by Anuj Dhar
“Has your department been dealing with the subject of Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose?” was Bhasin’s simple question.
“As director of intelligence branch I can only say that the intelligence department has wide possibility and whatever the government wishes to know, we will do it but it is difficult for me to say what we do or what we do not.”
Now Khosla took over. “Have you ever been asked specifically to make any inquiry relating directly or indirectly with Netaji since you took over as DIB?” he put to Jayaram.
“Since I took over, I have not been asked,” he replied.
“You were not asked but did you of your own accord and for good reasons direct or conduct any such inquiries?”
“No. Since I took over my office.”
“Can you say that the intelligence department has not at all been dealing with any news concerning Netaji?”
“I cannot say that but we have presented whatever material we have.”
“Not producing old files but doing a positive act. What (we) want to know is have you ever, your department, done inquiry?”
“Not that I know of.”
“Can you say that your intelligence department has never conducted any inquiry into baba of Shaulmari Ashram?”
“I can only talk from my memory. This subject did come up some years ago and when we use the word inquiry, not in the form of police inquiry.”
“I am talking as a layman!”
“Inquiries will be done by the police organisation. In this particular case by West Bengal Government and they would send their reports or pass their reports both to the Government and to us.”
“There were certain inquiries?”
“Certainly.”
This partial disclosure provoked Bhasin to put to Jayaram: “When the Government of India has accepted Shah Nawaz Committee’s report that Netaji is dead then how is it that the intelligence department goes after every news when it appears that Netaji is not dead and he is alive?” Jayaram’s non-answer to this was: “Whenever any report appears it is not necessary that we should go after that. We are not directed by Government to do anything. Intelligence organisation may do on its own.” [20]
It is my mortification to accuse the Intelligence Bureau of dissembling over a matter of utmost public importance. Not only did its serving and retired employees lie before the inquiry panels, the organisation also altered an important record to shore up evidence in favour of the air crash theory. Jayaram’s reference that “we have presented [to the commission] whatever material we have” was to a dossier of 1945-46 vintage reports, which was originally compiled and supplied to Shah Nawaz by Mullik himself. The first report in the dossier—which contained only those reports which appeared to support the air crash theory—was from PES Finney. Dated 5 September 1945, this report ran into three pages and comprised 10 points. The conclusion of the report looked like this:
Although at this stage one cannot rule out the possibility of Bose being still alive, and of these telegrams being a part of deception plan regarding himself, (particularly in view of his previous intentions of escaping to Russia), the general impression from the study of these documents and the talk with Isoda and my informant is that Bose did actually die as stated.
* * * *
Sd. P.E.S. Finney.
Assistant Director,
Intelligence Bureau, Govt. of India,
Attached I.A.U. 7 Division
Bangkok.
Both Shah Nawaz and GD Khosla used this report to assert that even the wartime intelligence inquiries had concluded what they did. Khosla gladly made the report an exhibit, assigning it number 6 A. The image you have just seen is from this exhibit.
The claim was patently false because Finney’s report of September 5 had not determined as such. The four stars at the end of the Khosla Commission exhibit No 6 A represented deletion. Khosla and Shah Nawaz knew what the missing chunk was about; they were shown a Ministry of Defence file titled INA 273. The file contained a copy of Finney’s report, inclusive of the two last points deleted from the copy supplied by the Intelligence Bureau. A reading of these points reversed the impression generated by the doctored document. After enumerating the general impression, Finney had actually detailed a further line of investigation to assess its validity and suggested circulation of “any conclusive information, one way or the other” because he could foresee that the inquiry would take a long time.
File INA 273 is available for public consultation at the National Archives in New Delhi for it was declassified in 1997.
What Khosla did after reviewing file INA 273—also containing a report about Bose’s possible presence in Russia—is the real eye-opener. Rather than taking the IB to task for supplying him a doctored document, he formally devalued the file by gratuitously leaving a note in it which said, “There is nothing in this file which can be said to have any relevance to the inquiry”. [21] The note was classified as “secret” and that’s rather outrageous because judges do not create classified records. That is the prerogative of the government servants. The slip showed which side Khosla was really on.
If this was not enough, serving and retired intelligence officials appearing before Shah Nawaz and Khosla bolstered the impression created by the Finney’s doctored report with their misleading statements. HK Roy, an inspector attached to the Finney-Davies team, told the Shah Nawaz Committee that Finney’s report “was definite that Netaji was dead”. BN Mullik made one untruthful statement after another before the commission. For instance, he said that “the only time I had a talk with Pandit Nehru about Netaji” was in 1950-51 and made the following remark about his assessment of the pre-1947 reports.
I gathered the impression that at that time the Intelligence Bureau came to the conclusion that Netaji had died as a result of plane crash. So, one day I talked to Pandit Nehru that these agitations are happening and we had this report in the Intelligence Bureau. He said he knew about this but he has been requested by Sarat Chandra Bose not to make it public due to family complications. [22]
Sarat Bose died in 1950 thinking that his brother was alive and one need not be the Director of Intelligence Bureau to see through a false statement coming from Nehru—unless Mullik himself was cooking up one.
Khosla also examined Kalipada Dey, who was part of Finney’s team as an inspector, and used his evidence to support Finney’s doctored report. “The witness went on to say that the substance of the police report was that Netaji had died due to air crash at Taihoku on the 18th August. This is borne out by the copy of the report supplied to the commission.” [23] The other reports, such as those based on the re-interrogation of Habibur Rahman and JK Bhonsle in 1946, never reached non-government lawyers, courtesy Justice Khosla.
Justice Mukherjee followed the simple procedure of asking all ministries and organisations which could possibly have records on Bose to state their positions through sworn affidavits. R&AW did not file any affidavit itself but on its behalf the Ministry of Home Affairs affirmed that the spy agency has no record about Bose. After some delay, a Joint Director of the IB filed an affidavit. It was stamped “secret” and attached to it was a copy of the dossier supplied to the previous panels. This director also informed commission that the IB had 76 other files on or relating to Subhas Bose. Of these, the following IB files are available on paper format.
The list of files on microfilm includes:
Policy of Central Government regarding re-employment of INA personnel in public service (file created in 1947)
Report addressed to Combined Inter-service Historical Section regarding non-availability of photographs of the remains of SC Bose (1950)
Sarat Chandra Bose’s allegation against Indian embassy (1962)
INA papers released in 1961 by a former Joint Director, like note on life and activities of Bose, public statements on his death
Note on the issue “whether Netaji is still alive or not”. Comments and views of different political parties. (1970)
I
have reasons to think that the IB must be holding records additional to those it disclosed to the commission. For example, not listed anywhere is one report filed in the early 1960s. Former IB Deputy Director VK Kaul categorically told me that as a young officer he spied on JK Bhonsle, ascertained his views on Bose's death and "submitted a full account of the matter" to BN Mullik. “It was seen by the highest officers before being returned to me as the originator for filing. It may be still in the old files,” Kaul stated in a written statement. [24]
Also not listed in the IB affidavit are the Rajiv Gandhi-era records detailing its discreet inquiries into claims relating to the property of Provisonal Government of Free India.
And I am absolutely flabbergasted that none of the IB people who appeared before Shah Nawaz and Khosla panels referred to the man who was the best-informed Indian about the early inquiries into Bose’s reported death.
Kalipada Dey told all sort of things to Justice Khosla but never uttered a word about “Rai Bahadur” Bakshi Badrinath, who was the only senior Indian officer on the case. In fact, Dey, Roy, Pritam Singh and Nagina Singh, all members of the Finney-Davies team, were only inspectors. Mullik knew Badrinath personally and had entrusted him with secret missions to Kashmir. Badrinath’s elder son Air Vice Marshal (Retd) Kuldip Bakshi was generous enough to show me a certificate signed by Mullik when his father retired in the 1950s. It was clearly mentioned in it that Badrinath had even worked on Bose’s disappearance in 1941. Unable to understand the value of that document at that time, I made the mistake of not keeping a copy of it. But I did make copies of Badrinath’s personal diaries for 1945-46.
The diaries contain pointers about Badrinath's investigation in tandem with Finney, Davies, Hugh Toye and others. The Air Vice Marshal told me that his father submitted “a bulky report” and all we have now is only a page referring to him at the National Archives in a file Khosla kept secret from all independent lawyers, and which also never reached the Mukherjee Commission. Only the IB can tell where are the other Badrinath records.
Kuldip Bakshi also told me that his father remained in contact with his former colleagues after Independence. I could never get any information from Phillip Finney’s family because I could not contact his son Chris. The younger son of Badrinath was in the IB as well and so the retired old man could have been easily contacted and asked to give evidence before the first two panels. Badrinath passed away in Delhi in 1985. Come to think of it, it shouldn’t have been difficult to trace Finney either, for he outlived Badrinath by one year.
I can also relate what Barun Sengupta testified before the Mukhejee Commission during his examination on 23 November 2000. He said he had himself seen “a report with an intelligence officer in Delhi” in the 1970s. He refused to divulge the name of his source as any journalist would. The report shown to Sengupta quoted Rahman telling a “British intelligence officer that he was not with Netaji in the aircraft which crashed”. Where is that report now?
Since the Intelligence Bureau is not covered by the Right to Information, one cannot request it under the act to state its position over matters just discussed. The Research and Analysis Wing—our external intelligence organisation—is also beyond the preview of RTI. But by a fluke, it responded to my 2006 request to the Prime Minister’s Officer seeking clarification whether or not it was holding any classified records on Bose. The response was that “R&AW does not have any information pertaining to Netaji”.
It could be that by making this unprecedented RTI response the organisation stifled any controversy which might have erupted in case it had remained mum. In any case, the answer, while appreciable, had some room for doubt. Not because some people in private tell me something else, but because I know for sure that a letter was written on 18 March 1994 by Special Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs, to R&AW chief on disclosures about Bose made in Russian media on the basis of classified KGB records. Would you believe that the R&AW did nothing about it?
Like everyone else, I am absolutely proud of my country’s security agencies and their valiant and unsung officers. I do not dispute the need for utmost secrecy in the matters of intelligence because national interest warrants it.
At the same time, there is no justification for our Government as a whole to conceal any direct or indirect information on Subhas Bose from the people. The disclosure of information in this case will only serve the national interest because the Indian public has an overriding right to know. That is why no exception should be made for our most efficient intelligence agencies. They must have hoarded a lot of information relating to the Bose mystery over the last few decades.
7. Ashes which turned to bones
The nip in the air wasn’t just due to the onset of Japanese winter when the Indian embassy car pulled in close to the entrance of Renkoji temple on 24 October 2002. First Secretary C Rajasekhar and Second Secretary T Armstrong Changsan walked in, going past the bust of Subhas Chandra Bose, looking sepulchral, on their way to perform a task no Indian official had ever attempted before.
Justice MK Mukherjee had come closer to it a year earlier during his visit to the temple. But either due to the reluctance on part of the temple authorities and the Indian embassy, or because of a pure oversight, he couldn’t. His trip to the temple had been organised by the embassy on a holiday. No carpenter was around to open up the wooden box reverentially placed on the altar of a cupboard. The box, wrapped in cloth with “Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose” written across it, contained his alleged ashes.
Temple priest Koshi Mochizuki and his wife stood attentively with the Indian officers as the square box full of controversies was opened. Out came yet another. The Indians saw no ash in it; there were big pieces of burnt, grayish bones and a bundle of brown paper. The bundle contained charred remains of teeth. A closer look at the bones revealed that there were chunks from a skull. The officers had the bones turned and noticed big fragment of a jaw.
This sombre episode was one of many forming the long tale of Renkoji remains. So long that it has so far taken several classified files to record them.
The first post-independence development happened almost six years after the air crash we now know never happened. In March 1951, the Government received a letter from former INA man JK Bhonsle, now a minister, saying that Bose’s ashes were lying in a Japanese temple. This prompted the Ministry of External Affairs to direct its newly established liaison office in Tokyo to carry out an investigation.
The liaison head KK Chettur reported back former Indian Independence League official Munga Ramamurti’s assertion that he and SA Ayer had been handed over the urn containing ashes at the entrance of the Imperial Japanese Army HQ in September 1945 and that they had later deposited the urn with the priest of Renkoji temple.
VC Trivedi became the first Indian official to visit the temple. Then a First Secretary and would-be ambassador and noted disarmament expert, Trivedi observed that any “further verification was obviously impossible”. New Delhi was promptly informed through a telegram.
Then followed SA Ayer’s covert visit to Tokyo. Ayer’s enquiry, though more about disposing off the INA treasure, paved the way for the Government of India to take charge of the ashes. In June 1951 Chettur invited the Renkoji priest Kyoei Mochizuki, the father of current priest, to his residence and officially requested him to keep the ash casket.
Thereafter, Chettur informed New Delhi that the ashes “presumed” to be of Bose were enshrined in the Renkoji temple but under the charge of Ramamurti. In New Delhi Prime Minister Nehru was briefed. Through Secretary, Commonwealth Relations, he instructed Chettur on July 18 “not to get mixed up with Netaji’s ashes at least for the present”. However, three months later, on 24 September 1951, Foreign Secretary Subimal Dutt wrote to Chettur that
the Prime Minister desires that you should immediately take over charge of these ashes from Ramamurti, without publicity, leaving them undisturbed in the temple until further instructions. This transfer of custodianship will be without prejudice to fi
nal decision, which will be taken later, as to whether the ashes are genuinely those of the late Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose.
In late November 1953, Nehru received a moving letter from Kyoei Mochizuki. The priest was under genuine impression that the ashes he was guarding were Bose’s remains and was consequently not pleased with the turn of events. He complained: “I, a stranger to the late Netaji, was asked to keep the ashes by people who were strangers to me including Indians of whom I have never heard since that time.”
Mochizuki meant Ramamurti and Ayer. He added: “Frankly speaking, I must inform you that, in spite of many inconveniences and troubles I underwent in keeping the ashes, I have never received any help privately and officially.” Nehru was to read something else into this. The priest continued:
Now Japan is not under occupation. The peaceful relations between Japan and India have been reestablished. So, it is meaningless and pity for the late Netaji that his ashes should be kept in a temple of a foreign country, lonely and secretly, after all his vain efforts to bring about the independence of India and happiness of Asia…. I should be much obliged if you would kindly understand me, and send me, directly, if possible, any suggestions you may have as to the disposal of the late Netaji’s ashes.
Nehru saw the letter and told Deputy Secretary Leilamani Naidu, daughter of Sarojini Naidu, that the priest must be thanked for guarding the ashes. “He should also be told that, at the proper time, we shall send for the ashes and have them in India. But, for the present, we should like him to keep them under his safe custody.”
