by Peires, Jeff
Xoseni was accompanied home by a settler named John Crouch who traded in Sarhili’s country and spoke Xhosa fluently. Inasmuch as Sarhili trusted any white man, he trusted Crouch, but it was a misplaced confidence. Crouch was the government’s chief agent in the transKei, supplying Maclean with detailed information on Sarhili and his people, and not hesitating, as we shall see, to conspire against the person of the King himself. Now Crouch was to be the bearer of Sarhili’s reply to Grey.
I Kreli came to this place today to have the Governor’s letter properly explained to me. – I am astonished the Governor should send to me about this thing, before he first heard from me.
I now understand his letter, my answer is this – I wish Crouch to report to the Governor, that there is a thing which speaks in my country, and orders me and my people to kill all our cattle, eat our corn, and throw away all our witchcraft wood, and not to plant, and to report it to all the chiefs in the country – in reporting this to the other chiefs to kill their cattle, I was ordered to do so by the thing which speaks in my country.19
It was a straightforward reply, restrained but uncompromising. Sarhili did not recognise the right of Governor Grey to interfere in Xhosa affairs without being invited to do so. Sarhili did not recognise the right of Governor Grey to prohibit his communications with the Xhosa chiefs living under British jurisdiction. Sarhili would abide only by the word of that thing which spoke in his country. The Xhosa King defied the British Governor. Grey was never to forgive him for it.
1 See, for example, some of Maclean’s early despatches, such as GH 8/29 J Maclean-G Grey, 17 Aug. 1856; BK 373 J Maclean-W Liddle, 4 Aug. 1856.
2 BK 373 J Maclean-W Liddle, 18 Aug. 1856.
3 GH 8/29 J Maclean-Sarhili, 15 July 1856; GH 30/4 G Grey-J Maclean, 24 July 1856; GH 8/49 J Maclean-G Grey, 31 July 1856.
4 BK 70 C Brownlee-J Maclean, 24 Sept. 1856.
5 Imperial Blue Book 2352 of 1857-8, C Brownlee-J Maclean, 16 Aug. 1856, p.18; BK 70 C Brownlee-J Maclean, 6, 11 Aug. 1856.
6 GH 8/29 Marginal note by Grey on Schedule 306, 14 Aug. 1856.
7 GH 30/4 G Grey-J Maclean, 28 Aug. 1856.
8 Grey’s mysterious illness, which was always blamed on his ‘wound’, was characterised by abrupt and sudden changes of mood, great waves of enthusiasm and frantic scheming alternating with deep lows of lethargy and depression, during which he was too weak even to receive visitors or write letters. The evidence on Grey’s health, which is very limited, can be found in: GH 30/11 C Boyle-H Cotterill, 16 May 1857; GH 23/27 G Grey-H Labouchere, 6 June 1857; GH 8/16 J Jackson-G Grey, 16 May 1857; Acc. 611/7 R Rawson-R Southey, 11 Jan. 1858.
9 For example, Maqoma and his Great Son, Namba. GH 8/29 H Lucas-J Maclean, 27 Aug. 1856.
10 Imperial Blue Book 2352 of 1857-8, G Grey-H Labouchere, 20 Sept., 24 Oct. 1856, pp. 24-5, 52-3.
11 BK 70 C Brownlee-J Maclean, 21 Sept. 1856.
12 BK 85 R Robertson-J Maclean, 15 Sept., 27 Oct. 1856; BK 86 F Reeve- J Maclean, 7 Sept. 1856; BK 82 H Lucas-J Maclean, 29 Sept. 1856.
13 BK 140 Memorandum of a meeting, 29 Sept. 1856; BK 140 H Vigne- J Maclean, 3, 10 Nov. 1856.
14 BK 89 Secret information, 18 Sept. 1856; BK 70 C Brownlee-J Maclean, 24 Sept. 1856; GH 28/71 C Brownlee-J Maclean, 26 Sept. 1856.
15 BK 81 J Gawler-J Maclean, 25 Sept. 1856; GH 30/12 G Grey-Umhala, 27 Sept. 1856.
16 GH 30/12 G Grey-Sandile, 27 Sept. 1856; GH 30/12 G Grey-Kreli, 27 Sept. 1856.
17 GH 8/29 C Brownlee-J Maclean, 20 Oct. 1856; BK 89 Secret information, 27 Oct. 1856.
18 20/2/1 Memorandum by J Maclean, 12 Oct. 1856.
19 BK 140 Statement of Kreli in reply to HE the Governor’s letter, 3 Nov. 1856.
3. THE CRUISE OF THE GEYSER
Censured by Grey for failing to report the presence of Sarhili’s messenger, Sandile and his brother Xhoxho called a public meeting to oppose the Cattle-Killing. The unbelievers mustered their full strength under the leadership of Tyhala, Sandile’s second-ranking councillor. ‘Let us learn to eat grass,’ he mocked the believers, ‘for we must eat that when we have killed our cattle.’ Kemhle, another unbeliever, urged his chief to ‘no longer to listen to the lies of every passer-by but to consult with the Government’. The believers were silent – theirs was not a case to be made in the open. Sandile contritely announced that he would start to cultivate on the following day but in his heart he did not wish it.1
Phatho, another chief in disgrace for receiving Sarhili’s messenger, also held a public meeting to clear his name with the government. He made good use of the troubles of the road police to avoid any mention at all of Nongqawuse’s prophecies. ‘My word is that this thieving must stop,’ he declared piously.2 After this loyal demonstration, Phatho and his Gqunukhwebe Xhosa went home and resumed the killing of their remaining cattle. The power of the colonial authorities in British Kaffraria was enough to furnish the government with as many public declarations as it liked, but these were quite hollow at the core. In the end, the government’s hard line against the Cattle-Killing only succeeded in driving it underground.
After an exceptionally dry winter, rain began to fall steadily and abundantly. The trees were covered with leaves, the grass shot up and the soil awaited the sower. Nature itself set a timetable which made the question of cultivation more urgent even than the killing of cattle. Under normal circumstances, planting began in British Kaffraria towards the end of August when the early rains wet the soil and enabled the Xhosa to break it up. Sowing might begin a little late without serious consequences, but it had to be completed by the middle of December at the very latest to give the crops time to ripen before the end of the rains the following April. Since the rains came late that year of 1856, the believers realised that if they could stave off cultivation for only two months more, all the Xhosa would be committed to the prophecies whether they liked it or not. Conversely, the unbelievers and the colonial authorities were eager to get cultivation going as quickly as possible.3
The believers threw their spades into the rivers, and unpleasant rumours began to circulate throughout Xhosaland concerning the fate of some who had been foolish enough to cultivate.
Those who attempt to cultivate will be fixed to the ground and unable again to leave their work.
A man who was burning grass to cultivate his garden was tossed into the air, he knew not by what.
All the women who are sowing will be carried into the sea with a strong wind when the mimosa blossoms.
A woman went to sow and there she became fastened to the spot, picking up the ground without making any progress, unable to go home.
A man went to cut bushes for a fence to his garden. He got up on a tree but could not come down nor did he make his work advance.4
Such rumours were especially widespread among Xhosa women, who performed most of the agricultural labour, and many women refused to cultivate despite pressure from their husbands. Commissioner Brownlee wrote:
The women are now the strongest supporters of the delusion, most of the men who have cultivated have had to break up their ground themselves, and when the husbands have insisted that their wives should take a part, they have left and gone to their parents.5
The cornfields were an easy target for the believers inasmuch as they were very vulnerable to attack. They could not be hidden or removed as cattle could, nor could they be defended. It was easy for the believers to reap what the unbelievers had sown or trample down their gardens with cattle. Furthermore, the Xhosa did not feel the same emotional attachment to their gardens as they did to their cattle, and it was much easier for the believers to persuade the uncommitted to passively desist from cultivating than it was to put them through the emotional ordeal of slaughtering their cattl
e.
Ultimately the decision to cultivate rested with the chiefs, the nominal owners of the land, who normally regulated the agricultural cycle on behalf of the community and whose ‘word’ was required before sowing could commence. When rain finally fell towards the end of September 1856, all eyes turned in their direction.
The role of Sandile was clearly going to be crucial. Not only was he the senior chief in British Kaffraria, but he was, as we have seen, the focal point for the average uncommitted Xhosa. All parties therefore looked to Sandile to give them a lead, but this was precisely what Sandile did not want to do. On the one hand, he was profoundly afraid of the colonial government and its local agent, Commissioner Brownlee. Tyhala and Soga, his venerable councillors, were strongly opposed to the Cattle-Killing, and six influential younger unbelievers took turns, unknown to the chief, to stick close by him at all times. But Sandile was also coming under pressure from believers such as his chief councillor Vena, his full brother Dondashe, his father-in-law Tobi and two anti-colonial firebrands named Baba and Mlunguzi. His mother, Suthu, urged him to join the Cattle-Killing.
It is all very well for you Sandile. You have your wives and children but I am solitary. I am longing to see my husband; you are keeping him from rising by your disobedience to the command of the spirits.6
Sandile was also worried about his political standing among his fellow Ngqika chiefs. Although he was the undisputed Great Son of his late father Ngqika (d. 1829), he was in constant competition with his elder brother Maqoma, whose skill with words and courage in battle Sandile could never hope to match. Maqoma was urging his fellow Ngqika chiefs to throw off their allegiance to Sandile and to place themselves directly under the rule of King Sarhili.7 Sandile himself did not like the idea of disobeying Sarhili whom he had always respected and heeded. He was well and truly caught in the middle.
In deference to Brownlee, Sandile permitted the unbelievers to cultivate his gardens and those of his mother Suthu and his Great Wife Noposi but he never fenced them and they soon spoiled. The chief also made life so unpleasant for those unbelievers who had been delegated to watch over him that they were forced to quit the Great Place. About the middle of October, Sandile began to kill his cattle, though he did so at night to hide this from Brownlee. He received messengers from Sarhili at night, alone with his mother and his brothers.8
The confidence of the believers was however undermined by their continuing uncertainty with regard to the date on which the prophecies were to be fulfilled. After a flurry of expectation towards the end of October, a reaction against the Cattle-Killing set in throughout the Ngqika district. Sandile called a meeting on 19 November and promised, with apparent sincerity, to cultivate. He even broke up a large patch of ground with his own hands. The wavering majority thronged Commissioner Brownlee with requests for seed. Though it was too late in the season to yield full crops, enough might still have been put into the ground to produce some kind of harvest.9
Everywhere else in British Kaffraria, the chiefs were forced to make a decision with regard to cultivation. Where the unbelieving chiefs were popular rulers and moved carefully, they were able to carry the majority of their people with them. Chief Anta called a meeting, from which his magistrate was excluded, in order to allow his people to air their thoughts freely. They decided to plant. Chief Dyani Tshatshu, who was more of a Christian than Chief Commissioner Maclean was willing to admit, set an example by cultivating himself, and most of his followers did the same. Chief Toyise stopped his followers from performing any other kind of work until they had their fields ready. Most of them cultivated though two of his brothers, including the rightful heir whose chieftainship Toyise had usurped, believed the prophecies and left the chiefdom. The young chief Jali, dominated by an old councillor of his late father named Mgwagwa, ploughed, though his elder brother Tabayi did not.10
The unbelieving Chief Siwani, deeply unpopular in his chiefdom for his violent authoritarianism and aggressively pro-colonial stance, peremptorily ordered his subjects to cultivate and not to listen to the ‘lies’ going about the country. But Siwani’s determination cut no ice with his people, most of whom killed their cattle, refused to cultivate and regarded Bangayi, the son of the imprisoned Siyolo, as their real leader. Siwani survived at least one assassination attempt and chose not to visit homesteads in his own chiefdom for fear that he would be mobbed and killed.11
The gentle Christian Kama was unable to enforce the stern warnings he had given at his August meeting. Kama’s country had experienced cattle-killing prophecies even before Nongqawuse. Many of the people were facing their second season without corn, but this did not in the least abate their commitment to the movement. They survived on the corn they purchased from their Mfengu neighbours in the Crown Reserve.12 A high proportion of Kama’s people were not his followers at all, but had settled in the large country given him by Governor Cathcart in 1853. They found their natural leader in Mate, the son of Kama’s senior brother, Phatho. Mate acknowledged Kama’s authority, and had acquiesced in Kama’s strong stand against the Cattle-Killing, but he remained the son of his father. Phatho taunted Mate with cowardice and urged him to kill his cattle.13
Kama was not equal to the challenge of the believers. He was by nature a man of withdrawn and uncombative disposition, and preferred to stay at home rather than ride about enforcing unpopular decisions. He was, moreover, resentful of Grey’s new administrative system which he professed not to understand. Reeve, his energetic magistrate, took Kama on a tour of his district and was distressed to find how few of the people had cultivated, and how many either received their chief coldly or avoided him altogether. Only Kama’s long-standing followers cultivated, and Reeve foresaw trouble when their corn ripened and the believers were hungry. By December 1856, Kama was forced to admit that the southern half of his country was completely ungovernable. The attitude of his own Great Son, Mani, was also very much open to doubt.14
Only Maqoma, his natural truculence unrestrained by his weak magistrate Lucas, openly admitted to supporting the Cattle-Killing. When the rains finally came in late September none of his people cultivated. He declared that neither he nor his people would sow again in the lands of their exile, ‘nor would they listen to anything the Government had to say … as long as they are living where they now are.’ It was ‘useless’ to cultivate since the new people would destroy all the standing crops when they arrived. ‘There appears to be a sullen determination amongst them to say and do nothing,’ wrote Lucas. Maqoma issued an unambiguous order, forbidding cultivation in his territories and threatening those who had already planted. There was to be no individual choice in the matter of sowing. Kona, Maqoma’s favourite son, worked on in his gardens although threatened by his father and abandoned by his mother until he was forced to quit the chiefdom and join his unbelieving brother Ned, who worked for Dr Fitzgerald at the hospital. In the end, not a single field was planted in Maqoma’s chiefdom, and only one in that of his neighbour, Chief Bhotomane.15 Phatho and Mhala, the most powerful chiefs in British Kaffraria after Sandile, were both ardent supporters of the Cattle-Killing. Phatho was greatly loved by his people and had managed to frustrate completely the efforts of Magistrate Vigne. ‘Never in one instance,’ complained Vigne, ‘did I ever get any truthful information from a councillor and no councillor allowed himself or was permitted to listen to me and plant, or save his cattle.’ 16 Yet even Phatho was too wary to come out into the open and admit that he supported the Cattle-Killing. In Vigne’s presence, he urged his people to cultivate. He promised that he would do so himself as soon as the rains came. When the rains did come, he promised again to plough, but said he had no oxen. Magistrate Vigne stocked up with oxen, yokes and ploughs only to find that Phatho was claiming that there was no one in his country who knew how to use a plough. It was only when Vigne named three men who were able and willing to plough for the chief that Phatho was forced to admit that he had no intention of cultivatin
g. Late in December, however, he was at it again, promising to cultivate at the first opportunity – which never quite arrived. Meanwhile, the stocks of seed corn lay rotting in Vigne’s offices, with only five takers over a period of more than two months.
Mhala’s problems were far more complex than those of Phatho: not only did he have an exceptionally tough magistrate in Major John Cox Gawler, but he faced considerable opposition from within his chiefdom, including his two senior sons, Makinana and Smith, and his powerful councillors, Ndayi and Gqirana. Mhala himself never doubted the truth of the prophecies but he nevertheless required some sort of concrete evidence if he was to carry his people with him. He sent several delegations to the Gxarha, the first as early as July 1856, but none of them returned with any conclusive proof. In public, Mhala refused to commit himself, saying that the Cattle-Killing was ‘a foolish thing that he should not trouble his head about’, but discreetly he attempted to substitute reliable believers for the unbelieving councillors on the government payroll. It was only with the visit of Sarhili’s second messenger Sixaxa at the beginning of October that Mhala came out into the open and issued a formal order not to cultivate, threatening to confiscate the cattle of any who disobeyed. His confidence in the prophecies grew to the point that he felt able to challenge the government openly:
The English tell us to cultivate and not to kill our cattle but how can we obey them when they have taken and killed our chiefs, Hintza, Seyolo etc, and we have done them no harm.17
