Revolution and the Republic

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by Jeremy Jennings


  1983), 228–85.

  302 See Mark Poster, Existential Marxism in Postwar France: From Sartre to Althusser (Princeton, NJ,

  1975).

  303 Critique of Dialectical Reason (London, 1982), 132.

  France, Intellectuals, and Engagement

  491

  relations with others were those of separation rather than reciprocity and where

  society took the form of a ‘series’ or ‘collective’ characterized by a lack of commu-

  nity. Sartre illustrated this beautifully with the example of a queue of people in the

  place Saint-Germain waiting for a bus. Although they possessed a common goal,

  the people in the queue existed in isolation.

  The greater part of the Critique de la raison dialectique explored the manner in

  which we might escape this condition of alterity and seriality. Sartre offered two

  possibilities. The first entailed the overcoming of scarcity through the economic

  reorganization of society and the abolition of capitalism. The second was more

  intriguing. What Sartre described was the transition from the series to the ‘fused

  group’, a situation in which there existed an absolute identity of interests between

  its members and where other people would become a source for, rather than an

  obstacle to, our freedom. Such a condition most typically emerged in circumstances

  of external danger or actual revolution. To illustrate the point Sartre chose as his

  example the storming of the Bastille on 14 July 1789 by the people of Paris. ‘In this

  behaviour’, Sartre wrote, ‘everyone sees his own future in the Other and, on that

  basis, discovers his present action in that of the Other.’304

  Yet written into the Critique de la raison dialectique was a vaguely tragic vision of

  our fate. After the revolution, Sartre argued, it should be our aim to preserve the

  group and to avoid lapsing back into the chaotic condition of seriality in which

  individuals are at war with one another. But Sartre recognized that the existence of

  the group was at best unstable and fleeting. Under constant threat from outside and

  from disunity within, the group would turn itself into an organization, into an

  ‘institution’, where there would exist a division of labour and where certain people

  would hold positions of authority. Mutuality and reciprocity would give way to the

  re-emergence of hierarchy and inertia. This time the principal example cited by

  Sartre was the descent into Terror experienced after 1789.

  Did this mean that Sartre’s analysis of the dialectic was ultimately redundant? If

  it did nothing else, it allowed Sartre to establish a critique of all those institutions

  which embodied seriality and thus to show that his vision of the future in a post-

  capitalist society was far removed from that of actual existing socialism in the Soviet

  bloc. The dictatorship of the proletariat, he wrote, was ‘a bastard compromise

  between the active sovereignty of the group and passive seriality’ leading to

  bureaucratic terror and the cult of personality. The internal contradictions of

  the socialist world, he continued, brought forth ‘the objective exigency for de-

  bureaucratization, decentralization, and democratization’.305 Likewise, it was the

  participatory ‘group-in-fusion’, rather than the elite Leninist political party, that

  was to be the proper mode of revolutionary praxis. From this it was but a short

  step to Sartre’s support of the student demonstrations of May 68 and the violent

  tactics of Maoism.306

  304 Ibid. 354.

  305 Ibid. 661–2.

  306 For three comprehensive biographies of Sartre see Annie-Cohen Solal, Sartre: A Life (London,

  1985); Ronald Hayman, Writing Against: A Biography of Sartre (London, 1986); and Bernard Henri-

  Lévy, Le Siècle de Sartre (2000).

  492

  France, Intellectuals, and Engagement

  It is impossible to speak of Sartre without mentioning Simone de Beauvoir.307

  Hers was a life as remarkable and her achievements were as significant. She, like

  Sartre, led the existentialist offensive and she, like him, underwent a radical

  conversion in the post-war years. She too expressed her ideas in a variety of literary

  forms: novels, plays, essays, and philosophical treatises. In some respects, however,

  her most substantial literary achievement was her three-volume autobiography,

  published between 1958 and 1963.308 Here was an account of a life that was no less

  candid and high-minded than it was humourless and self-serving. Only marginally

  less memorable was her Goncourt prize-winning novel, Les Mandarins, a roman à

  clef which, despite Beauvoir’s claims to the contrary, chronicled the lives of Sartre,

  Camus, herself. and other inhabitants of the incestuous world of the Parisian

  Left Bank. The title, Beauvoir later recalled, was chosen to reflect the fact that, as

  intellectuals, they existed as ‘a race apart’, the only remaining nobility in France.

  In 1943 Beauvoir began writing an essay entitled Pyrrhus et Cinéas. It was

  intended to be a companion piece to Sartre’s L’Être et le néant and sought

  (unsuccessfully) to define an ethics of freedom. Four years later, and encouraged

  by the favourable reception her first essay had received, she again took up the

  challenge of basing a morality upon Sartre’s text in her most sustained philosophical

  work, Pour une morale de l’ambiguité. Her intention, she subsequently explained

  in her memoirs, was to refute the charge that existentialism was a ‘nihilistic

  philosophy, wilfully pessimistic, frivolous, licentious, despairing, and ignoble’.

  Again, however, it was something of a failure. ‘I was in error’, she wrote in 1963,

  ‘when I thought that I could define a morality independent of a social context.’309

  Sartre, as we know, was experiencing similar problems. Infinitely more successful,

  however, was Beauvoir’s attempt to apply the lessons of existentialism to an

  examination of the condition of women.

  The impact of existentialism upon the argument of Le Deuxième Sexe was visible

  in three primary ways. First, Beauvoir was able to argue that women possessed no

  fixed nature or essence. This was the argument that informed her famous statement

  that: ‘One is not born but one becomes a woman. No biological, psychological, or

  economic fate determines the figure that the human female presents in society.’310

  Second, existentialist ethics stipulated that women, as much as men, were free and

  autonomous beings and therefore that they were capable of transcending their

  present condition and of living a life of authenticity rather than one of immanence

  and stagnation. Third, and most importantly, existentialism provided an explana-

  tion of the cause of the original subjection of women. This phenomenon was a

  307 On Beauvoir see Deidre Bair, Simone de Beauvoir: A Biography (London, 1990). On Sartre and

  Simone de Beauvoir, see Hazel Rowley, Tête-à-Tête: The Tumultuous Lives and Loves of Simone de

  Beauvoir and Jean-Paul Sartre (London, 2006) and Carole Seymour Jones, A Dangerous Liaison: Simone

  de Beauvoir and Jean-Paul Sartre (London, 2008).

  308 See Mémoires d’une jeune fille rangée (1958); La Force de l’âge (1960); and La Force des choses

  (1963).

  309 Beauvoir, Force of Circumstance, 76. See Anne Whitmarsh, S
imone de Beauvoir and the Limits of

  Commitment (Cambridge, 1981) and Penelope Deutscher, The Philosophy of Simone de Beauvoir: Ambiguity,

  Conversion, Resistance (Cambridge, 2008).

  310 The Second Sex (Harmondsworth, 1984), 295.

  France, Intellectuals, and Engagement

  493

  ‘result of the imperialism of the human consciousness’. If, Beauvoir explained, ‘the

  human consciousness had not included the original category of the Other and an

  original aspiration to dominate the Other, the invention of the bronze tool could

  not have caused the oppression of women’.311 Women, in other words, found

  themselves in a world where men compelled them to adopt the status of the Other.

  Less evident was the manner in which existentialism might enable women to

  overcome their subordinate position. A change in women’s economic condition

  alone would not be sufficient to effect this transformation. Nevertheless, Beauvoir

  placed great emphasis upon the emergence of ‘the independent woman’. She

  similarly stressed the need to engage in an activity of demystification and to

  avoid gender stereotyping. Crucially, however, she insisted that ‘legends notwith-

  standing, no physiological destiny imposes an eternal hostility upon Male and

  Female as such’.312 Accordingly, Beauvoir affirmed, the present condition endured

  by women could be surmounted and, as she continued her ascent, an ‘inner

  metamorphosis’ would occur heralding the arrival of the ‘new women’. When

  this occurred, women and men would live in a condition of reciprocity and

  mutuality. Nor, she concluded movingly, would this do away with the ‘miracles’

  of ‘desire, love, possession, dream, adventure’ that arose from the division of human

  being into two categories. ‘On the contrary’, she wrote, ‘when we abolish the

  slavery of half of humanity, together with the whole system of hypocrisy that it

  implies, the “division” of humanity will reveal its genuine significance and the

  human couple will find its true form.’313

  When Le Deuxième Sexe was published in 1949 it sold 20,000 copies in its first

  week. It also provoked a well-nigh unprecedented outpouring of criticism and

  abuse.314 It is not difficult to understand why. The second part of Le Deuxième

  Sexe, exploring ‘women’s lived experience’, was devoted to a detailed examination

  of such topics as menstruation, sexual initiation, lesbianism, pregnancy, marriage,

  and motherhood, the like of which had probably never been published before and

  certainly not as a work of philosophy. Conservative critics condemned it as a work

  of pornography. Many on the left––especially within the French Communist

  Party––were similarly shocked and dismissive. Nevertheless, for all its undoubted

  faults, Le Deuxième Sexe must rank as one of the most significant and important

  texts to be published in post-war France. Not only did it establish Simone de

  Beauvoir as a figure and a thinker in her own right, but it also provided the impetus

  for her own subsequent involvement in the feminist movement during the 1970s.

  In the words of Simone de Beauvoir, both she and Sartre had the impression that

  Frantz Fanon ‘must be one of the most remarkable personalities of our time’.315

  When they first met, however, Fanon was already dying of the leukaemia that

  would kill him in 1961 at the early age of 36. Fanon had been drawn early to

  Sartre’s writings and especially to the argument advanced in his Réflexions sur la

  question juive that it was not the Jewish character that provoked anti-Semitism but

  311 Ibid. 88–9.

  312 Ibid. 725.

  313 Ibid. 741.

  314 See Ingrid Galster (ed.), Le Deuxième Sexe de Simone de Beauvoir (2004).

  315 Beauvoir, Force of Circumstance, 597, 605–11.

  494

  France, Intellectuals, and Engagement

  rather the anti-Semite who created the Jew.316 For his part, from 1948 onwards

  Sartre was increasingly preoccupied with the issue of colonialism and the emerging

  anti-colonial struggles in Africa and Asia.317

  On the face it, there was something deeply incongruous about a Republic

  possessing a colonial empire.318 How could a regime founded upon rights, equality,

  and the rule of law be reconciled to a system of exclusion, discrimination, and

  violence? Yet the establishment of an overseas empire had been an integral, rather

  than a marginal, dimension of the republican project from the early years of the

  Third Republic onwards. In part, this policy was driven by the desire to replicate

  the lost empire of the ancien régime and to match the British Empire, but after

  the military defeat of 1870 empire-building was likewise fostered by the need to

  restore national pride and honour. The French were also not without a taste

  for exoticism. However, in the eyes of its proponents, the French Empire was to

  be marked out from its competitors by the spirit of generosity in which it was to be

  created and by its ‘civilizing mission’. Instead of oppression, there was to be liberty;

  instead of exploitation there was to be emancipation. What is more, this sense of

  mission was born of the two Frances. As the eldest daughter of the Church, France

  was under an obligation to spread the Christian message: as the inheritor and

  embodiment of the traditions of 1789, she was under a duty to save the oppressed

  and to export fraternity. Armed thus, it became possible for generations of sincere

  republicans and of devout Catholics to denounce the iniquities and abuses of

  colonialism319 and yet remain ardent defenders of a system whose self-proclaimed

  task was that of freeing the indigenous colonized peoples from savagery and

  ignorance and of providing both education and health. The instruments of coloni-

  zation, therefore, were not only to be the soldier, the administrator, and the settler,

  but also the teacher, the priest, and the doctor. To what extent this vision of empire

  bore any relation to reality is not a question that needs to be answered here. It

  is sufficient for us to know that, as France sought to re-establish her empire in Indo-

  China and North Africa after the Second World War, it was a vision that became

  increasingly difficult to sustain.

  Frantz Fanon was born in the French Caribbean island of Martinique and was a

  descendant of slaves. He completed his studies in psychiatry in Paris and Lyons and

  in 1952 took up a post in French Algeria as a doctor. The following year he married

  a white French woman. It was in the year of his appointment to Algeria that Fanon

  published Peau Noir, Masques Blancs.320 Described by Fanon as a ‘clinical study’, its

  subject was the position of the black person in relation to the white colonizer. It

  owed much to the phenomenological arguments of Sartrean existentialism. In brief,

  Fanon analysed the numerous ways in which the black person was persuaded to feel

  316 Sartre, Réflexions sur la question juive (1946).

  317 See Azzedine Haddour, Steve Brewer, and Terry McWilliams (eds.), Sartre: Colonialism and

  Neocolonialism (London, 2001). This includes Sartre’s introduction to Fanon’s Les Damnés de la terre.

  318 See Raoul Girardet, L’Idée coloniale en France de 1871 à 1961 (1972) and Nicolas Bancel, Pascal

  Blanchar
d, and Françoise Vergès, La République coloniale: Essai sur une utopie (2003).

  319 See e.g. André Gide’s Voyage au Congo (1927) and Le Retour du Chad (1928).

  320 Frantz Fanon, Peau Noir, Masques Blancs (1952).

  France, Intellectuals, and Engagement

  495

  inferior to the white colonizer and how he became ashamed of his own colour,

  language, and culture. Fanon also looked at the ‘arsenal of complexes’ that intruded

  their way into the sexual relationships between black and white persons, in the

  process exposing the supposed anatomical superiority of the black male as a

  myth. His overall conclusion was that, in the colonized world, the choice facing

  the black person was that of ‘turn white or disappear’. As Fanon wrote, ‘the

  Negro will become proportionately whiter––that is, he will become closer to

  being a real human being––in direct ratio to his mastery of the French language’.321

  The challenge facing the black person, therefore, was to choose authenticity and

  freedom. This could be achieved through nothing less than the removal of the

  colonial environment.

  It is clear that if Fanon, at this point, was not so naïve as to believe that such a

  ‘restructuring of the world’ could be brought about by appeals to reason and the

  dignity of man, he did imagine that it was possible to envisage ‘a healthy encounter

  between black and white’.322 In this sense, there were clear parallels to the positions

  then being developed by both Sartre on the proletariat and Beauvoir on the position

  of women. Like them, however, Fanon too was to undergo a radical conversion in

  the years which immediately followed. In his case, the decisive factor was his first-

  hand familiarity with the Algerian rebellion. Begun in 1954 and ending in 1961,

  this turned into a conflict of awful ferocity. Moreover, as a doctor, Fanon was to be

  witness to the victims of torture.

  It was this experience that led to the publication of Fanon’s Les Damnés de la terre

  in 1961323 and also caused Fanon to appreciate fully the nature of colonialism.324

  Fanon now wrote that colonialism ‘is not a thinking machine, nor a body endowed

  with reasoning faculties. It is violence in its natural state and it will only yield when

  confronted with great violence.’325 Accordingly, Fanon addressed two major

 

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