Again this analysis will focus on the ADF’s ground-based contribution to Operation Catalyst. This is not to distract from the RAAF’s C130 and P3C aircraft task groups or the RAN ship that continued to serve in the Middle East area of operations. Rather, it is because it was the land-based contribution that served in harm’s way, on the ground, inside Iraq. Initially, Australia’s assistance was quite small and took the form of a limited number of specialist personnel who deployed for a particular task and for a set period. Such tasks included, for example, assistance in the search for weapons of mass destruction, as air traffic controllers who helped run Baghdad International Airport, and as embedded personnel in US and UK headquarters. In addition, the ADF deployed to Baghdad a security detachment to protect the Australian ambassador and staff. Australia’s Middle East headquarters also moved forward to Baghdad in order to be located near the US headquarters.
Despite the initial intent to keep its presence inside Iraq as small as possible, the Australian government gave way to Coalition pressure and eventually deployed a more significant ground force. In April 2005, the ADF provided the al-Muthanna Task Group (AMTG). Its purpose was to protect a Japanese engineering group that was working in the province of the same name. The ADF also deployed the Australian Army Training Team – Iraq (AATT-I), whose task was to help the United States to train the Iraqi Army. Combined, both organisations numbered approximately 500 personnel.27 In July 2006, AMTG relocated to neighbouring Dhi Qar Province and was renamed Overwatch Battle Group – West (OBG-W). Its new task was to provide operational overwatch to the Iraqi forces based in Dhi Qar and al-Muthanna Provinces, in case the local troops needed assistance. Australia withdrew both groups in June 2008.28
Although an insurgency still raged across Iraq, its prosecution was not the mission of the Australians serving with AMTG/ OBG-W and AATT-I. Instead, their tasks were to train Iraqi soldiers and officers, and provide operational overwatch in both provinces, the latter a requirement they were never called upon to perform. Countering the insurgents was the job of the other Coalition forces that operated in these provinces, principally the American troops who guarded Main Supply Route Tampa, a key logistical corridor which traversed Dhi Qar. Instead of an aggressive pursuit of insurgents, the Australians adopted a defensive posture, a policy which allowed them to mitigate risk and thereby avoid casualties. The Australians could and did defend themselves if fired upon, but seeking trouble was someone else’s business.29
Moreover, Dhi Qar and al-Muthanna proved to be among the quietest of Iraq’s provinces, and the first to convert to local control. During the course of the war, Coalition forces suffered 99 and eight fatalities in these two provinces respectively. During the period in which the Australians were present, there were only five deaths as a result of hostile fire in Dhi Qar and none at all in al-Muthanna. In fact, both provinces were backwaters. The areas where the insurgency was most active were Basra to the south, al-Anbar to the west, or in Baghdad and its environs. Only the Kurdish regions of the far north were less dangerous. That said, it must still be recognised that threats did exist. Improvised explosive devices were used in Dhi Qar and al-Muthanna, and indeed a number of Australians were wounded in attacks. In addition, rockets did strike the Australian camp at Tallil, which resulted in the deaths of one Romanian and four US soldiers.30 But such events were comparatively rare, and an Australian risk assessment that needed to include criminal activity, unexploded ordnance left over from the 1991 and 2003 wars, and road traffic accidents did not suggest an area of operations of exceptionally high danger. The characterisation of the Australian area as a ‘non permissive battlespace’ only served to undercut any claim that Australia punched above its weight in Iraq.31
While casualty figures are an imprecise measure of how committed a country is to a military operation, they are indicative. As the United States bore the worst of the combat in the invasion of Iraq and the subsequent insurgency, it is not surprising that it also suffered the greatest number of fatalities: 4462 as of mid-2011. The United Kingdom’s loss of 179 personnel was smaller, but still considerable. By contrast, the ADF lost just two soldiers during its entire involvement in the Iraq War, and both deaths were non-battle related.32 That Australia in a military commitment that lasted more than six years and involved over 20 000 personnel can suffer just two fatalities is a great outcome for the organisation and those who serve in it. It is, however, so extraordinary an achievement that it is hard to avoid the suggestion that Australia’s commitment to the war was not as robust as that of its allies, and that while the ADF maintained a presence in the Coalition, the inescapable conclusion is that the policy of its deployed forces was to avoid taking any risks.33
At the time of writing, Australia has lost 27 soldiers in the ongoing war in Afghanistan. These personal tragedies do suggest that Australia is attempting to contribute more in a combat sense to the US-led Coalition there than it did in Iraq. Australia was also one of the first countries to join the United States in attacking al-Qaeda and their Taliban protectors, and its Special Forces troops served with distinction in the war’s opening phase in 2001 and 2002. The soldiers of the Australian SAS received particularly high praise for their performance during Operation Anaconda in March 2002, when they saved a party of US soldiers from two downed Chinook helicopters who were in danger of being overrun.34 US personnel who got to know the Australian Special Forces described them in glowing terms, calling them ‘pros’ and the ‘hardest looking men in Bagram’.35 After working with the Australian SAS, the then Brigadier General James Mattis remarked, ‘we Marines would happily storm Hell itself with your troops’.36
Australia withdrew the SAS from Afghanistan in 2002 in order to have them available for the war with Iraq, and the nation did not return a field force to Afghanistan until September 2005. By 2011 this deployment had grown to approximately 1550 personnel supported by a further 800 serving elsewhere in the Middle East. The operational name given to the Australian contribution to the war in Afghanistan is Operation Slipper.
Since re-engagement in 2005, the Australian area of operations has been Uruzgan Province in Afghanistan’s south-east. The ADF contingent’s mission is to train and mentor the Afghan National Army’s 4th Brigade, build the capacity of the Afghan National Police in the province, and improve the capacity of the provincial government to deliver essential services to the population. In addition, the Australian Special Operations Task Group’s mission is to disrupt insurgent operations and supply routes in the region. Based outside of Afghanistan but providing support to Operation Slipper are RAAF transport and surveillance elements, a detachment of gunners serving with the British Army in Helmand Province, embedded personnel serving on NATO and US staffs, as well as a RAN major fleet unit operating in the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea.37
In assessing the role of the ADF in the war in Afghanistan it is not yet possible to examine it from the perspective of outcomes achieved. Even the comparison of Australian accomplishments with those of other Coalition partners is problematic due to the limited information available. Moreover, there is considerable doubt among defence thinkers that Australia and its partners are even pursuing an achievable strategic goal. For example, the Provincial Reconstruction Team has completed an impressive list of reconstruction projects, yet the jury is still out on the effectiveness of such aid programs in winning the ‘hearts and minds’ of a people. Operational outcomes, therefore, are still too undecided to serve as useful guides for determining the mission’s overall success or failure.
It is necessary, therefore, to look at the Australian role in the war in Afghanistan not in isolation but rather in comparison with that of a defence force of another country. In its commitment to this conflict, Canada offers useful points of comparison with Australia. Canada and Australia share a common language, cultural values and history, and both rely on mineral extraction for much of their national wealth. Each country also has a close military relationship with the United States. While Canada is approximately 50 per c
ent larger than Australia in population, its defence expenditure and size of its armed forces are roughly the same. In 2009, Canadian and Australian defence expenditure were also almost identical at US$19 575 and US$19 515 million respectively, while the number of full-time personnel fielded by the Canadian forces was 66 000 versus 57 000 for the ADF.38
A superficial review of these figures suggests that Australia is attempting to do more with less, since its military share of GDP is higher on a per capita basis – US$892 versus US$580. Yet, when operational commitments are taken into account, the difference in the two nations’ degree of willingness to use military force dramatically changes the equation. A one-to-one comparison leads to the conclusion that it is Canada, not Australia, that is punching above its weight in Afghanistan.
Both countries are currently participating in numerous operations around the world, representing a mix of peace-keeping, peace stabilisation and war fighting missions in places such as Sudan, Sierra Leone, the Balkans, the Middle East, Afghanistan and Timor-Leste. There are approximately 2900 ADF personnel serving on ten international deployments, while Canada has about 3900 personnel serving on 14 international deployments.39 For both Australia and Canada, the most significant mission is Afghanistan, although Canada has also recently become involved in the effort to impose a ‘no fly zone’ on Libya, a task to which it has assigned another approximately 650 personnel.40
In its commitment to Afghanistan, Canada has taken responsibility for Kandahar province and deployed a combined arms battalion-size battle group based upon the 1st Battalion Royal 22e Regiment. In support, Canada has deployed its own artillery, engineer, armoured reconnaissance and tank elements. Also in Kandahar Canada has fielded an Operational Mentor and Liaison Team, a Civil-Military Co-Operation Team, an engineering team and additional support services. Canada has also deployed an air wing that includes three C-130 transports, six CH-47D medium-lift helicopters (more than the entire ADF inventory, it should be noted), and eight CH-146 Griffon utility helicopters, and has chartered additional medium-lift helicopters from a commercial provider. The Canadian contingent totals over 3000 personnel. In addition, serving under Canadian command in Kandahar is a battalion of US infantry from the 82nd Airborne Division with supporting cavalry elements from the 10th Mountain Division.41
Not only is the size of the Canadian contingent twice that of Australia, but its composition is a balanced combined arms team that is aligned for combat rather than the ADF’s preference for mentoring, reconstruction and social empowerment. In Uruzgan, only Special Forces troops have the specific task to hunt down and kill the enemy, while the rest of the ADF deployment’s focus is on less risky undertakings. In addition, the Australian contingent has not taken complete responsibility for the province, but shares this with the United States and remains dependent on US resources for much of its support. The contrast in posture means that Canadian troops are exposed to more danger, and the casualty figures mirror this. To date Canada has lost 156 soldiers in Afghanistan, compared to 27 Australians.42
Canada is in the heart of the conflict and it is one of the countries which have not shirked from the threat of losses. When it first deployed to Afghanistan, Canada had decided against sending tanks. Its leaders soon changed their minds and sent out the force’s elderly Leopard I vehicles. Canada then quickly upgraded its armour force by acquiring the newer and more capable Leopard II tank. Canada has also deployed a fleet of helicopters, whereas Australia maintains only two Chinooks in the theatre, and then for only an eight-month interval. The Australian Army’s sizeable fleet of Blackhawk helicopters remains at home and the Australians in Afghanistan instead rely on Coalition partners for the extra lift they need. Canada finds utility in employing the symbol of land power projection – the tank – whereas Australia’s state-of-the-art M1 Abrams tanks remain in Darwin, without any prospect for operational experience.
There have been suggestions that Australia should do more, to make a larger and more powerful contribution to the war in Afghanistan. Retired Major General Jim Molan has frequently called for the deployment of a brigade group to Afghanistan,43 yet successive Australian governments have decided that Australia is already doing enough.44 The result is that, while reports of the high regard in which the US-led Coalition holds Australia continue to be released, there are signs of a changing attitude. US General David Petraeus did single out Australia for praise, but he did so while fishing for a larger commitment – an opportunity the Australian government declined.45 Assessments in recent books place Australia above the league of many ‘do-nothing’ partners, but still well below the efforts of other countries.46 As one Australian commentator has observed, ‘instead of impressing its allies, Australia’s heavily circumscribed commitment dismays them with its timidity’.47 Australia’s forces in Afghanistan serve with national caveats designed to limit what they are allowed to do, and are similar to the ones that were in place for the war in Iraq. There is little doubt that these restrictions annoy the leaders of Australia’s partners, but they also understand the game and accept that domestic concerns trump the preferences of coalition partners, particularly in wars of choice.48 Elsewhere, the nature of Australia’s commitment has been described as ‘a politically safe deployment, designed to demonstrate Australia’s commitment to the war on terror without incurring electorally unpalatable casualties’.49 These are hardly ringing endorsements.
If the ADF does not punch above its weight, then what is its true nature? Through design, the ADF is a provider of niche capabilities to international coalitions. This has been a deliberate and long-standing policy and practice of the government: in fact it dates to the nation’s founding. Even the Australian Imperial Forces of the two World Wars were not independent armies, but worked within a coalition upon which they relied for much of their support and sustainment. For example, the tank was a critical factor in the Australian successes at the Battles of Hamel and Amiens in World War I, yet Australia did not raise any tank units. So strong has been the preference to field niche forces that it is no longer clear that Australia would want, or even could, initiate a military operation unilaterally. Moreover, this trend has been reinforced by the ADF seeking greater inter-operability with the military forces of the United States.50
Being a niche provider is not necessarily a bad thing: indeed it represents a sound strand of strategic thinking by the nation’s political and military leaders. By being willing to provide a coalition partner with effective niche forces, Australia has been able to provide for its broader security needs at a relatively affordable cost. This has also allowed Australia to achieve desirable international goals that might not otherwise have been available, including the ANZUS Alliance and a free trade deal with the United States. With relatively small contributions, Australia has fulfilled international obligations and enjoys a high standing with its coalition partners.51
Furthermore, being a niche provider is not incompatible with the claim to punch above its weight, because some parts of ADF’s forces do just that. Rather it is the myth’s universal application that needs to be checked. For example, the Australian Army’s Special Forces are justifiably held in high regard by the nation’s allies and, perhaps alone amongst the rest of the ADF, they do punch above their weight.52 US officials sincerely describe the Australian SAS as ‘shit hot’ and acknowledge that their own military personnel ‘love to work with them’.53 However, such comments are not indicative of the organisation as a whole, and too many examples exist where the applicability of ‘punching above its weight’ is patently false. Can an army that is unable to wage combined arms warfare, or a navy that fails to have any submarines or major amphibious vessels fit for sea, or an air force that nurses its aging jets on the promise of the joint strike fighter, realistically claim to be an above-average organisation?54
This myth is an especially pernicious one because it prevents the ADF from realistically assessing its own worth. Instead, it encourages the mistaken notion that Australian military perso
nnel can do anything, anywhere, and do it better than anyone else. In war, this is a dangerous belief to hold, particularly when the ADF does so little to back it up. Our coalition partners are realists, and they accept that there are domestic political limitations on what Australia can provide. They are content to accept a largely symbolic presence, as was the case in post-invasion Iraq and for much of the war in Afghanistan. Officials in Washington are also aware that it is the political fact of Australia’s contribution that really matters, not its composition. However, our coalition partners are also composed of people, some of whom have written letters to the families of soldiers who have died under their command, soldiers who fought with quiet dignity and without vocal claims to greatness. There are signs of the beginning of a change of attitude in the United States from those who have sacrificed so much towards those who contributed so little.
Whether this affects Australia’s strategic relationship is yet to be determined.55
This myth is dangerous for another reason, for it encourages wishful rather than clear, realistic thinking. It prevents the ADF itself from perceiving what it really is: a niche provider of discrete military elements to coalition warfare. In assessing Australia’s military worth, it is best to start from a point of reality rather then one of bravado. If being a niche contributor is openly acknowledged, than it can be assessed; if found undesirable it can be changed. If the ADF requires more ‘weight’, a case can be made for it receiving a larger share of the nation’s wealth. In understanding the true nature of the force the government and the ADF can make plans and policies backed by what the force can and cannot do. National security is just too important to allow the ‘punching above its weigh’ myth to survive any longer.
Further reading
Australian Department of Defence, The War in Iraq: ADF Operations in the Middle East in 2003, DoD, Canberra.
Anzac's Dirty Dozen Page 23
