The seven Sayeret Deep Penetration Teams would each target the nuclear plants. The facilities at Fordow and Natanz in particular were fifty to seventy-five metres underground, impervious even to bunker-busting bombs. Ari and Dov had quickly determined that any kind of conventional air assault would be fruitless.
Dov had studied these facilities for a long time, and based on the intelligence gleaned, he recognized one key weakness in the design of the underground sites. They all needed air. He had identified cleverly concealed air vents and breathers surrounding each location.
The Mossad recruited a dissident Iranian professor, Nader Ruhani, who lectured at a college near the Natanz nuclear plants. He had been an ardent but secret supporter of the opposition Green movement that was brutally suppressed after the rigged presidential elections in 2009. Ruhani had a passionate desire to aid any agency in bringing down the regime. He was a sleeper asset of Mossad and believed Israel could be that agent of change. The professor was unknowingly introduced to 9 when his handler and contact with Mossad changed. His new handler or control was one of Macha’s 9 personnel.
Macha sent one of Ari’s protégé operators, Nahum Gilwasser, into Iran. Gilwasser’s remit was to meet Professor Ruhani and learn about the topography surrounding the facilities. Nahum provided Nader with some highly classified spy equipment, the most important being miniature drones that carried infrared sensing devices with miniature cameras and GPS instruments. The drones were not much larger than a car key fob and impossible to identify once they were five hundred feet above ground. Nahum instructed the professor in their use.
“Nader, never fly these during the day. The risks are too great. These little guys are robust and can stay airborne on a battery charge for at least twelve hours. Dispatch them in ever widening asymmetrical loops just before dawn. The chances of you being seen are greatly reduced at that hour. Plan to retrieve them after dark so you are not compromised.”
Professor Ruhani was relieved at this news. “That will make the task less dangerous and there will be less of a chance of my being discovered.”
Nahum also showed Nader a small electronic key-sized device that to the casual observer was nothing more than a Nissan key fob. In fact, it was a self-destruct trigger. If Nader felt compromised and the drone was in danger of being intercepted or captured, he could depress the trunk latch symbol on the key fob and a very small explosive, one gram of Semtex and an ounce of phosphorus, would destroy the drone in midair, leaving only a small pile of ash with scorched and twisted metal. The source of the destructive trigger would be impossible to identify.
Ruhani was also instructed to send the pictures and infrared data back to Israel via a highly compressed data burst over a secure 9 cell phone. Again, if this was somehow seized, it would appear to be just as an ordinary cell phone. The addresses within the contact list would all be innocuous names and businesses that regardless of how hard the secret security forces investigated, there would be no suspicions raised. Professor Ruhani would check out as just another harmless middle-class educator.
CHAPTER 38
Ari and Dov rehearsed with Sarah every day how they would deal with the Basij. Their headquarters was in a compound in the centre of Tehran. Their objectives were to storm the buildings once the armoured trucks had breached the gates and walls. Once inside the compound, they were to enter and seize or destroy the command structure. In particular they were to take the Basij commander, Gholamhossein Gheybparvar, into custody along with any commanders or senior officers of the Ansar-e-Hezbollah, an even more militant and cruel militia associated with Basij. All of these special militia forces were ultimately commanded by General Hussein Suleiman of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards.
Sarah pushed her sections as hard as possible. After the armoured trucks broke through the gates, the alighting commandos would have less than thirty seconds to enter the buildings. Any longer and they would run the risk of being caught out in the open and subject to withering fire from both groups of militants. Once they gained entrance to the buildings, rooting out any opposition would be much simpler.
While the squad leaders charged with seizing the commanders and evacuating them from the buildings were searching office by office and room by room, their compatriots would restrict the Basij from escaping the compound. In this effort they were to be aided and protected, hopefully, by the IDF Air Force circling overhead.
The armoured trucks were Israeli-modified Russian GAZ Ural-M drop-sided vehicles. The Russian GAZ standard product is regarded as one of the most rugged and reliable transport trucks; they are a common sight on Iranian roads. The Israeli modifications were not visible from the exterior. The straight in line ten-cylinder, heavy-duty diesel engines were upgraded with superchargers; and the chassis were strengthened and stiffened to withstand their battering-ram role when they crashed the compound gates. The drop sides allowed the teams to travel without being seen, yet they could easily and quickly dismount and execute entry into target buildings.
At Rosh Pinah, the teams practised for many hours driving at the posted speed limit along mocked-up city streets on the air base until they were drawing level with the entrance gates to the Basij and IRG Headquarter buildings. Their drivers then had to be able to swing almost at ninety degrees across the roadway and accelerate as fast as possible into the gates. The Israeli military engineers had calculated that the sheer weight and relative speed and momentum of the trucks would carry them, with a relatively short accelerating run, through the gates. Once inside the compounds, the trucks would drive as close to the entry facades and the troops would be exiting over the sides covering each other as they leapfrogged into the buildings.
While the land teams were training at Rosh Pina, the naval team practised in and around Port of Haifa. They always did this at night to avoid prying eyes. The most critical issue was disembarking unobserved from their mother-ship submarine, which would have crept into the Persian Gulf two days before. The biggest risk would be getting through the Straits of Hormuz. At its narrowest, the Straits were only twenty-one miles across, heavily patrolled and monitored by the IRGC. They always had at least thirty small high-speed craft circulating through and around the Straits, monitoring all surface — and they hoped — under surface craft. The Israeli Navy commandos would have to leave the sub and board their Zodiacs, then travel approximately 2 miles to the harbour at Bandar Abbas, the eastern mouth of the Straits.
CHAPTER 39
Rosh Pinah and Azerbaijan, October
After thirty days of intense training, the mission was cleared by the prime minister and the IDF Supreme Command, and the groups assembled to execute their assignments.
The Air Force deployed eighteen F-16I fighter-bombers to Azerbaijan with which Israel, surprisingly, had a strong bond and relationship. Also deployed were three C-130 Hercules transporters, which made four trips delivering the eight converted CH-53 Yasur helicopters. They had secret access to a former Soviet air base, which was inherited from the Soviet adventures in the 1980s in Afghanistan. The helicopters were disassembled and, although a tight fit, two were able to be carried in the Hercules. Another transport plane flew in mechanics and ground crew for the fighter-bombers and the helicopters.
Macha, Ari and Dov concluded that the IRGC, mullahs, and ayatollahs would be expecting an air assault on the nuclear facilities, all of which were hardened with defences that were difficult to penetrate successfully, including the latest surface-to-air S-300 and S-400 Russian anti-aircraft missile technology. It was one of these that had brought down a Malaysian Airlines Boeing 777 over Ukraine in July 2014, with 298 passengers aboard, none of whom survived. While the whole world knew who was responsible for the heinous crime, the Russians never accepted responsibility.
The Sayeret and the female commandos had one of the hardest and riskiest assignments. Under Ari’s and Dov’s leadership, they were to infiltrate into Tehran, where the headquarters of the IRGC were located, and Qom where the ayatollahs and mullahs resided
and the Council of Clerics assembled.
The other deep penetration teams would fly from Azerbaijan and await the jump-off signal from Macha in Tel Aviv. Some Sayeret commandos were of Persian Jewish heritage, fluent in Farsi, so they could deal with any questions or problems from local farmers and villagers as they worked their way toward the nuclear plants. Others would drive the Israeli-modified GAZ trucks. The CH-53 helicopters would be reassembled at the Azerbaijan air base, then remain on standby until alerted by the AWACs to go. On command, they would fly the Sayeret teams close to their assigned nuclear site targets.
CHAPTER 40
Qom and Tehran, Iran
Dov went over his group’s plans in one final review.
“Our arms and munitions have been driven in from Azerbaijan to a warehouse near where we are staying. The Persians running the warehouse are only to receive the trucks. If they are for whatever reason investigated and arrested by the IRG, they will be charged as enemies of the State. They are not aware of us and our location, so there is no chance of them identifying us. Their instructions are to receive the trucks into the warehouse across from our hostel. We will watch for three days to see if anyone is curious. Then we will collect the material. Any questions?”
In Tehran, Ari reviewed the plans for his and Sarah’s teams one final time, with five-person groups meeting in their hotel rooms. To ensure security, Ari had a tech team sweep the rooms for listening devices and the meetings were conducted with water running, thus rendering it almost impossible for anyone to record their discussions.
As determined in Rosh Pinah, the crux of the plan was to cause disruption among the IRGC and the ruling clerics so the eight special teams targeting the nuclear plants and Bandar Abbas could complete their missions without being compromised or hindered.
If all went according to plan, three C-130 Hercules aircraft would fly to Imam Khomeini International Airport from Azerbaijan, while the teams drove to the airport. Two would land at the airport while the third, a “Spooky” gunship, would provide overwatch if necessary. The Spooky is considered one of the deadliest air gunships ever deployed. The armaments on a Spooky were able to deliver a devastating rain of fire and lead accurately on any ground target, either from a height of 1,000 feet or a low level of 150 feet. Armed with five-barrel Gatling cannons and a M102 mm howitzer cannon as well as 40 mm Bofors machine guns, Spooky was capable of totally destroying armoured vehicles, including tanks. If they were unable to execute the exfil, then the teams would drive to a location where the C-130s would land on a straight section of highway and pick them up. Plan B would be determined by the AWACS command crew. In addition to Spooky, this site would also be provided cover by the fighter planes if necessary.
Sarah and her group of commandos would attack the headquarters of the Basij, the vicious and brutal civilian militia that carried out daily beatings and harassment of ordinary Iranian citizens while providing support to the IRG. Sarah’s objective was to destroy Basij communications and prevent them from aiding the IRGC, plus capturing the commander, Gholamhossein Gheybparvar, who was on a terrorist watch list. Gheybparvar was responsible for crimes against humanity; he had been indicted by the International Court in The Hague. Sarah and her teams were also to prevent the Basij from organizing and threatening ordinary Iranian citizens.
The five teams under Ari’s command were to destroy the Guard’s ability to communicate with the Army and Air Force. Shutting down IRGC communications would render the Iranian military totally blind and deaf. This would allow the seven other commando teams to operate with a degree of impunity and avoid detection. The disruptions and chaos in Bandar Abbas, Tehran, and Qom would keep the Iranian Guards and military focused on the three centres and not the nuclear plants.
In the meantime, the Navy demolition teams would silently disembark from a submarine off the harbour of Bandar Abbas. Their task was to infiltrate the naval facilities and oil storage tank farms, and at a coordinated time with their fellow teams in Tehran and Qom, they would set off charges and demolitions that would render the Iranian armed forces useless for months. At the same time, they would restrict gasoline and oil distribution to the general Iranian public, thus severely crippling the economy even more than sanctions had done. This was a critical component of the plan, as the Iranian Republican Guard’s Naval forces had been charged with closing the Straits of Hormuz in the event of an attack on the rogue nation.
There would also be two Israeli Dolphin-II class submarines: Tanin (crocodile) and Rahav (splendour) stealthily approaching predetermined locations forty kilometres off the Iranian coast. They would coordinate with the fighter planes coming in from Azerbaijan, and each fire thirty-six Israeli-designed cruise missiles at the command and control centres of the Iranian military in Tehran and the Air Force control centres at the major air bases. The guidance technology was a closely guarded Israeli secret not shared with any allies. The missiles were so accurate they could be programmed to enter a specific window or door in a building even when fired from eight hundred miles away. They were guided by an ultrasensitive opton-electronic, photo radar guidance system designed by Elbit Systems, able to identify and home in on a target as small as six inches square. They would be programmed to destroy the communication buildings and do so with little or no collateral damage to civilians.
The Iranians would be unprepared and confused as to the main targets. The Israeli second salvo of thirty-six missiles would be targeted on the control centres and runways of the Iranian Air Force bases, hopefully destroying any Iranian Air Force planes as they readied to defend against the F-16I bombers. The Israeli fighter-bombers would destroy the air bases and any related infrastructure such as fuel depots and remaining radar and communication centres. This action would be reminiscent of the destruction of almost the entire Egyptian Air Force in 1967 during the Six-Day War by the IAF.
Another two flights of Israeli F-15I fighter-bombers would take off from Israel to coordinate an attack on the Kharg Island oil facilities. These were the main source of hard currency income for Iran. The Kharg Island facilities were a terminal for their substantial oil exports. The effect on the Iranian economy with the destruction of the Kharg Island facilities would be crippling, essentially forcing the Iranian government to its knees. If the Israeli attacks on Kharg Island, the nuclear facilities, and the IRG communication infrastructure proved successful, Iran would no longer be the Shi′ite hegemony threatening the whole of the Middle East and North Africa. Their plans for regional domination would be destroyed and the Iranian people would have to depend on sympathetic nations aiding them in rebuilding a free and democratic country that would be recognized within the community of nations — not as a pariah, but as an equal.
The ninth team of Sayeret troops would infiltrate Lebanon, where General Soleimani was training and organizing Hezbollah shock troops to invade Israel. With Soleimani the second most senior commander in the IRGC and feared head of the Quds Force, the Sayeret mission was to kidnap him and several Hezbollah commanders. They would bring them back to Israel to stand trial for war crimes in Syria and terrorism in Israel.
General Soleimani was a formidable opponent. He had trained and shaped the ragtag bands of Hezbollah almost single-handedly into a highly disciplined and effective fighting force. This was proven in 2006 when Israel invaded Lebanon to engage Hezbollah and were completely caught off guard by their tenacity and discipline. Since then, the general had been improving and honing the terrorist force into a fierce adversary. He had insisted they join the Syrian dictator Assad and his cause in the Syrian Civil War, and it was their training and expertise, along with Russian air power, that had swung the war in Assad’s favour.
It was an open secret that Lebanon and Syria were basically under the military control of Iran. Soleimani brooked no opposition. Regardless of where opposition to Iranian influence came from, he immediately and ruthlessly eliminated them, many times personally. He was an arrogant and bombastic individual, who had been in the cross
hairs of the Israelis for many years. Capturing him and his senior Hezbollah commanders was key to the 9 plan to eliminate terror from the region.
For over six years, General Soleimani had been consolidating his power base in Lebanon and Syria with his shock troops from the IRGC and Hezbollah. The incredibly strong force he developed had aided Bashar Assad in his fight to maintain control of Syria. General Soleimani was essentially the power behind the throne in Syria. He controlled Assad and his government ostensibly on behalf of the Mullahs in Iran. In reality, the general conducted his affairs as he saw fit with little or no direction from Tehran.
The Israelis had gathered an enormous amount of intelligence on Soleimani. They were concerned that he was developing a strategic plan to occupy the Golan Heights and draw Israel into a two-front war with Hezbollah in the North and Hamas in Gaza. He was using the brutal civil war in Syria to import large numbers of Iranian Guards and Shi′ite mercenaries into Syria. The Mossad and 9 were firmly of the opinion that if Suleiman was removed from his position of power, the whole plan he was developing would collapse.
Soleimani held the Lebanese and Syrian governments in absolute contempt. They either did his bidding and carried out directions or they would be removed. He had shown a great ability to engineer this in Lebanon, where the legitimate civilian government was completely subservient to Hezbollah under his leadership. There had been many mysterious accidents and killings in both Syria and Lebanon that removed vocal critics of Iran in general and the IRGC and Soleimani in particular. His arrogance was deemed to be his major weakness. He had a wife and family back in Tehran, but openly and publicly flaunted his relationship with a Lebanese TV personality. When he was not in the field, he would have her visit him at his headquarters and stay overnight or he would visit her lavish home just outside Beirut.
The End of Terror Page 12
