by Mark Zuehlke
Although the Canadian paratroops didn’t know it, their decisive counterstrike against the two grenadier regiments meant that most of the 346th Grenadier Division were still reorganizing on the morning of June 9 and so unable to launch an offensive alongside 21st Panzer Division at Escoville. Once again, a failure on the part of German divisional and regimental commanders to communicate intentions clearly had resulted in attacks being launched piecemeal, with nothing achieved but the spilling of blood on both sides.
The June 8 fighting also bought 1st Canadian Parachute Battalion a relative lull in combat the following day, which the men took advantage of to try getting a bit of rest. On ‘C’ Company’s front line, Corporal Dan Hartigan envied those who could easily find sleep despite the distant sounds of war. As evening settled in on June 9, temperatures remained warm, and the corporal watched wearily as “flares coursed into the sky… The crump-crump-crump of sporadic artillery fire chilled the lonely, sleepless senses of the infantrymen.”22
PART THREE
SLUGGING MATCHES:
D+4 TO D+6
[ 17 ]
Getting Nowhere
DURING THE NIGHT of June 9–10, Major General Rod Keller’s headquarters bustled with activity while staff drafted plans aimed at closing the gap between its two leading brigades, as well as establishing firm control over all ground north of the Caen-Bayeux highway. As these plans were developed, the officers started looking beyond the highway, with a mind to carrying out an armoured thrust from the Bretteville-l’Orgueilleuse strongpoint to occupy a steep hill immediately south of Cheux that dominated the surrounding country. In the original invasion plan, 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade was to have cleared both the village and hill as its last action on D-Day. But the brigade’s three fighting regiments had come up well short of this objective due to problems getting ashore and then stiff resistance met throughout the inland advance.
The 1st Hussars and Fort Garry Horse regiments, which had landed close behind the assaulting infantry battalions, had experienced heavy losses among their squadrons equipped with the experimental amphibious duplex-drive Sherman tank. Many of these self-propelled tanks had foundered in the rough seas, while others were immobilized or sunk by mines and beach obstacles. Once ashore, the tankers were exposed on the open stretches of sand, facing antitank guns that were dug into concrete pillboxes. Even when the beach was taken, the tanks were badly delayed heading inland due to the difficulty of getting over or around the steep seawalls. During the inland advance, the armoured regiments had been forced to crawl along at the pace of the infantry, who were often driven to ground by well-concealed machine-gun positions. To press on alone without the infantry was to risk being knocked out by fire from equally well-hidden antitank guns and Grenadiers firing Panzerfausts—shoulder-fired antitank weapons. By day’s end on June 6, tank losses within 2 CAB’s regiments had reached a state of crisis, with the 1st Hussars and Fort Garry Horse mustering barely half their strength.
But now Keller believed the time had come when tanks could regain the initiative on the battlefield and achieve the D-Day objectives. He summoned 2 CAB’s Brigadier Bob Wyman and instructed him to put together two operational plans for his tanks, whereby one regiment participated in clearing the Mue valley to the highway while another broke out of Bretteville and secured what was dubbed the Cheux hill feature.1
Having gone through the Sicily invasion and up the Italian boot to Ortona as the brigadier of 1st Canadian Armoured Brigade, Wyman had the most battle experience of all Keller’s brigadiers. During the fight for Ortona, he had drawn the ire of 1st Canadian Infantry Division’s Major General Chris Vokes for a perceived hesitance to fully support operations with his tank regiments. Vokes had been so angry at the conclusion of the December 1943 fighting he had made it known to Eighth Army headquarters staff that he would welcome the replacement of 1 CAB as the division’s armoured support by any British tank brigade. As the British considered 1 CAB the finest tank brigade in Eighth Army’s complement, the staff quickly removed it from Vokes, retaining it as a fire brigade to send to whatever division most needed tank assistance.
Vokes had almost immediate cause to regret his hasty outburst when Wyman was assigned to a stint in England on the First Canadian Army staff as brigadier of Royal Artillery, and 1 CAB received a new brigadier that the notoriously outspoken divisional commander greatly respected. He did not, however, miss Wyman, who he considered “a bull-headed guy, a little lord unto himself.” That he believed Wyman felt that infantry but not tanks were expendable only fuelled his disdain for the man.2
Wyman’s time at First Canadian Army headquarters was short, for once it was confirmed that 3 CID would be among the invasion assault divisions he was appointed to command 2 CAB. The division’s Deputy Adjutant and Quarter Master General Lieutenant Colonel Ernest Côté particularly appreciated Wyman’s tough, no-nonsense approach. On the first day ashore, when Keller sometimes appeared uncertain of what to do, Wyman was often at his shoulder providing advice based on his combat experience. Such advice, Côté noted, was “appreciated” by the divisional commander.3
Because the armour was expected to carry out these two operations in a bold dash, Wyman and his regimental commanders were placed in control, with the assigned infantry acting under their direction. This would be the combat debut for the division in an operation where infantry supported and were directed by tankers. During all earlier operations, the infantry brigadiers or their battalion commanders had had authority to assign specific supporting roles to the tankers, even those that saw the tanks ranging ahead of the foot soldiers.
This infantry-dominant command structure reflected standard Western Allied doctrine. Tanks were normally intended to act as well-armoured and highly mobile forward-based gun platforms capable of backing up advancing infantry at close quarters. This view was a major cause of the Allied failure to upgrade the Sherman tank in either firepower or armour thickness to enable it to engage in tank-versus-tank battle against German Tigers and Panthers. The only major improvement offered Commonwealth tankers by the time of the invasion was the provision of one 17-pounder fitted Firefly tank to each troop, which gave the unit a powerful antitank capability. But no thought had been given to equipping all Shermans with the heavier gun because the 75-millimetre was judged a better weapon for delivering high-explosive, armour-piercing, and phosphorous rounds at close range in support of infantry. The Americans showed no interest at all—dismissing the Firefly as unnecessary—in increasing the main gun power of the Sherman. Instead, they adopted a doctrine of putting enough tanks on the ground to ensure they outnumbered German armour.
For the forthcoming two Canadian assaults, however, there could be no assurance that the Shermans would enjoy anything close to superior armoured mass. Keller could give little intelligence to Wyman with regard to the number or dispositions of enemy units operating in the Mue valley or between Bretteville and the Cheux hill feature. Whatever his failings might have been in the Mediterranean, Wyman had demonstrated no hesitance in committing his three tank regiments to battle either during the assault landings or the drive inland. The result was that all three regiments were still badly depleted by the heavy losses suffered. Although the personnel of 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade Workshop worked tirelessly to repair tanks as fast as they were recovered and new armour was delivered to the front as soon as it arrived on the beach, the rebuilding efforts were frustrated by continuing high daily losses. Crews were also badly depleted, although there were generally spare tankers sitting around at the regimental headquarters for lack of Shermans.
By the end of June 9, the situation had worsened significantly. On June 7, the brigade’s first post-landing operational tank status report showed 115 Shermans fit for action, with 21 to be ready in twenty-four hours, and 36 knocked completely out. Among the fit Shermans, the Firefly model numbered 17 fit, 3 on the to-be-fit roster, and none knocked out. As for Stuart Honeys, 15 were fit, 3 to be fit, and 6 knocked out.4
&nb
sp; At the end of June 9, the brigade reported only 112 Shermans still fit for a fight, with one Sherman scheduled for service in twenty-four hours. This despite having lost only 11 Shermans in battle that day. Of the fit Shermans, 13 were Firefly models, and no more of these would be available for twenty-four hours. Of those lost during the day, three were Fireflies.5
Wyman’s immediate concern was to get as many functioning tanks as possible up to the regiments that were to carry out the two-phased operation. To speed the process of moving tanks from the beach landing sites or 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade’s Workshop, he issued immediate orders for all regiments to send back “all tank crews for which tanks are presently lacking.” Only three or four surplus tankers were to remain on hand to replace men who became unfit for duty. Those sent to the rear were cobbled into crews and assigned to the next available Sherman.6
He also ordered the workshop to pull out the stops and get as many Shermans operational as possible before dawn of June 11. By mid-afternoon on June 10, the workshop was able to report to brigade headquarters that it would have “11 tanks ready for return to units tonight.” Unfortunately, only two were destined to a regiment tasked with the attack.
On June 9, the 1st Hussars had thirty-five Shermans mounting 75-millimetre guns and six with 17-pounders, and had been promised two more 75-millimetre Shermans by the end of June 10. The Fort Garry Horse could field only thirty-four regular Shermans and four Fireflys. The Sherbrooke Fusiliers would not participate in the forthcoming attacks as this regiment was the most depleted, having lost most of its strength in the desperate Authie-Buron battle of June 7. By June 9, it still had only twenty-seven fit-to-fight 75-millimetre Shermans and three Fireflys. The Sherbrookes would be the division’s armoured reserve when the other two regiments went into action. Wyman bulked it up by sending nine fit-to-fight tanks its way.7
Wyman assigned the job of taking Cheux to the 1st Hussars, and clearing the Mue valley to the Fort Garry Horse. When Lieutenant Colonel Ray Colwell heard this news, he was still so short of both tanks and manpower that his 1st Hussars could only field two squadrons rather than the normal three. Colwell pleaded for reinforcements, and Wyman promised to see what was possible. He assured the worried officer that he would not commit the regiment into action until June 12. Between now and then, the brigadier said the 1st Hussars should make use of the time to “get as much rest as possible for tank crews, who are thoroughly tired out.”8
Keller, Wyman, and their respective staffs spent the first part of the day working out a general operational plan. The divisional commander informed the brigadier that the 1st Hussars would be accompanied in their attack by the Queen’s Own Rifles, while No. 46 Royal Marine Commando supported the Fort Garry Horse. Wyman and his people next got to work laying out the full sequence and timing schedules for each assault to attain a series of waypoints en route to the final objective.
At 2100 hours, Wyman held an information conference during which he briefed regimental staffs. Wyman told the assembled officers that the 1st Hussars, supported by the Queen’s Own and probably two troops of self-propelled antitank guns, would advance across six miles of ground from Bretteville to the Cheux hill feature on the division’s right flank. This would happen on June 12. On June 11, the Fort Garry Horse, he said, would “make good an intermediate objective,” by clearing the Mue valley from Vieux Cairon through to la Villeneuve. Once this hamlet was taken, the tenuous hold that the Regina Rifles had on Norrey-en-Bessin south of the Caen-Bayeux highway would be much more secure, enabling the village garrison to support the 1st Hussars and Queen’s Own Rifles during their ensuing assault. The Fort Garry force was to reach la Villeneuve by “last light.” The Canadian division would be free by June 13 to begin advancing in force south of the Caen-Bayeux highway to align with the long thrust into the German defences that the 1st Hussars and Queen’s Own would have won on the 12th.9
The attack by 2 CAB, Wyman understood, would loosely coincide with a planned major operation by the British 7th Armoured Division through the 50th Infantry Division towards Villers-Bocage. This was the first phase of General Bernard Montgomery’s flanking offensive from the right towards Caen. The 50th Division would also put in an assault to the left of Cheux between Cristot and Tilly-sur-Seulles. While the British and Canadian operations were not coordinated, they might strain the Germans’ ability to concentrate reserves to stem a massed assault developing over a couple of days across a broad front. Wyman had no information, though, on the specific timing Second Army had set out for the beginning of the 7th Armoured Division–50th Infantry Division offensive. He only knew that it was to occur sometime in the next few days. So it was likely that by the time the British offensive began, 2 CAB would have already cleared the Mue and be established at Cheux, enabling the Canadians to anchor 50th Division’s left flank as it and the 7th Division pivoted eastwards once Tilly and Villers-Bocage were taken.
WHILE WYMAN was carrying out his briefing on the night of June 10, Second British Army commander General Sir Miles Dempsey was ironing out final details with his own staff for Montgomery’s twopincer scheme. Originally, the operation was to have involved not only 7th Armoured Division’s major thrust west of Caen, but also a matching effort by the 51st Highland Division striking out from 6th Airborne Division’s perimeter east of Caen. Dempsey’s hopes to execute the operation in this manner were frustrated early on June 10 by German counterattacks against the paratroops.
The major thrust of these attacks launched by the 346th Grenadier Division was to achieve a breakout from the centre of a dangerous inward bend in the airborne division lines at Bréville, less than two miles from Ranville and Pegasus Bridge. This deep indentation in the airborne division’s lines had existed since the close of battle on June 6, when the casualty-riddled British 9th Parachute Battalion had been unable to eliminate the German defenders holding Bréville. While Bréville was the focal point on June 10, the paratroops holding the line all along le Plein–Bois de Bavent ridge were subjected to heavy artillery fire and sporadic probes by infantry seeking to exploit any weak point.
At le Mesnil crossroads, 1st Canadian Parachute Battalion was hammered repeatedly by shellfire, probed by patrols, and harassed by continuous sniper fire. Over the course of June 9–10, two strictly defensive days, the Canadians had sixteen casualties, of which six were fatal. This represented 4 per cent of the total Canadian strength at le Mesnil, which “indicated just how severe the results could be when a methodical, calculating and efficient enemy put their long experience to work,” noted paratrooper Corporal Dan Hartigan. “On an attack day casualties were to be expected. On a defensive day they seemed less necessary and so all the sadder.” It was obvious to the men holding the line that the battalion’s combat ability was being slowly whittled away.10
Gravely concerned that 6th Airborne Division’s grinding attrition rates jeopardized its ability to hold the lodgement east of the River Orne, I British Corps commander Lieutenant General John Crocker decided the 51st Division should take over responsibility for the southern half of the perimeter. He also placed 5th Battalion, The Black Watch, under 6th Airborne Division command, as part of its 9th Battalion, with specific orders to eliminate the Bréville inward bend on June 11.11 Although necessary, the commitment of the 51st Division to stabilizing the front east of the Orne meant it would be unable to carry out Montgomery’s left-hand pincer movement in anything more than a localized manner.
Unaware of Crocker’s decision, 2 CAB Brigadier Wyman and his staff were badly hobbled on June 10 by a lack of intelligence on the strength or composition of German forces in either the Mue valley or south of the Caen-Bayeux highway opposite 7th Canadian Infantry Brigade’s front. Vigorous reconnaissance patrolling was ordered in both of these areas, with little success. The North Nova Scotia Highlanders attempted to slip a patrol into Vieux Cairon, but it was quickly pinned down by fire from the Germans holding there and had to withdraw without learning anything of value. Meanwhile, the Stormont, D
undas and Glengarry Highlanders pushed a patrol out towards Buron, which they found to be heavily occupied. Bypassing the village, the patrol pressed on towards Authie but turned back about halfway because of heavy German activity in the area. The Highland Light Infantry carried out a patrol to the east of the division’s area of operations that failed to find either British or German troops.12
While patrols beyond the Canadian front lines were coming up dry, this was not the case for one small unauthorized patrol in friendly territory. The North Novas were still recovering from the debacle of June 7 and taking fresh casualties every day from the persistent shelling as well as patrols that the 9 CIB battalions were sending out on a nightly basis. On June 10, the arrival of a fresh draft of officers to replace those lost in the fighting led to a reorganization of the battalion and the re-imposition of a higher level of discipline. The men were ordered to shave and wash, but also treated to a welcome addition of an egg for breakfast. Then they were ordered to get what rest was possible.
A few enterprising troops, however, took the opportunity to stand down from sentry duty and explore the farm buildings near their position. In one, a 750-gallon barrel of wine was discovered in the basement. Word was quickly sent out and a large group of North Novas queued up in the cellar to fill canteens only to have, lamented the battalion war diarist, “the ‘dirty new adjutant’ stop them and place a guard on it.”13
While things were quieting down somewhat on 9 CIB’s front, snipers remained a persistent problem for the Canadian Scottish holding Putot-en-Bessin. The Germans were based in a strongpoint in a woods south of the railroad between Brouay and Putot. This same position posed a threat to both 7 CIB’s right flank security and also the forthcoming attack, as the 1st Hussars must pass through le Mesnil-Patry, only about a mile to the east. For these reasons, brigade ordered the strongpoint eliminated. Lieutenant Colonel Fred Cabeldu decided to wait until after dark to send a fighting patrol into the wood to wipe out the Germans, but in the meantime wanted to rid the area around his perimeter of snipers. Captain J.D.M. “Doug” Gillan offered to take some men outside the perimeter in his platoon’s Bren carriers and carry out a sweep of the area with the intent of deliberately drawing fire, determining the location of each sniper, and then killing him. As Gillan was explaining his idea, Captain Harold Gonder of the Cameron Highlanders’ No. 5 Platoon volunteered a couple of carriers mounting Vickers heavy machine guns. These guns were fitted to a pintle that enabled them to be fired perpendicularly—perfect for blasting snipers out of trees.
