but his own personal herd never amounted to more than 120. Of 100 cattle he had received in gifts he kept only ten. Of 80 cattle confiscated from a certain Qontshi, he kept only five.
15 For the early expulsion of Maqoma from the Kat River, see Peires (1981), pp.89-91. Lucas was very much a third choice – two other officers had been approached and refused before Lucas accepted. GH 8/16 J Jackson-G Grey, 14, 28 Feb., 23 March, 12 April 1856. Maclean thought to make Lucas more acceptable by giving him for his interpreter Maximilian Kayser, son of Maqoma’s old missionary. But the young Kayser was very unpopular with the Xhosa chiefs who specifically asked for his removal. BK 140 Maqoma and Botman-G Grey, 27 April 1856.
16 BK 85 RE Robertson-J Maclean, 20 Aug. 1856.
17 For the situation in Kama’s country, see Reeve’s informative dispatches in BK 86, for example, 27 Nov. 1856.
