by Charles Ross
Edward was deeply angered and chagrined by the news of the Treaty of Arras. We have the considerable authority of the Croyland Chronicler for the belief that he was so enraged that ‘he thought of nothing else but taking vengeance’, and Polydore Vergil expressed a similar view. It seems more than likely (as they claimed) that in the last months of his life he, was actively planning an invasion of France to punish his great rival.2 On 18 February parliament granted him a subsidy ‘for the hasty and necessary defence’ of the realm; money was demanded from the clergy; measures were taken for the strengthening of the fortresses in the Calais Pale, since Artois, which surrounded it, was now to be in French hands; and in February 1483 Edward tried to stir Brittany into action against Louis XI with a promise to send 4,000 archers to serve at English expense for three months, though there was no mention in his offer of a proposed English invasion of France.3 This impulsive reaction on Edward’s part to the news of the Treaty of Arras again suggests a certain lack of grasp of reality in his conduct of affairs, but if an immediate attack upon France was seriously contemplated for a time, the mood did not last long. By March 1482, when relations at sea between France and England had deteriorated badly, there are clear signs that Edward had changed course and was making every effort to preserve the truce with France.4
On the other hand, he was clearly determined to maintain his aggressive policy towards Scotland. Perhaps the influence of Gloucester may have strengthened his resolve, for the duke stood to gain directly from any conquest north of the border, and continued to be hostile to Scotland when he became king himself.1 A further inducement was provided by Albany’s fresh defection. That unstable nobleman had been appointed lieutenant-general of Scotland by a parliament meeting at Edinburgh in December 1482, but he remained uneasy and dissatisfied. He was certainly in touch with English agents by then, and perhaps even earlier. On 12 January 1483 he formally opened negotiations with Edward to confirm and implement the pact made at Fotheringhay in the previous June, and on 11 February a new agreement was reached. Albany was to attempt to secure the throne of Scotland for himself; Gloucester and Northumberland, as wardens of the Marches, were to hold themselves ready to provide him with up to 3,000 English archers serving for six weeks at Edward’s expense; and even larger forces would be supplied if needed. In return, Albany, once established on the throne, was to break any treaty with France, and to give aid to England against ‘the occupiers of the crown of France’ with all his power and at his own expense. He promised further to marry one of Edward’s daughters, to recognize Edward’s right to Berwick, and to restore his Scots friend, the earl of Douglas, to his estates.2 Thus the prospect of collaborating with a Scots faction to overthrow James III, and, less probably, of getting Scots aid against France, could be used to justify the renewal of hostilities against Scotland in 1483. But in contrast with the elaborate military preparations of 1482, no serious war plans were put in hand in 1483. No sooner had Edward begun to collect the money voted by parliament in February than the brittle nature of his deal with the shifty Albany was revealed. On 19 March the duke came to terms with James III, and renounced his treaty with England, although he promised to try to obtain peace with Edward and to encourage the marriage of Cecily of York with the future James IV. If Scotland were to be invaded again, there would now be scant legal cover for a war of aggression.3
Historians in general have been harshly critical of Edward’s conduct of foreign affairs in the years between 1475 and 1483. French scholars have tended to perpetuate the prejudices of Edward’s own foreign contemporaries, especially those under the influence of the French court, like Commynes and the Italian ambassadors, and have stressed Edward’s avarice, in combination with his indolence and his inability to match the cleverness of Louis XI, as the reasons for the eventual collapse of his foreign policies. One even goes so far as to claim that Edward’s attitude was wholly dominated by the desire for foreign marriages for his family obtained on the cheap.1 But even the sympathetic Miss Scofield – in a rare burst of emotion – roundly condemned Edward for a foreign policy she called at once shameful and impossible. It was shameful because he allowed himself to be outwitted and out-manoeuvred by the king of France, and it was impossible because the abandonment of the alliance with Burgundy and the search for friendship with the ancient and increasingly powerful enemy of France was ‘conceived, as he knew so well, in opposition to his people’s best interests and best wishes’.2 On the contrary, it would be easy to argue – with the advantage of historical hindsight – that England’s interests were best served by avoiding expensive military entanglements on the Continent, that the opportunities for effective intervention against a very strong and now united France were already past, with the weakening of the Burgundian state after the death of Duke Charles, and that in practice Edward gave his country eight years of relative peace and prosperity and freedom from the vastly expensive taxation which war involved. But to use such arguments would be to import into the discussion modern criteria which Edward and his contemporaries would either have failed to understand or would have rejected, and to credit him with achievements which he certainly never intended.
Certainly Edward does not emerge with any distinction in his direction of foreign affairs. The entanglement with Scotland was a major misjudgement which greatly weakened his position in relation to continental powers. A foreign policy based upon the continuing good faith of Louis XI was always likely to end disastrously. He was irresolute in that he would neither take the steps necessary to put real pressure on King Louis nor exploit the alternative advantages of a definitely anti-French policy. From his own standpoint his foreign and dynastic policies had been ruined by the time he died, and the chagrin and depression wrought in him by the Treaty of Arras were believed, both by Commynes and by his own keeper of the privy seal, Bishop John Russell, to have been one of the reasons for his death soon after.1
Yet it would be unfair to overlook his difficulties. In the Machiavellian phase in European power-politics which marks his lifetime he was dealing with opponents who were notably unprincipled, self-interested and shifty, above all with Louis XI, who was too clever for all his opponents (and sometimes too clever for his own good). Edward had neither the financial and military resources nor the backing of popular enthusiasm to enable him to indulge freely in ambitious schemes on the Continent. Moreover, it should not be forgotten that the failure of Edward’s foreign policies might have appeared as no more than a temporary setback had he lived longer. The conflicts between France, Burgundy and Brittany were not ended by the Treaty of Arras, and a secure and resolute English king could have taken advantage of them. Major changes in the structure of European politics followed soon after Edward’s death, with the death of Louis XI himself on 30 August 1483, his son’s involvement in Italy, and the long rivalry between France and the newly-developed power-bloc, based upon dynastic marriages, of Spain, the Hapsburg dominions, and the Burgundian territories in the Low Countries. But in this changing situation England was seriously weakened by two successive usurpations in 1483 and 1485; these placed her on the defensive against foreign rulers who could support pretenders to the English throne, and prevented her from exploiting the Breton succession crisis of 1491–2, or even the Franco-Imperial rivalry for many years to come. Finally, it is worth noticing that, if for rather different reasons, Henry VII chose to follow the essential principles of Edward’s foreign policy towards France and the Low Countries. He pursued them, however, with a cleverness, a consistency, and a grasp of reality notably absent from Edward’s later years.2
1 Rymer, Foedera, XII, 171 (misdated to 1482); YCR, 31.
2 Commynes, ed. Lenglet, IV, 7 (letter of a Breton spy, June 1480).
1 Cal. Docs Scotland, IV, 412–15.
2 CPR, 1476–85, 205, 213–14; Scofield, II, 279; ‘Brevis Cronica’, in Pinkerton, History of Scotland, I, 503. The evidence for the counter-raid rests upon Edward’s own statements in a signet letter to Salisbury and on a report from Jam
es III to Louis XI, mentioned in a despatch of 29 October 1480 (Benson and Hatcher, Old and New Sarum, 199; CSP, Milan, I, 244).
3 For a useful summary of James’s character and difficulties, see R. L. Mackie, King James IV of Scotland, 8–21.
1 Acts Pari. Scotland, II, 138; Benson and Hatcher, op. cit., 198–200 (for the council decision).
2 Richmond, ‘English Naval Power’, 9–15; P.R.O., E. 28/91–2.
3 Richmond, op. cit., 9–15; Scofield, II, 303–4; J. Payne Collier, Household Books of John, Duke of Norfolk, and Thomas, Earl of Surrey, 3, 9, 274; CPR, 1476–85, 240, 264.
1 CPR, 1476–85, 249–50; Scofield, II, 305, 316.
2 Cal. Docs Scotland, IV, 299–300; Rymer, XII, 140; John Lesley, History of Scotland, 45. John MacDonald’s earlier treasonable compact with Edward had come to light in 1475, and in 1476 he had been forced to give up his earldom of Ross and other lands and offices to the king (Acts Pari. Scotland, II, 113).
3 Scofield, II, 304–5; Benson and Hatcher, op. cit., 198–200 (for one of Edward’s requests for benevolence).
1 CSP, Venice, I, 142–3 (letter of 20 May 1481).
2 Richmond, ‘English Naval Power’, 10.
3 Acts Pari. Scotland, II, 138, and Lesley, op. cit., 45, for the Scots raids; also YCR, I, 34–6, for aid from York against the invasion, adopting suggestions of Kendall, Richard 111, 457, as to date of these letters.
4 Scofield, II, 319.
1 Chandler, Life of Waynflete, 150–2; ‘Brevis Cronica’, in Pinkerton, Hist. Scotland, I, 503.
2 Commynes, ed. Lenglet, IV, 38–40.
3 Cf. Scofield, II, 320; CSP, Venice, I, 145–6, for the papal letter.
4 Maximilian’s instructions to Margaret, Commynes, ed. Lenglet, III, 577–83; details of Margaret’s visit in Nicolas, Wardrobe Accounts, 126, 141–5, 163–6, 241, and Scofield, II, 283–97; and for the marriage, above, p. 247.
1 Rymer, Foedera, 123–39, for the treaty. Margaret could afford to recruit only 1,500 archers and 30 men-at-arms, whose wages were paid out of a loan of 10,000 crowns made to her by Edward (Commynes, ed. Lenglet, III, 587–9).
2 E.g. Calmette and Perinelle, 246–7.
1 Commynes, ed. Lenglet, III, 576–7, 603–8 (letters of Duchess Margaret of 27 July and 14 September 1480); Vaesen, Lettres de Louis XI, VIII, 295; Pocquet du Haut-Jussé, op. cit., 226–9, for the Anglo-Breton-Burgundian negotiations.
2 Ibid., 231–4; Rymer, Foedera, XII, 142–5, and, for the marriage-treaty, above, pp. 246–7.
3 Cf. Calmette and Perinelle, 247: ‘a blackmail… from which he planned to extract the maximum profit’.
4 Ibid., 246.
5 Commynes, ed. Lenglet, IV, 10–19, 32–5.
1 Scofield, II, 318–20.
2 Calmette and Perinelle, 248–50.
1 CPR, 1476–85, 343; TCR, I, 52–3; Somerville, Hist Duchy Lancaster, I, 252; Scofield, n, 334.
2 Rymer, Foedera, XII, 156–7 (for the treaty with Albany); Scofield, II, 334–9.
3 According to an entry in the records of the city of Canterbury, William, Lord Hastings, told the mayor that the king’s health was not good, and the mayor feared another revolution which would threaten the city’s charter. This may, however, refer either to 1481 or 1482. (Hist. MSS Comm., 9th Report, 145). For Gloucester’s raid, see TCR, I, 54–5, and H. E. Maiden, ‘An Unedited Cely Letter of 1482’, TRHS, 3rd ser., x (1916), 159–65, and, for Edward’s movements, Scofield, II, 336–8.
1 Rymer, Foedera, XII, 157–8 (Gloucester’s commission); C. A. J. Armstrong, ‘Some Examples of the Distribution and Speed of News in England at the Time of the Wars of the Roses’, in Studies in Medieval History Presented to F. M. Powicke, ed. R. W. Hunt and others, 429–54, and Scofield, II, 339–40, for the courier system.
2 TCR, I, 56; Scofield, II, 344, correcting Ramsay, Lancaster and York, II, 442, for size of army.
1 Hall, Chronicle, 334; Rymer, Foedera, XII, 160–1. According to Hall, who draws upon documentary material which has not survived, Albany pledged himself to Gloucester, by a secret deed of 3 August, to abide by his undertaking of 10 June to Edward, in spite of his temporary accommodation with the Scots.
2 Hall, 335–6; Rymer, Foedera, XII, 161–2.
3 J. Campbell, England, Scotland and the Hundred Years War in the Fourteenth Century’, in Europe in the Late Middle Ages, ed. J. R. Hale, J. R. L. Highfield and B. Smalley, 184–216, esp. p. 191.
1 Devon, Issues of the Exchequer, 502; Hall, Chronicle, 344–5; Lesley, op. cit., 49–50. Cf. Kendall, Richard III, 143, for a more indulgent view of Richard’s conduct of the campaign.
2 CC, 563.
3 This decision is implicit in the issue of writs on 15 November to summon parliament, the main purpose of which was to vote money for ‘the hasty defence of the realm’. For the dropping of the marriage schemes, Rymer, Foedera, XII, 164–9; Scofield, II, 353.
1 This refers to the renewal on 25 October 1481 of the truce between England and France originally agreed in 1477, which was to last for the duration of the lives of Edward and Louis, and for a year after the death of whoever died first (Rymer, Foedera, XII, 46–50). See also below.
2 Commynes, ed. Lenglet, IV, 20–5 (Maximilian’s instructions to Chimay); III, 616–17 (Edward’s reply). Calmette and Perinelle, 248, mistakenly assign Edward’s letter advising a truce to the spring of 1481, following Louis’s first stroke, but since it refers to Chimay’s mission, it must belong to the latter year and was based upon knowledge of Louis’s second stroke: v. Scofield, II, 320–1, 325. For the date of Louis’s first attack, see Kendall, Louis XI, Appendix III.
3 Commynes, ed. Lenglet, IV, 40–2 (Maximilian’s instructions).
1 For Louis’s publication of the truce, see W. Webster, ‘An Unknown Treaty between Edward IV and Louis XI’, EHR, xii (1897), 521–3; for the treaty of Arras and its background, G. A. J. Armstrong, ‘The Burgundian Netherlands, 1477–1521’, in New Cambridge Modern History, i (1957), 228–32.
2 CC, 563; Polydore Vergil, English History, 171. For a contrary view, see Scofield, II, 357, 363.
3 RP, VI, 197; Scofield, II, 363; Calmette and Perinelle, 253; Pocquet du Haut-Jussé, 239. But, as noted above (p. 290, n. 3), parliament was not originally summoned with this purpose in mind.
4 As shown in his efforts to put an end to seizures and reprisals against French shipping, Gairdner, Letters and Papers … Richard III and Henry VII, I, 18–19. The mission of Garter King of Arms to France in February 1483 (Scofield, II, 363) may have been connected with this.
1 The palatine grant to Gloucester made in the January 1483 parliament gave him control over any lands conquered north of the West March (above, p. 202); for his policy as king, Gairdner, Richard III, 177–80.
2 Rymer, Foedera, XII, 172–6; Acts Pari. Scotland, II, 142–3; Gairdner, op. cit., 176–7.
3 Acts Pari. Scotland, II, 31–3.
1 Pocquet du Haut-Jussé, op. cit., 232, and see also above, p. 247; see also Calmette and Perinelle, 245–60; and for contemporary criticisms of Edward, Commynes, II, 241, 245–7 (‘His greed [for the French pension] deadened his spirit’); CSP, Milan, 235–6, 244.
2 Scofield, II, 357.
1 Commynes, II, 231; Grants of Edward F, ed. J. G. Nichols, liii. See below, p. 415.
2 For assessments of Henry VIFs foreign policy, see R. B. Wernham, Before the Armada, 11–50; R. L. Storey, The Reign of Henry VII, 66–91; S. B. Chrimes, Henry VII, 272–97.
Part IV
THE GOVERNANCE OF ENGLAND
Chapter 13
PERSONAL MONARCHY
Edward of York’s approach to the tasks of kingship was essentially pragmatic. Under his rule England shared in the general European tendency towards a strengthening of the princely authority, but this was not accompanied by any interest on the king’s part in theories of kingship. His reign saw no significant additions to the law of treason such as had accompanied Richard IPs flirtations with absolutism. In contrast with Henry VII, he was in no way concerne
d to encourage the lawyers to expand the theoretical scope of the royal prerogative by subtly transforming antiquated rights into a new definition of the king’s rights over the property of his subjects.1 Towards the church, it is true, he continued the tendency of his predecessors to claim that the king was emperor in his realm. In 1482 it was held in the royal courts that the authority of convocation must give way to the authority of the royal prerogative, and precedents from his reign were quoted in 1486 to justify the idea that the pope could not act to the detriment of the royal authority.2 In general he was content with the practical exercise of the still very extensive powers vested in the person of the king. If, on occasion, he acted arbitrarily and without the law, he either dispensed with theoretical justification or, more commonly, sought to persuade his parliaments to give ad hoc ratification to particular acts.3
This does not mean that the House of York was insensitive to its image, as the survival of a large number of genealogical rolls showing the real or mythical descent of Edward, and of a body of partisan popular ballads, bears witness. Yet the tone of these, like the claims to the throne of 1460 and 1461, is essentially conservative and legitimist, stressing the notion of the restoration of the right line of kings, the true heirs of Richard II. The author of the carol Edward, Dei Gratia (probably 1461–4) refers to him as ‘Of the stock that long lay dead/God hath caused thee to spring and spread’, but combines this with the notion that his success in battle reflects divine assistance (‘God hath chose thee to be his knight’). The same idea recurs in a skilful piece of partisan verse, known as ‘A Political Retrospect, 1462’:
