13 Australian Archives A4531, item 201/2/1 part 1, Saigon – Vietnam elections – 1966, Cablegram, Australian Embassy Saigon to Department of External Affairs, Canberra, 13 September 1966.
14 H.G. Summers Jr., On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War, Random House, New York, 1982, p. 1.
15 Analysis of the ‘1ATF Contact Database 1966 to 1971’.
16 ‘1ATF Contact Database’.
17 Counter Revolutionary Warfare, p. 37.
18 ‘1ATF Contact Database’.
19 Analysis of 1ATF Intelligence Summaries (INTSUMs) and the ‘1ATF Intelligence Database’.
20 1ATF Intelligence Summaries (INTSUMs); ‘1ATF Intelligence Database’.
21 D. Hackworth, About Face: The Odyssey of an American Warrior, Macmillan, Melbourne, 1989, p. 669.
22 Of the enemy weapons captured by Australian and New Zealand forces in contacts, 748 were AK47s and 731 were other weapons including M16s, carbines and sub-machine guns, rifles, pistols, RPG launchers and machine guns: see ‘1ATF Contact Database’.
23 In early 1968, 2RAR, 3RAR and 7RAR were invited by HQ 1ATF to give a critical appraisal of the performance of infantry weapons in Vietnam. The results of this appraisal are found in AWM103, item R1000/1/8, HQ 1ATF Weapons – General – Review of infantry weapons.
24 HQ 1ATF Weapons – General – Review of infantry weapons. The COs of 2RAR/NZ (ANZAC), 3RAR and 7RAR each commented on the rifle’s ‘popularity’ with 1ATF soldiers, its ‘excellence’, reliability, accuracy and penetrating ability. See also I. Kuring, Red Coats to Cams: A History of Australian Infantry 1788–2001, Army History Unit, Canberra, 2004, p. 399. The L1A1 7.62mm Self Loading Rifle (or SLR) was in service with the Australian Army for about 25 years.
25 T. Page and J. Pimlott (eds), Nam: The Vietnam Experience 1965–1975, Hamlyn, London,1988, p. 64.
26 AWM95, item 7/2/54, Australian Army Commander’s Diaries, Vietnam – 2RAR/NZ (ANZAC) – Narrative, Annexes, 1–31 May 1970, p. 123, Routine Orders for 2 RAR/NZ, May 1970.
27 ‘1ATF Contact Database’. This represents the lowest figure for failure in contact. Many M60 problems were not necessarily reported in contact reports.
28 AWM95, item 7/4/53, Australian Army Commander’s Diaries, Vietnam – 4RAR/NZ (ANZAC) – Map, 1–30 September 1971, Contact report, D Company 4RAR/NZ, 21 September 1971.
29 R.A. Hall, Combat Battalion: The Eighth Battalion in Vietnam, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 2000, pp. 160–165.
30 G. Lockhart, The Minefield: An Australian Tragedy in Vietnam, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 2007, p. 216.
31 Hall, Combat Battalion, pp. 110–111.
10 The myth that Australia ‘punches above its weight’
Albert Palazzo
1 The views expressed in this chapter are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Australian Army, the Department of Defence or the Australian Government.
2 P. Kelly, ‘Punching above our weight,’ Policy, 20(2), Winter 2004, pp. 29–34; M. Thomson, ‘Punching above our weight: Australia as a middle power’, Strategic Insights, 18, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2005, p. 2; P. Cook, ‘Trade, equity and development’, address to the Australian APEC Study Centre, Melbourne, 18 June 2000; G. Evans, ‘The world after Wilenski: An Australian who mattered’, inaugural Peter Wilenski Memorial Lecture, Canberra, 1995.
3 For examples see: P. Cosgrove, ‘Year sees a versatile force punch way above its weight’, The Australian, 12 November 2004; ‘Address by the Chief of Army Lieutenant General P.F. Leahy to the Defence Management Seminar’, 24 September 2004; A. Houston, ‘The future of airpower: RAAF response to the ADF NCW Roadmap’, 2004 Air Power Conference CAF Keynote Speech, 16 September 2004; D. Hurley, ‘Managing in crisis: The road to recovery,’ 27 October 2008; & Brigadier C.W. Orme, ‘Size and complexity: A soldier’s perspective’, address to Institute of Public Administration, 14 September 2006.
4 ‘1 RAR Band’, Australian Army Band Corps, 2010; ‘Punching above their weight’, Navy News, 10 June 2010; APA-H, Career News, Summer 2008; JLU(S) Newsletter, 1(3), July 2009; ‘Australian business wins more JSF contracts’, On Target, 37, January 2004; and RAAPC, Integrity Times, Spring 2004.
5 ‘Putting the tiger in the shed: Dechaineux Rests’, Trade, June 2005.
6 See ‘Punching above our weight: Australia once again ranked 6th at Cannes; NZ placed equal 9th’, Campaign Brief, 29 June 2010,
7 The Anzac legend and the cult of the ‘digger’ have been dealt with in the previous volume: see C. Stockings (ed.), Zombie Myths of Australian Military History, UNSW Press, Sydney, 2010.
8 Thomson, ‘Punching above our weight’.
9 P. Cosgrove, ‘One mission accomplished: What’s next?’ The Sydney Papers, 12(3), Winter 2000, pp. 94–105.
10 For a brief discussion of Australia’s role in East Timor see D. Horner, Making the Australian Defence Force, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 2001, pp. 7–39; also, B. Breen, Mission Accomplished: East Timor, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 2000.
11 For examples see Australian National Audit Office, Management of Australian Defence Force Deployments to East Timor, Commonwealth of Australia, Department of Defence, 2002, pp. 89–90; B. Breen and G. McCauley, The World Looking over their Shoulders: Australian Strategic Corporals on Operations in Somalia and East Timor, Land Warfare Studies Centre, Canberra, 2008, pp. 164–67.
12 Defence 2000: Our Future Defence Force, Commonwealth of Australia, Department of Defence, para 1.15.
13 J.R Ballard, Triumph of Self-Determination: Operation Stabilise and United Nations Peacemaking in East Timor, Praeger, Westport, 2008, pp. 67–69; Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, East Timor: Final Report of the Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, 2000, pp. 49–51.
14 Ballard, Triumph of Self-Determination, p. 67.
15C.A. Collier, ‘A new way to wage peace: US support to Operation Stabilise’, Military Review, January–February 2001, pp. 2–9; see also D. Stevens, Strength through Diversity: The Combined Naval Role in Operation STABILISE, Sea Power Centre Australia, Canberra, 2007.
16 A. Ryan, ‘Primary Responsibilities and Primary Risks’: Australian Defence Force Participation in the International Force East Timor, Land Warfare Studies Centre, Canberra, 2000, pp. 75–76.
17 East Timor: Final Report of the Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee, p. 51.
18 Ballard, Triumph of Self-Determination, p. 70.
19 See Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, From Phantom to Force: Towards a More Efficient and Effective Army, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, 2000.
20 Horner, Making the Australian Defence Force, p. 11.
21 Horner, Making the Australian Defence Force, pp. 35-40.
22 T. Allard, ‘Experts of stealth leave their mark’, The Age, 25 April 2003.
23 On Iraqi military incompetence see K.M. Woods et. al., The Iraqi Perspectives Report, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 2006, pp. 39–48.
24 The Australian Experience of Airpower, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, 2007, p. 161; P. Cosgrove, ‘Fighting fists forged in Falconer’, The Australian, 20 June 2003; Allard, ‘Experts of stealth leave their mark’; and ‘Colonel John Mansell provides an overview of Australian Special Forces contribution to Operation Falconer’, Defence Media Release, 9 May 2003.
25 Figures are for April 2003 and compiled from A. Belasco, Troop Levels in the Afghan and Iraq Wars, FY2001-FY2012: Cost and Other Potential Issues, Congressional Research Service,
Washington DC, 2009, p. 64; Operations in Iraq: Lessons for the Future, [UK] Ministry for Defence, London, 2003, p. 84; The War in Iraq: ADF Operations in the Middle East in 2003, Department of Defence, Canberra, 2003; & United Nations Population Data Base,
26 D. Fickling, ‘Australia criticised for troops pullout’, Guardian, 18 April 2003; M. Wilkinson, ‘Bush wants Canberra role in Iraq,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 1 May 2003.
27 Australian Defence Forces Deployed to Support the Rehabilitation of Iraq: Report of the Delegation 22 to 28 October 2005, Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Canberra, 2006, pp. 25–26. Prior to the establishment of the Training Team, Australia provided some trainers who served embedded in the US training organisation.
28 ‘Australia marks end of Iraq combat mission’, ABC News, 2 June 2008,
29 A. Smith, Improvised Explosives Devices in Iraq 2003–1009: A Case of Operational Surprise and Institutional Response, Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle, 2011, p. 40.
30 Casualty figures sourced from
31 M. Armstrong, ‘Not hearts and minds: Civil-military cooperation in OBG(W)-3’, Australian Army Journal, 8(1), Autumn 2011, pp. 64–65 and 73.
32 Casualty figures are from
33 Department of Defence, ‘Operation Catalyst’,
34 J. Birmingham, ‘A time for war: Australia as a military power’, Quarterly Essay, 20, 2005, p. 19.
35 S. Naylor, Not a Good Day to Die: The Untold Story of Operation Anaconda, Berkley Books, New York, 2005, pp. 87 & 158.
36 G. Sheridan, ‘The finest troops, but mission bound to fail’, The Australian, 8 June 2011.
37 Department of Defence, ‘Afghanistan Fact Sheet’,
38 Figures are drawn from The Military Balance 2011, Routledge, London, 2011.
39 For Australian figures see Department of Defence, ‘Global operations’,
40 For Libyan figures see the operation’s fact sheet,
41 ‘Joint Task Force Afghanistan: Composition as of 30 November 2010’, CEFCOM,
42 Figures from
43 J. Molan, ‘Afghanistan: The case for 6000 Australian troops’, The Interpreter, 25 March 2009.
44 For an example see ‘No Afghanistan troop boost, says Kevin Rudd’, APP, 15 October 2009,
45 S. Sara, ‘Australia “punching above its weight” in Afghanistan’, ABC News, 1 May 2010,
46 For examples see B. West, The Wrong War: Grit, Strategy, and the Way Out of Afghanistan, Random House, New York, 2011, pp. 248–49; P. Bishop, Ground Truth, 3 Para: Return to Afghanistan, Harper Press, London, 2009, p. 36.
47 W. Mason, ‘Diggers need freedom to win freedom’, The Australian, 6 July 2010.
48 R. Shanahan, ‘What did you do in the war, Australia?’ The Interpreter, 12 March 2010.
49 ‘Assessing Australia’s Afghan effort,’ The Australian, 27 December 2008.
50 N. Bensahel, ‘International alliances and military effectiveness: Fighting alongside allies and partners’, in R.A. Brooks & E.A. Stanley 9eds), Creating Military Power: The Sources of Military Effectiveness, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 2007, p. 188.
51 Thomson, Punching above our weight?, p. 11; see also, P. Hartcher, ‘Smith calls for more overseas clout’, Sydney Morning Herald, 23 April 2008.
52 Birmingham, ‘A time for war’, p. 8.
53 Quoted in G. Sheridan, ‘The finest troops, but mission bound to fail’, The Australian, 8 June 2011, p. 8.
54 C. Stewart, ‘Not a single submarine seaworthy’, The Australian, 10 June 2011, p. 5; D. Oakes, ‘Neglect of amphibious fleet triggers Defence inquiry, Sydney Morning Herald, 16 February 2011; and J. Molan, ‘Defensively speaking, Australia finds itself on dangerous ground’, The Australian, 14 June 2011, p. 10.
55 Molan, ‘Defensively speaking’, p. 10; Shanahan, ‘What did you do in the war, Australia?’; & Thomson, ‘Punching above our weight,’ pp. 10–11.
11 Critical reflections on the Australia–US alliance
Michael McKinley
1 Commonwealth of Australia, Defending Australia in the Asia-Pacific Century: Force 2030, Defence White Paper 2009, Australian Government, Canberra, 2009.
2 G. Evans & B. Grant, Australia’s Foreign Relations in the World of the 1990s, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1991, p. 308.
3 J. Vasquez, The Power of Power Politics, Rutgers University Press, New Jersey, 1983, p. 220.
4 I should like to acknowledge the benefit of long, helpful conversations with my friend and colleague, Jim George, on the ideas pertaining to this section. I have also benefited immeasurably from his writings on the meta-theory of realism and the critique it has attracted.
5 D. Day, The Great Betrayal: Britain, Australia and the Onset of the Pacific War, Angus & Robertson, Sydney, 1988, esp. p. 351.
6 J. Rusbridger & E. Nave, Betrayal at Pearl Harbour: How Churchill Lured Roosevelt into WWII, Summit, New York, 1991, pp. 99–106.
7 Defending Australia in the Asia-Pacific Century.
8 J.N. Rosenau, ‘Peripheral international relationships in a more benign world: Reflections on American orientation towards ANZUS’, paper presented to the conference on Australia, New Zealand and the United States: National Evolution and Alliance Relations, phase 1, Socio-Political Change and National Images, East-West Center, Honolulu, Hawaii, 24–26 August 1988, p. 2.
9 B. Toohey & M. Wilkinson, The Book of Leaks: Exposes in Defence of the Public’s Right to Know, Angus & Robertson, Sydney, 1987, pp. 130-42
10 The arguments and conclusions summarised in the following reflect the findings of the writer’s own survey of the recent intelligence literature which, it must be said, is voluminous. Only in the interests of brevity is the writer’s unpublished but publicly presented survey (which is currently undergoing revision) cited: see M. McKinley, ‘The alliance intelligence benefit and Australia: A challenge to the prevailing orthodoxy’, paper presented to the 32nd Annual Convention of the International Studies Association’s panel on ‘Topics in Intelligence and National Security’, Vancouver, British Columbia, 21 March, 1991. A broader analysis of US intelligence is to be found in M. McKinley, ‘American intelligence as American knowing’, Alternatives, 21(1), 1996, pp. 31–66.
11 The clearest expression of the defensibility of Australia is to be found in the ‘Review of Australia’s Defence Capabilities: Report to the Minister for Defence’ by P. Dibb. See also D. Ball, ‘The ANZUS connection: The security relationship between Australia, New Zealand and the United States of America’, in T.J. Hearn (ed.), Arms, Disarmament and New Zealand: The Papers and Proceedings of the Eighteenth Foreign Policy School 1983, University of Otago, Dunedin, 1983, pp. 79–83.
12 P. Seabury & A. Codevilla, War: E
nds and Means, Basic Books, New York, 1989, p. 128.
13 For a full account of the works consulted in this paragraph see G. Cheesman & M. McKinley, ‘Australia’s regional security policies 1970–1990: Some critical reflections’, Working paper No. 101, Australian National University Research School of Pacific Studies, Peace Research Centre, pp. 35–37.
14 Cheesman & McKinley, ‘Australia’s regional security policies 1970–1990’, p. 37.
15 This argument is made at length in M. McKinley, ‘The battle’, in I. Bickerton et.al., 43 Days: The Gulf War, Text/ABC Books, Melbourne, 1991.
16 A recent case in point concerned the software for the weapons systems on Australia’s F/A-18 and F-111 aircraft: see J. Edwards, ‘US happy to sell us weapons, but not the instructions’, Sydney Morning Herald, 22 March 1989, p. 1.
17 R. Fox & J. Field, The Defense Management Challenge: Weapons Acquisition, Harvard Business School Press, Boston, 1988, p. 38.
18 D. Hedgpeth, ‘GAO blasts weapons budget’, Washington Post, 1 April 2008, p. A01.
19 As cited in D. Rasor, ‘The buying and selling of the Pentagon’ part 1, < www.truthout.org>, accessed 14 April 2011.
20 L. Strickler, ‘Pricey Pentagon programs and the “kill fee”’, CBS News, 15 February 2011,
21 A. Davies & P. Layton, ‘We’ll have six of them and four of those: Off-the-shelf procurement and its strategic implications’, Special Report iIssue 25, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, November 2009, p. 2.
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