by Jared Cohen
Despite the international concern and hand-wringing over Ahmadinejad, who has turned out to be just as conservative as the youth feared, the presidency in Iran is a relatively weak office. To ascertain which members of the government speak with the force of the regime, one must first understand the tremendous complexity of Iran’s governance structure. At the top of this chain of command is Ayatollah Ali Khamanei, who is the supreme spiritual guide and has the power to make all final decisions and revoke those of others. Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati chairs the Guardian Council, the authority charged with interpreting the Iranian constitution. In this position, Jannati has the power to disqualify presidential and parliamentary candidates. The Guardian Council also has the authority to reject any law passed by the parliament, or Majles, as it is called in Persian. Another noteworthy branch of the government is the Expediency Council, tasked with the responsibility of resolving disputes between the Majles and the Guardian Council as well as serving as a consultative body to the supreme spiritual leader. Other notable branches include the Expediency Council, which will choose a new supreme leader upon Khamanei’s death; the Judiciary; Parliament; and the National Security and Intelligence apparatuses.
These branches of government, as well as the advisors and clerics that comprise them, are the movers and shakers of the Islamic Republic. The president is absent from this list, as he is kept in check by each of them. Even the few powers that the president is given are easily checked by the supreme spiritual leader. There are 177 articles of the Iranian constitution, none of which grants the Iranian president any final power or decision-making capability in Iranian policy. The ultimate check on the Iranian president comes in Article 113 of the constitution:
After the office of Leadership, the President is the highest official in the country. His is the responsibility for implementing the Constitution and acting as the head of the executive, except in matters directly concerned with the office of the Leadership.
So if Ahmadinejad doesn’t have the power in Iran, what is all the fuss about? There is the obvious point that he is part of the regime and therefore his statements reflect at least in part those of his colleagues who do actually exercise power. But Ahmadinejad doesn’t need decision-making power to influence. Even if his message doesn’t necessarily resonate with the majority of young Iranians, he speaks in such a way that it resonates with anti-American populations from Venezuela to Lebanon to Pakistan. His ability to fuel the anti-American fire with words across sects, ethnicities, and nationalities is part of what makes him so dangerous. But his words have also fueled an even larger fire. His rhetoric has taken the nuclear issue to an entirely different level and brought it to the forefront of international security concerns. While the world cautiously determines how to resolve the conflict peacefully, Iranian youth fear the worst. Ahmadinejad is being used by the regime as a scare tactic.
As the world responds to the government’s rhetoric, young Iranians attentively watch the news on their satellite televisions and they read the news on the Internet. They hear rumors about what will happen to their country and they wonder what these rumors will mean for them. Do more Security Council sanctions mean war? Will the United States come into Iran and overthrow the regime?
Young Iranians dream of a change that will bring them opportunity, but they do not want this change to come through violence. As children, they lived through eight years of war with Iraq and don’t want to experience that horror again. Still, they are obsessed with the idea of change. Young Iranians can tell you exactly what they want, but they make assumptions about the relative ease through which such change can be brought about, particularly when it comes to the use of force. In 2002, at the onset of the United States bombing campaign in Afghanistan, there were pockets of Iranian youth holding signs that read “Bomb Us First.” Similarly, I met Iranian students throughout the country who joked that the United States is paying the price in Iraq for jumping the queue; these young people wanted the Iranian government overthrown before the Iraqi government. This is their way of saying that they want a new regime in Iran, although their words are not meant to be taken literally.
These same youths were always careful to remind me that they would never tolerate a foreign boot on their ground or a foreign tank rolling through their streets. They have a tremendous amount of pride and it was amazing how many times students would draw on the historical examples of Mossadeq in 1953 or even Alexander the Great’s burning of Persepolis, as evidence for what happens when foreigners get involved in Iranian affairs.
The day after my trip to Natanz, I arranged to meet a group of students for lunch. I wanted to talk to them about possible responses to the nuclear crisis. The basic consensus among these students was that, if given the choice between violent change or allowing the regime to remain in place, they would rather try their luck with the regime. Most Iranians take a positive view of the United States, but any American involvement in a violent revolution, sure to bring back memories of the Iran-Iraq War, will quickly sour that association. Currently, the admiration young Iranians have for the United States is based more on America’s symbolic position as the antithesis of the Iranian regime than on any specific policy. The wrong specific policy, however, would supersede the general affinity Iranians feel for the United States. As one of the students, a native of Natanz, said to me, “I love George Bush, but if he invades my country I will hate him.”
In Esfahan, I had met a family in the Imam Square, with two daughters who were just a few years younger than I. While they were cordial to me, they showed great support and admiration for Iran’s supreme spiritual guide, Ayatollah Ali Khamanei, and the Islamic Republic; they were also very religious. As soon as I told them that I was American, one of the girls went into a tirade about America’s “criminal support for Israel” and the American “murder of Palestinian people.” Her comments didn’t offend me; if anything, I’d expected to hear such things far more often than I had. In Iran, state-designed history books and massive propaganda campaigns teach young people oversimplified bumper-sticker slogans; if their families reinforce these beliefs, they will likely hold them themselves. These girls were clearly influenced by a very conservative father, who was not shy about sharing with me his own viewpoint, which I would categorize as a more extremist version of what his daughters had expressed.
The conversation continued about the Arab-Israeli conflict for about fifteen minutes and I rarely got a word in. Indoctrination is easy to detect because those who have been most affected by it are the least willing to engage on relevant issues. When discussing contentious issues they want to preach, not discuss. Once she found out I was Jewish she inquired, “Why don’t you want to be a Muslim? I think all people should be Muslim.” And my rebuttals didn’t seem to make much sense to her; I would repeat over and over again, “I think we are all children of God and how we choose to embrace that relationship is the choice of an individual,” but made no headway. This was my standard response to questions about my religion; I had been trained to give it by a few concerned mentors back in the United States. As it turned out, it was usually unnecessary; in this case, it proved more perplexing than effective.
The conversation did not degenerate completely, as a shift from the topics of politics and religion brought us to similar curiosities. The same girl who had given me a state-sponsored history lesson in “America’s oppression of Muslim people” now smiled at me and asked, “Are the buildings in New York really like we see on TV? I think it is not possible and if it is, then it must be with the hand of Allah.” I proceeded to tell her about glass elevators, buildings that were over a hundred stories high, and what it feels like to walk down a city block in downtown New York. She loved hearing this and she grew more curious with each description. I had never thought about it this way before, but in the same way I had always traveled places to see ancient ruins and marvelous achievements of the world’s oldest civilization, young people in the Middle East want to come to America to see modernity at
its best.
When I asked to take a picture with them, they looked to their father for permission. He agreed, but only if he stood between me and his daughters dressed by choice in full chador.
At the University of Tehran, I met several girls who would not stand within several feet of me when we spoke. I stopped them outside of the on-campus mosque to see if I could ask them a few questions. Each was dressed in full black chador all the way down to her feet. Their faces were ovals surrounded by black head-scarves that covered every strand of hair, and they wore no makeup.
These girls were quick to remind me that they had no problem with the American people or the country, but they were very comfortable lashing out at the American government. They emphasized that it is America’s “support of Israel” and “oppression of the Palestinian people” that is creating problems in the world. The girls were emphatic about reminding me that they are tired of America pushing its weight around.
“But who is to blame for Iran’s domestic troubles, such as the economy?” I pushed.
The shortest of the three girls spoke up.
“America has the sanctions on Iran, America supports Israel, America attacks Islam; these are the things that make for our troubles in Iran.” The other girls nodded in agreement. She sounded as if she was muttering a propaganda headline.
“What do you think should be America’s role in the Middle East?” I asked, trying to deduce what they thought of the war in Iraq and the prospect of American intervention in Iran.
One of the other girls spoke. She was tall and thin, and unlike the other girls, she spoke with a very angry tone. It was as if she saw me as a representative of the government. She asserted that even though Saddam Hussein is the enemy of Iran, “the Americans should not have come to Iraq and should not have invaded the Iraqi regime, because there were other means to control the country and that regime, there were other options put forward by European governments, and the invasion was not worth all this bloodshed and this violence in the name of democracy.” She had a lot to say and there was little room for my words.
“It is doubtful whether American presence in the country, in the region, will actually enhance the chances of democracy,” she continued. “People will always see this American democracy as imposed on the regime, so it will always have this stigma attached to it. They do not feel emotionally attached to this democratic experience and it will have a boomerang effect and will result in the opposite and make it antidemocratic.”
This girl, at least four years younger than I am, had rendered me speechless. She was so articulate and so passionate in her words that I didn’t know what to say. She then issued what sounded to me like a warning.
“America should know that its presence in the region is a threat to Iran, this is part of the same old story of how the Americans are a danger,” she cautioned. “The Americans are no longer a danger; they are a closer danger residing in the east and in the west. Even if the economics change, the danger is still there with their presence.”
This stank of indoctrination for me. Indoctrinated youth were everywhere. In southern Tehran, I went into some of the poorer areas, where I encountered similar, if more populist-tinged, rhetoric. Some youth I met there believed that the regime protected them and safeguarded their livelihood. I couldn’t understand how they could have so much confidence in a government that squanders its country’s resources and wastes funds needed for the economy on corrupt enterprises and a radical foreign policy.
Every chance I got, I would ask students to explain to me, as I put it, “Who are the youth who chant ‘Death to America’?” What I learned is that there is not one answer to this question, as such “Islamic Republic fans” are pulled from various strata of society. One Iranian student explained that the youth who support the regime “come from the stomach of the Islamic Republic government.” This was a cute analogy, but I didn’t quite understand it.
“What do you mean?” I asked.
“Imagine you are thirteen or fourteen years old and you are confused about what happens around you because you don’t know the reality. Then someone appears and wants to bring you up the way he wants, so he tries as well as he can to change your mind.”
“But where do they find these youth?” I probed.
“Most of them come from poor families because they show them that rich people and the people who think modernly are taking their rights for life. So they wash their brain with the old model of Islam and they tell them that is justice.”
“And what do they tell them?”
“They tell them that anybody except them is evil, it doesn’t matter who they are. This can be America, Israel, or even other Iranians.” She continued by explaining that agents of the regime support the poor families with money, but she reminded me that this is not for the well-being of these families; it is to buy them off. Rather than actually changing the policies to provide for better social services and opportunities, the regime takes advantage of the short-term needs of the impoverished by giving them immediate cash. They take advantage of the lack of education by scapegoating others and casting themselves as the protectors of the poor in the face of Western secular imperialism.
Many of those targeted for indoctrination are the families of martyrs from the Iran-Iraq War. Following eight years of bloody war, hundreds of thousands of families had been affected by it. Some had lost fathers, husbands, and sons, while others had lost houses and businesses. With hundreds of thousands of soldiers throwing themselves before the front lines of the war in massive human-wave attacks, a substantial portion of the previous youth generation was killed, incapacitated, or disappeared. Immediately after the war, the Iranian government began investing in the minds of these families, in particular the youth who had lost one of their kin. The war was blamed on America, Israel, and the West; the Islamic Republic government was cast as the great protector of the people’s security and well-being. The Martyrs Foundation and government-sponsored schools, with their regime ideology, reached out to the impoverished communities and the slums. The ideology was believable to these youth simply because the only money they received was from the government and they didn’t have any other information. Some of these youth actually do buy into the ideology, but more often than not, subscribing to it is a reflection of ambition rather than loyalty.
Ultimately, support for President Ahmadinejad, even among the lower class, is based on little more than his rhetoric. He has failed in his actions and already lost much of his support base. When Ahmadinejad ascended to the presidency, he promised economic change at the expense of secularization; not only has society become more nonsecular but the economy has also worsened. The difficult time he had in getting his ministers confirmed illustrated his ineffectiveness within the Iranian government circles; given these circumstances, many are questioning how he can execute an economic agenda.
It is important to note that the small minority who support the regime are not limited to the impoverished. There is a very real, if minuscule, segment of the population who can be classified as true believers. These true believers are the ones who subscribe fully to the ideology of the Islamic Republic and want a fully nonsecular government. They attend Friday prayers, they participate in demonstrations (although many of them receive money for this), and they hope to become the next generation of the ruling elite. Almost perversely, these true believers are often driven more by ambition than by true belief, as such. The true believers I met in the universities aspired to be head of the Guardian Council, president of Iran, or ministers in the government, and becoming a true believer is the only way for them to do this. They are deeply religious, but so are other members of the population who despise the regime. The key difference is that the true believers show a willingness to sell out to ambition.
Among the true believers, there are also those who are the kin of the inner circle of the ruling elite. These families have prospered under this regime and know that whatever follows will lead to a lower quality of lif
e for them and their families. As a result, they hope to keep the generational support alive by following in their fathers’ footsteps and by supporting the regime in all of its policies. Having been socialized in the homes of the inner circle, they have no reason to reject a status quo that has brought them wealth, opportunity, and personal prosperity.
While the impoverished and the true believers are key components of the regime’s support base, the most important and stable support base they have is among the youth who participate in military and paramilitary activities.
In addition to the traditional military, some elements of Iranian youth are actively involved in the Basij forces, Ansar-e Hezbollah, and the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps. Each of these organizations serves a different purpose, but they all allow for youth participants to hold positions of social and political prominence. It is empowering for these youth; they are given uniforms and authority to command over the population. For those who have grown up either humiliated or impoverished, the military is a great way to get ahead and is a way to experience a level of power and comfort that is not enjoyed by the vast majority of Iranian young people. These youth do not live in fear like the rest of the population; instead, they take part in evoking fear. Because many of these youth lack a strong education, they actually enjoy a relative position in society that far exceeds what they would otherwise have.
These military organizations are integrated into Iranian society so as to maintain order and keep the regime in control. While the traditional military are responsible for protecting Iran from outside threats, these state-sponsored paramilitary organizations are designed to maintain domestic stability, i.e., to keep the population suppressed. The Basij forces can best be thought of as volunteers for military service. Not surprisingly, they are usually young and come from the poorer and less educated segments of society. The Basij forces first came to prominence during the Iran-Iraq War by providing bodies for the human-wave attacks against southern Iraq. At present, the Basij are supposed to be role models for their peers and are tasked with enforcing proper ethical conduct. This enforcement has often been violent and has caught the attention of groups such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International.
