by Mark Zuehlke
Most of the reinforcements received by the Royal Winnipeg Rifles went to bring the devastated ‘B’ Company back to a semblance of combat readiness. This company had been shredded on the beach, its commander Captain Phil Gower counting only twenty-six men fit for duty and all its platoon commanders either dead or wounded after the German beach fortifications were cleared.
The battalion was in the midst of integrating the reinforcements at 0200 hours when a German patrol blundered into ‘C’ Company’s perimeter and was lashed by rifle and machine-gun fire as the troops hit it from the protection of their slit trenches. Most of the Germans immediately surrendered, while a few managed to escape into the darkness. The Canadians rounded up nineteen men and one officer, who was quickly shot and killed when he attempted to make a break for it.15
The Winnipegs’ other assault company had been Major Lockhart “Lochie” Ross Fulton’s ‘D’ Company. Although his men had suffered fewer casualties than ‘B’ Company, Fulton knew they were badly worn out from the hard fighting and undoubtedly had managed little rest during a night disrupted by the fireworks at the beach and ‘C’ Company’s sharp fight with the German patrol. With dawn approaching, the thirty-seven-year-old officer from Birtle, Manitoba set out with his runner to check his company lines and ensure everyone was ready to begin the dawn move.16
The short firefight had left everyone in the battalion jumpy. Private Gordon Maxwell stared into the blackness beyond his slit trench and imagined anything moving out there must be Germans trying to creep up on him. His heart started pounding when two shadows slinked across his front. Maxwell drew a bead on the lead shadow, but eased off the trigger at the last moment. “I decided not to fire. If it was a German, we may have been able to take him prisoner. I finally figured out who the man creeping around in the darkness was. It had been a close call for Major Fulton.”17 Maxwell later confided that, although happy he hadn’t fired, he was “such a poor shot I probably wouldn’t have hit him anyway.”18
UNAWARE OF HIS CLOSE brush with death, Fulton led his company out at 0615 hours towards the objective. Fulton’s men trailed behind those of ‘C’ Company, which led the advance under the command of Major J.M.D. (Jimmy) Jones. Concerned by a gap between the Winnipegs and the 7th Green Howards of the 50th British Infantry Division advancing from Gold Beach, Lieutenant Colonel John Meldram assigned Captain D.B. Robertson to guard the battalion’s right flank. He was given a platoon from ‘A’ Company, two sections of the carrier platoon, and one section of six-pounders from the anti-tank platoon for the task.
Hedgerows walled in the narrow lanes and it was difficult to locate any reference points to serve as guideposts. Consequently, ‘C’ Company soon took a wrong turn and wandered off into the blue.19 When Fulton reported that the company he was supposed to be following was no longer out to the front, Meldram said, “Lead the battalion into Putot.”20 The lieutenant colonel, fretting that the Germans would soon counterattack, urged haste and left it to ‘C’ Company to find its own way back to the rest of the battalion.
‘D’ Company moved quickly, Fulton effectively using his map and compass to stay on a track that took the Winnipegs through the hamlet of Lantheuil and then a maze of grain fields, dairy cattle paddocks, and orchards that led unwaveringly towards Putot-en-Bessin. The only opposition was presented by a scattering of snipers who were either quickly wiped out or took to their heels after snapping off a shot or two. Occasionally, a German artillery shell shrieked down to explode nearby, but this seemed nothing more than undirected searching fire intended to harass the advancing troops. Neither the snipers nor the random shelling caused any casualties and little slowed the pace of the marching troops.21
So quickly did the Little Black Devils, as the Royal Winnipeg Rifles were known, and the Regina Rifles move in the early morning that Brigadier Foster decided at 0800 hours that the Canadian Scottish should join the advance by coming up in the centre between the two battalions. This battalion could then easily shift as needed to support the Winnipegs or the Reginas if either ran into stiff fighting, while also keeping the entire brigade in contact across a one-and-a-half-mile-wide front.
Despite the ease of the advance, Canadian Scottish Lieutenant Colonel Cabeldu was uneasy. “Rumours were running rampant through the ranks of the battalion that paratroopers were dropping. We were green troops in a strange land, therefore we believed everything that came our way.”22 Throughout the night, there had been numerous baseless reports over the Canadian wireless net that German paratroopers were being dropped to the rear of the forward battalions in an attempt to cut them off. At one point, the Sherbrooke Fusiliers came up on the net insisting that paratroops “had landed nearby but… were adequately handled by the infantry and our machine guns.”23 In the morning, no sign of phantom paratroops were found, but the reports of paratroop drops and fierce fights persisted.
The Canadian division’s radio communications were badly confused by German signallers, in possession of the radio code books captured along with the two Sherbrooke Fusilier officers during the night, interjecting with regular disinformation. 9 CIB’s Brigadier Ben Cunningham was so pestered by one German operator that he later commented on how “an interesting example of enemy ingenuity is afforded by the skill of a German wireless operator whose set was functioning on the brigade link to [the Sherbrooke Fusiliers.]” The German signaller “quickly adopted our wireless procedure, even to such details as: ‘Report my signals’ and ‘Say again all after… ’ His cleverness was annoying at the most, since it became difficult to know if wireless messages were being received, but his skill at mimicry was such that by the end of the day he could imitate the voice of Colonel [Mel] Gordon, OC [Sherbrooke Fusiliers.]”24
The sun soon rose high overhead and the heat became stifling as the Canadian Scottish, for want of a road running in the right direction, cut through grain fields. Captain P.F. Ramsay, second-in-command of ‘B’ Company, noted that “the yellow grain was almost waist high and the ground beneath dusty so that movement had to be cautious to prevent clouds of dust. Water discipline had to be maintained at a high level.” The wisdom of not raising dust that could betray their positions was rammed home when a German ME-109 fighter plane roared overhead, only to be pounced upon by a Spitfire. “We witnessed the first daylight air skirmish above us and an me came hurtling down in flames and a parachute blossomed out above us. A cocky young German pilot landed in the middle of the company,” Ramsay wrote.25 He was shunted off to battalion headquarters.
Although 7 CIB was moving forward quickly, the lead companies also anxiously expected at any moment to meet heavy resistance. As the men passed through small hamlets, local farmers generally offered up dire warnings along with copious helpings of calvados, a French apple brandy, and wine. At 0950 hours, Brigadier Foster radioed a report to Keller’s headquarters that the Winnipegs had just been advised by “local inhabitants” that “150 enemy” were massed in St. Croix Grand Tonne and were “in goodly number” at Brettevillel’Orgueilleuse.26 Both these villages were byways on the Caen-Bayeux highway, situated directly in front of the brigade’s line of advance.
Despite the grim cautions from locals, the Germans failed to materialize in any strength. ‘D’ Company continued brushing aside snipers that were more nuisances than effective opposition. At 1010 hours, Lieutenant Colonel John Meldram reported to Foster that Fulton’s men, having found St. Croix empty of enemy, were crossing the highway and pushing on to Putot-en-Bessin. He expected to have an advance platoon in the village within ten minutes. For the Winnipeg Rifles, Putot was their final objective—codenamed Oak—for D-Day. Exactly at 1020, Foster reported that this battalion had reached Oak and was concentrating there.27
Instead of trading bullets with a determined enemy, Fulton and his men were met by a mayor bent on celebrating the village’s liberation with “calvados he had saved for three or four years. So we drank to the victory.” Then Fulton said, “I’ve got to move now. I’ve got to take up a position just to
the side of the village.” When the mayor asked if there was anything further he could do for Fulton’s Canadians, the officer replied, “Well, we haven’t been eating that well. We’ve been aboard that ship for three or four days and eating British compo rations and we’ve always been short of eggs in England.”
“Do not worry,” the mayor declared. “There’s no shortage of eggs here.”
“Well, that’s nice if you want to deliver some eggs to us. But I need to move my company to our position now.” Breaking up the party, Fulton marched his men out to the left of Putot and ordered them to dig in. Within a couple of hours, the mayor and several villagers showed up with “a big washbasin filled with a thousand or so eggs that were hard-boiled. It was rather pleasant.”28
By this time, the rest of the battalion had arrived and Meldram deployed three companies forward and ‘B’ Company in reserve within the village. Guarding the left flank was Fulton’s ‘D’ Company, with ‘C’ Company to the immediate front of the village just back of the railroad, and ‘A’ Company to the right of Putot where a white limestone-coloured bridge provided a road crossing over the railway.29
Out on 7 CIB’s left flank, the Reginas had been neck and neck in the advance with the Winnipeg Rifles and each regiment would claim to be the winner. Foster credited the Manitoban regiment with this honour, while divisional headquarters diplomatically declared a tie.30 Unlike the Little Black Devils, the Reginas had advanced in two columns, with ‘C’ Company leading ‘A’ Company and battalion headquarters along a road running south from Camilly to Bretteville and from there across the highway and railroad tracks to seize Norrey-en-Bessin. ‘B’ Company, meanwhile, moved with ‘D’ Company in trail via Thaon to Vieux Cairon and then along the western bank of the River Mue through Rots to take up positions behind the railroad to the right of la Villeneuve. Matheson had split his battalion into two columns in order to sweep as much of the three-mile-wide gap between 7 CIB’s eastern flank and 9 CIB’s westernmost battalion as possible. Along the way, ‘D’ Company was to drop off and “occupy the road, rail and river crossing just south of Rots” in order to provide some semblance of flank protection. Even then, 7 CIB would be out on a salient with its left flank dangerously exposed.31
Because of this open flank, the Reginas had originally been expecting support from ‘C’ Squadron of the 1st Hussars Armoured Regiment. Needing first to resupply with ammunition and fuel, the tankers were unable to get on the road until mid-morning and then failed to link up with the fast-marching infantry. Unable to establish radio contact with the Saskatchewan battalion and unsure where in the open country it might be, ‘C’ Squadron’s commander finally ordered an about-face and rolled off towards the regimental harbour. He had only just turned the Shermans around when up came the nine tanks of ‘A’ Squadron and four tanks of ‘B’ Squadron that had managed to survive D-Day and had been pooled together into a composite unit, under command of Major Dudley Brooks. Determined to establish contact with the infantry, Brooks turned ‘C’ Squadron around and the entire force pressed on towards Bretteville.32 The tankers rolled up on the heels of ‘C’ Company just as it pushed into the village.
Matheson’s wisdom in having ‘B’ and ‘D’ companies guard the left flank was confirmed when they met fairly stiff opposition. While the rest of the battalion enjoyed “a very friendly reception” from the villagers of Bretteville, ‘B’ Company had to call upon the mortars of the Cameron Highlanders to convince a group of heavily entrenched Germans to fall back. Intermittent small firefights continued throughout the morning until the two companies reached their assigned positions at about noon.33
This was much later than ‘C’ Company’s arrival time at Norreyen-Bessin, a village that “consisted of a score of houses which straggled along a main street for 500 yards.” The street was actually a section of paved secondary road running through the village that linked it to St. Mauvieu, a mile to the south, and to le Mesnil-Patry, which lay just over a mile to the west. The road from Bretteville linked up to the street at Norrey’s old church, around which were three or four shops.”34 From the bell tower of this four-hundred-year-old church, a German sniper started snapping off rounds at the lead platoon as it moved into the village along the Bretteville road. ‘C’ Company responded and it seemed to Rifleman John Swityk that “everything available was shot at the tower until Major [Stu] Tubb told us to stop since we were only giving away our position. I think F.H. (Froze and Hungry) Smith got the sniper. We were assigned to clearing houses; then some of us found some wine… we drank beside our [antitank] gun, which was sighted to cover the open field beyond the hedge. We all really thought it was a picnic.”35
“Having been the first battalion in 21st Army Group to reach the final objective,” Matheson declared, “[the] Regina Rifles were determined to hold it.” Whichever 7 CIB battalion was first on the objective, the fact remained that this brigade was ahead of any other brigade in the Allied invasion force. Second British Army commander General Miles Dempsey acknowledged this fact in a message to Keller that read: “A battalion of 3 Canadian Division was the first unit in the Second Army to reach the final objective. That is something which you will always remember with pride.”36
Sandwiched between these two battalions, the Canadian Scottish moved into Secqueville-en-Bessin and Cabeldu quickly got his four companies fanned out in a defensive arc south of it, which extended from immediately south of the village eastwards to where a low ridge bordered the River Chiromme opposite Bray. Orders issued, the lieutenant colonel then happily sat down in a farmhouse at 1330 hours and dug into a late breakfast prepared for him by the battalion quartermaster that consisted of “eggs and calvados (straight) to drink. I didn’t know whether I liked it or not.”37
From his position on the battalion’s left flank, ‘B’ Company’s Captain Ramsay thought Bray was “an insignificant conglomeration of barns and stone buildings with stone walls around some of them.” On the opposite side of the village, just beyond a dense wood, Ramsay could hear the growl of engines and squeal of steel tracks that told him some of the 105-millimetre self-propelled Priests being used by the division’s artillery regiments were moving into their assigned position, codenamed “Norah.”38
The 13th Canadian Field Regiment’s war diarist noted that “the gun position at Bray was most satisfactory and defensively ideal with a good tank killing ground forward.” All would have been well, he figured, had the regiment been occupying the position alone and able to develop an all-round defensive perimeter. Unfortunately, good artillery positions were in short supply amid the broken farm country and small woods dominating the area near the Caen-Bayeux highway, so divisional headquarters had also ordered 12th Field Regiment and two batteries of Centaurs seconded to it from the Royal Marines to crowd into the same space. “The result,” wrote the war diarist, “being a dangerously cramped group position without any advantage of perimeter fire!”39
There was good reason to be concerned about this, he thought, for as the afternoon progressed, many German troops that had been passed undetected by the infantry during their rapid advance began to emerge from hiding. Most were scattered remnants from the 716th Infantry Division, who could do little more than snipe at the gunners with rifles and light machine guns. But there was also a worrisome increase in the rate of German mortar and artillery fire falling on the gun position and beginning to harry 7 CIB’s infantry battalions. “The regiment is being constantly annoyed by snipers, mortars, 88-millimetre airbursts, and machine guns,” the 13th’s war diarist wrote. Combined with news that 8 CIB’s North Shore (New Brunswick) Regiment was locked in a bloody slugfest in front of Douvres-la-Délivrande radar station and confused reports that 9 CIB had stepped into the middle of a major German counterattack, a grim fight seemed imminent. But he was reassured by the fact that “an absolute determination to stand on the line come ‘Hell or high water’ was evident in all ranks.”40
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Performance Most Creditable
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nbsp; WHILE 7TH CANADIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE enjoyed relatively easy passage to its objectives on June 7, the 8th Canadian Infantry Brigade’s North Shore (New Brunswick) Regiment stepped into a hornet’s nest minutes after moving out from Tailleville towards the radar station. Situated just west of Douvres-la-Délivrande, the radar station was heavily fortified with two strong-points surrounded by minefields and barbed wire. Six 50-millimetre guns, sixteen machine guns, and three heavy mortars gave the position formidable firepower, and its Luftwaffe operating and defence force of about 230 men had been greatly strengthened the night before by most of 1st Company of the 192nd Panzer Grenadier Regiment and several self-propelled guns.1 This element of the 21st Panzer Division had participated in the desperate counterattack launched on the evening of June 6 into the wide gap between the Canadians at Juno and the British at Sword. When the attack collapsed in disarray, this company and its supporting armour had become separated, eventually taking refuge within the radar station’s defensive network. The presence of the crack Panzer Grenadiers stiffened the backbone of the Luftwaffe garrison, which was trained more to provide security to prevent sabotage by the French underground than to fight Allied troops.
